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Rev. W. H. WITMROW, M.A., D.D., F.R.S.C. 




Vol. XVII. 







Development of Military Science 



Lecturer in History at Cambridge University. Author of "The Thirty Years' 

War," "Modern England," "Modern France," "England and Xapo- 

leon in 1S03" "A History of England," 4 Vols.," Life of 

George Eliot," "Dante's Life and Works," " Life of 

Peter the Great." Etc. 

London, Toronto, Philadelphia 



Eatered, according to Act of Congress, in the Year One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and One. by the Bradley-Garretson Co., Limited, in the Office 
of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 

Entered, accordiDg to .\ct of Parliament of Canada, in the Year One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and One, by the Bradley-Garretson Co., Limited, 
in the Office of the Minister of Agriculture. 

All Rights Reserved. 




"No account of the Nineteenth Century would be 
complete without a narrative of its wars which are 
not inferior in interest to any which History records. 
The campaigns of I^apoleon are not only replete with 
instruction for the military student, but are full of 
striking dramatic incidents, and from the marvellous 
personality of the principal actor in them exercise a 
fascination over the mind of the reader independent 
of his sympathies. The War of Secession in 
America touches us nearly both from the science 
and heroism displayed in it, and from the fact that 
the two combatants were of the same race and 
language, while the great War of 1870 must remain 
for many years the classical example of every branch 
of the military art. 

It is humiliating to reflect that after so many cen- 
turies of civilisation war should still hold so largo 
a place in the annals of a nation, but although war 
is the cause of incalculable suffering and the product 
of passion and folly, yet it gives abundant op- 
portunity for endurance and self-devotion, and is the 
parent of many of the noblest qualities of man. In 
the nineteenth century we may at least comfort our- 
selves with the contemplation of long periods of peace. 
The present work contains the history of no war 



between 1815 and 1854, and there is a long stretcli 
of peace between 1878 and 1898. Undoubtedly, 
also, in the progress of military science wars tend to 
become short, and a Thirty Years' War, or even a 
Seven Years' War, is hardly possible in our time. 

The present writer has had to cover a large field in 
a small compass. He has endeavoured to make his 
book intelligible to those unfamiliar with professional 
military phraseology, and for this reason he has 
preferred to indicate the progress of military science 
rather b^- what is implied in the narrative than by a 
special treatment which could hardly fail to be- 
come unduly technical. His qualifications for the 
task he has undertaken are, mainly, that for many 
years he has given great attention to the campaigns 
of Xapoleon, and that the later wars which he has. 
described have fallen within his own recollection. 
Schoolfellows of his oaati fought in the Crimea, and 
the succeeding struggles of the century recall to him 
many personal details with an acute vividness. 
Without pretending to original research, he has en- 
deavoured to follow the best authorities witih judg- 
ment and impartiality. The greater part of the 
book was written at Berne, which possesses one of 
the best military libraries in Switzerland, that of 
the General Staff, and the warmest thanks of the 
author are due to the Federal authorities by whose 
courtesy he was allowed to borrow books from its 


Kino's College, Cambridoe. 








Bonaparte as First Consul.— His Letter to King George 
in. of England.— Bonaparte's March on Italy.— The 
Difficulties Encountered during the March.— Arrival of 
the French Troops at the Hospice.— The Condition of 
the Troops.— Napoleon's Advance Stopped by the Fort 
of Bard.— Bernkopf Tricked 1 



Bonaparte's Entrance into Milan and How he was Re- 
ceived.— Genoa Captured by the Austrians and their 
Subsequent Defeat.— The Battle of Montebello and Re- 
sults.— Afraid Melas would Escape Him 'J 



Me-las Explains the Condition of Affairs to his Brother 
Gei:erals.— How the Austrian Army was Composed.— 
The v'rench Driven Back.— Where the Hardest Struggle 
Took Place.— The Austrians Gain Marengo.— The Ap- 




pearance of Bonaparte.— The French Again Driven Back. 
— The Arrival of Desaix and Subsequent Defeat of the 
Austriuns. — Death of Desaix. — Bonaparte's grief 13 



French Success in Small Engagements. — How Moreau 
Drove Kraj' North. — The Meeting of Joseph Bonaparte 
and Cobentzel at Luneville. — Bonaparte's Conditions of 
Peace. — The Austrians Reject the Terms 20 



The War Renewed. — Wliere Bonaparte's Armies were 
Posted. — Disastrous Retreat. — A Figlit in tlie Woods. — 
The Danube Valley and the Tvrol Surrendere<l to the 
French. — Macdonald's Marvellous Passage of the Splii- 
gen 24 






Napoleon Crowned Emperor. — His Scheme for the Inva- 
sion of England. — How it Failed. — How the French 
Soldiers were Exercised for the Purpose of Invading. — 
Avenging the Disgrace of Six Hundred Years. — Cowar- 
dice of a French Admiral and its Effect 29 



Napoleon's Anger. — His Plan of the Campaign of 1805 
Against the Austrians and the Russians. — The Plan of 



the Allies. — How the French Army was Mobilized. — The 
Austrians' Mistake and Weakness. — How the French 
Deceived their Enemy. — Like the Rabbit Before the 
Cobra.— The Battle of Elchingen.— A Triumph of Military 
Skill.— How Pitt Received the News of the Defeat of the 
Austrians at Ulm 35 



Napoleon's March on Vienna. — The Dangers and Difficul- 
ties to be Encountered. — French Success. — How Napo- 
leon Acted. — His Plan for the Entering of Vienna 
Spoilt by Murat's Impatience. — The Frencli Suffer 
Heavy Losses. — Napoleon's Delight at their Defence. — 
His Anger with Murat.— How the Tabor Bridge was 
Won. — What Proved Kutusov's Ruin. — The Russians 
Determine to Attack the French , 46 



Napoleon's Position. — How he Invigorated the Courage 
of the Army. — Before the Battle. — The Austrian Gen- 
eral's Elaborate Plan of Battle. — Its Failure. — How the 
Battle of Austerlitz was Fought.— Napoleon Surveys 
the Enemy's Movements. — The Tactics of the Allied 
Forces. — Napoleon's Counter Moves. — How the Allied 
Army was Cut in Two. — The Composition of the French 
Army and How it was Armed 53 



Napoleon's Aim and What he Did. — The Mobilization of 
the Prussian Army and What it was Composed of. — A 
Contrast. — An Ultimatum to France. — French Victor- 
ies—Napoleon's Plan.— The French Defend Bravely. — 
Withstood the Assault of a Thousand Cavalry. — Destruc- 
tion of the Prussian Army. — Napoleon Enters Berlin. . . 60 





Napoleon Threatens to Extiuguisli Prussia.— Prussia Raises 
Another Army.— Summoning the Poles to Freedom. — 
Napoleon Enters Warsaw. — Benningsen's Bold Move. — 
Napoleon Determines to Fight a Decisive Battle. — The 
Position of the Rival Armies. — Napoleon's Situation 
Critical. — The King of Prussia Refuses Napoleon's Offer 
of Peace. — Determines to Crush the Enemy 69 


THE WAR OF 1809. 



Austria's Desire to Wipe out the Disgrace of the Treaty 
of Pressburg. — Reorganization of the Austrian Army. 
— Tlie Austrians Surprise Napoleon. — Wliat Napoleon 
Did to Raise Troops. — Napoleon's Scheme. — Archduke 
Charles Crosses the Isar and his Plan of Campaign. — 
The Battle of Abensberg and its Object.— The Battle of 
Landshut. — The French Gain Ratisbon 75 



Napoleon Drives the Austrian Troops Before Him. — The 
Battle of Ebelsberg. — A Useless Sacrifice . — The Situation 
of the Invaders. — Napoleon Crosses the Danube. — The 
French Suffer a Heavy Defeat at Aspern. — Napoleon 
Worsted for the Second Time — His Retreat Across the 
Danube 82 



t^apoleon's Plan of Defence.— An Impregnable Citadel. — 



The Austrian's Opinion of Napoleon's Intentions.— His 
Preparation for a Big Battle.— How he Crossed the 
River «9 



The French once more Cross the River.— How the French 
Advanced on Enzersdorf.— The Position of the Austri- 
ans.— The Two Generals before the Battle.— How Napo- 
leon Surveyed the Battle.— The Peace of Vienna and 
End of the Campaign 93 



The DiflFerent Branches of the Military Service of the 
World and How they Fought.- The Different Methods 
of Fighting '•'8 





Napoleon's Desire to Force Russia into a Closer Observ- 
ance of the Continental System.— Napoleon Wishes to 
Call Back into Life Italy and Spain.— The Greatest 
Military Enterprise of the World.— Emperor Alex- 
ander Issues a Proclamation.— The Effect of Russian 
Weather on the French Army. — Napoleon's Movements. 
—The Russians Retire, Devastating the Country.— Fail- 
ure of Napoleon's Plan.— His Entrance into Smolensk. 
—The Successes of his Generals. — Napoleon's Entrance 
into Vilna.— Balashov and Napoleon — 104 





The March upon Mosccnv.— The French Suffer through 
Lack of Food and Water. — Kutusov Commands the 
Russians.— What the French Saw when they Arrived 
at the Kolotza. — Tlie Simple Plans. — Heavy Losses, 
70,000 Dead and Wounded 113 



The Goal of their Wanderings. — How the French Found 
Moscow. — The Burning of Moscow. — Why Alexander 
Refused to Negotiate for Peace. — Napoleon Determines 
to Leave Moscow. — The Battle of Maloyaroslavetz as 
the Turning Point of Napoleon's Career. — Napoleon 
Abandons the Project of Retreating by Kaluga. — How 
Napoleon Found Borodino. — ^The State of the French 
Army. — Soldiers Dying from Fatigue. — The Retreat on 
Smolensk. — The Hardships Encountered. — The Disas- 
ters to Napoleon's Armies 117 



The Russians Determined to Intercept the Retreat of the 
Great Army. — How Eugene Reached Krasnoe.— A 
Needless Act of Barbarity. — The Condition of the 
French. — What the Remnant of Invaders had to Deal 
with. — Working Up to their Shoulders in Icy W^ater. 
— The French Attacked on Both Sides of the Stream. — 
A Panic 123 



The Cold Intense. — The Destruction of Life Terribly 
Rapid. — Napoleon Determines to Leave the Army and 
Hasten to Paris. — He Narrowly Escapes Capture. — Not 
Recognizable. — The Soldiers Reduced to Despair. — 



Killed by the Cossacks and Peasants.— Nothing Com- 
parable to the Catastrophe of this Campaign. — The Dis- 
appearance of Half a Million Human Beings. — At- 
tempted the Impossible and Failed 128 


THE WAR OF 1813. 



Napoleon Works with as Great Energy as Ever. — Had to 
Drain the Resources of his Empire Even to Exhaus- 
tion. — How he Raised his Army. — Lacking in Material 
Resources. — The Patriotic Zeal of the Prussians. — Mur- 
murs of Revolt from the Rhine to the Elbe. — What 
Napoleon Lost through the Russian Campaign. — The 
Advance of the Allies. — Napoleon's Strength and his 
Design. — Bliicher Retakes Rahna. — Bliicher Forced to 
Retire. — Both Sides Claim the Victory 131 



Napoleon Follows the Allied Armies to Dresden. — His 
Entrance and Presentation with the Keys. — Feared 
Assassination. — The German Elbe in the Hands of Napo- 
leon. — To Deal a Fresh Blow on the Allies. — The Head- 
quarters of the Tliree Chiefs. — The Battle Becomes Gen- 
eral. — The Position of the Rival Armies. — Ney does not 
Carry out Napoleon's Orders. — The Armistice of Plei- 
switz 139 



Napoleon Superintends the Armies of his Dominions. — 
What Napoleon Possessed upon the Elbe and his 



Strength. — His Plan to Recover his Former Position. — 
The Force of the Allies and their Plan. — Napoleon's 
Forces. — He Receives News of an Attack on Dresden. — 
Unlieard-of Rapidity.— The Cry of Anguish Loud and 
Bitter.— How the Battle was Fought.— Napoleon Sur- 
veys the Ground from a Tower.— A Colossal Figure 144 



The Allies' Successful Plan.— The Emperor's Mistake. — 
Bliicher's Victor}-. — Disastrous French Retreat. — Napo- 
leon's Dreaded Attack. — Failure of his Design to Seize 
Berlin. — The Grand Army Reduced to One-half.— Con- 
tents Himself with a Defensive Position. — How He 
Placed his Forces.— The Plan of the Allied Forces.— 
Napoleon Forced to Quit Dresden 151 



A Six Days' Battle.— Called the Battle of the Nations.— 
Napoleon's Arrival at Leipzig. — A Violent Cavalry En- 
gagement.— Preparation for the Main Conflict. — Napo- 
leon's Plan of Attack.— A French Cavalry Charge.— A 
Russian Regiment Absolutely Annihilated. — The Main 
Charge Ineffective.— Napoleon's Pride would not Allow 
Him to Make this Confession of Failure.— A Furious 
Salvo of Artillery.— The King of Saxony Declared a Pris- 
oner of War.— The Empire of Napoleon at an End. . .. 1.5G 




To Subdue England.— To Form a Confederation of Latin 
Races under the Leadership of France.— What was 



Necessary. — What Napoleou Called upon the Govern- 
ment of Lisbon to do.— Not Unwilling so Long as their 
Co-operation did not Imply a Breach with England. — 
How Portugal was to be Partitioned. — The House of 
Braganza Ceases to Reign. — A Revolution Breaks Out. 
— Napoleon Throws off the Mask. — Insurrection in 
Madrid. — Napoleon's first Great Check. — The Battle of 
Vimiero 161 



Napoleon Determines to Take the Affairs of the Peninsula 
into his Own Hands. — He Crosses the Frontier.— ^Ney to 
Follow Castanos and Not to Leave a Man of his Army 
Alive. — Napoleon's Orders. — He Attacks the Enemy's 
Position. — A Panic Seizes the Spanish Troops. — Austria 
Arming. — Napoleon's Resolution. — The English Retreat. 
— Death of Sir John Moore 168 



The War was not of Such a Nature that it Could be Ter- 
minated by Victories. — The French Harassed by the Con- 
tinual Attacks of the Guerilleros. — The Siege of Sara- 
gossa. — The Corpses Filled the Cellars and Choked the 
Streets. — Capitulation a Matter of Necessity. — The 
French Moved by Pity. — French Generals Unable to Act 
Together. — Their Ambition. — The Duty Imposed upon 
Soult by Napoleon. — Why Victories Meant but Little. . 178 



Soult's Dream of Perfect Security. — The English Surprise 
Soult. — His Retreat Disastrous. — Wellesley Determines 
to Carry the War to Spain. — Wellesley's March on Tala- 
vera. — Assailed by the United French Armies. — A Fierce 
Bayonet Charge Hurls the Enemy Down the Hill. — 



Raised the Military Reputation of England to a Height 
Which it had Never Reached Since the Campaign of 
Marlborough. — Wellington's Warning Unheeded and 
the Result. — The Tactics of the French Generals. — Na- 
poleon Changes his System in Spain 178 



Wellington Retires Before Massena. — The Position Wel- 
lington Took up Behind Coinibra. — How the French At- 
tacked the English Position. — How they were Met by 
the Defenders. — The English Forced to Retreat. — The 
Celebrated Lines of Torres Vedras. — What they Consist- 
ed of. — Hoped to have Driven the English to their 
Ships. — Massena Obliged to Retreat. — Massena Once 
More Attacks Wellington. — The English Made a Gallant 
Resistance. — Massena Returns to France in Disgrace. — 
The Battle of Albuera 183 



Marshal Marmont Keeps Guard over the Frontier. — Wel- 
lington Driven from Badajoz.— Wellington Retires into 
Portugal.— A Note of 111 Omen.— Mortal Hatred between 
Soult and Marmont.— The Fortress of Badajoz.— Ex- 
tremely Formidable.— One of the Most Thrilling Chap- 
ters in Military History. —The Assault on the Breaches.— 
Belched Forth its Hideous Artillery.— How the Broken 
Parapets had been Retrenched.— The English Obtain the 
Fortress.— In Front of Salamanca.— How Wellington 
was Received.— The Position of the Battle-field and the 
Fight 187 



Wellington Pursues Clausel.— Wellington's Efforts to Cap- 
ture Burgos Castle Unsuccessful. — The Blame of Failure 



Laid on Soult.— Obliged to Recall a Number of Officers 
and Seasoned Soldiers.— How the Battle of Vittoria was 
Fought.— Joseph Recalled to France in Disgrace and 
Placed under Arrest.— Wellington Narrowly Escapes 
Capture,— Pamplona Surrenders to Wellington.— The 
End of the Peninsular War 194 

THE WAR OF 1814. 



Napoleon's Position after the Battle of Leipzig.— No 
Energy to Resist these Invasions. — Lost the Power of 
Initiative.— The Object of the Armies of Bohemia and 
Silesia.— Napoleon Worked with all the Resources of his 
Energy.— Defending the Soil of his Country Against 
the Pollution of an Invading Foe.— How Napoleon 
Thought to Supply the Deficiency.— The Design of 
Schwarzenberg and Bliicher.— Strength of the Imperial 
Army.— Napoleon's Plan of Attack.— Forced to Retreat. 
—The Invaders Determine to March on Paris.— How Na- 
poleon Defeated Bliicher's Troops.— Cut them Down and 
Huddled them up in Confusion.— Napoleon's Intentions. 
—The Allies' Grand Army Arranged in Order of Battle. 
—The General Position of the Armies 199 



The Position of Affairs.— The Allies Form Important 
Resolutions.— Bliicher's March on Paris.— Desisted 
from the Pursuit of the Austrians.— Bliicher's Soldiers 

xviii CONTENTS. 


in the Worst Extremity of Fatigue and Misery. — 
Marched Barefooted and in Rags. — All the Fruits of 
Napoleon's Brilliant Mauceuvres Lost. — The Rage of the 
Emperor. — The Battle of Craonne. — Bliicher Establishes 
Himself at Laon and is Attacked by Napoleon. — The 
French Dispersed Looking for Food. — Paralyzed by Cold 
and Slept like Sheep in a Pen. — Cut to Pieces in their 
First Sleep. — Gunners Killed at their Post. — Napoleon 
Defeats the Russians at Rheims 208 



Napoleon's Whole Scheme Rendered Impossible and How. 
— Napoleon Decides to March to Troyes. — The Allies in 
Confusion and Embarrassment. — Schwarzenberg Passed 
from the Heights of Confidence to the Depths of Pusil- 
lanimity. — The French Driven Back in Confusion. — Na- 
poleon Restores Order. — The French Hold their Ground 
under a Terrible Fire of Artillery. — Continued with 
More Boldness than Prudence. — An Intercepted Des- 
patch Gives Allies the Light they Desired. — To March 
on Chalons to Approach the Army of Bliicher. — A Fatal 
Suggestion 215 



The March on Paris. — The National Guards Defended 
Themselves witli Heroic Courage and Destroyed to a 
Man. — Napoleon Ignorant of the Allies' Movements. — 
The Sceptre and Sword were Trembling in his Hands. — 
Orders Issued for an Advance on the Capital. — Paris Not 
Fortified. — Its Position. — The French Evacuate the City. 
—Napoleon Receives Bad News at Every Post-house. — 
Napoleon Signs his Abdication and Accepts the Sov- 
ereignty of the Island of Elba 221 








The Restoration of the Bourbons. — Looked upon the An- 
cient Regime with Horror. — The Mistakes of the Bour- 
bons on their Return to Paris. — Took Every Pains to 
Obliterate the Memory of the Revolution and the Em- 
pire. — The Strengtli of the Army Reduced. — The Long- 
ing for the Return of the Emperor. — Napoleon Follows 
the Movements with a Watchful Eye. — Reasons Why 
he should not Remain where he was. — Napoleon 
Leaves Elba. — Napoleon's Boastful Prophecy Fulfilled. 
— Ney's Promise to Bring Back Napoleon in an Iron 
Cage. — Sang a DifTerent Note 225 



At the Congress of Vienna Napoleon Declared an Outlaw. 
— Strength of Napoleon's Army. — What Wellington Pro- 
posed. — Six Armies to Invade France Simultaneously. 
— Napoleon Hesitates. — Napoleon's Plan to Conquer the 
English and the Prussians. — Felt Confident One Decisive 
Victory would Destroy the Coalition. — To Aim Straight 
at the Point of the Juncture of the Two Armies. — Na- 
poleon Addresses his Soldiers. — How the French Army 
was Concentrated. — The Allies did not Believe Napoleon 
would Begin the Attack. — General Bourmont Deserts on 
the Morning of the Battle. — Prussians Visible in Force 
at Gosselies. — What Napoleon Decided upon. — One of 
the Chief Causes of his Ill-success 230 



Napoleon Throws Himself into the Centre of the Allied 
Position. — His Orders to Grouchy and Ney. — Bliicher 



Full of Ardor. — Wellington at the Duchess of Rich- 
mond's Ball. — Wellington and Blucher View the Posi- 
tion Ironi a Windmill. — What Wellington Arranged. — 
The Battle-field of I.igny.— Napoleon's Plan.— The Prus- 
sians Lose, but Regain St. Amand. — The Prussian 
Army Mutilated, but not Destroyed 238 



Had Ney Acted with Promptitude he would have been in a 
Position to Attack Quatre-Bras. — What Quatre-Bras 
Consisted of, — The Centre of the Enemy Forced. — The 
Allies Began to Yield.— Death of Duke Frederick Wil- 
liam. — The English Retii'e Gallantly. — How Picton Ral- 
lied the 28th Regiment. — D'Erlon Mi.sreads his Order. — 
Ney Prays that he may be Killed by an English Bullet. — 
Kellermann's Charge Paralleled by tlie Charge of the 
Light Brigade. — Ney's Face Suffused with Blood, Bran- 
dishing his Sword Like a Madman. — Napoleon's Orders. 
— Wellington Retreats. — Like a Fox Hunt. — Napoleon's 
Hatred for the English.— He Felt Certain of Victory. . . 244 



Position oi the Battle-field at Waterloo. — The British Posi- 
tion. — The Morning of the Battle. — Wellington Employs 
Special Tactics to Resist the French. —The First Occasion 
in which Napoleon had Come in Conflict with English 
Troops. — Napoleon's Opinion of the English. — Gave False 
Information. — Napoleon's Troops Pass in Review. — 
Never Greater Enthusiasm Exhibited. — The Battle Com- 
menced by an Artillery Duel. — Preparing to Make his 
Main Attack. — The Order to Attack.— Descended into 
the Valley under an Arch of Bullets. — Wellington 
Watches the Fight from the Foot of a Large Elm. — 
Picton Fell in the Moment of Success. — Slaughtered like 
Sheep. — The Objects of Wellington and Napoleon. — 
Tlie British Fire Rattled upon the Cuirasses of the Enemy 



like Hail on a Slated Roof. — Unable to Break the 
Squares. — Wellington Becomes Anxious. — The Defeat 
of the French Made Almost Certain. — The Guai-ds of 
Maitland Stood like a Red Brick Wall.— The French 
Guard Gives Way. — A General Rout. — The Old French 
Guards Unable to Make Headway Against the English 
Cavalry 253 




The Allied Armies of English and French Land at Galli- 
poli. — A Council of War. — Best Metfiod of Annihilating 
the Naval Powers of Russia. — Strength of the Allied 
Armies. — How the Armies Advanced. — The Russian's 
Position. — Showed a Want of Tactical Skill. — The Fire 
of the Russian Batteries Cause Much Loss. — The Ad- 
vance of the Guards and Highlanders Decided the 
Battle. — A Flank March Determined upon. — A Fruitful 
Cause of Disaster 266 



Position of Sebastopol Harbor. — Where the Allied Armies 
were Posted. — The Historical Famous Redan. — The De- 
fence of Sebastopol, How it was Built up. — Sir John 
Burgoyne Directs the Siege Operations of the English. — 
The French Batteries Silenced. — The English Fire More 
successful. — The Bombardment of Canrobert's Hill. — 
The Russian Mass Gave Way and Fled Behind the Hill. 
— The Two Orders Sent to Loi-d Lucan. — The Famous 
Charge. — Although they Knew the Charge to be Desper- 
ate, they did not Hesitate. — Rode Back Singly or in 
Twos and Threes 271 





A Russian Force Marches against the Camp of the Second 
Division— The Sand-Bag Batter}-. —A Crisis Impending. 
— MenchikofT's Plan.— How the Battle was Started.— 
15.000 Ru.ssians Repulsed by Less than a Fourth of their 
Number. — Captured and Spiked .some English Guns — 277 



To Winter in the Crimea.— Sick and Wounded left Bare 
of Protection. — Twenty-one Vessels Dashed to Pieces. — 
The Sick and Wounded Reposed in Mud.— Nearly 8.000 
Men in Hospital. — Condition of the Hospital. — Great Ef- 
forts Made to Remedy these Disasters. — The French in 
Better Condition.— Arrival of Miss Florence Nightin- 
gale. — Refused the Conditions of Peace. — The Russians 
Repulsed at Eupatoria. — Death of the Emperor Nicholas. 
— The French Repulsed. — A Truce Agreed upon. — The 
Hillside Crowded with Spectators. — The Cannonade Be- 
gins.— The Suffering in Sebastopol Terrible. — Destruc- 
tion of Provisions and Supplies. — Canrobert Resigns the 
Command of the French. — A Fresh Bombardment Com- 
menced as Never Seen Before. — The Allies Make an As- 
sault on the Russians.— The Enemy Driven from all 
their Outworks. — Death of Lord Raglan.— The Russians' 
Attack Repulsed with Great Slaughter.— The Last Hope 
Taken Away. — The Bombardment Assumes still Greater 
Proportions.— Every Traverse Taken, Retaken and 
Taken Again.— The End of the Crimean War 382 





Austria Presents an Ultimatuin to Sardinia.— What the 

CONTENTS. xxiii 


Austrian Forces in Italy Consisted of, — How they Ad- 
vanced. — The Sardinian Army. — Its Strength. — The 
Force of the French.— The Conduct of theAustrians Re- 
garded as Inexplicable. — The First Meeting of the Ene- 
mies. — The Austrians Occupy Genestrello. — Conditions 
»£.the Battle Changed. — The Austrians Fall Back on 
Montebello. — The French Advance. — Obliged to Fight 
Hand to Hand. — The Austrians Retreat.— What General 
Forey had Accomplished 294 



The Attack on Palestro. — The Austrians Prepare to Make 
an Assault. — The Battalion of Jagers Compelled to Yield. 
— Austrians Drowned in the Canal. — The Result of the 
Battle in Favour of the Allies. — The Austrians in Full 
Retreat. — Disheartened by Retreat. — The Position of 
Magenta. — A Formidable Defensive Position. — Before 
the Battle. — The French Driven Back across the Canal. 
— The Battle Swayed Backwards and Forwards. — The 
Rush of Picard's Columns Irresistible. — The Emperor's 
Position. — How the Austrians met MacMahon's Attack. 
— Tiie Fight at Magenta 300 



The Emperor's Plan to Impede Giulay's Withdrawal to 
the Mincio. — Position of the Battlefield of Solferino. — 
The Military Importance of Guidizzolo. — The Strength 
of the Allied Army. — The Austrians' Intentions. — The 
Plan of the French. — Description of the Battle. — The 
Austrian Cavalry Driven Back. — The Movements of Neil 
and Canrobert. — The Operations of the Sardinians. — 
Struggle on Either Side Terrific. — The Austrians Retreat 
in all Directions. — The Losses at the Battle of Solferino. 
—The End of the War 309 







How the War Started. — Seven States Declare their Union 
with the Other States Dissolved. — The Formation of a 
Confederate Government. — The Capture of Fort Sumter. 
— Tlie First Blood was Shed at Baltimore. — How Els- 
worth Became the Hero of the National Movement. — To 
Increase the Strength of the Federal Army. — The Plans 
of the Opposing Generals.— Tlie Federal Army Drive the 
Confederates Back. — A Rout and a Race for Washing- 
ton. — One of Prince Consort's Last Public Acts 320 



The Blockade of tlie Southern Ports.— Grant's Reply to 
Buckner's Application for Terms of Capitulation. — The 
Foundation of Grant's Reputation. — The Strategic Value 
of New Orleans.— The Confederates Prepare Fire Ships. 
— Farragut's Important Victory. — One of the Bloodiest 
Battles of the War.— General Grant's Position.— How 
Grant Described One Part of tlie Field.— General Johns- 
ton Bleeds to Death 327 



General McClellan to Fortify the Capital and Organise 
the Army.— McClellan's Movements.— The Fight at Wil- 
liamsburg.— The Cost of the Battle of Fair Oaks.— The 
Commander of the Confederate Army and his Plan.— 
The Battle of Richmond Rages Seven Days.— The Battle 
of Gaines Mills.— The Federals Retire.— The Battle of 
Frazier's Farm. — How McClellan's Army Made its Final 
Stand.— Banks Engages Jackson at Cedar Mountain. — 
Pope Orders a Retrograde Movement. — The Second Bat- 



tie of Bull Run.— General Lee Pushed into Maryland.— 
McClellan's March to Cover Washington and Baltimore. 
—The Battle of Antietam. — The Confederate Army 
Ought to have been Annihilated.— Burnside Succeeds 
McClellan in Command.— Burnside Aims at Richmond. 
—The Attack on the Heights Held by Lee.— Nearly Half 
of the Attacking Force Shot Down.— The End of the 
Campaign 332 



President Lincoln's Letter to General Hooker on his Suc- 
ceeding Burnside in Command. — Hooker begins by Re- 
storing the Discipline of the Army of the Potomac. — 
His Move on Richmond. — Lee's Movements. — Death of 
" Stonewall " Jackson. — Hooker Driven Back. — The Fed- 
eral Army Recross the Rappahannock. — Admirable Gen- 
eralship versus Superior Numbers. — The South Demands 
the Invasion of the North. — Hooker Resigns his Com- 
mand. — The Enemies Meet. — The Position of the Battle- 
field. — Both Sides Fight with Determination. — The 
Federals Driven Back by Superior Forces. — A Murderous 
Struggle for the Possession of Little Round Top.— Ewell's 
Troops Driven out of Gulp's Hill. — Lee Determined to 
Pierce the Centre of Meade's Line. — An Artillery Duel. 
— Lee's Famous Attack. — Stuart's Cavalry Unable to Co- 
operate with the Movement. — A General Advance of the 
Federal Line brings the Battle to a Close. — Lee's Retreat 
a Pitiful One. — The Loss of the Federals and the Con- 
federates. — Vicksburg Capitulates 345 




General Rosecrans Proceeds in Pursuit of Bragg. — The 
Struggle between Bragg and Rosecrans. — The Battle Re- 
garded as a Confederate Victory. — The Federal Forces 
Re-organised. — Grant's Plan to Attack Bragg. — The 
Battle above the Clouds. — Bragg's Army Completely 



Defeated.— Grant Given the Title of Lieutenant-Geneial. 
—What the Confederate Army Consisted of.— Lee At- 
tacks Grant in tlie Wilderness.— A Hand-to-Hand En- 
gagement. — No Decisive Advantage Gained on Either 
Si,ie.— The Battle Resumed.— The Federals Retire.— The 
Assault on the Confederates' Entrenchments. — Lee's 
Attempt to Recapture the Salient Angle.— The Two 
Armies Opposed to Each Other at Cold Harbour. — 
Grant's Reputation Suffers. — Grant's Movements to In- 
vest Richmond and Gain Petersburg 358 



To Capture Atlanta.— Sherman's Force Comes into Con- 
tact witli that of Johnston at New Hope Church.— 
Sherman Gradually Drawing Nearer to Atlanta.— His 
Attempt to Capture Johnston's Position in the Battle 
of Kenesaw a Failure.— The Battle of Atlanta.— Atlanta 
Won by Hard Fighting and Clever Strategy.— Sherman 
Sends Away all the Civil Inhabitants of the City.— His 
Great March from Atlanta to Savannah.— The Number 
of Troops at Sherman's Disposal. — The Negroes Swarmed 
after the Army Believing the Day of Jubilee had Come. 
— Sherman Occupies Savannah. — His March towards 
Columbia.— Sherman's liast Battle Fought at Benton- 
ville.-- -The Terms under which Lee and Johnston Sur- 
rendered. — The End of the War 368 


THE WAR OF 1866. 



The Comparative Strength of the Belligerents. — How 
Prussia Commenced her Preparations for War. — The 



Austrian Army. — The Strength of the Italian Army. — 
What the Saxony Army Consisted of. — Prussia Declares 
War against Hanover, Hesse Casel and Saxony. — The 
Elector made Prisoner of War. — The Invasion of Saxony. 
— How the Prussian Troops were Received by the Popn 
ulation. — Benedek's Scheme to Strike a Deadly Blow to 
the Heart of the Prussian Kingdom Rendered Impos- 
sible 377 



The March of Prince Frederick Charles.— The Battle at 
Podol. — The Prussians Victorious. — A Combat Takes 
Place at Miinchengratz. — Prince Frederick Charles with 
the Loss of only 100 Men Gains 13 Miles of Country and 
Captures 1,000 Prisoners. — A More Serious Battle at 
Gitchin. — The Strategic Object of the Movements of the 
Two Prussian Armies Achieved. — The Prussians Cap- 
ture Koniginhof after a Hot Contest.— The Result of the 
Battle of Skalitz and Schweinschadel. — Benedek Retires 
Towards Koniggratz. — Severe Actions Fought by Prince 
Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince. — How the 
Prussians Attacked Benedek. — The Austrian Batteries 
Attacked and the Austrians Forced to Retire. — Benedek 
Retired to Koniggratz with the Fragments of his Beaten 
Army. — The Losses of the Two Armies Engaged 383 



Where the Strength of the Austrians Lay in Italy. — What 
La Marmora Determined. — The Two Armies Meet. — The , 
Austrians Gain a Brilliant Victory at Custozza. — Gari- 
baldi Twice Worsted in Small Engagements. — Cialdini 
Succeeds La Marmora in Command of the Italians. — The 
Position of the Troops. — The Italians Aimed at Occupy- 
ing all Territories in which the Italian Language was 
Spoken. — Their Ardour Checked by the Result of the 

xxviii CONTENTS. 


Naval Battle of Lissa. — The Austrians Ceded Venetia 
to the Emperor Napoleon, who Made it Over to the 
Italians 390 



The Efficiency of the Bavarian Army was Spoiled by the 
Vacillation of Prince Charles. — A Want of Energy in 
the Leaders on Both Sides. — The Battle of Langensalza, 
— Tlie Prussians Retreat. — The Hanoverians Masters of 
the Field. — King of Hanover Hemmed in by an Army of 
40,000 Enemies. — Determines not to Sacrifice his Soldiers 
and Accepts the Terms Previously Proposed by Prussia. 
— Tlie Position of General Vogel von Falckenstein after 
the Capitulation of the Hanoverian??. — The Cause of the 
Unity of the Federals not being Attained. — The Plan 
Conceived by Falckenstein. — Tlie Battle of Dombach 
had no Decisive Conclusion. — The Prussians Gain the 
Passage of the Saale at Hammelburg. — The Prussians 
Surprise the Bavarians. — Prince Alexander's Action to 
Hold Back the Prussians. — Prince Alexander Forced to 
Retire. — Falckenstein Establishes his Headquarters in 
the Old Imperial City. — Terror Reigned in Vienna. — 
Archduke Albert's Orders to Field Marshal Benedek. . . 394 


THE WAR OF 1870. 



The French Army Looked upon as a Pattern for all Euro- 
pean Armies. — The Principle of Liability to Military 
Service Acknowledged b}' Frencli Law. — Creation of a 
Mobile National Guard. — The Military Organisation of 



Prussia. — The Contrast between the Organisation of the 
Two Armies More Apparent in their Mobilisation. — King 
William of Prussia Arrives at Berlin and Sanctions the 
Orders Prepared by General Moltke. — The Operation of 
Bringing a Great Army from a Peace to a War Footing 
Carried Out in tlie Short Period of Eighteen days. — The 
German Army Rested on Solid Foundation and Noth- 
ing Left to Chance. — The French Army Loosely put 
together. — The Disposition of the Two Armies. — The 
Mobilisation of the French Army an Entire Contrast to 
that of its Antagonist 403 



The Emperor Leaves St. Cloud. — The Empress Radiant 
with Joy and Hope. — It is my War, She Proudly Claimed. 
—The French Plan.— The First Engagement.— The Gen- 
eral Abel Douay Occupies Weissenburg. — The Prussian 
Force. — The Town of Weissenburg Stormed and Taken 
after a Gallant Resistance.— The First Victory gained 
by German Troops on French Soil. — The Battle of Worth. 
— The Superiority of the Prussian Artillery had Become 
Evident. — Worth Carried by Storm. — The Storming of 
the Heights East of Froschweiler. — The French Fought 
with Passionate Courage. — The Prussians Gain Posses- 
sion of the Coveted Ground. — The French Broke and Fled 
after the Loss of Froschweiler. — The Germans Gain a 
Victory at Saarbriicken. — Two Attacks of the Prussians 
Repulsed. — With Reinforcements the Prussians Make 
Another Attack. — The French Driven Back. — General 
von Goltz Takes the Kaninchenberg. — Marshal Bazaine 
Offers his Co-operation to Frossard but it is Declined. 
— How the Battle was Won 412 



The Gate of France Opened to the German Armies with- 
out Further Struggle. — General Consternation Felt at 



Paris. — (xeneral MacMahon Entrusted with the Forma- 
tion of a New Cabinet. — The Prussian Army March into 
Lorraine and Take Possession of Nancy. — The King Is- 
sues a Proclamation to the French People. — The War 
Rapidly Assumed an Internecine Character. — German 
Governors Appointed in Alsace and Lorraine. — General 
von der Goltz's Aim and Movements. — His Advance 
Brought to a Check at Colombey. — The Prussians in a 
very Critical Position. — General Kameke Turned the 
Fortune of the Day. — The French Withdrew to Metz. — 
The French Army Set Out from Metz towards Verdun. 
— The Positions of Tronville, Mars-la-Tour and Vion- 
ville Reached. — Alvensleben Determines to Attack the 
French. — A Terrible Struggle. — The French Compelled 
to Retreat. — Bazaine Nearly Taken Prisoner. — The Bril- 
liant Charge of Bredow's Corps. —The Losses in the 
Battle. — The Result not so Much a Tactical as a Moral 
Victory. — The French Ordered to Retire towards Metz. 
— Bazaine Announces to his Government the Battle of 
Vionville as a French Victory.— Why he Withdrew... . 419 



The French Army had Entirely Changed its Method of 
Fighting from the Days of Napoleon. — Bazaine Deter- 
mined to Engage in a Decisive Battle. — Where the 
French were Posted. — How the King of Prussia Drew up 
his Own Army. — The French Opened the Battle with a 
Murderous Fire.— Marshal Bazaine had Sound Reasons 
for Believing that the Battle was Already Decided in 
his Favour.— The Germans Became Masters of St. 
Privat. — Ladmirault Evacuates liis Position — General 
Fransecky's Orders to Carry the Plateau of the Moscow 
Farm.— Necessary to Pass through the Terrible Defile 
of Gravelotte. — How the Orders were Carried out. — The 
Losses of the Opposing Forces.— The Line of the Moselle 
the Objective of the German Army 428 





Bazaine Definitelj' Shut up in Metz. — The German Army's 
Difficult Task.— The King's Plan.— The Crown Prince to 
March upon Paris. — The Army of the Siege Invests the 
City on Both Sides of tlie Moselle. — The Whole Length 
of the Line of Investment about Thirty Miles. — Bazaine's 
Object to get Possession of Thionville. — After a Few 
Attempts Became Convinced that the Prussian General 
was his Master. — Bazaine Makes a Powerful Sortie. — 
Succeeded in Driving the Germans out of their Posi- 
tion. — Repulsed by a Night Attack. — The Surrender of 
the Ai'my in Metz only a Matter of Time. — The Em- 
peror to Proceed to Paris and Resume the Reins of 
Government. — MacMahon's Army to March on Paris and 
Accept a Battle there if Necessary. — The Opposition of 
the Empress and the Ministry to Both. — It was Insisted 
upon that MacMahon should Make an Offensive Ad- 
vance in the Direction of Verdun. — MacMahon's March 
to Montmedy. — The Army of Chalons Gradually Lost 
Confidence in their Leaders. — Dejection and Insubordi- 
nation Became Rife. — The Manoeuvres of the Germans to 
Destroy MacMahon never been Equalled in the His- 
"*" tory of War. — The French Forced to Accept Battle 
under Most Unfavourable Circumstances. — ^The French 
Troops were Enjoying their Ease when Shells Fell into 
the Camp. — The Battle of Beaumont had a Decisive Ef- 
fect. — The Emperor of the French Refused to Leave the 
Army. — To Escape Being Surrounded a Night March 
Necessary. — MacMahon's Design Rendered Nugatory by 
the Swift Advance of the German Troops. — The French 
Entangled in a Snare without any Chance of Escape. . . 437 



The French Army at Sedan Confined within a Space of 
Four and a Half Miles from North to South and Two 

xxxii CONTENTS. 


Miles from East to West. — The Battle Began before Day- 
break. — The Bavarians Attack Bazeilles. — Captured 
after a Hard Struggle. — Marshal MacMahon Severely 
Wounded. — He Appoints Ducrot as Commander. — 
Wimptfen Claims the Position. — The Bavarians Become 
Masters of Bazeilles after Six Hours' Fighting. — The 
Prussians Direct a Terrible Artillery Fire on the French 
Division Defending Floing and Illay. — The French had 
only Two Means of Escape.— The Boldest General Might 
well Hesitate before Accepting Either Course. — Broken 
Bodies of the French Flying in all Directions. — The 
Prussians Succeed in Cutting off the Eetreat from a 
Number of French Detachments. — General Duci'ot's 
Entrance into the Town. — The Streets and Squares 
Blocked with Guns. — Nothing before him but a Chaotic 
Mob. — Found the Emperor in a State of Deep Dejection 
and Perfectly Hopeless. — King of Prussia Calls on the 
French Commandant to Capitulate. — The Emperor De- 
livers his Sword to the King. — The King Deeply Moved 
— The Capitulation Signed. — Tlie French Prisoners of 
War Taken to a Tongue of Land at Iges. — Bivouacked in 
Mud. — No Further Obstacle to the Advance of the Third 
and Fourth Armies on Paris. — The German Losses 
9,860 ; French Losses 41,000 447 



General Vinoy Returns to Paris. — The Agitation in Paris 
Became More Riotous. — The City Being Gradually In- 
vested. — The Number of Forces Occupied in this Invest- 
ment was 250,000. — Paris a Fortress of the First Rank. — 
The Germans Placed their Confidence in Famine. — Toul 
Capitulated after a Terrible Bombardment. — Strasburg 
Falls into the Hands of the Germans. — Incidents of the 
Siege. — Leon Gambetta Leaves Paris in a Balloon. — He 
Used every Effort to Rouse the Country against the 
Invaders. — The French Succeeded in Driving the Ger- 
mans from Le Bourget. — Eventually Driven Back after 

CONTENTS. xxxiii 


an Obstinate Resistance.— Communications between the 
Capital and the Provinces Supplied by Carrier-Pigeons 
and Balloons.— Bazaine Capitulates,— General vou Wer- 
der has to Deal with a Guerilla Warfare.- Prince Wil- 
liam of Baden Captures Dijon.— Gambetta Succeeds in 
Involving the Whole of the French Nation.— Making the 
Annihilation of the Enemy a National Duty.— The 
French Compelled to Fight in the Forest of Orleans.— 
Motterouge Deprived of his Command. —A Severe Battle 
at Coulmiers.- The French Successful.— The Indecisive 
Battle of Beaune la Rolande.— The Battle of Loigny.— 
The French Compelled to Retreat 456 



Trochu Tried to Second tlie Efforts Made to Relieve Paris 
by Repeated Sorties.— The French Compelled to Retire 
to the South.— The Germans Enter Orleans.— The Pas- 
sionate Efforts of the French.- Resembled the Struggles 
of a Victim in the Arms of the Murderer who was 
Strangling him.— The Seat of Government Removed 
from Tours to Bordeaux.— French Successes,— Chanzy 
Gradually Driven Back.— All Hopes of Relieving Paris 
Disappeared.— Energetic Sorties from Within Paris.— 
General Ducrot Compels the Germans to Evacuate Brie 
and Champigny.— But were Recovered the Next Day.— 
Faidherbe Suffers a Heavy Defeat at St. Quentin.— The 
Bombardment of Paris Begun.— Trochu Makes one Last 
Effort.— Vinoy's Column Gains Possession of the Ger- 
man Entrenchments at Montretout.— Gambetta Forms a 
Plan for the Destruction of the Germans.— The French 
Surrender.— An Army of 85,000 in the Most Miserable 
Condition Lay down their Arms,— The Preliminaries of 
Peace Signed at Versailles between Bismarck and Jules 
Favre,— One of the Most Remarkable Wars in History. 
—Never before had such Large Masses of Men been 
seen in Conflict 467 






The Emperor Alexander II. Issues a Proclamation. — To 
Secure for his Suffering Fellow-Cliristians on Turkish 
Soil the Safeguards Necessary- for their Future Welfare. 
— Prince Charles of Roumania Assists the Russians. — 
The Russians Cross the Danube at Galatz with but Little 
Difficulty. — The Important Fortress of Nicopolis Falls 
into their Hands. — England Offered to the Porte to 
Send Men of War into the Bosphorus. — The Turks Su- 
perior to the Russians in Armaments.— Two Attempts of 
the Russians to Capture Plevna Fail. — The Russian Ad- 
vance Brought to a Standstill. — The Russians had Under- 
estimated their Enemy.— The Russians Act on the De- 
fensive. — The Three Turkish Commanders all Independ- 
ent of Each Other. — Suleiman Determines to Attack 
the Shipka Pass.— The Position of the Russians Critical. 
— Their Artillery Ammunition Exhausted. — Reinforce- 
ments Save the Situation. — The Turks Driven Back. — 
For Three Days Less than 8,000 Russians Hold the 
Army of Suleiman in Check, their Only Food being the 
Biscuits they had in their Pockets when they Began. — 
Mehemet Ali Drives the Russians Back. — Mehemet De- 
feated and Compelled to Retreat Along his Whole Line. 
— He is Superseded by Suleiman Pasha 476 



The Attention of the Russian Directed towards Plevna. — 



The Grand Duke Attacked by Osman.— Tlie Russians 
Capture Lovtcha.— Dead and Wounded Piled up Six 
Feet deep around its Approach.— Osman Fortifies 
Plevna.— The Russians Attack and Bombard the Re- 
doubts.— A Great Disaster for the Russian Army.— In 
Armenia the Turks Force tlie Russians to Evacuate 
Bajazid.— The Army of the Caucasus Redress this De- 
feat. — Suleiman Pasha Drives General Gourko Back to 
the Shipka Pass.— Orman Pasha Refuses to Surrender 
Plevna.— A Third of his Army Sick and Wounded.— De- 
sertion Increasing every Day. — His Army Defeated. — 
Nothing Left but to Surrender.— The Turks Retreat To- 
wards the Vid.— The Retreat Turned into a Rout.— Os- 
man Pasha Credited with a Brilliant Defence.— Ought to 
have Retreated to Radonitz.— Could have Saved his 
Country from an Irreparable Disaster 484 



The Turkish Cause Far from being Hopeless. — War De- 
clared against the Turks by Servia. — The Grand Duke 
Nicholas Determines to Cross the Balkans before the 
Turks had Time to Recover themselves. — The Attack on 
Sophia.— The Turks Evacuate the City.— To Retire with 
Safety across the Mountains of Rhodope the Turks 
Forced to Accept a Battle. — Suleiman Runs Away be- 
fore the Battle.— The Russians Successful.— The Turks 
Climb up the Mountains through the Snow. — Gourko 
had Succeeded in Entirely Destroying Suleiman's Army. 
— Suleiman was Arrested and Tried by Court-Martial. — 
The Passage of the Shipka Pass.— The Turkish Redoubts 
Carried in a Brilliant Manner. — Surrender of the Whole 
Turkish Force of 36.000.— The Defence of the Balkans 
Entirely Collapsed. — The Ancient Capital of Turkey Fell 
without a Blow 490 

xxxvi CONTENTS. 





The News of War between Spain and America Received 
with Great Joy in New York. — The Northern Coast of 
Cuba Blockaded. — Spanish Gunboats Succeed in Break- 
ing through the Blockade of Havana. — A Squadron Left 
Cadiz under Admiral Cervera. — Castle Morro at Havana 
Bombarded by the American Fleet. — Cervera might At- 
tack the East Coast of North America. — Mines Laid as 
a Precautionary Measure in the Harbour of New York. 
—Admiral Dewey Ordered to Sail for the Philippine 
Islands.— He Destroys the Spanish Fleet Lying in the 
Bay of Manilla.— The Spaniards Defend themselves 
with Heroic Courage.— Consternation in Madrid.— The 
Ministry Reconstructed.— The Arrival of Cervera at Mar- 
tinique.— The Situation of Santiago.— The Bombard- 
ment.— The Americans Joined by the Insurgents.— The 
Battle of Guasimos a Victory for the Americans.— The 
Main Burden of the Fighting Fell upon the Regiment of 
" Rough Riders."— Attacked and Vanquished a Force 
of over Four Times their Number 496 



The Battle of San Juan.— Caney Held by 500 Spanish 
Soldiers.— The Americans Attack and Take the Village. 
—Their Loss Greatest at the San Juan River.— They As- 
sault the Hill on which were the Spanish Blockhouse 
and Fort of San Juan.— Madness to Assault this without 
Artillery. — They Flooded the Ridges and Swarmed in 
the BlockhoiLse. — An Unexpected Incident Supervened. 
— Cervera's Fleet Sails out of the Harbour and in Three- 



quarters of an Hour is Entirely Destroyed.— The Ameri- 
can Fleet Three Times Superior in Number and Armed 
with Excellent Artillery.— Cervera Taken Prisoner.— 
The Town and Province of Santiago de Cuba Surren- 
dered.— Marshal Blanco Refused to Recognise the 
Capitulation of Santiago.— The Spanish Troops in Ripa, 
Caimanera and Guantanamo liay Down their Arms.— 
Great Dejection in Spain.— Might have Conquered if 
they had Sent 4,000 Men to Florida.— Governor-General 
Augusti's Proposition to the German Vice- Admiral von 
Diedrich at Manilla, the Neutral Powers should Take 
Manilla under their Protection.— The Offer Refused.— 
The American Flag Hoisted in the Ladrone Islands.— 
The Surrender of Manilla Demanded by Admiral Dewey. 
—The Summons Rejected— The Capture of the Island of 
Puerto Rico.— A Striking Contrast to the Operations in 
Cuba.— A Protest against the Attack of the Americans 
on Puerto Rico.— The Army in Puerto Rico Advanced 
with the Precision of a Set of Chessmen.— The Spanish 
Government Declares itself Beaten and Asks for Condi- 
tions of Peace.— The Definite Treaty Signed 503 



The Author Frontispiece. 

Napoleon I., Emperor of the Fren'ch 26 

The Duke of Wellington 170 

Napoleon III., Emperor of the French 298 

General U. S. Grant 346 

Field Marshal, Count Helmuth Von Moltke 410 







Bonaparte left Egypt on August 24, 1799, and 
landed in France on October 8. By the events of 
jSTovember 9 of the same year, better known as 
Brnmaire 18, the government of the Directory was 
overthrown and Bonaparte became First Consnl,with 
Cambaceres and Lebrun as his colleagues. His first 
act was to address on Christmas Day, 1799, a letter 
written in his ovm hand to George III., King of Eng- 
land, in the following terms : 

" Called bv the wishes of the French nation to 
occupy the first magistracy of the republic, I think it 
proper, on entering into oSice, to make a direct com- 
munication of it to your majesty. The war which 
for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the 
world, must it be eternal — are there no means of 
coming to an understanding ? 

" How can the two most enlightened nations of 


Europe , po\verful and strong beyond what their 
safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of 
vain greatness the benefits of commerce, internal 
prosperity and the happiness of families ? How is 
it that they do not feel that peace is of the first 
necessity as well as of the first glory ? 

" These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart 
of your majesty, who reigns over a free nation, and 
Avith the sole view of rendering it happy. Your 
majesty will only see in this overture my sincere 
desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, 
to a general pacification, by a step speedy, entirely of 
confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, 
necessary perhaps to disguise the dependence of 
weak states, prove only in those which are strong 
the mutual desire of deceiving each other. 

" France and England, by the abuse of their 
strength, may still for a brief time, to the misfor- 
tune of all nations, retard the period of their being 
exhausted. But, I will venture to say, the fate of 
all civilised nations is attached to the termination of 
a war which involves the whole world." 

This letter was met bv a chilling official answer 
from Lord Grenville, as Secretary of State, and the 
war begun in 1793 went on, notwithstanding strong 
opposition in the English Parliament. A similar 
letter was addressed by Bonaparte to the Em- 
peror Francis II., reminding him of the re- 
lations which had previously existed between 
them, and offering to renew the peace of Campo- 
Formio. But Austria had regained so much 
lost ground during the absence of ]^apoleon in 
Egypt that the offers of the First Consul were re- 
jected. The cold and insulting replies of Pitt and 
Thugut increased the popularity of Bonaparte in 


France, and the country armed itself with enthusiasm 
to extort hy force the settlement which it could not 
obtain by persuasion. General Moreau, who was 
occuj)ying the valley of the Rhine from Strasburg to 
Bale, received orders to cross the stream and to ad- 
vance against the army of the Black Forest under 
the command of Kray. Massena and Suchet were 
charged to protect the sea-coast of Nice and Genoa and 
to prevent the Austrian General Melas from crossing 
the Apennines. In the centre General Lecourbe, 
with his headquarters at Schaffhausen, was to main- 
tain his connection with both armies and to lend his 
assistance either to the Xorth or South, according to 
circumstances. An army of reserves was formed at 

On May 6, 1800, Bonaparte, enveloped in a long 
gray coat, left his apartments in the Tuilleries, 
jumped into a travelling carriage and passed through 
Paris at a gallop accompanied by Bourrienne. Duroc 
had left the capital two days before to prepare relays. 
At half-past seven in the evening tlie First Consul 
reached Avallon, having travelled about one hundred 
and thirty miles in fifteen hours. He worked till 
midnight, left before dawn and reached Dijon at 
midday. In the afternoon he held a review and 
spoke to the several soldiers about their terms of 
service. He found many of them badly clothed and 
shod, but promised them abundance of everything in 
the paradise of Italy. At midnight he entered 
Geneva, gay and in high spirits. He examined his 
maps, and finally determined to invade Italy by the 
Great St. Bernard. 

His arrangements were rapidly made. The Italian 
legion was to proceed by passes now familiar to tour- 
ists, from Sion up the valley of Saas, over the Monte 


jNIoro to Ponte Grande, and then bv the Col de Ran- 
zola to Grcssonay, distracting the attention of the 
Anstrians, and facilitating the passage of the St. 
Gothard by General Moncey. For the army of re- 
serve the route was traced from Villeneuve, at the end 
of the Lake of Geneva, to Aosta, in Piedmont, the 
principal halts being ]\Iartigny, twenty-five miles ; 
(Saint Pierre, twenty miles ; Etroubles, twenty miles, 
which is ten miles distant from Aosta. Out of the 
whole distance ten miles was across a mountain track. 
The first corps was placed under Lannes, the second 
corps under Duhesme ; the cavalry was committed 
to Murat, the artillery to Marmont. 

On May 23 Bonaparte reviewed his troops at Ville- 
neuve. Here he received bad news from Genoa, in 
which city Massena was blockaded by Melas, while 
the English fleet prevented all relief by sea. Bona- 
parte answered the message : " Report to Massena 
that vou have seen me close to the Great St. Bernard. 
In a short time Italy will be reconquered and Genoa 
delivered." Two hours later the First Consul received 
the welcome announcement that Moreau had beaten 
Kray at Stokach. The rain fell in torrents. The 
new shoes delivered at Dijon were soon worn out. 
'" Bare-foot " battalions were formed by soldiers, who 
sang gaily as they marched, and promised to provide 
themselves with shoes from the bodies of those killed 
in the first battle. Bonaparte now returned to Lau- 
sanne, and finally reached Martigny on Saturdav, 
May 27. 

The advanced guard under Lannes marched 
merrily on. They replied to a heavy thunderstorm 
by sounding the charge; when up to their knees in a 
marsh they sang the " ^farseillaise." The houses 
were for the most part deserted by their inhabitants. 


At last St. Pierre was reached, where a large camp 
had been formed. 

Great difficulties were foimd in the transport of 
the artillery. The road between Martigny and 
Orsieres had to be made afresh. In some places no 
stone was to be found and the trunks of trees were 
used instead. Each cannon Avas taken to pieces and 
the parts were numbered in legible figures in yellow 
ochre. A number of pine trees were cut doA\m, sawn 
asunder and hollowed out. The gun itself was de- 
posited in the hollow tree, the carriage was secured 
between planks of wood six inches thick, the ramrods, 
sponges and other implements were placed in another 
hollow tree, and the wheels were carried bv them- 
selves. The Avhole mass was lashed to the backs of 
mules and thus transported in safety. Twenty-four 
pounds were paid for the portage of an entire cannon 
to the Great St. Bernard, and the peasants did their 
best in hope of reward. The transit from St. Pierre 
to the Hospice, a distance of less than eight miles, 
occupied nine hours. The artillery was drawn up in 
order on the other side of the lake, on the road to St. 

Unfortunately some of the peasants who were en- 
gaged in hauling the artillery were frostbitten. This 
deterred others from following their example and 
assistance was difficult to procure. At last all ob- 
stacles were surmounted. Although the line of march 
occupied three miles, and progress was impeded by 
snowstorms and avalanches, the advanced guard under 
Lannes at length reached the Hospice with cries of 
" Vive Bonaparte ! " " Vive la Rej)ublique ! " The 
first Prench troops had arrived at the Hospice on May 
15, at ten o'clock in the evening, after just escaping 
destruction by an avalanche. The monks assisted the 


"wounded, and t']ie soldiers slept along the corridors 
on straw. Lannes and the advanced guard made their 
appearance on May 16. The brethren recruited the 
troops witih bread, cheese and white wine, gave fresh 
shoes to the soldiers whose feet were bleeding, and 
bandaged the wounded. The passage of fifty thousand 
men occupied, as may be imagined, many days. Six- 
teen large tables were spread out before the Hospice 
at which the soldiers could refresh themselves, and 
wood fires w^ere lighted which burned day and night. 
Bonaparte himself crossed before the rear-guard. 
His countenance was sombre, his voice harsh, his 
every word sounded like a command ; he rode on im- 
mersed in thought. The expense of the passage to 
the monks was nearly a thousand pounds, and the 
debt was not paid till several years had passed. 

At the Hospice Bonaparte had visited the library 
and asked for a copy of Livy in order that he might 
study the description of Hannibal's passage of the 
Alps, the only enterprise in history similar to his 
own. On Mav 21 he arrived at Aosta at the foot of 
the pass, on the other side. The march of the army 
had been stopped for some days by the little fort of 
Bard, which commanded the road to Ivrea and the 
plains of Italy, being about thirty miles distant from 
Aosta. It was only possible to turn it by climbing 
the steep hill of Albaredo, which was impassable for 
artillery. Fifteen hundred sappers were employed 
in making a passage. In the more difficult places 
stairs were cut in the rock, walls were built to mask 
the precipice which bordered the road, bridges were 
thrown across ravines, and at length the cavalrv were 
able to march over the obstacle. If the hill had been 
occupied in force by the Austrians the French army 
would have been completely stopped. The little town 


was soon wrested from the enemv, but tlie fort still 
resisted and the commandant refused to capitulate. 
Bonaparte, reaching Bard on Mav 24, found that if 
he began a regular siege, he could only reduce the 
place bv famine, and the garrison was provided with 
food and water for six months. At the same time he 
determined to attack the fort from three sides : from 
Sonnaz lower down the river, from the town itself, 
and from the other side of the stream. All brandies 
of the assault were repulsed, two hundred men were 
lost, and a raft which was crossing the river was sunk 
by the explosion of a shell. It was absolutely neces- 
sary to send on the artillery to Lannes, who com- 
manded the van-guard. For this purpose the wheels 
of the gun carriages were enveloped in hay and straw, 
the road along the river was covered with a thick 
layer of dung, and fifty trumpeters were sent to the 
summit of Albaredo to divert attention. Sixty men 
were harnessed to each cannon, and a reward of 
twenty-four pounds was promised for each gun which 
reached Sonnaz in safety. A terrible thunder- 
storm deluged the town with rain; the river rose in 
flood, the drums and trumpets sounded from Albare- 
do and caused an additional bewilderment to the gar- 
rison. The men dragging the guns advanced steadily 
and in good order. "When it was too late, Bernkopf, 
the commandant, discovered the trick, but the four- 
pounders and the eight-pounders were already out of 
range, and his muskets only inflicted a slight loss on 
the rear-guard. On the following morning tlie hill 
of Albaredo was passed by three thousand cavalry. 
Lannes succeeded in enterina; Ivrea and reviewed his 
artillery. In the middle of the succeeding night 
Bonaparte crossed the Albaredo on foot. The fort 
of Bard, after this heroic resistance, eventuallv 


capitulated on June 3. Bonaparte had already 
entered ^lilan on the evening of the previous day. 
Thus had the difficulty been overcome of marching 
an army across the Alps, when the enemy was not even 
aware of its existence, and when that army was 
stopped by the resistance of an obstinate fortress in 
a narrow pass, of conveying the artillery secretly to 
the advanced guard, and eventually securing the 
passage of the troops. 




The First Consul had wished to enter Milan in 
triumph, but the elements were opposed to him. At 
Turbigo he mounted a golden coach, drawn by six 
white horses, but on the way a terrible storm of rain 
broke through the roof of the vehicle and deluged 
the occupants ; not till half-past six did the procession 
reach the gate. The streets were filled with people 
who maintained a stubborn silence; they believed 
that the real Bonaparte was dead or was a prisoner of 
the English, and they were anxious to know who had 
taken his name. He found in the streets caricatures 
of the army of reserve, which was now conquering 
Lombardy, representing the cavalry as mounted on 
asses, and the infantry composed of decrepit old men 
and children playing with bayonets. Bonaparte 
reported to Paris that Milan had greeted him with a 
manifestation spontaneous and touching. One of 
his first public acts was to order the completion of 
the cathedral, the marble shrine which still recalls his 
genius and his glory. 

On June 5 Bonaparte announced the re-establish- 
ment of the Cisalpine Republic and his own devotion 
to the Roman Catholic religion ; but on the day before 
Genoa, defended by Massena and besieged byMelas, 
had capitulated through famine, after terrible suf- 
ferings. It has been said that Bonaparte might have 
relieved Genoa by simpler methods, and that in fol- 


lowiiic; the course which he pursued he had thought 
more of his own aggraudisement than of anything 
else. A little examination will show that this charge 
was unfounded, and that Bonaparte in the plan of 
his campaign not only followed the dictates of pru- 
dence, but left an example to all students of the art 
of war. 

His plan was that while Moreau, operating from 
the Rhine, attacked the Austrians on the Danube, the 
First Consul should assail them in Italy. The Aus- 
trians were at this time besieging Genoa; they were 
occupying all the passes of the western Alps, and they 
had a force ready to cross the Var into France, which 
was defended by Suchet wuth inferior numbers. 
Bonaparte had tw'O objects in view: to relieve Genoa 
and to deal the Austrians a decisive blow. He saw, 
wuth marvellous sagacity, that if he occupied the 
roads between Milan and Piacenza, he would cut the 
Austrians from their base of operations, deliver Genoa 
and force them to a decisive action. To effect this 
purpose he could not advance along the sea-coast be- 
cause he w^ould only drive the Austrians before him. 
If he had marched to Turin across the Mont Cenis, 
he would have attacked the centre of the Austrian 
line, which could have been easily reinforced from 
either side. In each of these two cases the Aus- 
trians would interpose betw^een himself and his object. 
Moreover, he had formed a plan that a part of 
Moreau's army, after effecting its object in Germany, 
should recruit his somewhat scanty forces in Italy, 
and to meet these fresh troops he must not separate 
himself too far from the northern passes of the Alps. 
By crossing the St. Bernard he reached Milan by the 
shortest route and under the most favourable condi- 
tions. The fact that the passage \vas difficult and 


considered impossible favoured his designs. He ar- 
rived at Milan before the Austrians knew that he was 
in Italy at all. He was joined in the capital of Lom- 
bardy by the detachments which he had expected ; 
he guarded the passes of the Ticino with half his 
forces, and with the rest occupied the road to Pia- 
cenza. He lost Genoa, but the capture of that city 
had delayed the Austrians so as to deprive them of 
their one chance of escape. Their communications 
were cut off, they were forced to fight at Marengo 
with their faces to their line of retreat, and when they 
were defeated nothing remained for them but to 

On June 12 General Moncey arrived from Como. 
Having waited until the army of Moreau was on the 
point of forcing the Austrian General Kray as far as 
Ulm, he had crossed the St. Gothard in storms of 
rain and had driven the enemy from the castle of 
Bellinzona. He brought to Bonaparte a reinforce- 
ment of well-seasoned soldiers, fifteen thousand in 
number. Bonaparte left Milan on June 9, at eight 
o'clock in the morning, and proceeded to Pavia. On 
his road towards the Po he heard the sound of artil- 
lery from morning to evening. Xot knowing what 
had occurred, he hastened to Stradella, and found the 
fortress full of wounded soldiers. It was Lannes, 
who had been fighting the battle of Montebello against 
the Austrian General Ott, who had commanded in the 
blockade of Genoa. Lannes had crossed the Po in 
spite of considerable resistance and had encamped op- 
posite the Austrian army which occupied ^rontebello 
and Casteo'wio. Lannes had not intended to attack, 
and was waiting for reinforcements, but Ott began 
the battle at daybreak with a force of at least fifteen 
thousand men. Lannes had onlv half that number, 


but he fought splendidly and was aided by Victor, 
who had crossed the river in another place. The 
Austrians struggled with desperation to regain their 
communications and to open the road to Mantua. 
When Bonaparte arrived the battle was already won. 
The enemy had lost three thousand killed and six 
thousand taken prisoners. Lannes himself was drip- 
ping with blood. 

The next three days Bonaparte remained at Stra- 
della, in a strong position. His right rested on the 
Po and the marshy flats in its neighbourhood; his 
centre blocked the great highway, supported by large 
villages and solid farmhouses built of stone; while 
his left was posted on the gentle elevations which 
make the defile of Stradella famous in military his- 
tory. On the 11th Desaix, who was returning from 
Egypt, and who had lost a week in quarantine at Tou- 
lon, arrived at headquarters with Savary and Eapp as 
his aides-de-camp. He and the First Consul dined to- 
gether and spent the night in talking over the affairs 
of Egypt. Desaix Avas burning to distinguish him- 
self and to avenge himself for the insults which ho 
had suffered from Admiral Keith at Leghorn. He 
was placed in command of the second division. At 
the same time he had the presentiment of death. He 
said to Eugene Beauharnais : " The Austrian balls 
knew me once, but I am afraid that they will recog- 
nise me no more." 

Bonaparte was determined to advance. He was only 
afraid lest Melas should escape him. He reached 
Voghera early on the morning of June 12. The Scri- 
via was crossed on the following day. On the same 
morning Bonaparte arrived at San Giuliano and saw 
before him the plains of Marengo. 



BoNAPAKTE had expected to find the whole of the 
Austrian army ranged in battle array before him. 
When no one came to oppose him he supposed that 
Melas had retreated to Genoa, and gave orders to 
Desaix to proceed to Rivalta, to send scouts as far as 
Novi, and to watch the communications of the enemy 
with the southern coast. At last he discovered the 
Austrian advanced guard at Marengo, and gave 
Victor orders to attack and to drive the Austrians 
across the Bormida. 

Melas had held a council of war in Alessandria 
on June 12, in which he explained the condition of 
affairs to his brother generals. He said that the Aus- 
trian cavalry was excellent, their artillery superior 
to that of the enemy ; that the plain between the Bor- 
mida and the Scrivia was exactly suited for an en- 
gagement under these conditions, and that they had 
every chance of victory. The Austrians numbered 
30,837 men, of whom 7,343 were cavalry, and they 
had 92 guns in reserve, besides the ordinary artillery 
of the line. Ott, in command of the left, was to at- 
tack the French at Sale, the centre was to advance 
first to Marengo and then to San Giuliano, then to 
move towards the left and to press the French at Sale 
both in flank and rear. If these operations suc- 
ceeded the enemy would be driven back upon the Po 
and the Austrians might recover their communica- 


tions. If Ott found the force opposed to liim too 
strong he was to retire behind the Bormida. A 
strong bridge-head was formed on the Bormida, and 
two bridges of boats were thrown across the stream. 
Evei-ything was done to rouse the spirits of the Aus- 
trian army and to supply their material needs. 

The decisive battle of Marengo was fought on June 
14, 1800. At eight in the morning the Austrians 
crossed the Bormida by their two bridges in excellent 
order. O'Beilly drove back the French advanced 
guard under Gardanne into the valley of Marengo, 
and there w^aited until Iladdick and Keim had been 
able to come up. But the passage through the 
bridge-head was narrow and the Austrians were com- 
pelled to move slowly. General Ott, according to 
the plan which had been arranged, moved on theleft 
towards Ceriolo Avith the view of outflanking the 
French. General Victor did his best to maintain 
possession of Marengo, and informed the First Con- 
sul that the whole of the Austrian army was before 

In front of Marengo flows a deep and marshy 
brook, the Fontanone, which, after many windings, 
pours its M-aters into the Tanaro. The hardest 
struggles took place upon the banks of this stream, 
between Eivaud and Haddick, who was severely 
wounded. Melas sent reinforcements to the relief 
of Iladdick, and the Austrians attacked a second time, 
but were again repulsed. An attempt w^as made by 
Piladi to cross the brook further to the south, but 
he was driven back by Kellermann, the hero of 
Valmy, with great loss. Melas now put forth all 
his strength. Lattermann was able to traverse the 
brook with his grenadiers and to maintain himself 
upon the right bank. After a murderous conflict 


the village of Marengo came into the posession of the 
Austrians. They had met with equal success upon 
the left. Ott had been able to reach Castel Ceriolo, 
his point of attack, and had outflanked the corps of 
Lannes, who had been compelled to retreat. It was 
now ten in the morning. After a two hours' 
struggle the Austrians had conquered and the French 
had given wav. The battle-field was strewn with 
dead and wounded. 

At this juncture Bonaparte appeared upon the 
field with his consular guard, composed of eight hun- 
dred grenadiers on foot and two hundred on horse- 
back, distinguished by lofty bearskins, encircling the 
man whose presence alone was worth an army. Early 
in the morning he had sent an order to Desaix to 
return as soon as possible, and had received an an- 
swer that he would collect the division Boudet, and 
be at San Giuliano by four in the afternoon. Bona- 
parte in the meantime, surrendering the high-road 
between Marengo and San Giuliano, drew his troops 
off to the right, so as to secure his retreat upon Pavia, 
and be on the flank of the Austrians should they at- 
tack. He refused to acknoAvledge defeat and pre- 
pared for the possibility of victory. 

The grenadiers of the consular guard held firm 
countenance against the dragoons of Lobkowitz, and 
the division of Monnier was sent to retake Castel 
Ceriolo. The division of Victor, shattered in the first 
engagement, was re-formed anew, and ordered to press 
forward on the left wing. The battle began with 
fresh furv, and a^ain with advantaa:e to the Aus- 
trians. The French were again driven out of Castel 
Ceriolo; all efforts to capture Marengo were fruit- 
less. In the general confusion the consular guard, 
with their lofty bearskins, stood like a fortress amidst 


the shocks of the cavalry. But Melas made a desper- 
ate sortie from Marengo, and the French columns 
could no longer stand before him. The only hope of 
Bonaparte lay in the arrival of Desaix, and until he 
arrived there was no resource but in retreat. 

Melas now thought that the victory was sure. He 
was wounded in two places, and two horses had been 
shot under him, so he retired into the fortress of Ales- 
sandria, leaving to General Zach, the chief of his staff, 
the duty of pursuing the French. He next sent 
couriers in all directions to announce his victory and 
the defeat of Xapoleon. Zach formed his troops in 
a single column, with two regiments of infantry in 
the van, then the grenadiers, and the baggage in the 
rear. He marched along the high-road from Maren- 
go to San Giuliano, believing himself secure from 
further attack, his left protected by O'Reilly, his 
right by Keim and Haddick. 

About five o'clock in the afternoon, or, according to 
Bonaparte, about three, Desaix arrived. He had 
turned back at the sound of the cannon, even before 
the orderlies despatched by the First Consul had 
reached him, and had marched all day in the direc- 
tion of Marengo. As soon as he reached San Giu- 
liano he rushed to his commander-in-chief, while the 
guards formed a circle around them. Bonaparte ex- 
plained the position of things. Desaix gazed upon 
the field covered with dead and wounded, and said, 
" Yes, the battle is certainly lost, but it is only just 
five o'clock and there is time to win another." De- 
saix' body of six thousand fresh troops was dra\vn up 
on the Marengo road to oppose the Austrians, who 
were prevented from seeing them by the sinuosities 
of the ground. Bonaparte massed his own troops on 
the left in order to attack the Austrian flank. 


The Austrians were marching, in all the confi- 
dence of victory, with bands playing and colours 
flying, when Marmont received them unexpectedly 
with a hail of bullets from a battery of twelve guns. 
At the same moment Desaix' soldiers fired a volley 
which was vigorously returned. A ball struck 
Desaix in the back of the head and killed him im- 
mediately. He fell without a word. The Austrians, 
disordered by this unexpected onslaught, wavered 
and retreated on the second line. The grenadiers of 
Lattermann attempted to make a stand, but were 
thrown into disorder by Kellermann on the left. The 
column was cut in two, and two thousand Austrians 
were taken prisoners, amongst them General Zach, 
who was now chief in command. There was no one 
to give orders, as Mclas remained in Alessandria, 
believing that he had gained a victory. The defeat 
of the Austrians was consummated by Lannes, and 
the whole line of the French advanced victoriously 
forward. Saint Cyr retook Ceriolo ; the Austrians 
were seized with a panic ; Ott had great difficulty in 
gaining the bridge over the Bormida. The troops of 
Keim and Iladdick were swept away, first over the 
Fontanone, then across the Bormida. 

Melas, roused from his dream by the thunder of 
the cannon, Avhich came nearer and nearer to his city 
of refuge, rode to the banks of the stream and beheld 
with astonishment his glorious victory turned into a 
terrible defeat. The Austrians had the greatest diffi- 
culty in making any resistance. The bridge across 
the river was very narrow, and guns, cavalry, in- 
fantry, waggons, were all mixed in inextricable con- 
fusion. Many pieces of artillery were lost in the 
muddy bed of the stream. The pursuit of the French 
Avas only put an end to by the darkness. It was 


iiiii'lit before Ott crossed the Bormida to his 

The Aiistrians lost eight thousand dead and 
wonndcd and four thousand prisoners; the French, 
six thousand dead and wounded and one thousand 
prisoners. But the death of Desaix outweighed all 
the rest to Bonaparte. Savary was sent to find him 
in order that Bonaparte might embrace him on the 
battle-field, but he only found his corpse, stripped of 
the uniform, but recognisable by the long hair and 
the wounds. It was brought on a horse's back to 
headquarters, and Bonaparte wept over it. Orders 
were given that his body should be embalmed. I^Text 
day at daybreak it ^Tas sent to Milan in a peasant's 
cart, and was buried in the convent of Sant' Angelo. 
In June, 1806, his remains were transferred to the 
monastery of the Great St. Bernard, where thev still 
repose. At his funeral Berthier said: '' Here is the 
man whom the East saluted by the name of Just, his 
country by the name of Brave, his generation by the 
name of Wise, and whom Xaj^oleon now honours 
with a monument." 

At daybreak on the following morning Melas sent 
to propose a suspension of arms, and a convention 
was signed by which the French obtained possession 
of the whole of Xorth Italy as far as the Mincio, in- 
cluding the fortresses of Liguria, Piedmont, Lom- 
bardy and the Legations, Melas being permitted to 
Uptire to Mantua. 

On June 10 Bonaparte reviewed his troops at San 
Gduliano, the soldiers being decorated with oak 
leaves. On the following day he returned to Milan, 
and on June 18, just fifteen years before the battle 
of Waterloo, his triumph was celebrated by a solemn 
Te Deum in the Cathedral. Ten days later he 


arrived at Paris, having in the meantime declared 
the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic. 

There are certain similarities between the battle 
of Marengo and the battle of Waterloo. Jnst as 
Wellington waited anxiously for the arrival of Blii- 
cher to give him the victory, so Bonaparte waited for 
the coming of Desaix, and just as Wellington was 
surprised by the sudden inroad of Napoleon at 
Charleroi, so Bonaparte was surprised to find the 
whole Austrian army arrayed against him on the 
Bormida. At the same time, if Grouchy had pos- 
sessed the qualities of Desaix and, instead of partly 
misinterpreting and partly obeying too strictly some- 
what dubious orders, had marched to the sound of 
the cannon, the issue of that momentous field might 
have been diflFerent and the course of the world's his- 
tory have been changed. 




"We must now consider with what success Morean 
was conducting liis part of tlie operations. Bona- 
parte naturally desired for the success of his own 
plans that the attack against Kray in Germany 
should be made in the most decisive manner. He 
wished to concentrate the French armv between 
Schaffhausen and the Lake of Constance, and to 
break the Austrian communications at Ulm. But 
Moreau was afraid of so bold a scheme and adopted 
a more timid course. He dreaded the possibility of 
having to cross the Rhine in the face of a large body of 
the enemy and adopted various devices to deceive the 
Austrians as to the real motive of his plans. Bona- 
parte did not insist upon his own views, thinking it 
unwise to force upon a general charged with the con- 
duct of a campaign a plan different from that wdiich 
the general had himself originated, even though it 
should be decidedly superior. 

^Morean crossed the Bhine at several points, 
joined with the army of Lecourbe, and defeating 
Kray in a number of engagements at Engen, 
Stockach and ^^losskirch, drove him towards the 
Danube. The famous fortress of Hohentwiel, which 
had hohl out for so many years in the Thirty Years' 
War, was now surrendered by the incompetence of 
the commandant and razed by the French to the 
ground. There was much jealousy between Moreau 


and his subordinate St. Cjr, and the effect of this was 
that the battle of Mosskirch was less decisive than it 
would otherwise have been. But St. Cyr regained 
his reputation by his conduct at Biberach and on the 
Mettenberg, where he induced Kray to believe that 
he was opposed by the whole of the French army and 
frightened him into a retreat to the Iller and to the 
lines of Ulm. The Austrians lost so many men m 
these continued engagements that their numbers were 
very little superior to those of the French, although 
Moreau had, as we have already seen, detached a 
body of sixteen thousand troops under Moncey to as- 
sist Bonaparte. 

Moreau put into action every device to allure Kray 
from his defensive position before Ulm, but without 
effect. At last marching down the Danube, he 
crossed it at Donauworth, and occupying the famous 
battle-fields of Blenheim and Ilochstiidt, threatened 
the communications of Kray with his own country. 
The effect of this was to drive Kray towards the 
north. In the battle of Neuburg, fought on June 28, 
the brave Latour d'Auvergne, who had been called by 
Bonaparte the first grenadier of France, was fatally 
pierced by the lance of an Austrian Uhlan. The 
whole army wore mourning for three days in his 
honour. Every soldier contributed a day's wage to 
provide a silver urn in which his heart might be en- 
shrined. When the roll of his regiment was called 
the name of Latour d'Auvergne was always recited 
first, and a sergeant answered for him, " Fallen on 
the field of honour," a practice which lasted down to 
1814. Moreau erected a monument on the place 
where he fell which he placed under the protection of 
" The Brave of every Xation." In July the French 
reached the line of the Isar, and spread themselves 


over Bavaria, wliile Kray occupied the line of the 
Inn. Both armies needed repose. The armistice 
of Parsdorf was signed on July 15, the effect of 
which was to leave Sonthern Germany in the hands of 
the French for an indefinite period. The armistice 
of Alessandria had heeii signed just a month before. 

Bonaparte used tliis breathing space to strengthen 
his forces both in Italy and Southern Germany. He 
formed a second army of reserve under Macdonald, 
which was to operate in Eastern Switzerland, and to 
leave Moreau free to employ his whole strength upon 
the Isar and the Inn. The government of Vienna 
did not, on their side, neglect their opportunities. 
They restored confidence to the troops by recalling 
the incompetent Generals Kray and Melas. The 
Emperor went in person to tlie army of the Inn, and 
after encouraging his soldiers, left his brother Arch- 
duke John in command. 

The operations of the Austrians M'cre slower than 
those of the E'rench, and the English subsidies were 
grudgingly contributed ; negotiations for peace be- 
tween Austria and France had no effect, even if they 
were seriously meant, and there was no resource for 
the Emperor but to purchase a breathing space by 
further sacrifices. On September 20 the convention 
of Holienlinden prolonged the convention of Pars- 
dorf for a few \veeks by the surrender of the 
fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt. The 
court of Vienna was anxious for peace. The opinion 
prevailed that they were dragged at the wheels of 
England and were prevented from concluding a peace 
witli France which would make for their interests. 
Thugut, who was the founder and the sustainer of the 
coalition, had to bear the brunt of this obloquy. He 
"was allowed to resign his office, but Cobeutzl and 


Lehnbach a\^io succeeded him pursued a similar 
policy. Still, negotiations were begun at Luneville, 
which had been chosen as the seat of a new congress. 
Joseph Bonai3arte and Cobentzl met at Luneville 
on iSTovember 9, and the French plenipotentiary 
asked the following questions: Are you empowered 
to make a treaty 'I Are you empowered to do so 
without the co-operation of England ? Are you 
acting only for the Emperor personally and for his 
Austrian possessions, or are you representing the 
German Empire ? Cobentzl replied that he could 
sign no treaty except with the intervention of an 
English envoy. But he went on to ask whether the 
secrecy of the French government could be trusted, 
and was assured that it could be. He then said that 
Austria would be prepared to make a separate peace 
without England if the negotiations could be kept 
secret till February 1, 1807, and if an English envoy 
might be present at Luneville to cover the negotia- 
tions. Bonaparte replied that he would have no Eng- 
lishman at Luneville, that Austria had the choice 
either of war within forty-eight hours, or of peace on 
the following conditions: (1) The Rhine to be the 
frontier of France. (2) The Mincio to be the frontier 
of Austria and Italy, but Mantua to be surrendered 
to the Cisalpine Republic. (3) The Milanese, the 
Valtelline, Parma and Modena to belong to the Cis- 
alpine Republic. (4) The Legations to go to the 
Grand Duke of Tuscany. (5) Piedmont, Switzer- 
land and Genoa to be independent. If these condi- 
tions were accepted the whole negotiation should be 
kept secret till the time named, and the armistice 
should continue. The Austrians rejected these terms 
and hostilities were renewed on Xovember 22. 



H O H E N L I X D E JT. 

WiiEx the war broke out again, after the deter- 
mination of the armistice, Bonaparte had four hun- 
dred thousand men under arms, including the forces 
in Egypt. Twelve thousand French and eight thou- 
sand Dutch were posted under command of Augereau 
between the Rhine and the Main, to protect the left 
flank of !^Ioroau's army, who lay with one hundred 
and ten thousand men between tlie Inn and the Isar, 
having his headquarters in Munich. Macdonald com- 
manded fifteen thousand men in the Orisons, Brune 
eighty thousand on the Mincio. Besides thistherewere 
eiglit thousand French soldiers in Tuscany, and twelve 
thousand in the north of Italy. The Austrian army 
was inferior to the French both in numbers and in 
quality. It was not till November IT that Moreau 
announced that hostilities would recommence on the 
2.Stli. This left no time to draw troops from Hun- 
gary and Bohemia. It is probable that, all told, the 
forces of the Emperor did not exceed three hundred 
thousand men. 

The fortune of war was to be decided between the 
Inn and tllie Isar. The line of the Inn was easy to 
defend, but the Austriaus conceived tlie unlucky 
scheme of leaving their safe position, turning the left 
flank of the French and attacking them in the rear, in 
order to drive ]\roreau back upon the Lech. In an- 
swer to this, he commanded an advance from Rosen- 


heim to Milhldorf, in order to discover the plans of 
his adversary. On the two last days of November 
the two armies came into conflict. Moreau pushed 
his right wing under Lecourbe to Kosenheim, his 
centre to Wasserburg, and his left to Ampiing. The 
Austrians, who were further in advance with their 
right wing, at first determined to give battle, but, 
frightened by the difficulties of the roads, by the 
heavy rain and the news of Moreau's advance, they 
altered their plans and marched through the valley 
of the Isar towards Hohenlinden. This compelled the 
left wing of the French to retreat, an operation in 
which ^ej greatly distinguished himself hj his cool- 
ness and bravery. 

As soon as Moreau became fully aware of the de- 
signs of the enemy he led his armv on December 2 
into the broad forests which surround Hohenlinden, 
where they were safe from observation. On the fol- 
lowing day the Austrians were marching up the val- 
ley of the Isar and were on the road from Miihldorf to 
Hohenlinden. It v/as on this memorable scene, an 
open space in the middle of thick woods, that the de- 
cisive struggle must be fought. Moreau gave orders, 
the night before, to Richepanse and Decaen to march 
by side-paths through the forest of Ebersberg and to 
fall upon the Austrians at Mattenbott, as they were 
approaching Hohenlinden in a long thin line through 
the wood. The Austrians had very imperfect know- 
ledge of the country in which they were engaged, and 
were still more ignorant of the position of the French. 
It was the middle of winter. A heavy snowstorm 
blinded their eyes, and hid everything from them even 
at a short distance. The roads, bad at the best of 
times, were rendered impassable by melting sleet, and 
by a combination of snow and rain. The Austrian 


columns were separated from each other in the for- 
est, and reached Hohenlinden without the slightest 
idea that they would find the French ready to meet 
them in battle array. 

The battle soon raged with fury. The Austrians, 
as soon as they had disengaged themselves from the 
toils of the forest, attacked with vigour. Moreau 
watched the struggle with the eye of a master, and 
when he saw the Austrian line wavering he cried, 
" Now is the time to advance ; Richepanse and De- 
caen must be harassing their rear." The Austrians 
were driven back into the wood, and the attack of 
Eichcpanse andDecaenwas as unexpected as his own. 
Indeed the cuirassiers had dismounted and were lead- 
ing their horses by the bridle. Owing to the state of 
the roads the artillery could not be brought into ac- 
tion. Infantry and cavalry were mingled in hideous 
confusion. Some detachments fought heroically to 
the death, others offered no resistance and surren- 
dered themselves as prisoners ; they threw their arms 
away and fled into the wood for safety. Ney and 
Richepanse, pressing in from different sides, at length 
met and embraced each other, beside themselves with 
joy. The left wing of the French was not less suc- 
cessful, and the victory was complete. Seven thou- 
sand men had fallen, twelve thousand were taken 
prisoners. Such was the battle of Hohenlinden, 
immortalised by the verse of Campbell. 

The Austrians found it more difficult to get out of 
the wood than they had to enter it. Their first rest- 
ing-place was the Inn, which however was crossed by 
the French on December 9. They were now obliged 
to retire to the line of the Salzach, which was incapa- 
ble of defence. The retreat was disastrous, prisoners 
were made, and gunpowder and guns captured at 

S.\tuL,hj>S I.. K-MlKRoK Ol THE FRENCH. 



every step. On December 20 the French army was 
preparing to cross the Enns, and Vienna itself 
seemed to be in danger. 

The Archdnke Charles now hastened to save the 
defeated army from destruction. He wept when he 
saw the extent of the disaster. He sent to demand an 
armistice, and Moreau accorded one for forty-eight 
hours. ]yioreau was pressed by his generals to ad- 
vance to Vienna, but he replied : " It is better to con- 
quer peace than the capital. I have no news from 
Macdonald or Brune. I do not know whether the 
one has succeeded in marching into the Tyrol, or 
whether the other has crossed the Mincio. Augereau 
is a long w'ay off and is entirely undefended. I do 
not wish to humiliate the Austrians or to drive them 
to despair. It is better to rest now and to content 
ourselves with the peace which is the object of every 

The result was the conclusion of an armistice, 
which included Macdonald and Brune. The whole 
of the Danube vallev and the Tvrol was surrendered 
to the French, as well as the fortresses of Braunau, 
Wiirzburg, Scharnitz and Kufstein. The Austrian 
magazines were placed at the disposal of the con- 
querors. iSTo reinforcements were to be sent to 
Italy unless the generals commanding there refused 
to accept the armistice. The convention was signed 
on Christmas Day. 

Before hostilities came to an end in Italy Mae- 
donald had accomplished his marvellous passage of 
the Spliigen, an exploit even more extraordinary 
than the passage of the Great St. Bernard by Bona- 
parte, because it was undertaken in the middle of 
winter over a far more difficult pass. Macdonald 
was posted in the Grisons with fifteen thousand men 


and received orders to threaten the rear of the Im- 
perial army on the ]\Iincio while Brune attacked in 
front. lie was ordered to pass the Spliigen for this 
pnrpose, and was so impressed with the difficnlty and 
danger that he sent Mathieu I3nmas to Paris to ask 
the opinion of Bonaparte. lie replied that the 
passage was absolntely necessary for the success of 
liis plans, and that an army could, move anywhere 
at any season of the year — wherever, indeed, two 
men could ])laee their feet. Macdouald nerved him- 
self for the effort. Setting out from Thusis on 
N"ovember 21, the rear-guard reached the village of 
Spliigen in five days. The guns were conveyed on 
sledges (it is needless to say that the present magnifi- 
cent road across the pass did not exist), the muni- 
tions of war on mules. Every soldier had to carry 
provisions and ammunition for five days. 

The day after their arrival at Spliigen a terrible 
blizzard broke over the pass and lasted for three 
davs. To ao forward meant death bv avalanche ; to 
reinain, death by starvation. The poles, which mark 
the road, had been blown down, but Macdouald, staff 
in hand, led the way. At length they reached the 
Hospice. j\Iore than a hundred soldiers and as 
many mules lav buried in the snow, and manv of 
those who survived were frost-bitten. Chiavenna 
was at last attained, on December G. The march 
was pursued partly by the Valtelline over the passes 
of Aprica and Touale to Trent, and partly by the 
Eno-adine into the Austrian vallev of the Inn. The 
operations were closed by the armistice of Treviso, 
signed on Januarv 10, 1801, whicli immediatelv 
preceded, the peace of Luneville, signed on Febru- 
ary 9. 





Napoleon was croAvncd Emperor on December 2, 
ISO-i. The answer to this new assumption of power 
was the armed rising of Europe against him, under 
the leadership of England, which is generally known 
as the Third Coalition. Sfapoleon hoped to antici- 
pate the military measures of the continent by strik- 
ing a fatal blow at the power of England. He said 
to Cambaceies: ''Put confidence in me, put confi- 
dence in my activity. I shall astonish Europe by 
the fury and swiftness of my attacks." 

Xapoleon had collected one hundred and fifty thou- 
sand chosen troops on the Erench shores of the Chan- 
nel. For two years and a half ho had practised them 
in embarkation and disembarkation, and had taught 
them how to manoeuyre, steer and work their guns 
under eyery condition of the changing sea. The 
spirit of the soldiers was excellent and they had full 
confidence in their commander. They were con- 
stantly employed in exercises either by sea or land, 
in difffi^inc; trenches, fortifyinc; the shore, or beautify- 
ing their camps. Special boats or barges were as- 



signed to each battalion and company, and every 
man, down to the smallest drnmmer, knew his own 
craft and his place in it. As soon as the signal was 
given, the different arms — infantry, cavalry and ar- 
tillery — were immediately in readiness and marched 
straight to their ships. At the sound of a warning 
gun all the officers dismounted and placed themselves 
at the head of their troops, a second gun ordered them 
to prepare for embarkation, a third was fired for the 
])lacing of non-commissioned officers, a fourth for 
the march. In this manner twenty-five thousand men 
could be embarked in ten minutes and a half. The 
army was full of enthusiasm ; they thought that the 
decisive moment had come at last, but a fifth report 
bade them leave their ships. In thirteen minutes 
they again stood upon the shore in battle array. 

For the success of the scheme it was necessary 
to lure the English fleet away from the Channel. Na- 
poleon in after years was accustomed to talk of this 
mighty enterprise, and to declare that with better 
luck it ^vould have succeeded. lie said that he had 
determined to collect forty or fifty line-of-battle ships 
in the harbour of Martinique, drawn from the ports 
of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol and Brest, to bring them 
back Avith all speed to Boulogne, and then to be mas- 
ter of the sea for fourteen days. His further plan 
was to collect one hundred and sixty thousand men 
at Boulogne, with four thousand ships of transport 
and a huge material of war, to embark with men 
and munition without the enemy suspecting his real 
object. lie imagined that he could do this by using 
rafts and gun1)oats instead of ordinary transports. 
Had he collected some thousands of unarmed trans- 
ports in the Channel the enemy would have known 
that he must wait for the arrival of his fleet. But 


when they saw him building gunboats and floating 
batteries, they would imagine that no escort was 
necessary and would pay less attention to the where- 
abouts of the French fleet. In this way he imagined 
that he had entirely deceived the watchful English ; 
but it may be doubted whether he did not rather de- 
ceive himself. 

Let us see how the plot worked out. Admiral 
Musiessy reached the Antilles on February 5, 1805, 
drawing the English after him. Villeneuve man- 
aged to escape from Toulon. He sailed first to the 
east, then turning round passed the Straits of Gib- 
raltar on March 30 and joined Gravina in Cadiz, 
who had about six Spanish line-of-battle ships under 
his command. Gantheaume was in a similar fashion 
to sail forth from Brest, join Villeneuve, Musiessy 
and Gravina at Martinique, sail back with them to 
Boulogne and hold the Channel whilst the fleet of 
England was dispersed all over the globe. But J^elson 
was too formidable an antgonist. He followed close 
on Villeneuve's track as swiftly as was possible with 
contrary winds. He at first thought that he was aim- 
ing at Ireland ; not till May 5 did he learn that his 
objective was Jamaica. The French had thirty days' 
start of him ; but he hastened to Jamaica. He said 
to his captains : " You may each of you take a 
Frenchman, but leave all the Spaniards to me. Strike 
your flag when I strike mine, but not before." On 
June 4 iSTelson arrived at Barbadoes, but found no 
trace of the French, nor were they visible at Trini- 
dad. He sought them at the mouth of the Orinoco 
and heard that they had sailed northwards. The 
French fleet had received orders to return to Europe, to 
raise the blockade of Ferrol, to set free Gantheaume 
from Brest, and with these united forces to appear in 


the Channel. Villeneuve was to avoid all engage- 
ments which were not absolutely necessary, and to 
come as close to Brest as possible in order that Gan- 
theanrae might co-operate with him. He was told 
that if he could only be master of the Channel for 
fortv-eiffht hours the ffreat scheme would be accom- 
plished. Xapoleon was informed that Villeneuve 
had reached the Azores on June 23, and waited im- 
patiently for his appearance oil the French coast. 

But by this time Xelson began to discover what 
J^apoleon's plan Avas. He had visited all the West 
Indian islands in seventy-ei2,iit davs. When he heard 
that the French were returning to Europe he sent 
some of his swiftest sailers to Portsmouth and Lisbon 
to inform the English government. Xelson was back 
ajTain at Gibraltar on Julv 18. Collina^wood also 
began to suspect the truth. He knew that Xapoleon 
would never risk his fleet without some great end in 
view : that his object must be to lure away the English 
fleet in j^reparation for some important enterprise, 
probably the capture of Ireland. The English gov- 
ernment gave orders to Admiral Stirling, who was 
blockading liochefort, to join Sir Bobert Caldcr at 
Ferrol and to arrive in the neighbourhood of CajDe 
Finisterre in order to intercept the French fleet on 
their return to Brest. These manoeuvres were ac- 
complished by June 15, and Calder went to meet 
the French with fifteen ships. 

The two fleets came in sight of each other off Cape 
Finisterre on Julv 21. The weather was so hazv 
that thev could see nothing of each other until thev 
were quite close. Villeneuve was dislicartened, and 
his men were sick with fever. He was therefore re- 
luctant to en2;ae:e and delaved the commencement of 
the battle from eleven to one. It lasted for four 


hours. The hattle was not verj decisive, but it ruined 
Kapoleon's plans. ISTeither party renewed the con- 
flict on the following day, although both of them 
might have done so. On August 2 Gravina sailed to 
Ferrol and Yilleneuve to Corunna. In this port he 
received the most positive orders from JSTapoleon to 
sail to Brest and to set Gantheaume free from block- 
ade even at the risk of his own destruction. 

Villeneuve left Corunna on August 14, with fore- 
bodings of misfortune. It is possible that if he had 
shown sufficient energy he might have executed the 
commands of his master, because C alder and ]Srelson 
had not as yet united their forces. Xapoleon was at 
the height of expectation. The troops were embarked, 
the artillery and the cavalry were on board, watch 
was kept on the heights to give the first warning of 
the approaching fleet. Lauriston, avIio was with Vil- 
leneuve, wrote to ISTapoleon : " We are sailing to 
Brest," and the Emperor wrote to Gantheaume : " I 
reckon upon your abilities, your steadfastness, your 
character. Set sail and come hither — we are aveng- 
ing the disgrace of six hundred years; never have 
my soldiers risked their lives for a greater object." 
To Villeneuve he said : " Lose not a moment, England 
is ours ! We are prepared ; everything is on board." 

But Villeneuve had not the stomach for such a 
crisis. Hearing from some Danish ships that the 
British fleet was at hand, twenty-five strong, he turned 
back and reached Cadiz on the very day on which he 
was expected at Brest. Gantheaume had ventured 
out, and was drawn up in battle array in the roads of 
Bethune. Cornwallis fired at him from a distance. 
All eyes were turned towards the horizon in the hope 
of sighting Villeneuve, but not a sail was visible, and 


Gantheaume was obliged to seek his old anchorage 
in the evening. 

I^apoleon's wrath was terrible. It fell first upon 
Decres, the Minister of Marine, for having recom- 
mended to him so worthless a sailor. " Your Vil- 
leneuve," he said, " is not even fit to lose a battle. 
What can one say of a man who when a few 
sailors are sick, when he has lost a few masts, or re- 
ceived bad news, loses his head and disobeys his 
orders ? If Xelson and Calder had joined, they would 
be in the Bay of Ferrol and not on the open sea. That 
is quite simple and obvious to every one who is not 
blinded by fear." He ordered that the command of 
the fleet should be given to Gantheaume. 

Decres had the courage to reply that Xapoleon's 
enterprise was impossible, and that by retiring to 
Cadiz Villeneuve had saved his country from a great 
disaster. The only safe plan, he said, was gradually 
to build up a fleet which should contend with the 
English. Thus the great scheme for the invasion of 
England came to a sorry end, but l^apoleon till the 
day of his death maintained that it was possible. 




E'apoleon revealed the key-note of his character 
when he said, " I mav lose a battle, but I will never 
lose a minute." When he heard that his plans for the 
invasion of England were shattered he summoned 
Daru into his cabinet. Daru found him walking up 
and down like a caged lion, breaking a gloomv silence 
with passionate exclamations : " What a fleet ! What 
sacrifices for nothing ! What an admiral ! All hope is 
lost ! This wretch Villeneuve, instead of sailing into 
the Channel, retreats to Cadiz. All is over; he will 
be blockaded ! " Then, after a few moments' pause, 
he cried, '' Sit dovn\ and write." He then dictated 
without a moment's hesitation the plan of the wonder- 
ful Campaign of 1805 against the Austrians and the 
Russians. He prescribed in detail the march of the 
troops, the very spots where battles would be fought, 
the gigantic movements of a whole army over a space 
of a thousand miles. On September 23 he wrote to 
Talleyrand : " My resolution is firm. My fleets 
were sighted on August 1-i at the level of Cape 
Ortegal ; if they come into the Channel, then I shall 
havetime to cut the knot of this Coalition in London. 
But if my admirals are too weak for such an enter- 
prise, then I shall break up my camp, invade Ger- 
many with two hundred thousand men and not stop 
until I reach Vienna, and have driven the Austrians 
from Italy and the Bourbons from Naples. I shall 


beat the Austrians and Kussians before thej have 
time to unite. When the Continent is appeased I 
shall return to the shores of the ocean to secure j)eace 
at sea." 

The plan of the allies had been drawn up in 
the following manner: Five thousand English and 
t\ventj-hve tliousand Russian troops were to land 
in Naples from Malta and Corfu, drive out the 
French, and advance into Lombardy. An Austrian 
army of one hundred and forty-two thousand men 
under the command of the Archduke Charles was to 
conquer Mantua and Peschiera, expelling the French, 
and then entering Switzerland. Another Austrian 
army of fifty-three thousand men under Archduke 
John was to be posted in the Tyrol andthe Vorarlberg 
to maintain communications between the army in 
Lombardy and the forces under Mack. This general 
at the head of eighty-three thousand was awaiting on 
the Lech the arrival of ninety thousand Russians, 
With this united strength he was to march into 
Switzerland and press on into Franche-Comt^. Be- 
sides this, twenty thousand Russians were to sail 
from Reval to Stralsund, to join there with twelve 
thousand Swedes and a few thousand English and to 
proceed to the reconquest of Hanover. If, as was 
probable, Prussia joined the Coalition, her armies 
were to l)e directed against Holland on the middle 
Rhine. Such was the scheme of a great concentric 
attack, the success of which depended on the exact- 
ness with which it was carried out. 

The mistakes and weaknesses of the Austrians will 
appear in the sequel, but in the designs of ISTapoleon 
there were no weaknesses and no mistakes. He after- 
wards spoke of his plan of campaign as " Granite 
of which no envy can contest the glory." He showed 


himself a general worthy to rank with Caesar, simple 
and grandiose in conception, unwearying in minute- 
ness of detail, swift and exact in execution. Europe 
was struck dumb with admiration and amazement. 

The Austrians had sent their best generals and 
their most trustworthy troops to Italy, thinking that 
Napoleon was sure to command there in person, in 
the scene of his youthful triumphs. But the Em- 
peror had determined to leave the defence of Italy 
to Massena, whose tenacity could be trusted, and who 
could support himself on the Adige and the Mincio 
as he had before held out in Genoa. He reckoned 
that with fifty thousand seasoned troops Massena 
could keep head against the Archduke Charles for 
a month and give i^apoleon time to strike such de- 
cisive blows that it would be necessarv to recall the 
Archduke into Germany; Massena could then follow 
him and join Xapoleon on the Danube. 

Xapoleon determined that he would himself ad- 
vance with all speed to the Danube, and defeat first 
the Austrians and then the Russians before they had 
time to unite. This could only be done if his plan 
were carried out with the utmost celerity and the- 
strictest secrecy. The army of England was to be 
moved with incredible rapidity to the banks of the 
Danube, the Russians to be surrounded before they 
were aware of the approach of an enemy, the Russians 
defeated and peace enforced in Vienna. This was 
the plan which iSTapoleon dictated in five hours to 
Daru. Finally, he said : '' Travel to Paris, but give 
out that you are going to Ostend. Prepare all orders 
for mobilisation, for marching, and for the commis- 
sariat in siich a way that they only need my signa- 
ture. Do all this yourself, let no one else have a 
hand in it." 


Bernadotte was now in Hanover with twenty thoii- 
sand men ; he was to collect half of these in Gottin- 
gen and the other half in Hanover. lie was to send 
six thonsand men to Hameln and to provision their 
fortress for a year. After twelve marches he was to 
reach Wiirzbnrc; on September 20, and then take com- 
mand of twenty thousand Bavarians. He was to pay 
for everything in ready money and preserve the strict- 
est discipline. In a similar manner Marmont, who 
was posted at Xijmegen with twenty thousand men 
and forty well-equipped guns, was to set out on Sep- 
tember 1, and follow the course of the Rhine until 
he reached Mainz. From that point he was to arrive 
at Wiirzburg on September 23. 

The array of England was to break up on August 
25. The camj) of Ambleteuse, under the command 
of Davout, was to proceed by Lille, ISTamur, Luxem- 
burg and Deux Fonts to Mannheim ; that of Bou- 
logne, under Soult, by Saint Omer, Douay, Verdun, 
and Metz to Spires; that of Montreuil, under Lannes, 
by Arras, liheims, Xancy and Saverne to Strasburg. 
Xey was to march to Weissenburg. Each of these 
camps was to march in three divisions, with one day 
between their movements. By September 24 the 
whole of the troops would be in the neighbourhood 
of the Rhine. The cavalry w^ere spread about over 
Alsace; the Imperial Guard marched from Paris to 
Strasburg. These movements were so little known 
to the enemy that the Austrian government heard 
nothing of the plan till the end of September. The 
spirit of the soldiers was excellent. They marched 
Avith bands playing, singing patriotic songs, and 
shouting, " Vive I'Empereur ! " When they reached 
the Rhine each soldier received an overcoat and two 
pairs of shoes. In order the better to conceal his 


plans Napoleon remained for six days in Boulogne, 
which he did not leave till September 2. He reached 
Malmaison on September 3. He stayed at Paris 
exactly three weeks, working all the time with inex- 
haustible energy. On September 24 he left the 
capital for Strasburg, commissioning his brother 
Joseph to preside over the Senate, Louis to raise 
troops and form a National Guard, and Camba- 
ceres to take charge of the Council of State. All 
matters were to be communicated to him in his 
absence and the final decision was to rest with the 
Emj^eror. A courier was despatched to head- 
quarters every day, and, if it was absolutely neces- 
sary for a Minister to do anything on his own ac- 
count, he was held personally responsible for his 
actions. Napoleon remained the ruler of Paris and 
of France even in the midst of his army. General 
Brune was left in Boulogne to defend the sea-coast, 
Lefebvre was in Mainz, and Kellermann in Stras- 
burg. Josephine desired to accompany her husband 
in the campaign, but she was only allowed to go as 
far as Strasburg. Talleyrand w^as also to remain in 
that frontier fortress for the present, while Maret 
attended the Emperor in the capacity of Minister. 

On October 1, 1805, Napoleon crossed the Rhine 
and set foot on German soil. He was greeted by the 
Elector Palatine, and Baden promised a contribution 
of three thousand troops to the Grand Army as well 
as transport and provisions. Wiirtemberg followed 
this example and contributed about six thousand men. 
This country remained faithful to the alliance till 
the catastrophe of 1813. The motive in each of 
these cases Avas on the one hand the difficulty of neu- 
trality and on the other the desire for an enlarge- 
ment of territory and an advancement in rank. These 


hopes were not disapjiointed — Wiirtcmberg became a 
Kingdom, and Ijadcn a Grand Duchy. 

Meanwhile Napoleon's generals were advancing 
with the utmost speed along the routes marked out 
for them. The cavalry under Murat, supported by a 
part of Lannes' corps, entered the depths of the 
Black Forest, and, passing by what are now magnifi- 
cent roads through the hills, advanced to the highest 
point at Freudenstadt, and then down to Rottweil 
and Xeustadt. Lannes' main body, crossing the 
Rhine at Strasburg, moved to the north through Stutt- 
gart to Xeresheim, and was followed along the same 
road by Xapoleon with the Guard. His plan was to 
make Mack believe that the main attack would be in 
front, and to induce him to preserve his position on 
the Iller between Ulm and Memmingen. In the 
meantime he would push on with his left wing to- 
wards the Danube, cross it at Donauworth and Ingol- 
stadt, and occupy Mack's rear in such a manner that 
he should not be able to retreat to the Lech or the Isar. 
Mack would then be compelled to surrender, and iSTa- 
poleon with his collected army would meet the Rus- 
sians whom Mack was expecting. 

Napoleon used every art to deceive Mack's vigi- 
lance, which was not very great. He sent a spy into 
liis camp to persuade him that the French were at- 
tacking from Freiburg along the old road by the Hol- 
lenthal. He also induced him to believe that a revo- 
lution had broken out in Paris and that the French 
were in retreat. In the meantime Napoleon's troops 
moved from point to point as accurately as if they 
were machines. The decisive moment arrived at the 
end of the first week of October. Soult occupied the 
important bridge at Donauworth, ]\Iurat another 
bridge a few miles higher up. On the evening of Oc- 


tober 7, sixty-five thousand French were posted on 
the right hank of the Danube, and soon occuj)ied 
the ground between the Iller and the Lech. On the 
same day Xapoleon reached Donauworth and made 
arrangements for meeting the Russians and for cut- 
ting off Mack's retreat to Munich. Murat and Lannes 
took a post between Uhn and Augsburg, which was 
occupied by Soult. Davout crossed the river at iSTeu- 
burg, below Donauworth, and Bernadotte with his 
Bavarian troops at Ingolstadt. On October 12 the 
Bavarians regained possession of their capitaL 

The toils were gradually closing round the un- 
haj)py Mack, and the process of investing his army 
was left mainly to Murat and ISTey. Xapoleon him- 
self reached Augsburg on October 9. Mack's only 
chance of safety would have been to retreat south- 
wards towards the Tyrol, which he could have reached 
in two or three davs. He would have ioined the armv 
there and united himself with the Austrian army in 
Italy, which would liave been a serious blow to Xa- 
poleon's plans. But Mack remained paralysed and 
unable to move, like the rabbit before the cobra. On 
October 9 there was a serious enoagement at Giinz- 
burg for the possession of three bridges. The Aus- 
trians fought bravely and the French suffered liea^'v' 
losses, but they obtained possession of one of the 
bridges and the Austrians were compelled to retreat, 
with the loss of two thousand men. On the following 
day thev returned to Ulm, tired, disheartened and 
without confidence in their general. 

The Archduke Ferdinand has the credit of having 
foreseen the inevitable disaster. After the battle of 
Giinzburg he told Mack that he should hold him re- 
sponsible for all the consequences of his actions, 
that the only hope of safety lay in a speedy march to 


Xordliiigon, where an openinj":; was still left in the 
iron ring of investment. In this way it would be pos- 
sible to reach Bohemia and act in the rear of the 
French army. This plan might have been possible 
on October 10, but every day and every hour made it 
less likely to succeed. At last on October 13 Mack 
gave way to the pressure of his colleagues and pre- 
pared for a retreat to ISJ'ordlingen. But no sooner 
were the orders given than they were recalled. Mack 
was informed that the English had landed at Boulogne 
and were marching towards Paris, that the French 
army was in retreat, and that in two days there would 
not be a single French soldier in the neighbourhood 
of Ulm. 

Napoleon, on tlie other hand, was preparing for a 
decisive battle. He issued a manifesto to his soldiers 
in the following words : '" Except for this army 
which stands in your way we should now be in 
London, and should have avenged the insults of six 
hundred years, and given freedom to the seas. To- 
morrow you will fight against the allies of England. 
The day which da^\^ls to-morrow will be a hundred 
times more important than Marengo. You will be 
the marvel of the future. It is not enough to con- 
quer the enemy. ISTo! not a single man of the 
enemy's army, must escape us." 

On October 14 was fought the battle of Elchingen, 
in wliich the large abbey of tliat name was bravely 
defended by the Austrians. But after three hours' 
conflict the Austrians were driven back with the loss 
of three thousand men, and that evening Napoleon 
slept in the abbey. Ney, who was the hero of the 
day, received at a later period the title of the Duke 
of Elchingen. On the same evening the French 
stood round Ulm in a half circle, but retreat was still 


possible either to Bohemia or the Tyrol. A council 
of war was held, in which the danger of the whole 
army becoming prisoners was insisted upon. But 
Mack's sole idea was to attack N^apoleon. He de- 
clared that it was the French who were in a desperate 
condition ; that the recent assaults were only made 
with a view of covering their retreat. He said that 
a revolution had broken out in Brabant and France, 
that Xapoleon was hastening to the Rhine and that 
the retreat would beein on the following dav. After 
many hard words, in which Mack threatened to cut 
off the Archduke's head, a retreat was decided upon. 
But it was too late. 

Napoleon now determined to make an end, and the 
storming of Ulm was fixed for October 15, and com- 
mitted to the charge of Xey and Lannes. The 
Austrians offered but little resistance and the 
Michelsberg and the Frauenberg were captured, and 
Segur was sent to demand the capitulation of the gar- 
rison. Mack was beside himself with rage. " You 
see men before you," he cried, " who are ready to shed 
their last drop of blood in self-defence." Segur 
poiiited out that he was surrounded by more than 
one hundred thousand French troops, that the Rus- 
sians were far away, that the line of the Inn was 
occupied by sixty thousand French, and that Arch- 
duke Charles was detained on the Adige by Massena 
and could not possibly come to his assistance. Two 
days later Mack had an interview with ISTapoleon 
himself, the result of which was a capitulation. The 
French were to enter Ulm on the following day. If 
before midnight on October 25 no Austrian army 
came to their rescue, the whole of the troops in Ulm 
were to lay down their arms, declare themselves 
prisoners of war and be conveyed to France. The 


officers wore to return to their country under a pledge 
not to tight against France during the remainder of 
the campaign ; their arms and all munitions of war 
were to remain the property of the French. 

Napoleon succeeded in shortening the delay. On 
October 20 twenty-seven thousand Austrians sur- 
rendered to the conqueror. ISTapoleon stood at the 
foot of the Michelsberg, his infantry in a semicircle 
behind him, liis cavalry in a line before him ; and be- 
tween the two marched the Austrians in pairs and 
laid their arms at his feet. 

To have enforced the capitulation of Ulm was a 
triumph of military skill. The Third Coalition be- 
tween England, Austria, Russia and Prussia was en- 
tirely broken. The Austrians were crushed before 
any of their allies had time to assist them, and before 
they were able to collect their own forces together. 
This disaster was a terrible blow to Pitt. In the 
autumn of 1805 he was standing in a house at Bath, 
looking at a portrait of Quin, the actor, when sud- 
denly the noise of rattling hoofs was heard along the 
pavement. He looked out of the window and saw 
a mounted courier carrying a post-bag ga]loping up 
the street. " Those despatches are for me," he cried. 
He stopped the messenger, read the despatches and 
fell into a swoon from which it needed a strong 
draught of brandy to revive him. He regained his 
senses, but his face never recovered its natural hue, 
and the ashy paleness then impressed upon his 
features remained till his death J^o wonder that a 
few days before that event he perceived a map of 
Europe hanging on the wall, and said, " Roll up that 
map, we shall never want it more." 

On October 21 Xapoleon issued a proclamation to 
his army in which he boasted that in fourteen days 


they had finished a campaign, they had driven the 
troops of the House of Austria from Bavaria, and 
replaced the allies of France in the government of 
their States. " Of one hundred thousand men 
which formed this army," he continued, " sixty 
thousand are our prisoners; they will replace in 
agricultural labour the soldiers whom we have sum- 
moned to arms. Two hundred guns, ninety ban- 
ners, all the generals are in our power; only fifteen 
thousand of the enemy have escaped." On the very 
day that these proud words were spoken was fought 
the battle of Trafalgar, which it is not within our 
province to narrate, which annihilated the navies of 
France and Spain, and dealt them a blow from which 
they have not recovered at the present day. 




Aftek the destruction of Mack's army at Ulm, 
Napoleon hastened to Vienna. He had nothing to 
oppose him excepting an army of fiftv thousand men, 
commanded bv Ivutusov and the Austrians who had 
been saved from the capituhation by Kienmayer and 
Meerveldt. Having ordered the fortifications of 
Ulm and Memmingen to be destroyed, N^apoleon 
marched to Augsburg, making the Lech the line of 
his operations instead of the Danube. His safety 
now lay in the speed of his operations. The longer 
the line of his communications, the greater were 
the dangers to which he was exposed. He had to 
cross many rivers, to run the e:auntlet of the remains 
of the Austrian army, and the reinforcements which 
were pouring in from the eastern provinces and from 
Russia. It was possible that Archduke Charles, 
hastening up from Italy, might reach Vienna before 
him ; that Prussia might take up arms and assail him 
in the flank ; that the Archduke Ferdinand, who was 
collecting an army in Bohemia, might cut his line of 
operations in two ; that the combined army of Rus- 
sians, Swedes, and English might press forward with 
rapidity; and that another allied force of Russians, 
English, and Neapolitans might attack Lombardy. 
These dangers and difficulties would have dismayed 
any ordinary man, but the greater his peril the more 
remarkable became the clearness of his vision and 


the intrepidity of his soul. On October 24, 1805, 
three days after the proclamation of Ulm, Napoleon 
was received in Munich with enthusiasm. On the 
following day the French army moved towards the 
Inn. Ney received orders to march into the Tyrol 
and to give his hand to Augereau, who was bringing 
a force of twenty-five thousand men from Bordeaux 
by way of the Arlberg. Bernadotte and ]\Iarniont 
were despatched to cross the Inn in its upper waters 
and to distract the attention of the enemy from the 
main advance. ISTapoleon himself, with the divisions 
of Davout Soult, and Lannes, with the guard and 
the reserve cavalry, were to cross the Inn in the 
neiffhbourhood of I3raunau. In the meantime Du- 
pent was to make himself master of Passau. 

These movements were carried out with marvellous 
rapidity and exactness. The Austrians were too 
much astonished to resist. The fortress of Braunau 
fell into the hands of the French, without a struggle, 
well supplied with all munitions of war. ISTapoleon 
made it the headquarters of supply to his army in its 
future operations, and confided it to the care of 
Lauriston. JSTapoleon remained for a few days in 
Linz, and from this place despatched a division along 
the left bank of the Danube, partly to hinder the 
operations of the Archduke John, who was collecting 
troops in Bohemia, and partly to provide against the 
second army which the Emperor Alexander was col- 
lecting in Moravia. He also formed a flotilla, for 
the purpose of conveying supplies, artillery and am- 
munition down the Danube, and also of affording 
rest to foot-weary soldiers. The flotilla also served 
the purpose of a floating bridge, as by its means ten 
thousand men could be conveyed from bank to bank 
in the course of an hour. 


Mortier was placed in command of the left bank 
colnmn, and JSTaj^oleon's wish was that both columns 
should advance upon Vienna in parallel lines, keep- 
ing as nearly opposite to each other as possible. This 
plan was spoiled by the impatience of Murat, whose 
vanity led him to desire to enter Vienna as speedily 
as possible. Thus on November 11 Murat was, with 
his cavalry at Burkensdorf, close to Vienna, when 
Mortier had not advanced further than Diirrenstein, 
the castle in which Richard, King of England, was 
confined on his return from the Crusades, and where 
it is said that he was discovered by the song of the 
faithful Blondel. Here he came in conflict with 
the Russians, some of whom also crossed to the left 
bank. The French divisions were divided by a day's 
march, and the flotilla was not in sight. The French 
were in considerable danger and suffered heavy 
losses. The Russians took two thousand prisoners, 
including a whole regiment of dragoons ; the division 
of Grazan was almost destroyed. Napoleon was 
much delighted with the gallant defence made by the 
French ; he praised Mortier, recalled him to the right 
bank and placed Bernadotte in charge of the left 
division. All the more severe was the wrath and 
contempt which he poured on the head of Murat, 
who had caused the disaster. He wrote : " I can- 
not approve of the manner in which you haste ahead ; 
you run like a fool, and pay no attention to the com- 
mands which I send to you. Instead of covering 
Vienna, the Russians have marched over the bridge of 
Krems, you have lost me two days, and have had 
nothing before your eyes except the vain glory of 
being the first to enter Vienna. There is no glory 
where there is no danger, and there is no danger in 
entering a capital which is not defended." 


Murat was the first to enter Vienna. His soldiers 
marched into the town at midday on ISTovember 17 ; 
they hurried through the streets with all haste, as 
they were anxious to get possession of the Tabor 
bridge over the Danube as soon as possible. This 
important bridge was won by a trick. It was only 
built of wood, and every preparation had been made 
to destroy it as soon as the French appeared in force. 
Cannon were posted on the left bank, the bridge had 
been carefully mined, and a single spark would set it 
in flames. Murat and Lannes, spreading the report 
that an armistice had been signed, held the Austrian 
commander in conversation while their soldiers 
gradually approached the bridge and threw the ma- 
terials which were ready for its destruction into the 
stream. The Austrian soldiers saw that they were 
being cheated, and a sergeant urged the general to 
give orders for firing the train ; but Lannes ex- 
claimed, with much presence of mind, " How can you 
allow a soldier to address you thus ? Where is the 
Austrian discipline so famous throughout Europe ? " 
The soldier was arrested for his boldness of speech, 
the bridge was occupied by the French, the guns re- 
moved and their gunners captured. The seizure of the 
bridge over the Danube had an important influence 
over the course of the campaign. The decisive battle 
would otherwise have been fought in Hungary in- 
stead of Moravia, and the result might have been 
very diiferent. 

As soon as Kutusov heard that the bridge over the 
Danube had been captured by the French he began a 
retreat into Moravia, preferring that to Bohemia be- 
cause he was aware that a second Russian army was 
on the march towards Olmiitz. ISTapoleon gave orders 
for the union of the divisions of Soult, Lannes and 


Murat in order that thej might cut off the retreat of 
Kutusov by reaching Hollabrunn before him. Kutu- 
sov despatched Prince Bagration with seven thousand 
men to Hollabrunn, which he succeeded in reaching 
on November 15, while Kutusov was able to give his 
troops some much-needed repose. Murat imagined 
that he had the whole of the Russian army before 
him, and was therefore willing to listen to Kutusov's 
deceitful proposals for an armistice, being beguiled 
by the flattering suggestion that he should be the 
first to make peace as he had before been the first 
to enter the capital of the Kaiser. When jSTapoleon 
heard of the armistice he refused to ratify it and 
ordered an immediate attack. This was made with 
success, but Kutusov had been able bv his trick to 
reach Olmiitz with his army, where he knew that he 
should meet his Emperor, Alexander I. The plans 
of N^apoleon for annihilating the army of Kutusov 
before he could be reinforced had entirelv failed, 
owing partly to the impetuosity of Murat, and partly 
to the admirable strategy of the Russian general. 

Kutusov i:)itched his camp in a favourable position 
at Olschan, close to Olmiitz, on ISTovember 22, and two 
days later the advanced guard of the second Russian 
army under the command of the Grand Duke Con- 
stantine was able to join him. They were in a splen- 
did position, commanding a plain in their front, their 
rear protected by earthworks, a marsh on their right, 
and a river before their lines. Kutusov had care- 
fully selected this position, and would have had a good 
chance of protecting it even against the onslaughts of 
Napoleon. But the young military party induced him 
to desert it and to attack Napoleon on the way to 
Briinn, and this proved his ruin. 

The two Emperors, Francis II. of Austria and 


Alexander I. of Russia, had their headquarters at 
Olmiitz. Francis was confined to his bed with fever, 
the result of continual diseases. He was stronglj^ in 
favour of deferring an engagement until the Arch- 
duke Charles had arrived from Italy, who was march- 
ing at the head of an army of eighty thousand men. 
jSTapoleon could not maintain his position at Briinn, 
the camp at Olschan was unassailable, and when the 
new army arrived and had occupied the passage of 
the Danube the French Emperor would be between 
two fires. Seldom have such momentous results de- 
pended upon such narrow issues. 

Everything depended upon the decision of Alex- 
ander. He had at first been in favour of delay, but 
on November 24 a review was held, to celebrate the 
arrival of the guard, in which the young Emperor was 
received by the troops with the wildest enthusiasm. 
The Russian armv had been victorious at Diirrenstein 
and Hollabrunn: what might not be expected when 
they had their sovereign in their midst ? Alexander 
was young, inexperienced, greedy of glory, open to 
flattery. He was inclined to believe that the French 
could not resist him. On the following day Savary 
arrived in the Russian camp bearing a letter from 
Napoleon, asking for a personal interview. The 
Tzar sent Prince Dolgoruki with Savary to iSTapoleon, 
and a conversation took place between them on pos- 
sible conditions of peace. Dolgoruki, who, although 
at the head of the Young Party, was probably not a 
very experienced politician, produced an unfavour- 
able effect on Napoleon, and received himself the im- 
pression that the French army was on the verge of a 

The impression was deepened by a cavalry en- 
gagement which took place on November 28, in which 


the Russians were victorious. Dolgoruki com- 
manded, and Alexander was present. They believed 
that under the eyes of their sovereign the Russian 
army could do anything. The policy of waiting for 
the Archduke Charles and for the Prussians was 
given up, and an advance against Napoleon resolved 
upon. Czartoryski argued in vain that they were 
marching into the jaws of a hero of a hundred fights, 
and that in three weeks the Prussians would join 
them with one hundred and fifty thousand. They 
had only to wait and all would be well. These words 
were spoken to the wind. The advance was deter- 
mined upon. Alexander undertook the command of 
the troops, Kutusov remaining general-in-chief, but 
without the main responsibility. The advice of the 
Emperor Francis was not asked, as it was feared that 
he might opi^ose the operations. 




I^APOLEON had been established at Briinn since 
November 19 in an admirable position, at the junc- 
ture of the roads which lead to Vienna on the one 
side and to Olmiitz on the other. He now sum- 
moned Bernadotte and Davout to his assistance. He 
invigorated the courage of the army by promising 
large sums of money to them and pensions to all who 
should be wounded. On December 1 the two hosts 
were within gunshot of each other. With proud con- 
fidence he announced to his soldiers that the morrow 
would put an end to the campaign, and that they 
would then retire into winter quarters, while the re- 
inforcements which were being collected in France 
would compel the enemy to a worthy peace. He 
told Haugwitz, who had been sent by the Prussians to 
give N^apoleon some good advice, that he would speak 
with him after the battle, unless he was himself killed 
by a cannon-ball. The soldiers were in the highest 
state of enthusiasm and devotion. The following 
day, the day of the battle, was the anniversary of the 
Imperial coronation. ISTapoleon drank a glass of 
" punch " with his marshals and explained his plans. 
He then slept for a few hours in an armchair. At 
four o'clock in the morning he was at the outposts, 
listening to the noise which arose from the enemy's 
camp, for the thick mist prevented anything from 
being seen. 


The Austrian General Wevrotber liad, after study- 
ing the maps, made an elaborate plan of battle which 
he felt certain would resnlt in the defeat of Xa- 
poleon. Langeron, a French emigre, on hearing it, 
asked Wejrother if he really thought that matters 
would turn out as he expected, and Bagration on 
reading the plan expressed his opinion that the battle 
was already won. The scheme consisted of a design 
to outflank the French and to drive them into Bo- 
hemia, but Napoleon by his last dispositions had 
made the design useless, even before it was at- 

It is difficult for one who visits the field of Auster- 
litz at the present day to understand the features of 
the fight, because the ground has been so completely 
changed by modern conditions of agriculture. We 
will do our best to make it intelligible. Whilst Na- 
poleon stood at the outposts in the early morning the 
French camp was silent, but that of the allies was 
full of motion. The sentries could hardly see each 
other at ten paces, but the great commander witnessed 
the bivouac fires gradually paling towards the north 
and torches moved towards the south. They were 
leaving Pratzen and marching towards Tellnitz, with 
the proud idea of surrounding the French. Na- 
poleon knew that to do this would be to weaken their 
centre. He would shift his troops towards the north, 
fall like an avalanche upon their disorderly col- 
umns and scatter them to the wind. He returned 
cheerfully to his tent posted upon a height. One 
by one his marshals came and spoke to him. He 
gave them all the same advice : to remain quiet, to re- 
strain their enthusiasm, and to await until the enemy 
had incurred all the consequences of their error. 

Owing to the mist the allied army marched on 


within cannon-shot of I^apoleon and his marshals, 
"without an idea that they were in the neighbourhood. 
It had been arranged that the columns should pass 
the defile of the Goldbach in different places, the 
first at Tellnitz, the second between Tellnitz and 
Sokolnitz, the third at Sokolnitz itself, while the 
Austrian cavalry were to seize the monastery of 
Raigern. They were to keep in parallel order, and 
take care that the head of one column should not get 
before the head of another. 

Suddenly the battle burst when the allies least ex- 
pected it. The Austrian hussars were assailed at 
Tellnitz by the French sharpshooters. Tellnitz was, 
however, captured by the first column, which now 
waited for the advance of the second. Davout, who 
had been posted in the monastery of Raigeru, ad- 
vanced and attempted to drive the allies out of Tell- 
nitz, but at this point the French were defeated. 
Similarly the second column was able to drive the 
French from the village of Sokolnitz, and the third 
to occupy the castle of the same name, although 
Davout displayed marvels of energy in their de- 
fence ; for the moment the allies were victorious on 
their left wing. 

But the master of the fight, N^apoleon, remained 
quiet in the centre. He had forbidden any advance 
till nine o'clock. Then, on that winter's morning, 
arose the sun of Austerlitz, blood-red and majestic, 
a presage of slaughter and victory. The mist was 
split asunder, the heights became visible, like islands 
in a sea ; at length a gust of wind dispersed the fog, 
and the battle array of the French became visible to 
all. It was then seen that the heights of Pratzen 
were but feebly held, while the Austrian army was 
engaged in the depths of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz. 


Xapoleon said to Soult, " How long would it take 
yon to occiipj the heights of Pratzen ? " " Less than 
twenty minutes," was the reply. " Then we will 
wait twenty minutes," said the Emperor, " and not 
disturb the enemy in their false movement." At last 
he drew his glove from that soft, tiny right hand 
which Heine has described so well, and said, " l^ow 
is the time." Napoleon rode at the head of his 
marshals, and cried, " The enemy have delivered 
themselves to us by their folly, we will now end the 
war with one shock of thunder." 

The two Emperors were with the fourth division, 
commanded by Kutusov; Alexander in black uni- 
form, Francis in white. Kutusov was just begin- 
ning to advance when the mist lifted, and he saw 
with horror the centre of the French army in battle 
array before him in front of the defiles, whereas he 
imagined that it was behind them. One of the first 
shots fired struck Kutusov in the cheek. He said, 
'" It is not mortal, but there is the mortal wound," 
pointing to the heights of Pratzen. Yandamme and 
Saint Hilaire, Murat and Soult stormed the heights 
on which the Russians Avere posted. A wild scene 
of confusion ensued. The two Emperors were lost 
in the surging throng; no one knew what had be- 
come of Kutusov. The mass of the allies retreated 
towards Austerlitz. In two hours the heights of 
Pratzen, the key of the allied position, were complete- 
ly conquered, and the allied army was cut into two 

Such were the operations on the left and in the 
centre of the allies ; their fortunes fared no better 
U]ion the right. Lannes and Murat were opposed to 
Lichtenstein and Bagration. In accordance with 
Weyrother's plan, Prince Lichtenstein was to seize a 


position which was already in the hands of the 
French. The Grand Duke Constantine, posted on 
his left, performed prodigies of valour, and exhibited 
the greatest steadfastness and endurance. The 
battle on this side raged round Blasiowitz, which 
had been occupied by the French Guard before the ar- 
rival of Lichtenstein. Constantino attacked with the 
bavonet, and the French line beoan to waver, when 
ISTapoleon, who was posted at Blasiowitz, sent the 
cavalry of the Guard to their assistance. Guard 
struggled against Guard, and the Russians captured 
an eagle. Xapoleon sent also reinforcements under 
Rapp, which compelled the Russians to retreat. A 
similar struggle Avas raging on the Olmtitz road be- 
tween Lannes and Bagration. The Russians were 
at length defeated and retreated towards Austerlitz. 
The baggage of the allies fell into the hands of the 
French. The result of the battle on the right wing 
was that two thousand dead and wounded covered 
the field, and that Lannes had made four thousand 

Wlien Xapoleon had severed the centre of the 
enemy he left Bernadotte in possession of Pratzen, 
and with the divisions of Soult and Oudinot followed 
the same line of march which the left of the allies 
had taken in the .morning. His design was to fall 
upon their rear and destroy them entirely. The re- 
mainder of the battle is a tale of flight and slaughter. 
The allies were attacked in the same positions which 
they had captured so valiantly in the early hours of 
the day. In this part of the field were a number of 
ponds, at this time of the year covered with ice. In 
these the Russians took refuge, but the French artil- 
lery was turned upon the frozen surface, and many 
Russians were droA^iied. Imagination has busied it- 


self with the creation of frozen lakes, their treacher- 
ous surface crushed hj the red-hot bullets of the 
French, thousands of the enemy perishing in the last 
rays of the winter sun, but historic truth will not 
admit this exaggeration. The ponds are now dried 
up and it is difficult to estimate their extent, but it is 
probable that the number who perished in them did 
not exceed a hundred. At any rate the victory was 
complete. Those who escaped death or capture fled 
to Austerlitz, and the French occupied the ground 
which the Russians had taken. 

The night came on early and quickly. After the 
fog of the morning had lifted the day was cold and 
clear; clouds rose in the afternoon, and snow and 
rain now began to fall. But all through the winter 
night such Russians as survived retreated from their 
terrible foe. The allies had struggled bravely, 
but they were entirely defeated. The Austrians lost 
about six thousand men ; the Russians acknowledged 
their loss to be twenty-one thousand, but it more prob- 
ably reached thirty-three thousand. Two-thirds of 
their artillery were captured. The loss of the French 
must also have been great, but they prided themselves 
on the possession of one hundred and thirty-six cap- 
tured guns. 

Such was the battle of Austerlitz, one of the great- 
est monimients of Napoleon's military genius. He 
infused a new spirit into the use of troops, although 
he made but little changes in military organisation, 
and confined himself to the improvement of the ma- 
chine which he had received from the Revolution. 
Still his plans had certain necessities for their execu- 
tion which could only be provided by new expedients. 
He required large masses which he could manoeuvre 
rapidly, a numerous cavalry, both heavy and light, for 


the purpose of combat and of exploration, and a pow- 
erful reserve. For the old divisions he substituted 
corps d'armee, equal in number to two or three di- 
visions, with a staff, an artillery and a light cavalry 
of their own. He placed Murat at the head of a 
cavalry of reserve — hussars, dragoons, cuirassiers — 
who would go anywhere and dare everything. As a 
final reserve the Emperor kept in his own hands the 
Imperial Guard, a select army of fifty thousand men, 
all seasoned veterans, attached to the fortunes of the 
Empire and to the glory of their master. He also 
largely increased the number of the artillery. But, 
curiously enough, he made few changes in the arma- 
ments of his troops. They were armed to the end 
with flint muskets, and with old-fashioned cannon. 

After the battle Napoleon placed his headquarters 
in the castle of Austerlitz, from which he dated his 
bulletins, and which he selected to give the name of 
his victory, although the village itself had scarcely 
been included in his sphere of operations. Peace with 
Austria was concluded at Pressburg before the end of 
the year, but the conditions of that pacification belong 
rather to political than to military history. 




The battle of Austerlitz and the peace of Press- 
burg were followed bj great changes in Germany. It 
was Xapoleon's object to weaken Austria as much as 
possible and to destroy the German Empire of which 
she was the head. He was the consolidator of the 
principles of the French Revolution, the enemy of 
feudality and of the old state of things, the " Ancien 
Pegime." In gratitude for their neutrality he raised 
the Electors of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg to the rank 
of Kings, a position which they still maintain. He 
formed the Confederation of the Rhine from these 
two States and others in the south and west of Ger- 
many, and became himself the Protector of it. The 
Holy Roman Empire, which had existed for a thou- 
sand years, came to an end on August 6, 1806, and 
the Emperor Francis II., who had assumed the title 
of Francis II., Emperor of Austria, two years before, 
now laid down his superior title in obedience to his 
conqueror. A number of small princes were " media- 
tised," as it was called, losing their sovereign power, 
but keeping their property and patrimonial rights, 

Prussia had seen the defeat of Austria, and the 
subjection of Southern and Western Germany to the 
power of jSTapoleon, without being aware to what ex- 
tent her own safety was endangered. In iSTovember, 
1805, she had attempted to desert the position of 
neutrality Avhich she had taken up two years before, 


and, as we have seen, had despatched Ilaugwitz to the 
headquarters of Napoleon just before the battle of 
Austerlitz. She then committed the serious fault of 
irritating the conqueror to the utmost without afford- 
ing the slightest assistance to his enemies. The re- 
sult of this was the humiliating treaty of Schon- 
brunn signed by Haugwitz with Napoleon a fortnight 
after the battle, by which Prussia surrendered to 
France the portion of the Duchy of Cleve which lay 
on the right bank of the Rhine, the fortress of Wesel, 
and the principality of Neufchatel; to Bavaria the 
Margravate of Anslaach, receiving in exchange Han- 
over, with the duty of excluding the English from 
the harbours of the Korth Sea. To escape the wrath 
of France she incurred the hostility of England. 
The conditions of the treaty of Schonbrunn were 
made more degrading and exacting by the treaty of 
Paris signed in February, 1806, and Prussia actually 
went so far as to declare war against England, with- 
out improving her relations Avith Napoleon. He 
could only regard such vacillation and meanness with 

It now came to the ears of the Prussian govern- 
ment that Napoleon in his negotiations for peace 
with England had offered the restoration of Han- 
over, which he had already given to Prussia. He 
had also held out to Russia the tempting bait of 
Prussian Poland, and had talked of recompensing 
the Neapolitan Bourbons by the gift of the Hanse 
towns. This was more than their patience could 
bear, and the mobilisation of the Prussian army was 
ordered on August 9. That army was indeed little fit- 
ted to cope with an antagonist like Napoleon. It de- 
pended upon the reputation of Frederick the Great, 
but it had not advanced since his time. It had been 


brought up in the aristocratic ideas of the old regime 
and had no conception of the strength of a 
democratic host. The officers had grown old in 
their stiff uniforms and their pride of rank. The 
machine moved slowly and with effort, and had 
nothina; of the efficiency and hardiness of the French. 
Arms, clothing and commissariat were all of an 
obsolete pattern, more suited for the parade ground 
than for the field. If thev could march with regular- 
ity and precision their arms were too often of no use 
whatever. An enormous amount of baggage fol- 
lowed their movements. It is said that a certain 
lieutenant even took a f)iaQoforte with him on the 
march. Where the French were content to bivouac 
in the open field the Prussians could not dispense 
with their tents. The French drew their supplies 
from the enemv's countrv ; the Prussians carried 
their magazines with tliem. It was an armv whose 
strength existed only on paper. It was composed 
largely of foreigners ; desertions were frequent ; the 
severest punishments were ineffectual to maintain 
discipline, and the troops were as miserably paid as 
they were contemptibly organised. 

Moreover, the position of Prussia was isolated, as 
might be expected from her wavering and uncertain 
policy. Austria was exhausted, England was but 
half-hearted in her cause, and the question of Han- 
over was an apple of discord between them. On the 
other hand, the French were in admirable order, 
posted on the Prussian and Saxon frontiers, ready to 
strike. The best of Xapoleon's marshals, Soult, 
Xey, Berthier, Davout, Bernadotte, Augereau, 
Lannes, and Murat, were posted in Bavaria, Fran- 
conia and ^Yiirtemberg with two hundred thousand 
men. The Prussian army was inferior in nimibers, 


and its divisions were scattered. ]^o adequate 
preparations had been made ; at headquarters there 
was no unity of plan, no energy or decision. The 
generals were advanced in years ; the Duke of Bruns- 
wick numbered seventy-one; Field-Marshal Mollen- 
dorf, who had fought under Frederick the Great in 
Silesia, eighty-one years. ^Notwithstanding this an 
ultimatum was addressed to Napoleon on September 
25, 1806, which could only receive one answer, and 
the war was immediately begun. 

The mass of the French army was posted in the 
valley of the Main, six corps d'armee being con- 
centrated between Wiirzburg and Bamberg. I^a- 
poleon reached Mainz on September 28. The Prus- 
sian army was established in the forest of Thuringia 
on the main road between the Rhine and the heart of 
Germany. Napoleon's plan was to advance by the 
upper waters of the Saale, to turn the Prussian left, 
and to march on to Berlin. For this jDurpose three 
roads lay at his disj)osal, all passing through Fran- 
conia; one from Coburg to Saalfeld, another from 
Kronach to Schleitz, and a third from Bayreuth to 
Hof. He determined to utilise all three, to con- 
centrate in the valley of the Saale, where the roads 
debouched, and to march on to Berlin with a united 
force of two hundred thousand men. Brunswick, 
whose troops were at Erfurt and Weimar, determined 
to await the development of Napoleon's plans, whilst 
Hohenlohe, who was on the right bank of the upper 
Saale, considered himself sufficiently protected by 
detachments placed at Schleitz and at Saalfeld, 
where the roads from the Franconian forest find their 

The French crossed the frontier of Saxony on 
October 8, The central road of the three above 


enumerated was taken by the cavalry of Mnrat, who 
also kept an eve on the other two. With the assist- 
ance of Bernadotte he occupied Saalburg, and at- 
tacked on October 9 at Schleitz ten thousand Prus- 
sians under General Tauenzien. Surprised and dis- 
persed, they were driven back in disorder on the army 
of Hohenlohe. Soult, following the easternmost 
road, reached Hof without meeting an enemy, but on 
October 10 the division of Prince Louis Ferdinand, 
posted at the end of the westernmost road, was at- 
tacked by Lannes. The Prussians were driven back 
and Prince Louis, refusing to surrender, found the 
death which he so earnestly desired. The upper 
waters of the Saale were now entirely in the hands of 
the French, and ISTapoleon, keeping strictly in view 
his objective, Berlin, moved on to Gera, believing 
that on his side Hohenlohe would march rapidly 
down the Saale and reach the valley of the Elbe. 

Hohenlohe, on the contrary, crossed the Saale at 
Jena, in order to join the army of Brunswick. The 
Prussians were now concentrated in a compact mass 
between Erfurt, Weimar and Jena, and IsTapoleon 
determined to attack them there. He made prepara- 
tions to guard the outlets of the river, and with this 
object despatched Bernadotte and Davout to occupy 
the bridges of Dornburg and j^aumburg. By these 
manoeuvres, the Prussian army, which was on the left 
bank of the Saale, was cut off from Berlin by the 
French, who occupied the right bank. ISTapoleon 
thought that he had succeeded in forcing the enemy 
to a battle, but Brunswick, being afraid lest he 
should be cut off from the Elbe and should suffer 
the fate of Mack, determined to escape by the defile 
of Kosen, leaving Hohenlohe to watch the valley of 
the Saale. Hohenlohe, thinking that the French 


were j^ressing on towards the Elbe, thought that he 
had but little to fear on this side of Jena, so he posted 
his troops on the heights which extend from Jena in 
the direction of Weimar, but neglected to occupy the 
town and the passage which lead to the heights. 

Napoleon reached Jena on October 13, where he 
met Lannes, and determined to attack on the follow- 
ing day. He sent his troops up the narrow ap- 
proaches which lead to the high ground, but had some 
difficulty with his artillery. The roads had to be 
enlarged by torchlight under N^apoleou's supervision. 
It needed twelve horses to drag a cannon up the 
hill. The Emperor's tent was pitched in the 
middle of his guard, but few fires were lighted. On 
the other hand, the numerous watch-fires of Hohen- 
lohe blazed forth on tlie road to Weimar, Avhile those 
of the retreating Brunswick glimmered towards the 

The cold bright night was succeeded by a misty 
morning, recalling the great day of Austerlitz. 
]!^apolcon, lighted by torches, visited the troops, and 
advised them to be on their guard against the Prus- 
sian cavalry and to form themselves into squares. 
He said that the Prussians were already cut off from 
the Elbe and the Oder. The battle was engaged be- 
fore the mist had lifted. By nine o'clock Napoleon 
had gained space for the development of his army; 
Augereau came to his assistance from the left, Soult 
from the right ; ISTey and Murat hurried to the scene 
of conflict. After a short rest Napoleon began a 
second attack with fresh troops. Augereau and 
Soult had some difficulty in reaching the plateau up 
the steep paths which led to it, and Ney, who was re- 
pelling the Prussian cavalry with his squares, was in 
danger of being captured. But the issue was soon 


decided by the advance of Napoleon's guard. The 
army of Hohenlohe wavered, broke and fled along the 
road to AVeimar. Riichel, whom he had summoned 
from that city, came too late to help and was involved 
in the disaster. 

The victory was complete. Murat followed the 
fue;itives far bevond Weimar. The field was covered 
with corpses and abandoned arms. The Germans 
had lost twelve thousand dead and wounded and two 
hundred guns. The poet Goethe feared for his life 
in Weimar. Jena was plundered and burnt. It is 
said that Hegel continued writing his treatise of 
PlioonomenoJogy during the progress of the battle, 
and that when his house was plundered he stuffed it 
into his pocket and fled to Niiremberg. 

On the day of the battle of Jena, October 14, 
180G, Davout won the battle of Auerstiidt, which 
completed the destruction of the Prussian army. The 
King of Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick had re- 
treated along the road from Weimar to Naumburg in 
five divisions, and had halted in Auerstadt, intending 
to pass the bridge of Kosen on the following day. On 
the evening of October 13 Davout was informed at 
ISTaumburg that the King's army was approaching. 
On that he sent a detachment to occupy the bridge of 
Kosen, and went in person to Bernadotte to ask for 
his assistance. Bernadotte refused, alleging the order 
of Napoleon that they should observe the bridge at 
Naumburg. Nevertheless Davout determined with 
twenty-six thousand men to oppose the royal army, 
which was sixty-six thousand men strong, and occu- 
pied the bridge of Kosen during the night with three 

At six o'clock on the morning of October 14 he oc- 
cupied a height which commands the hollow of Has- 


senhausen, and in this place the battle was actually 
fought. Scarcely had he done this when the heads of 
the Prussian columns advanced. The Held was cov- 
ered with thick mist, so that the Prussians had no idea 
of the presence of the enemy. Bllicher, who was in 
command of the rear-guard, found himself unexpect- 
edly engaged with the French cavalry. Davout, 
finding that the engagement had begun, brought up 
his artillery and fired into the masses of the enemy. 
The battle raged round IIas[>enhausen, which was 
bravely defended by the French. In their attempts 
to capture it Schmettau was killed, the aged Mollen- 
dorf was mortally wounded, and the King had a horse 
killed under him. Brunswick, whilst he was urging 
his soldiers to the attack, was struck by a shot which 
deprived him of the sight of both eyes, and he was led 
from the field, his face covered with a cloth. The 
French, formed into squares, withstood the assault 
of ten thousand cavalry, and none of the squares were 
broken. At last they changed into a column of attack 
and drove the Prussians from the village. Bliicher 
strongly urged the renewal of the engagement, and 
was supported by the King, but the opinion prevailed 
that they should await the arrival of ITohenlohe and 
Riichel, not knowing that they had been already 
beaten in the battle of Jena. 

They therefore began the retreat, leaving ten thou- 
sand dead and wounded on the field and one hundred 
and fifteen guns in the hands of the enemy. The 
French had also suffered severely. Out of I )avout's 
twenty-six thousand men seven thousand were dead 
or wounded and the rest were so exhausted that pur- 
suit was impossible. General Kalkreuth was ordered 
to lead thei reserve to Weimar, and to collect the strag- 
glers in that town. But at Apolda, half-way between 


Jena and Weimar, he heard that Hohenlohe and 
Riichel were defeated and that Weimar was in the 
hands of the French ; he was therefore oblig;ed to 
take another route. All hope was at an end, all dis- 
cipline was lost. The soldiers wandered in the woods, 
throwing away their arms and knapsacks, which hin- 
dered their flight. Xot only were the battles of Jena 
and Auerstiidt lost, but the whole army was destroyed. 
It was difficult for any one to believe that Prussia 
could continue to exist as a kingdom. Napoleon re- 
sumed his march to Berlin, which he entered on Oc- 
tober 27. 




The disastrous defeats of Jena and Auerstadt did 
not immediately put an end to the war. The King of 
Prussia fled to Konigsberg, and the Ministers whom 
he left behind at Berlin were ready to make almost 
every possible sacrifice for peace. But Xapoleon de- 
manded more than they could give. The Russians 
were still in arms, as they had not been included in 
the treaty of Pressburg, and Xapoleon gave the Prus- 
sians to understand that if he should once more defeat 
the Emperor of Russia, the kingdom of Prussia 
would soon cease to exist. 

When the war began anew the only Prussian army 
consisted of twenty-five thousand men posted on the 
farthest north-east corner of the monarchy, from the 
bank of the Vistula to the frontiers of Russia. In 
the middle of November the divisions of Davout, 
Lannes and Augereau were established upon this 
river, and at the end of the month Murat, Ney, Soult 
and Bernadotte moved in the same direction. Xa- 
poleon entered Posen, the capital of Prussian Poland, 
on Xovember 27, 1806. From this city he issued his 
famous proclamation to the Poles, summoning them 
to freedom. They replied with enthusiasm and 
formed themselves into battalions and regiments 
which placed themselves under the command of the 
conqueror. On the second of January, 1807, Xapo- 


leon entered Warsaw amidst the universal joy of the 

Russia, who was the only effective ally of Prussia 
at this moment, had sent two armies into that country, 
and the combined Russian and Prussian forces were 
placed under the command of Benningsen. But 
his operations were marked with uncertainty, and 
could lead only to disaster. He first determined to 
retreat from the line of the Vistula, and deserted 
the fortress of Thorn, which had been bravely de- 
fended by L'Estocq. His plans were then changed 
and it was determined to meet I^Tapoleon. The great 
battle of Preussich Evlau, one of the most murderous 
of these wars, was fought on February 7 and 8, 1807. 
Benningsen had determined to march towards the 
sea-coast by Marienburg, Elbing, and Danzig, hoping 
to find there plenty of supplies, to surprise the French 
left, crumple up Bernadotte and compel Napoleon to 
leave Warsaw in order to defend the lower Vistula. 
The scheme was a bold one, and it was so well car- 
ried out that he reached Heilsberg on January 22, 
without the French being aware of his approach. 
jSTapoleon soon divined the plans of Benningsen. He 
determined to pass round the Russian army in a 
curve, and, if his left wing could only hold their 
ground, to attack them on two sides and to drive 
them towards the sea. The to^^^l of Allenstein was 
designated as the place of concentration; and 
Davout, Soult, Augereau and ]S[ey were to march 
thither. Bernadotte was to retreat slowly towards 
the Vistula so as to entice the Russians to that river, 
and then by forced marches to join the left wing of 
the main army in order to drive the Russians to- 
wards the sea. Frost had now set in, which 
facilitated the movements of the troops. The 


Russians were being gradually entangled in a net 
from which it was impossible for them to escape. 

Luckily for them a Cossack was taken prisoner, 
who bore a letter from the Emperor to Bernadotte 
which gave a full account of Napoleon's plans. Ben- 
ningsen became aware of his danger and retired to 
Allenstein. But Napoleon was determined upon 
fighting a decisive battle, and moving with great 
rapidity succeeded in intercepting the Russians. 
Benningsen could only get as far as Eylau, which he 
reached on February 7. That evening a serious en- 
gagement took place, the result of which was that the 
Russians were first driven back into Eylau, and then, 
after a hardly contested struggle, carried on from 
street to street, from the town to the churchyard and 
from the churchyard to the heights. Here Benning- 
sen determined to make a final stand. 

Napoleon had sent orders to Davout and Ney to 
march with all haste to his support. He spent the 
night in the post-house of Eylau, sleeping for two 
hours in an armchair. The Russians were superior 
to the French in artillery and infantry, but the 
French outnumbered the Russians in cavalry. 

In the early morning of that fatal day Napoleon 
mounted his horse to survey the position of the 
enemy. The Russians were drawn up in solid 
masses, protected by a very numerous artillery. An- 
other division of artillerv, scarcelv inferior in num- 
ber, was posted in the rear of the main body. The 
Russian cavalry was placed partly on the flank and 
partly with the reserve. Their whole army formed 
a massive wall, pouring forth a deadly fire from its 
embrasures. Napoleon hesitated to attack the 
enemy in front and determined to operate upon their 
flank. He placed his guard and cavalry in the 


rear where tbej would not be exposed to the Russian 

At daybreak the Russians began the struggle with 
a terrible cannonade, which was answered by the 
French. The earth shook with the thunder of the 
artillery. But the French suffered but little, being 
protected hy houses, whereas the Russian ranks were 
mowed down. Davoust now appeared upon the 
scene and was able to hold his ground. At ten 
o'clock Xapoleon began an attack upon the left 
Russian wing, which he attempted to force upon their 
centre. This attack was hindered by a violent storm 
of snow, which drove in the faces of the soldiers and 
prevented them from following their proper direc- 
tions. The Russians had the snow in their backs, 
and they were able to cut the French line of ad- 
vance in two. The Russian centre now began to 
move forwards in its turn, and the situation of 
Xapoleon became critical. He ordered Murat to 
extricate him, and to attack the Russians with eighty 
squadrons. He succeeded in breaking the first three 
lines, but was then relieved with a heavy fire of 
artillery. During this part of the conflict a mass of 
four thousand Russian grenadiers pressed on to- 
wards the churchyard where Xapoleon was standing 
with his staff, and he was with difficulty saved by 
the devotion of the guard. At this decisive moment 
L'Estocq appeared upon the field with eight thousand 
Prussians, anticipating the advance of Xey by two 
hours. His arrival gave new vigour to the Russians, 
and thev aii'ain attacked the French under Davoust. 
The man of iron will and iron courage was not to be 
driven from his ground. He passed through the 
ranks crying, " The cowards will die in Siberia, the 
brave will fall here as inen of honour," and the 
village which he held was never taken. 


I^Tight was coming on. Both sides were tired out and 
they had no provisions. Benningsen thought of re- 
newing the conflict, but hearing that ^ej was not far 
off, determined upon a retreat. The next day he 
retired to Konigsberg. The French remained in 
possession of the field of battle, but they had lost at 
least ten thousand men and the Russians fifteen thou- 
sand. Napoleon now made serious offers of a sepa- 
rate peace to the King of Prussia, who had taken 
refuge in Memel, but he refused to desert his Russian 
ally and would hear of no terms in which he was 
not included. Tlie war was at last put an end to by 
the battle of Friedland, situated a short distance to 
the east of Eylau. It was fought on June 14, the 
anniversary of Marengo. At one o'clock in the morn- 
ing Lannes, who had reached the table-land of Post- 
henen on the road froiu Eylau, observed large masses 
of troops before him. In those northern latitudes it 
was already light at 2 a.m.^ and Lannes was con- 
firmed in his opinion. He had only ten thousand men 
with him, whereas the Russians were threefold his 
strength. They were under the command of Benning- 
sen, who was advancing to the relief of Konigsberg. 
The Russians threw three bridges over the Alle, one 
above and two below the town. It is said that his 
whole forces amounted at this moment to seventy-five 
thousand and tw^o hundred guns. Lannes gradually 
received reinforcements and was able to hold his 
ground, but he was in hard straits, and sent orderly 
after orderly to jSTapoleon for assistance. 

The Emperor came riding up with joy. " It is 
the day of Marengo," he cried, " for us a day of good 
fortune." Resisting all advice to defer the battle, he 
determined to crush the enemy while they were cross- 
ing the river, but in order to do this he must get pos- 


session of Friedland in order to cut off their retreat. 
He sent Xev forward to seize the town and the bridges 
at all hazards. " The man is a lion," said Xapoleon 
when he witnessed his prowess. He pressed forward 
with incredible energy, seized the bridges and burnt 
them. The Russians had now no power of retreat. 
They were entirely at the mercv of the conqueror, and 
the battle raged during the whole of that long day till 
ten o'clock at night. A third of the Russian army 
was dead or wounded, and the victor slept on the field 
of battle. Xapoleon wrote to Josephine that Fried- 
land was a worthy sister to Marengo, Austerlitz, and 
Jena. The result of the battle of Friedland was the 
peace of Tilsit, the details of which belong to history 
of European politics. 


THE WAR OF 1809. 



The war undertaken bv Austria against l^apoleon 
in 1809 was the fruit of a long-cherished desire to 
wipe out the disgrace of the treaty of Pressburg. 
When the French first declared war against her in 
1792 she was crystallised in the torpor of an immov- 
able routine, and the disasters of two unsuccessful 
campaigns were not sufficient to arouse her. It re- 
quired the campaign of 1805, the catastrophes of 
Ulm and Austerlitz and the capture of Vienna itself 
to galvanise her into life. Convinced of her military 
inferiority, she committed the care of her reorganiza- 
tion to the Archduke Charles, whose presence before 
Napoleon in the campaign of 1805 would perhaps 
have prevented the disastrous defeat of Austerlitz. 
He created an active army of three hundred thou- 
sand men and a reserve of two hundred thousand. 
Encouraged by the arwakening of national feeling in 
Germany, by the insurrection in the Tyrol, and by the 
ill-success of the French arms in Spain, the Emperor 
determined to hazard a great stroke for independence, 



and lie issued an appeal to his country dated March 
27, 1809. 

Archduke Charles crossed the Inn on April 10, 
and at the head of the principal army invaded 
Bavaria. Archduke John, setting out from Carin- 
tliia, crossed the Karawankas Alps in a snowstorm 
and attacked tlie army of the Viceroy Eugene, com- 
posed of a mixture of French and Italians, which was 
advancing towards the Tagliamento. At the same 
time he stirred the fire of patriotism in the moun- 
tains of the Tyrol. Archduke Ferdinand was posted on 
the Vistula to oppose the Polish army of the Grand 
Duchy of Warsaw, wdiich, under Prince Joseph 
Poniatowsky, was threatening Austrian Galicia, and 
an army of thirty-two thousand Russians who were 
nominally allies of France but were only lukewarm 
in the cause. The Austrians had been careful not 
to repeat their errors of the previous campaign. 
They made up their minds that the principal struggle 
would be in Germany, and they collected an army of 
two hundred thousand men in the valley of the 

This action of the Austrians came upon l^apoleon 
as a surprise, and he had only the first three months 
of 1809 to prepare for the blow. He had removed 
the seasoned soldiers stationed in the other parts of 
Europe in order to supply the requirements of Spain. 
Napoleon did his utmost to raise troops. He made 
new demands upon the four previous conscriptions 
and called up in advance the conscripts of 1809, but 
there w^as a wide difference between these raw levies 
and the veterans of the Grand Armee. He was able, 
l^owever, to get together two hundred thousand men, 
to which he added one hundred thousand more, com- 
posed of Saxons, Bavarians, Wiirtembergers and 


Hessians. But it was difficult to estimate the exact 
value of these auxiliary troops, and the extent to 
which they were to be trusted. 

jN^apoleon, having decided to march upon Vienna, 
gave orders for his army to assemble according to the 
following scheme. The corps of Davout was to 
march on Ratisbon, that of Lannes on Augsburg, 
and that of Massena on Ulm. In their rear was 
formed the reserve of the cavalry and the guard. 
The auxiliary forces were posted thus : The 
Saxons under Bernadotte at Wiirzburg, the 
Wiirtembergers between Wiirzburg and Ulm, and 
the Bavarians between Munich and Landshut. The 
main centre of concentration was to be Ratisbon, 
and the Emperor sent Berthier to that place to make 
preparations. Judging from previous experience, 
he thought that Austria would not commence hostili- 
ties till the end of April. 

Archduke Charles crossed the Isar at Landshut on 
April 16, and, advancing in a westerly direction, 
drove the Bavarians back upon J^eustadt. He was 
imperfectly informed as to the position of the 
French and believed them to be divided into two 
masses, one at Augsburg, the other at Ratisbon. His 
plan was to penetrate between them, to cut them in 
two, and then to double round u^Don Ratisbon and 
crush the French between his own army and the army 
of Bohemia. On April 17 he reached the river 
Abens, in pursuance of his scheme, and only sent a 
weak body towards Ratisbon to reconnoitre. On 
April 18, leaving the troops of General Hiller and 
the Archduke Ludwig at Abensberg, he prepared to 
march by his right towards Ratisbon with seventy 
thousand men. 

If the Archduke had been a day or two earlier in 


liis movements he would have accomplished his de- 
sign, and perhaps annihilated the corps of Davout. 
^Napoleon was far from the scene of conflict, and 
Berthier, bewildered without the presence of his 
master, did not know w^hat to do. He was so ac- 
customed to act under orders that he was paralysed 
by responsibility. By the rapidity of the Austrian 
advance the original plan of concentration at Ratis- 
bon had become impossible, and it was difficult, un- 
der these new circumstances, for the Emperor to give 
precise orders, or for Berthier to carry them into 

But ]S[apoleon, if he was late in entering upon the 
campaign, now lost no time. He set out from Paris 
on April 14, reached Strasburg on the following day, 
and travelling post-haste, arrived at Donauworth 
at eight o'clock in the evening of April 17, without 
liis guard or his field equipage, without horses or 
staff. He addressed his troops in trumpet tones : " I 
have come here with the speed of lightning. You 
were with me when the sovereign of Austria came to 
my bivouac in Moravia; you heard how he begged 
for my clemency and swore eternal friendship. We 
have been conquerors in three wars ; Austria owes 
everything to our magnanimity ; three times has she 
broken her oath. Our previous successes are a sure 
guarantee of the victory that awaits us. Forward, 
then, so that the enemy when he sees us may recog- 
nise his conquerors." 

Concentration at Ratisbon having become impos- 
sible, Napoleon determined to concentrate at JSTeu- 
stadt, and ordered Davout and Massena to advance 
thither, Massena leaving only two German regiments 
at Augsburg, and Davout only one regiment at Rat- 
isbon. Davout was to march towards the mouth of 


the Abens, between the Danube and the army of the 
Archduke, with the utmost secrecy and rapidity ; 
ISTapoleon would advance as far as Ingolstadt to meet 
him. Davout performed this difficult task with fore- 
sight, cleverness, tenacity and courage, passing by 
country roads, through a woody and hilly country, 
and arrived at Abensberg on April 19, unperceived 
by the Austrians. 

Napoleon now felt himself in a position to strike 
a decisive blow. On April 20 he fought the battle 
of Abensberg, the object of which was to cut the Aus- 
trian army into two, in which operation he was com- 
pletely successful. When the battle was over he did 
not take off his clothes and only slept for a few hours 
in an armchair. He mounted his horse at daybreak 
to pursue the enemy to Landshut. Here on April 21 
a furious engagement took place, as the Austrians 
had made this town a depot for their munitions of 
war, their provisions, their artillery and their pon- 
toon train. The struggle was mainly directed to- 
Avards the possession of the bridge. Massena arrived 
with three divisions at a critical moment of the 
fight. The Austrians were compelled to retreat and 
abandoned to the French the whole of their war ma- 
terial and seven thousand wounded, sick, and pris- 

The next day, April 22, witnessed the battle of 
Eckmiihl. The Archduke had kept his army during 
these two days between Tengen and Eckmiihl, but 
he had also made himself master of Ratisbon in order 
to secure his retreat across the Danube. After this 
he determined to await a decisive battle on the river 
Gross-Laber. Napoleon, wdien he heard of the cap- 
ture of Ratisbon, knew that the troops whom he had 
defeated at Landshut could not be the main body 


of the Austrian avmj, so he determined to seek his 
adversary fartlier towards the north. He ordered 
Davout to hold his ground and promised that he 
woukl soon come up to his assistance. Leaving Lands- 
hut in the early morning with Massena he reached 
Eckmiihl at two in the afternoon. The Archduke 
had committed the error of marching with the bulk 
of his army towards the Abach, to cut off the French 
communications ; so that Eckmiihl was only defended 
by a small detachment. Even before IsTapoleon 
arrived Davout attacked the Austrians' right with 
impetuosity. There was no question of Charles be- 
ing able to turn the flank of the French ; he had 
enough to do to protect himself. Davout wrested 
from the enemy the two villages of Oberleichting 
and Unterleichting, driving them with the bayonet 
from house to house, while I^apoleon, commanding 
in the centre, swept the high-road and the banks of 
the Labor. The ground beyond Echmiihl rises to- 
wards the north, and here the Austrians were able 
for some time to make a stand. But on ^Napoleon 
threatening their left, as their right was already 
threatened by Davout, they were afraid of being 
surrounded, and retreated towards the plain of Rat- 
isbon with the loss of ten thousand men. Darkness 
put an end to the battle at about seven o'clock, and 
the pursuit was not continued after nightfall. In 
this murderous conflict the French lost two thousand 
five hundred men and the Austrians about three 
times that number. Davout received the title of 
" Prince of Eckmiihl." 

The Archdvike retreated to Ratisbon, and during 
the night his best troops crossed the stream to the 
left bank. The French were again in movement at 
daybreak on April 23. At Ratisbon they engaged 


with the Austrian cavalry, who for some time pre- 
vented them from seeing the pontoons which had 
been thrown across the river. As soon as Lannes 
observed the pontoons he opened fire upon them and 
set them in flames. The town was surrounded by a 
simple wall defended by towers and a ditch. Napo- 
leon, who- desired to sleep that night in the town, 
ordered a breach to be made. As the Emperor rode 
up to watch the operations through his field-glass, he 
was wounded in the foot, but very slightly, and was 
soon able to mount his horse again. After some de- 
lay the wall was climbed by the aid of scaling-lad- 
ders; a gate was opened and the French became 
masters of the town. 

Thus ended this marvellous campaign of five days, 
each day of which was marked by a battle. The 
glorious successes which Xapoleon had achieved 
might console him for his delay in beginning the 
war, for the insurrection of the Tyrol, for the in- 
difference of the Russians, and for the reverses of 
Prince Eugene in Italy. Even his detractors admit 
that his military genius never showed itself in great- 
er perfection, and the mixture of calculation and 
daring with which these results were brouglit about 
have never been surpassed in the annals of war. The 
Emperor could with truth make the proud boast to 
his soldiers that they had exemplified the difference 
between the trained veterans of Ca!sar and the armed 
hordes of Xerxes, that in less than a week they had 
been victorious in three pitched battles and in three 
engagements, and that they had captured one hun- 
dred gains, forty standards, and fifty thousand joris- 




l^APOLEON now marched upon Vienna by the right 
bank of the Danube, driving before him both the 
troops of Archduke Ludwig and those of Hiller. 
Archduke Charles, even after the battle of Eckmiihl, 
might have disputed the advance of the enemy 
upon the capital, by crossing himself to the right 
bank of the river either at Linz or at Krems. But 
this would have been a dangerous undertaking and 
the Archduke did not feel himself strong enough to 
adopt it. He therefore took up a position at Cham, 
on the frontiers of Bohemia, whilst Massena pushed 
on rapidly towards Linz. A battle took place at the 
village of Ebelsberg, which commands the passage of 
the Traun, dominated by a castle full of troops and 
well provided with cannon. The place was hard to 
capture, and it would liave been better to wait for 
reinforcements, but Massena was always inclined to 
take the bull by the horns and gave orders for the 
assault. The village which lies before the bridge 
was speedily mastered, the Austrians being killed or 
dispersed in flight. General Coehorn pressed over 
the bridge with his light troops, mounted the steep 
heights on the other side and penetrated to the market- 
place, over which the castle towered. To save 
Coehorn Massena bombarded the castle, and sent two 
brigades across the bridge, which was encumbered 
with dead and wounded. Thrice was the bridge 


taken and retaken, and only in the third attack did 
the French sncceed. 

The town soon burst into flames. The castle was 
defended with heroic valour, the doors were hewn 
down and the fortress was disputed room by room, 
and won by cold steel. The Austrians now retired, 
having lost one hundred and sixteen officers and four 
thousand five hundred men, but having taken three 
eagles and fourteen hundred prisoners. Attracted by 
the cannonade, Napoleon now rode up to the scene of 
battle. He was enraged at what he saw, because he 
knew the sacrifice to be useless. The Traun had 
already been crossed in two or three places, and the 
Austrians, when they recognised the superiority of 
the enemy, would not have attempted resistance. 
It is probable that if the offender had been any other 
than Massena he would have been driven from the 
army; as it was, Napoleon contented himself with a 
severe rebuke. 

On May 7 Napoleon reached the great monastery 
of Molk, and on May 9 the headquarters of the 
French were at St. Polten. On May 10, at nine 
o'clock in the morning. Napoleon rode into the Park 
of Schonbrunn, just a month after the beginning of 
the war. Vienna, commanded by the Archduke Maxi- 
milian, attempted to resist. But the French threw 
some three thousand bombs into the town, and caused 
some damage and more terror. In the middle of the 
night the Archduke withdrew over the Danube bridge, 
which he destroyed, giving orders to General Bubna 
to hold out for two days longer. This, however, was 
impossible, and on May 13 the city was occupied by 
the French. 

The situation of the invaders was now less favour- 
able than in 1805, because their conmiunications 


with the left bank of the Danube had been cut off by 
the destruction of the Tabor bridge, which on the 
previous occasion they had taken by a stratagem. 
Napoleon therefore took precautions against attack, 
especially on the part of the Archduke John, and of 
the Austrian army in Italy. He formed a vast net- 
work of cavalry along all the roads by which the 
enemy could advance. He ordered Prince Eugene 
to follow the Archduke John, and Marmont to leave 
the Illyrian provinces. Archduke John had crossed 
the Isonzo on May 11, closely followed by Eugene 
and Macdonald. The Austrians now divided them- 
selves into two armies, one advancing to Laibach in 
Carinthia, and the other to Graz in Styria. Eugene 
was compelled to make a similar partition of his 
forces, but his strategy was successful, for the Arch- 
duke was compelled to make a long detour, and could 
not appear on the battle-fields of the Marchfeld in 
time to be of any use. 

Napoleon was relieved from this danger, but he 
had still to deal with the Archduke Charles, who had 
drawn up his army in front of Vienna on the plain 
of the Marchfeld. In order to attack him it was 
necessary to cross the Danube, a river broad, deep, 
and rapid. The enterprise was not impossible, but 
it was very difficult. It required much time and 
mature preparation. But the genius of Napoleon 
took no account either of difficulties or of time. 
From his first arrival at Vienna he had collected 
with the utmost vigour everything that could serve 
for his passage of the stream. He, however, soon 
discovered that they were insufficient for an army 
of eighty thousand men and for the crossing of a 
river like the Danube, subject to continual floods 
from the melting of the mountain snows. He deter- 


mined to effect his passage at the point where the 
stream is divided into two parts by the island of 
Lobau, which is about eight miles long and five broad. 
It was wooded in the centre, and could conceal and 
protect an army. On one side it is only about sixty 
yards from the left bank, but in order to reach it from 
the village of Ebersdorf two branches of the Danube 
had to be crossed, the first of which was 
two hundred and forty and the other one hun- 
dred and twenty yards wide, divided by a sand- 
bank in the centre. It was necessary, therefore, 
to build three bridges, the last in sight of the enemy. 
For this purpose seventy or eighty large barges 
would be required, and the Austrians had been care- 
ful to destroy or, to remove everything of the kind. 
All preparations, therefore, had to be made afresh — 
pontoons, cables, and anchors. As these last would 
take much time to forge, jSTapoleon used heavy cannon 
instead, five hundred of which he had found in 
Vienna, and chests full of cannon-balls. Massena 
conducted the work with such speed, under the super- 
vision of Napoleon, that in six days the bridges were 
ready without the Austrians knowing anything that 
was going on. 

On May 18 the Emperor removed his headquarters 
from Schonbrunn to Ebersdorf, and at ten o'clock 
on the evening of the following day the first French 
boat left the shore. The Austrians, who held the 
island, were surprised and driven back, and the cen- 
tre of Lobau was occupied, the troops wading through 
water. The construction of the third bridge offered 
the greatest difficulties, but it was completed in three 
hours. Lasalle was the first to occupy the left bank 
with four cavalry regiments, followed by skirmishers. 
The villages of Aspern and Esslingen were seized 


without mucli difficiiltv. Aspern was occupied by 
Molitor, and Esslingen by Boudet. Both villages 
possessed wide streets and stone houses, Aspern a 
church with a walled churchyard, and Esslingen a 
huge corn magazine built of stone. These features 
were of importance in the battles which ensued. 

Before the two villages was a small wood in which 
the cavalry of Lasalle bivouacked. Here also 
Xapoleon slept, surrounded by a detachment of his 
guard, without taking off his clothes. The advance 
of the army continued through the whole night, 
infantry, artillery and cavalry, the last consisting 
of fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, under the com- 
mand of Espagne. The army debouched into a wide 
plain, consisting of meadows and corn-fields. 

About midday Berthier, looking out from the 
church-tower of Esslingen, saw a cloud of cavalry, 
and the army of the Archduke Charles coming down 
into the plain in battle array. Xapoleon said to 
the priest of Aspern, " In an hour Austria will be at 
my feet." Many hours, however, had to pass before 
that end could be accomplished. Lannes was now 
ordered to advance from Esslingen on the right wing, 
and Massena from Aspern on the left wing ; the space 
between being occupied by cavalry and artillery. 
The numbers on each side are not certain. The best 
authorities say that one hundred and five thousand 
Austrians were opposed to one hundred and ten thou- 
sand French, although the ofiicial records of the time 
make the numbers seventy-five thousand and eighty 
thousand respectively. 

The battle bes'an at two in the afternoon on Mav 
21, by the attack of ITiller upon Aspern, Every 
house was hotly disputed, and the village was set in 
flames; it was taken and retaken six times, Massena 


directing the fight from the churchyard with great 
coolness, but at the seventh charge he was forced to 
retire, and at eleven at night the Austrians were in 
possession of Aspern. I^ot less violent were the at- 
tacks on Esslingen and on the centre, but neither of 
them proved successful, and at night Esslingen still 
remained in the possession of the French. jSTapoleon 
spent the night at the side of the bridge, watching 
over the passage of his troops. Twice or more news 
was brought to him that the great bridge had been 
broken do\\Ti, but each time it was restored. 

The battle was renewed on the following day. 
ISapoleon, having received reinforcements of twenty- 
two thousand men during the night, felt certain of 
victory. His plan was that Massena should retake 
Aspern, Lannes should defend Esslingen against all 
attacks, and then force himself like a wedge through 
the Austrian centre, and cut the army of the enemy 
in two. Davout, who had been left on the right 
bank of the river, was now to support Lannes. 

The battle raged for many hours round the two 
villages. Massena captured Aspern nine times and 
succeeded in becoming master of the churchyard, 
but each time he was driven back. Napoleon took 
advantage of the mist to attack with his cavalry the 
Hungarian regiments of General Hiller, but he also 
was repulsed. In the meantime Lannes formed the 
wedge consisting of twenty thousand infantry and 
six thousand cavalry which was to penetrate the 
centre of the Austrians. The charge was at first 
successful, and some fugitives declared that the bat- 
tle was lost; but by the bravery and steadfastness 
of the Archduke and Prince John of Lichtenstein 
order was restored. Their whole line moved for- 
ward, and Esslingen was nearly recaptured. Lannes 


sat down disheartened on the edge of the canal which 
united Aspern with Esslingen and covered his face 
wnth his hands. A spent ball struck him on both 
knees. " I am wounded/' he cried to his adjutant; 
" give me your hand and help me to rise." But 
he was unable to stand. He was carried from the 
field of battle, but died on May 30, the cherished 
friend of his master and the hero of the Erench 

The onslaught of the Austrians had failed, but the 
French had suffered a heavy defeat. They had 
probably lost seven thousand dead and thirty-four 
thousand wounded, while the loss of the Austrians 
w^as four thousand two hundred and eighty dead and 
sixteen thousand wounded. This was the second 
great battle in wdiich Napoleon had been worsted. 
The belief in his invincibility was on the wane, but 
he was now to show that his genius shone forth as 
highly in adversity as in success. Esslingen and 
what remained of Aspern were still in the possession 
of the Erench and covered their retreat across the 




ITapoleon returned to the island of Lobau and 
summoned his marshals Massena, Berthier, and 
Lannes to a conference. Davout arrived somewhat 
later. The Emperor now formed the plan of convert- 
ing the island of Lobau into a place of arms, in 
order that he might cross into the Marchfeld a month 
later when the waters were lower, and the bridge was 
in greater security. The generals w^ere in favour of a 
speedy retreat to Vienna, leaving behind them their 
wounded, their artillery, and their horses ; but Na- 
poleon pointed out that this meant nothing less than 
a retreat to Strasburg, and possibly the destruction 
of the Empire of France. It was better that Massena 
should continue to hold Aspern till midnight, and 
then retire into the island and hold it against all 
comers. Davout promised, on his part, to defend 
Vienna against the Archduke. 

l^apoleon, on his side, crossed the island of Lobau 
with Berthier, Davout and Savary, and reached the 
rio-ht bank in a small boat shortlv before midnight. 
From Ebersdorf he ordered supplies of all kinds to 
be carried into the island, biscuits, wine, brandy 
and ammunition. He sat for some time in thought 
with tears in his eyes ; he then fell into a deep sleep 
wdiich lasted for thirty hours, his staff doubting 
whether he would ever wake. The forty days which 


intervened between the battles of Aspern and 
Wagram were spent by Napoleon in converting 
Loban into a fortress, an impregnable citadel. He 
was present every day in person directing all kinds 
of work. The island was occupied by forty-live thou- 
sand picked troops, commanded by Massena. In the 
space of three weeks sixty piles had been driven into 
the river-bed, reaching far above the highest known 
high-water mark. On these was laid a perfectly 
firm road, capable of being used by any number of 
artillery and cavalrv. Twentv vards lower down the 
stream lay the old pontoon bridge, for the use of the 
infantry, strengthened, enlarged and held firm by 
strong cables and anchors. The upper bridge, while 
it protected the l)ridge of boats, was itself protected 
by a stockade, built in an oblique direction, across the 
stream. A guard of sailors was formed to watch the 
upper waters and to intercept anything which was 
likely to interfere with the security of the bridges. 

In this manner Lobau was transformed into a forti- 
fied camp, in every respect fit for the sojourn of a 
large army, spacious, secure, and healthy. Lofty 
causeways afforded a dry passage free from all danger 
of floods. Bridges were built across all the w^ater- 
courses. A powder-magazine was erected, bakehouses 
and kitchens were established, and places were 
marked out for washing. Large quantities of meal 
were stored in the island ; thousands of horned cattle 
from Hungary were collected there. There was 
abundance of rich Austrian wine in casks and bottles, 
the whole place was lighted up like a towTi, and the 
place of each regiment w^as legibly marked. Thus 
Lobau formed not only a safe and secure passage 
into the ]\rarchfeld, but a means of retreat to Vienna 
in case of disaster. 


There was little doubt that ISTapoleon would again 
seek the Archduke Charles in his old position, but 
there was grave doubt as to where he would cross. 
The Austrians were of opinion that out of sheer ob- 
stinacy he would again attack Aspern and Esslingen, 
which were consequently most carefully fortified by 
the Archduke. Napoleon, however, had other plans 
in view. lie determined to cross from the east side 
of the island, to throw a mass of French troops into 
Marchfeld over four bridges in two hours, to march 
round the Austrians and to make their present posi- 
tion useless, to roll them up from the left flank and to 
compel the Archduke to retreat. He therefore had 
four bridges secretly prepared in a retired bay sur- 
rounded by woods. One of them was constructed 
in a single piece, so as to swing across the stream. 
The channel was comparatively narrow in that part, 
and it was quite the best place for the crossing, al- 
though it had been overlooked by the Austrians. As 
the decisive day approached Napoleon's visits became 
more frequent and longer, and the works were con- 
tinued day and night. He practised sailing up the 
Danube in all weathers. In the principal branch of 
the Danube he had twenty-two rafts, twenty-one pon- 
toons and many boats of different sizes. Captain 
Baste of the Imperial navy anchored with a flotilla 
above the island. Enzersdorf was well defended by 
a battery. Munition and supplies of every kind were 
most abundant. On July 1 Napoleon left Schon- 
brunn and established his headquarters in Lobau. 
Archduke Charles could observe from his position 
regiment after regiment marching into the island, 
but he could not see what was inside, as it was pro- 
tected by lofty trees. Spies were altogether absent, 
because any one found in the island who was not a 


French soldier was immediately hanged. War cor- 
respondents were not thought of in those days ! 

On June 30 Massena set his troops in motion 
and built a pontoon bridge in the very spot where 
Napoleon had crossed on the previous occasion. 
Three days afterwards he occupied another large is- 
land and protected it by an earthwork. This also 
pointed to a passage opposite Esslingen. These two 
bridges enabled him to advance ae-ainst the rig-ht and 
left of the Austrians. Sailors summoned from Hol- 
land and from Brest sailed up and down the Danube, 
apparently with the object of finding a landing- 




On the afternoon of July 4, 1809, l^apoleon ol>- 
served that the point at which he intended to cross 
was only guarded by small detachments of the enemy. 
The day was extremely hot and a storm seemed to be 
imminent. At eight o'clock in the evening three guns 
were fired as a signal. All the bands and trumpets 
played the air of Queen Hortense, '' Partant pour la 
Syrie," and a cry of " Vive I'Empereur ! " broke 
from a thousand voices. In the midst of the pouring 
rain and blinding hail General Couroux occupied the 
Shoemakers' Island with fifteen hundred sharp- 
shooters. He drove before him the weak Austrian out- 
posts, while Captain Baste commanded the left bank 
from his flotilla. In two hours the first bridge was 
ready, and Oudinot crossed at midnight. The other 
three bridges were soon fit for use. The darkness was 
lit up by the lightnings of the sky, the flight of the 
red-hot cannon-balls, and the burning houses of En- 
zersdorf. Napoleon superintended the construction 
of each bridge himself, giving counsel and urging the 
men to haste. The storm was in hi& favour as it had 
been in his first enterprise, the capture of Toulon. 
In twelve hours one hundred and sixty thousand men 
made their way into the Marchfeld full of confidence 
in their leader. The plan had been carefully 
thought out, and every general knew what he had to 
do. The French were ready for the attack before 


the Austrians had taken up their position. About 
eight o'clock in the morning Napoleon threw two 
other bridces across the Danube for the third and 
fourth army corps, which consisted of one hundred 
and fifty thousand men, five hundred and fifty 
guns, and forty thousand horses. He crossed him- 
self a little before ten, with the joy of victory in his 

Wednesday, July 5, 1809, broke a lovely summer's 
morning, fresh and invigorating after the storm of 
the previous night. Napoleon's first action was to 
occupy Enzersdorf. The French advance was in the 
shape of a fan. In the first line Massona occupied 
the extreme left in the neighbourhood of Esslingen, 
then came Bernadotte with his Saxons, then Oudinot, 
and then Davout In the second line the army of 
Prince Eugene, which had come up from Italy, 
formed the left, and the corps of Marmont the right. 
The Guard formed the reserve. The artillery and 
the cavalry were massed on the flanks. Kegnier 
was left behind with seven battalions to defend 

The Archduke Charles had dispersed his army 
in a wide sweeping curve. His left, covered by the 
Russbach, occupied the plateau of Neusiedel and 
Wagram, his right rested on the Danube. Napo- 
leon met with few obstacles as he advanced ; Davout 
was able to seize the villages opposed to him ; Ber- 
nadotte reached Aderklaa ; the left under Massena 
took possession of Esslingen and Aspern. Napoleon 
made an attempt to capture Wagram, but he met with 
an obstinate resistance, and it became evident that 
the Archduke was prepared for a mortal struggle, 
Avhich the following day would decide. 

Napoleon's order of battle for June 6 formed an 


obtuse-angled triangle. Xapoleon slept in his own 
field-tent surrounded by his guard. His marshals 
received no written orders; they only knew that his 
scheme was to pierce the centre with a wedge and to 
surround the left flank of the enemy, to break through 
the Austrian line and then to roll it up. The Arch- 
duke in vain tried to sleep. Anxiety and labour ban- 
ished sleep from his eyes, and he suffered on the day 
of battle from this want of repose. At break of day a 
thick mist covered the field. The Austrians began 
the battle with an attack upon Davout who held his 
ground with his accustomed tenacity. The fire then 
extended along the whole line from Glinzendorf to 
the Danube. On the previous day Bernadotte had 
occupied Aderklaa, which formed the apex of the 
French triangle, but he was violently attacked by the 
Austrians and driven out. Massena, who, unable 
to sit on horseback, was driven in a carriage, attempt- 
ed to stop the flight by firing on the fugitives, and 
Xapoleon riding up, cried, " Why can I not be mas- 
ter of Aderklaa only for a few hours ? " 

Encouraged by this success, the Archduke at- 
tempted to extend his attack towards Aspern and Ess- 
lingen on his right. He desired to weaken the centre 
of the French and to press on towards the river. How- 
ever, the centre was protected by the artillery of the 
reserve and by Macdonald's infantry. Davout now 
received orders to attack the heights of Neusiedel. 
This was a serious task, as it meant an advance over 
steep ground under a plunging fire. After two re- 
pulses Davout was successful, and the heights were 
won. This was the decisive moment of the battle, 
and even if Archduke John had now appeared upon 
the scene he would have been too late. The whole 
of the Austrian position, behind the Eussbach, was 


enfiladed, and at one o'clock the Archduke ordered 
the retreat of the fourth corps. 

During all these hours Xapoleon was watching the 
battle with eagerness. He had covered his simple 
uniform with a gray overcoat, rode a small Arabian 
horse, white in colour, and carried a little riding- 
whip in his hand. He was surrounded by a numerous 
staff, including about a dozen orderlies who were 
ranged in lines one behind the other. His coun- 
tenance betrayed no emotion, his expression was 
serious, and in his face nothing stirred but his fiery 
eyes. He listened quietly to all the advices brought 
to him, and if he had to give an order he called out, 
'' Officier d'ordonnance," and an orderly rode up. 
He dictated the order to him slowly and clearly, and 
then said, " Ecpetez,"" upon which the ofiicer repeated 
the order word by word. If he made a mistake the 
Emperor showed no annoyance, but repeated the 
order again, and again said, " Repetez." When the 
order had been completely understood the Emperor 
said, " Allez," and the orderly shot forth like an 
arrow from the string. From the hill on which he 
was placed Xapoleon could survey the whole battle- 
field, but he seemed to pay little attention to what was 
immediately in his neighbourhood. He showed no 
emotion at bad news ; once only, when his orders 
were not immediately obeyed, he took an additional 
pinch of snuff. When he heard by the sound of his 
cannon that Davout had taken ISTeusiedel his coun- 
tenance lit up with joy, and turning to Berthier, he 
said, " The battle is won." 

At this moment he determined to give the enemy 
the coup-de-grace. He ordered Oudinot to attack 
Wagram and gave Macdonald the command of the 
column which was to pierce the enemy's centre* 


More than a hundred guns were to begin the attack, 
and the column consisted of thirty-one thousand in- 
fantry and six thousand cavalry. Napoleon in per- 
son brought up the reserve. The charge was suc- 
cessful. Wagram was conquered, and the possession 
of this, together with that of I^eusiedel, delivered 
the whole of the plateau behind the Russbach into 
the hands of the French, At about two o'clock in 
the afternoon the Archduke saw that all resistance 
was hopeless and began the retreat. He had lost 
thirty thousand men and the French eighteen thou- 
sand. ISTapoleon, who had been nearly forty hours 
in the saddle, gave up the pursuit and retired to his 
tent to rest. The Archduke John, who had been so 
anxiously expected, reached the field of battle at seven 
in the evening. After some hesitation he determined 
to retreat and the French were left unmolested. 

The army of the Archduke Charles retired towards 
Bohemia, pursued by the corps of Marmont, who 
captured many prisoners and stragglers. The Arch- 
duke concluding the armistice of Znaim on July 11, 
and the peace of Vienna, signed on October 14, 1809, 
put an end to the campaign. 




It may be useful in relating the history of cam- 
paigns, such as those of iSTapoleon, in which almost all 
nations of Europe were engaged, to give some account 
of the tactics employed by them, and of the systems 
of discipline which were suited to their individual 
character; and in this there can be no better 
authority than Colonel George Cathcart, who was 
himself present in the campaigns of 1812 and 1813. 
He tells us that in the eighteenth century all the war- 
like nations of Europe brought their armies into 
the field on nearly the same system, which perhaps 
took a consistent form in the time of Gustavus 
Adolphus and attained its perfection under Frederick 
the Great. This system had the formation of general 
lines and movements in line for its chief characteris- 
tics, and although the evolutions calculated to lead to 
that object were generally in open columns, and 
slower and more formal than those adopted in recent 
times, yet they continue even to our own day to form 
the basis of tactics. 

A new system of tactics became necessary when the 
armies of the French Revolution began to overrun 
Europe. The ranks were mainly composed of raw 
lines of youths, brought up in revolutionary princi- 
ples, and not calculated to submit to the methodical 
theories previously practised. A new system was re- 



quired to enable superior numbers to prevail over 
superior discipline. jSTapoleon found this system in 
operation and followed it, but improved it by his 
genius. He trusted mainly to the influence of large 
concentrated masses of troops placed in reserve and 
concealed from the enemy as much as possible. When 
,he had arranged these with great skill, he began oper- 
ations with numerous light troops along his whole 
front, supported by artillery at various points. His 
object often was to deceive the enemy as to his real 
intentions, and to induce them to compromise their 
whole force along an extensive front. At last the 
decisive moment was seized for bringing up an over- 
whelming mass of troops, preceded by a swarm of 
light infantry, and covered by concentrated power 
of artillery, to attack the weakest or most unguarded 
point of the enemy's position, and to secure the vic- 
tory which was completed by cavalry. Under these 
circumstances grand line movements of the whole 
army, after the manner of Frederick the Great, were 
never used, and would not have been practicable 
amongst troops of that time. Occasional deployments 
into line were used for special purposes by single 
battalions or brigades, or even by larger bodies ; but 
nothing like the old " order of battle " was ever 
thought of in that mode of warfare. 

This new system, introduced by necessity, had 
two great advantages — celerity of movement in the 
field and the right use of reserves. The armies of 
the eighteenth century were active on the march, 
but were slow and pompous in their preparation for 
attack, and they underrated the importance of re- 
serves. Wellington appears to have combined the 
best parts of both these systems and to have adopted 
a quickness of movement without hurry and con- 


fusion, and a judicious use of reserves without 
abandoning line formation. 

Napoleon, having been educated as an artillery 
officer, always made good use of that arm, and placed 
great reliance on it, often concentrating batteries to 
the amount of one hundred guns to support an attack 
or strengthen a weak position. His light artillery 
was also efficient, but from carelessness in its use 
he often exposed his guns to capture. But artillery, 
although it may intimidate inexperienced troops, is 
generally less destructive than musketry at close 
range, or the bayonet if applied with vigour. It 
certainly was so in the battles which we are narrat- 

The nations who were opposed to and were beaten 
by ISTapoleon generally learnt to imitate his methods 
and gave up many of their old traditions. In the 
campaign of 1806 the Russians were very steady in 
the ranks and capable of line mov^ements, but having 
been beaten by Napoleon, they changed their system 
in 1812 and 1813, apparently without any great ad- 
vantage. The Russian artillery, also, were better 
able to pull through and surmount obstacles than 
any other in the field ; they arrived sooner in position, 
and could remain there longer. This is greatly due 
to their experience of the bad roads of their own 
country and of Poland, which are almost impassable 
in spring and autumn. The Russian cavalry of re- 
serve was most splendid and efficient in respect to 
horses, appointments and discipline, but the Em- 
peror was too much inclined to husband their 
strength and to keep them out of danger. The 
Russian light cavalry was also very good and steady. 
Cathcart is of opinion that the Cossacks were neither 
so terrible nor so useful as has been generally rep- 


resented. They had little efficiency in a general 
action, or when opposed to regular cavalry forces at 
all equal to their own. On outpost duty they saved 
much fatigue to the regular cavalry, but were never 
entirely entrusted with that service. Cathcart tells 
us that he once heard Prince Eugene say that the 
Cossacks did more good than harm to their enemies, 
especially in the retreat to Moscow, and he is in- 
clined to give his adhesion to this judgment. 

At the time of the battle of Jena the Prussians pos- 
sessed a fine army composed largely of veteran soldiers, 
and drilled in the tactics of Frederick the Great. 
It was consequently beaten by Napoleon, who 
brought concentrated masses to bear upon it with a 
celerity not hitherto considered practicable. After 
the peace of Tilsit the numbers of the Prussian 
regular army were reduced to very small dimensions, 
but the outburst of national feeling which followed 
the humiliation of that ei:)ocli called into existence 
a national army, while the genius of Scharnhorst con- 
verted the oppression of the conqueror into a ma- 
cliinery for giving raw recruits the solidity and 
efficiency of practical soldiers. 

The ordinances of August, 1808, gave the Prussian 
army an entirely new organisation. They provided 
that foreign recruiting should be abolished, and that 
promotion should no longer be determined by ad- 
vantages of birth or mere length of service, but that 
professional knowledge, education and bravery 
should take their place. Dishonourable punishments 
were done away with, the articles of war made more 
lenient, and improvements effected in dress and 
equipment, in the formation and organisation of 
the army, and in the comparative strength of the 
various arms. By the treaty of Tilsit the strength 


of the Prussian army was reduced to forty-five 
thousand men, but it was arranged that the com- 
ponent parts of this force should be changed every 
three months. New recruits were admitted to the 
army, and those who passed out were formed into a 
reserve. Even those who had received no military 
trainins; were formed into a jSTational Militia. Be- 
sides the standing army, all able-bodied men between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty were to arm, clothe, 
and exercise themselves at their own cost. The 
schools also received a military organisation, so that 
boys and young men might gain experience of 
soldierly discipline and training. 

It is evident that there was not time for these 
new levies of the Prussian army to arrive at tactical 
efiiciency, and there were good reasons for assimilat- 
ing the use made of them in war to that employed 
by the enemy, and although at a later period the 
Prussian army revived the old system of line move- 
ments, vet in 1813 this was not the case. The 
system then adopted was that of concentrated masses, 
and the employment of light infantry supported by 
columns of attack. Cathcart considers that the 
Prussian artillery was efficient in every respect, but 
inferior to the Russian in cases of difficultv and even 
on the line of march. The Prussian cavalry was 
extremely good, which is partly owing to the fact 
that Bliicher was brought up as a cavalry officer. 

Similarly the Austrian army was in a high state 
of systematic discipline, and was accustomed to the 
tactics dependent on line movement ; but it had not 
the good fortune of being schooled in adversity to the 
same degree as the Prussians. It never adopted a 
democratic or a national system. The new Bohemian 
and other levies which were summoned to its ranks 



were a source rather of danger than of strength. The 
Austrian artillery, also, was old-fashioned and slow 
to move, but when it did arrive in positi(?n was 
scientifically served. Their ambulance, also, was 
cumbrous and expensive^ and too slow for the modern 
rapidity of movement. The Austrian cavalry w^as 
perhaps superior on the whole to that of any other 
Power in the field ; their light cavalry was composed 
of Hungarian hussars and Polish Uhlans, which re- 
ceived from other nations the sincere flattery of 

It may be remarked, in conclusion, that in all con- 
tinental armies the order of battalions when formed 
in line was invariably three deep, the English being 
the only nation which could trust the stability of a 
line only two deep. In the days of Marlborough the 
formation of the British army was also three deep. 





It is no part of the scope of this work to discuss 
the causes of Napoleon's invasion of Russia, amongst 
the outward reasons for which, perhaps, the most in- 
telligible was the desire to force Russia into a closer 
observance of the Continental System, that is of 
the continental blockade against English commerce. 
But it must be remembered that the main object of 
Napoleon's policy, after the regeneration of Erance, 
was the calling back into life the two other Latin 
nations, Italy and Spain, placing them under strong 
governments, instinct with the modern spirit, and 
forming them into a confederation under the suprem- 
acy of France to resist the great military despotisms 
of the North. It must have been obvious to Napoleon, 
as it is clear to any one at the opening of the present 
century, that unless some heroic effort were made to 
preserve them, the Latin nations were doomed to 
political disintegration, and that England and Russia 
must become the eventual masters of the world. Na- 
poleon, at St. Helena, deeply as he regretted the folly 
of the Russian campaign, also foresaw the gigantic 


development of that country in the future and the 
danger which it might cause to Europe. It is prob- 
able therefore that, even if events had turned out very 
differently to what they actually did, ]^apoleon could 
not have completed his career without a struggle 
against Russia of some kind. The re-establishment 
of the independence of Poland, which may be com- 
pared to the creation of the Italian kingdom, was an 
insult and a menace to Russia, and it is not likely that 
the renascence of a Polish ISTation would have been 
more tolerable to Alexander than it had been to his 

However this may be, the expedition into Russia is 
the greatest military enterprise the world has ever 
seen, and it will be sufficient if we confine ourselves 
to its military aspects. Napoleon began to cross the 
Niemen on June 24. To those who know the later 
history of the campaign it is difiicult to understand 
why he commenced operations so late in the year. 
Napoleon had originally intended to open the cam- 
paign towards the close of May, at which time the 
grass would be grown and there would be fodder for 
the horses. He also apparently designed to attack 
St. Petersburg and to begin with the siege of Riga 
and Diinaburg. He probably hoped to bring the 
Russians to a decisive engagement somewhere in 
Lithuania, and it is fairly certain that, if at the out- 
set of the campaign he had contemplated the march 
to Moscow, he would not have lost so important a 
month as June. 

The Emperor was for some time in the dark as to 
the Russian plans, but when he heard that two Rus- 
sian armies had been formed, one of one hundred and 
fifty thousand men under Barclay de Tolly, and the 
other of one hundred thousand men under Prince 


Bagration ; that the first was to advance in the direc- 
tion from Vilna to Kowno, and the second from Minsk 
to Grodno, he determined to cross the Niemen at 
Kowno, to march quickly on to Vilna, to place him- 
self hetween the two armies and to keep them separ- 
ated during the remainder of the campaign. ^N'a- 
poleon had with him the corps of Davout, Oudinot, 
Xey, and the Imperial Guard. Macdonald was to 
cross the Niemen (or, as it is there called, the Memel) 
at Tilsit, occupy both sides of the stream and march 
into Courland. He had with him thirty thousand 
Prussians and two divisions of Poles, and these 
formed the left wing. Prince Eugene was to com- 
mand the right wing, eighty thousand strong, coq- 
sisting of Italians and Bavarians, and was to cross 
the I^iemen at Prenn. Still further to the right 
King Jerome was to pass over the stream with the 
Poles, Saxons and Westphalians and the fourth corps 
of the reserve artillery. Besides there was a reserve 
of one hundred and fifty thousand men and sixty 
thousand soldiers who had been disabled by the heavy 
marchine;. The whole armv which traversed the 
frontier of Russia at midsummer is reckoned by the 
best authorities at 630,058 men, consisting of 533,- 
479 foot and 96,579 horse — the largest body of men 
which ever obeyed a single commander in historical 

This mighty host stood on the banks of the 'Nie- 
men on the eve of St. John's Day, 1812. ISTothing 
was heard of the movement of the Russian armies, 
but some squadrons of Cossacks were seen riding 
over the plain on the other side of the stream. The 
Emperor passed the night in a peasant's hut on the 
left bank, having traversed the river, driven away 
the Cossacks, and chosen the best spot for crossing. 


Three bridges were constructed. Xapoleon stood at 
their head at daybreak and witnessed the march 
of the invading columns. He was saluted by the 
youth of Europe, an army drawn from every portion 
of his vast dominions,with the cries of "' Vive I'Em- 
pereur! " and a joyous enthusiasm which showed no 
foreboding of future disaster. 

During the whole of two days the vast masses were 
defiling across the bridge, and, as soon as they had 
crossed, pressed on to Vilna. The distance is sixty 
miles, and it was covered by many of the troops in 
three days. During this time the Emperor Alexan- 
der was at Vilna, which he did not leave till June 
27. Before doing so he issued a proclamation to 
his army saying that he had no wish for war, that he 
had refrained from arming until repeated insults 
compelled him to do so, and that the attack of Xa- 
poleon was unjorovoked. On the same day he ad- 
dressed a letter to the Governor of St. Petersburg, 
by way of a manifesto to the nation, which ended 
with the declaration that he would not lav down his 
arms so long as a single hostile soldier remained on 
the soil of Russia. He also sent his aide-de-camp, 
Balashov, to ISTapoleon, with offers to negotiate if 
the French would recross the J^iemen. The messen- 
ger was by the Emperor's orders detained by Davout 
until Napoleon was installed in Vilna in the quarters 
which Alexander had only just quitted. 

When the heads of the first French column reached 
Vilna the Lithuanians were prepared to give them a 
welcome reception. But the troops were weary with 
their forced march, hungry and thirstv ; tliev threw 
themselves like beasts of prey upon the bakers' shops 
and the wine-shops and consumed everything that 
they could lay their hands upon. The inhabitants 


were frightened ; they shut up their houses and con- 
cealed themselves. The consequence of this was that 
when Xapoleon rode into the town on the morning 
of June 28, he found closed windows instead of 
triumphal arches. aSo officers came out to meet him. 
Vilna seemed a citv of the dead. He rode throueh 
the town to the bridge, which the Russians had fired 
before their retreat. On the other side of the stream 
he saw the magazines blazing which the Russians 
had sjDent eighteen months in collecting. He then 
retired to the Palace, which Alexander had left the 
evening before, and sent for the authorities, by whom 
he was well received. 

On the following dav there was a violent storm, 
the precursor of five days' heavy rain. The tempera- 
ture fell and the heat of summer was turned into the 
frost of winter. The soldiers had their first experi- 
ence of Russian weather. Its principal effect was 
to disorganise the vast trains of supplies which were 
following the ranks of the army. The roads broke 
up, the horses failed, the waggons stuck fast in the 
ruts unable to move, and the soldiers had no food ex- 
cept what they could obtain by pillage. 

On July 1 Balashov was admitted by the Emperor 
to an audience. The conversation lasted a long time. 
Amongst other things Xapoleon asked for informa- 
tion about Moscow. " How many inhabitants has 
Moscow ? " " Three hundred thousand. Sire." 
" How many houses ? " " Ten thousand, Sire." 
" And how many churches ? " " More than three 
hundred and fifty." "Why so many?" "They 
are much frequented by our people." " How is 
that ? " " It is because our people are very re- 
ligious." " Bah ! no one is religious nowadays." 
" Pardon, Sire, that is not the case everj-^vhere. 


People are no longer religious in Germany and Italy, 
but they are still religious in Spain and Russia." 
" What is the roadtoMoscow ? " ^' Sire, your question 
is embarrassing. The Russians say as the French 
do, ' All roads lead to Rome.' Many roads lead to 
Moscow; Charles XII. chose the road by Poltava." 
The negotiations came to nothing. The two Em- 
perors, who had been so friendly at Tilsit, never saw 
each other again, yet Alexander always retained 
kindly feelings towards him, and he was, perhaps, the 
only European sovereign who felt comj)assion for the 
prisoner of St. Helena. 

On July 17 Xapoleon left Vilna to begin the 
march to Moscow. Competent judges are of opinion 
that if he had not delayed there so long the Russian 
armies might have been destroyed. Their forces 
consisted at this time of one hundred and seventy 
thousand ordinary soldiers and ten thousand Cos- 
sacks. Their whole strength was calculated at 
six hundred thousand, but of these only four hun- 
dred thousand were ready, and not more than one 
hundred and eighty thousand were actually available 
to oppose the French. Barclay de Tolly retired 
slowly towards the Dwina ; Bagration remained 
in the province of Minsk. Napoleon's design was 
to crush Barclay himself, whilst Davout and Jerome 
disposed of Bagration. The Emperor began by 
marching towards the Dwina as if he wished to 
join Macdonald, who was advancing on Mitau 
and Riga; he then turned suddenly to the east 
and reached Glubokoie on July 18. But he found 
no Russians there. Barclay was determined not 
to be cut off from Smolensk. He placed his safety 
in retreat, and with this object in view sacrificed 
the camp of Drissa, which it had been intended to de- 


fend in imitation of the lines of Torres Vedras, the 
citadel of Wellington in Portugal, and the possession 
of the valley of "the Dwina. For these reasons he 
withdrew to" Vitebsk, followed at a considerable dis- 
tance by Miirat's cavalry. 

Napoleon had no other course open to him but to 
pursue Barclay on the road to Vitebsk, hoping to 
bring him to a general action. But the liussian 
general vanished before him. A cavalry engage- 
ment took place at Ostrovno on July 26, in which the 
Russians lost some two thousand five hundred men. 
Two days later Napoleon entered Vitebsk, but ho 
found it as deserted as he had found Vilna, 
Barclay being in full march for Smolensk. He was 
much disappointed, as he had hoped to engage the 
enemy before he arrived at Vilna, and certainly be- 
fore he reached Vitebsk, but the Russians retired be- 
fore him, devastating the country in their march, 
pursuing the same policy as the Tartars had em- 
ployed with such success against Peter the Great. 

Nor had the efforts of his subordinates been more 
successful. Davout was marching against Bagra- 
tion, having Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome, 
King of Westphalia, under his orders. Jerome's 
forces did not arrive at the specified time, whether by 
his o^vn fault or not is a matter of dispute, but Na- 
poleon thought he was to blame and placed the whole 
of his army on the right under the command of 
Davoust. Jerome retired in disgust to Cassel, the 
capital of his Westphalian kingdom. In con- 
sequence of these errors, for which Napoleon himself 
may have been partly responsible, Bagration was 
abletoretreat to Smolensk. Davout intercepted' him 
at Mohilev on July 23, and the Russians suffered 
a defeat. But they were able to cross the Dnieper 


lower down and to continue their marcli. On 
August 3 the two armies of Barclay de Tolly and 
Bagration were united at Smolensk, so that plan of 
Napoleon had completely failed, 

Napoleon was not a man to be disconcerted by the 
failure of his first plan, nor was he long in forming 
another. He determined to march southwards to- 
wards the Dnieper, to join the army of Davout, and 
then to proceed up the left bank of the stream to- 
wards Smolensk. Having occupied this important 
town, he would cross over to the right bank and force 
the Eussians to a decisive battle, even if they did not 
come out to meet him before, in order to preserve 
one of their sacred cities from violation. He left 
Vitebsk on August 8, crossed the Dnieper at Orsha, 
and effected a junction with Davout. He found 
the left bank defended only by bodies of Cossacks 
who were easily disposed of. Marching with ex- 
treme rapidity, he arrived at Smolensk on August l>i, 
where the Russians were already assembled. 

After a considerable struggle the conqueror en- 
tered the town, but he found little either to gratify 
his ambition or to further his designs. Barclay, who 
now had command of both Russian armies, was able 
to retreat from Smolensk as he had retreated from 
Vilna and Vitebsk, and to cover his march fifteeen 
thousand Russians sacrificed themselves on the walls 
and in the streets of their holy city. A council of 
war was held and the advance upon Moscow resolved 
upon. It is said that Murat and Prince Eugene 
were opposed to this plan, but the will of their master 
was inflexible and the majority voted with him. Be- 
fore this final resolution was adopted was fought the 
battle of Valutino or Lubino, in which Ney and 
Murat attacked the rear-guard of the Russian army 


on August 19. The loss on both sides was very 
licavy, but the engagement had no influence in cheek- 
ing the Russian retreat. There is reason to believe 
that Xapoleon originally intended his first campaign 
to have ended at Smolensk. But matters had not 
turned out according to his expectations. To arrest 
his march at Smolensk under present circumstances 
would have been to acknowledge defeat, and defeat 
meant the destruction of his empire. 

The successes of Napoleon's generals had in the 
meantime been greater than his own. Macdonald 
had occupied Mitau and was now blockading Riga. 
Oudinot occupied the valley of the Dwina and cap- 
tured Polotsk. St. Cyr, who succeeded him in his 
command, defeated Wittgenstein on August 18. On 
the right the Austrians under Schwarzenberg 
obtained advantages over the enemy and were able 
to hold the Russians of Tormasov in check. It is 
possible that these successes encouraged the Emperor 
on his advance, as they seemed to show that his com- 
munications were assured. 




The march upon Moscow began on August 25, 
1812, Napoleon having with him a force of one hun- 
dred and fifty thousand men, which was perhaps suffi- 
cient to conquer the armies opposed to him. The rest 
of the Grand Army was scattered either between 
Vihia and Smolensk or on the wings. The condition 
of the ordinary troops became worse than ever. After 
leaving Smolensk the country was found to be a 
barren desert, from which the peasants had fled after 
burning their villages. The towns, themselves of no 
importance, were abandoned. The harvest of 1812 
was scanty. The latest historian of this campaign, 
Mr. George, tells us that between Smolensk and Mos- 
cow the operations were of extreme simplicity. The 
Russian army, he says, retreated directly on their 
base, from time to time threatening to give battle and 
once doing so, the French following them, ready to 
accept battle if it were offered, but unable to compel 
it. The Russians suffered but little, as they had 
ample magazines on the road ; on the other hand, they 
destroyed all the stores which they could not carry 
off. The French suffered considerably, as they had 
to live by marauding, and spread themselves many 
miles on each side of the road in search of food. 
Still worse was the lack of water. When the army 
reached the Borodino it only numbered five-eighths 
of what it had been on arriving at Smolensk. 


The French passed through Dorogobuzh, Viasma, 
and Gzhatsk. At Viasma reinforcements were re- 
ceived of fifteen thousand men. Barclay had made 
up his mind that the time had now come for a 
decisive engagement, and was preparing a position 
between the two last-mentioned toAVTis, when on the 
evening of August 29 Prince Kutusov appeared to 
take over the supreme command. 

Russian public opinion had been excited by these 
continual retreats, the more so that they were 
directed by Barclay, who was a German by origin. 
The Russians became ashamed of giving up their 
country to the enemy, without a struggle. It seemed 
as if Moscow would in its turn suffer the fate of 
Smolensk. The result of this was that Barclay was 
superseded by Kutusov, whose name is familiar lo 
us from the battle of Austerlitz. He was not a more 
capable general than Barclay, being over seventy 
years of age and too stout to mount on horseback. 
'Not was his mind much more active than his body. 
But he was supposed to represent the fighting tradi- 
tions of Suvorov, and he possessed the confidence of 
the nation. He declined toengage in the position chosen 
bv Barclay, and after a few days' march selected an- 
other, ever after famous in history as the Borodino. 

On September 5 the French army arrived on the 
banks of the Kolotza, a stream nearly dry in summer, 
flowing north-eastwards into the Moskva, by which 
name the French call the battle. Tli^ey found the 
heights on the other side of the river fortified by 
earthworks, a large redoubt on the south and three 
small batteries. The left of the Russians rested on 
Utitza and the right on the Kolotza. In front was the 
redoubt of Shevardino which Xapoleon was able to oc- 
cupy immediately. The numbers engaged w;ere about 


one hundred and twentj-five thousand on the French 
side and one hundred thousand on the Russian. The 
plan of Kutusov was to remain firm in his position, 
and to rest entirely on the defensive. l^apoleon's 
plan was also simple — to mass guns at points con- 
venient for commanding the Russian defences, and 
under cover of their fire to take them by assault with 
infantry, Poniatowski at the same time turning the 
enemy's left. Davout was posted on the right, in 
front of the Shevardino redoubt ; ISTey, with Junot to 
support him, prolonged the line to the Kolotza and 
was to attack towards Semenovskoie ; Eugene com- 
manded the left ; he was to gain possession of Boro- 
dino, and at the due time attack the great redoubt. 
Behind the centre was posted the guard, which had, 
however, sent part of its artillery to the front. Thus 
one hundred and fifteen thousand men were drawn up 
in a line not much more than two miles in length. 

The battle began on September 7 at six o'clock in 
the morning, and by eight o'clock Davout and ISTey 
had captured the works opposed to them. By this 
time also Poniatowski had reached Utitza and 
Eugene had taken Borodino. In order to complete 
the victory Murat and Ney asked ISTapoleon to send 
the guard into action, but he refused, saying that the 
time had not yet come. After a slight pause the 
battle began anew, the principal point of attack being 
the great redoubt. ^ey and Murat crossed the 
ravine and captured Semenovskoie. This enabled 
them to attack the great redoubt in the rear, whilst 
Eugene assailed it in front. After a considerable 
struggle it came into the possession of the French. 
This was the turning-point of the battle, but success 
was dearly purchased, for in the melee Caulaincourt 
was killed. 


It was now three o'clock in the afternoon, but the 
victory was not complete. It is said that N^apoleon 
was suffering from a sev'ere cold, and that he was 
without his usual energy, but Mr. George dismisses 
this as a legend. It is certain that ^ej and Murat 
again asked for the guard to defeat the Russians, but 
^Napoleon refused, and the best judges are of opinion 
that he was right in his refusal. He said, " If my 
guard is destroyed to-day and I have to iight another 
battle to-morrow, how shall I gain it ? " He there- 
fore contented himself with cannonading the Rus- 
sian position with the whole of his artillery. The 
Russians held their ground with obstinacy and 
Kutusov did not retire from the field till the follow- 
ing day. The loss was very heavy on both sides. 
At least seventy thousand dead and wounded strewed 
the battle-field. The Russians retreated easily and 
kept at bay the languid pursuit of the French. The 
army of Kutusov could not prevent the French from 
entering Moscow, but it remained organised and 
formed the kernel of future vengeance, and around it 
was grouped in October the levy of the Russian 
nation which eventually accomplished the destruction 
of the invaders. 

MOSCOW. 117 



The French entered Moscow with Murat at their 
head on September 14, 1812, just a week after the 
battle of Borodino. Thej had reached the holy city, 
the goal of their wanderings, with its fortified 
Kremlin and its gilded cupolas. But they found the 
capital deserted. The nobles and the well-to-do 
citizens had left the town; the palaces, well stored 
with supplies, were empty of inhabitants, and the 
streets were given up to the common people and to 
some prisoners who had been released from gaol. The 
first sight of Moscow had worked upon the French 
army like that of Jerusalem upon the Crusaders, but 
when they entered the deserted streets they were 
seized with a grim horror. In all the capitals which 
I^apoleon had entered he had been met by deputa- 
tions from the municipality begging for grace and 
mercy. Here there was nothing of the kind; he 
was received by no one. The detachments which 
first entered suspected treachery and moved along the 
streets with caution, but they soon saw that the city 
Avas indeed abandoned and that the signs of deso- 
lation were real. 

ISTapoleon had hardly established himself in the 
Kremlin before a fire broke out in a large store con- 
taining spirits belonging to the Government. This 
had been extinguished with difficulty, when it was 
discovered that the great bazaar lying north-east of 


the Kremlin was on fire. The wind blowing from 
the east carried the conflacration across the finest 
streets of the citv, and then a change in the wind 
brought the flames back till the Kremlin itself was in 
imminent danger and ISTapoleon was obliged to leave 
it. The fire raged for three days entirely beyond all 

When Xapoleon was at St. Helena he began to 
ask Betsy Balcombe, the little English girl who 
treated him with such scant ceremony, some questions 
in geography, and on her giving him the information 
that Moscow was the capital of Russia, he fixed his 
eyes upon her with a terrible expression and said in 
a solemn voice, " Who burnt it ? " The poor child 
did not comprehend the significance of the question, 
which has been indeed a puzzle ever since. But 
there can be little doubt that it was the work of the 
governor Rostophchin, acting on his own responsibil- 
itv, without communicatinff his desim to the Em- 
peror. Wolzogen tells us that when he was leaving 
Moscow with Barclay de Tolly and his suite 
Eostophchin joined them. He saw on the road some 
waggons guarded by soldiers, and on coming up with 
them discovered that thev were the Moscow fire 
engines. He naturally asked Rostophchin why he 
had removed them from the capital, and received the 
reply that he had his good reasons ; " But," he added, 
" I have taken for myself only the horse on which I 
ride and the dress which I wear." Then turning 
to his son Sergius, a boy of sixteen, he said, " Take 
leave of Moscow for the last time ; in half an hour 
it will be in flames." 

iN'apoleon employed the month which he spent at 
Moscow in active correspondence. He first formed 
a plan for marching upon St. Petersburg, but Prince 

MOSCOW. 119 

Eugene was the only one of his generals who sup- 
ported it and the rest clamoured for repose and 
finality. He also sent, more than once, overtures to 
Alexander to make peace, but the Tsar, according to 
his settled resolution, refused to negotiate so long 
as a single foreign soldier remained on Russian soil. 
It is not knoum why jSTapoleon stayed at Moscow so 
long or why he left when he did. He formed day 
after day the most inconsistent projects; he claimed 
that he was giving the army repose whilst the cavalry 
was rapidly perishing from want of forage, and 
whilst Kutusov, who was posted to the south of Mos- 
cow at TarutinO, received constant reinforcements 
and patiently waited for the winter. 

At last, on October 19, iSTapoleon suddenly deter- 
mined to leave Moscow. He marched in a southerly 
direction towards the army of Kutusov, with the 
view of dispersing it and of living in the provinces 
of Kaluga and Orel, from which he hoped to pene- 
trate into Poland. The numbers of the French army 
leaving Moscow were ninety thousand infantry, in 
good condition after their long rest, fourteen thou- 
sand cavalry in a wretched state, and other arms 
numbering twelve thousand. 

The advanced guard commanded by Eugene on 
reaching the town of Maloyaroslavetz found a body 
of Russian troops dra^vn up to intercept them. There 
was a hotly-contested struggle for the bridge, and 
Eugene, with his Italians, succeeded in capturing 
the bridge and in taking the town, which was abandon- 
ed by the Russians. Xapoleon arrived about one 
o'clock, but he saw that it would be useless to bring any 
large number of forces across the bridge, which was 
commanded by Russian guns, and that the whole 
Russian army would be in position to meet him, be- 


fore ho could reinforce Eugene. He therefore had 
to give up all hope of advancing in that direction. 
It is said that Malojaroslavetz, although it was a 
battle on a small scale, was the turning-point of Na- 
poleon's career, and may therefore be reckoned as one 
of the decisive battles of the world. Mr. George says 
that it showed for the first time that his expedition 
had substantially failed. " This day converted 
fortune into destruction and made his ultimate over- 
throw a certainty when his enemies combined against 
him." After the battle he sent for Berthier, Murat, 
and Bessieres. After discussing the state of affairs 
he put his elbows on the table, and sat for an hour 
gazing at the map, with his head between his hands, 
without uttering a word. " In that bitter moment," 
says Mr. George, " he perhaps realised for the first 
time that he had failed irretrievably." On the fol- 
lowing day he was nearly captured by a body of Cos- 

JSTapoleon now abandoned the project of retreating 
by Kaluga, and determined to regain, by a cross pas- 
sage at Mozhaisk, the road to Smolensk, which he had 
followed on his advance. We now know that, if he 
had persisted in his first designs,he would have been 
successful. Kutusov had made up his mind to re- 
treat to Kaluga, if ISTapoleon should show any signs 
of seriously attacking him, and his troops had already 
begun to move with that object. If the Emperor 
had made one more effort he might have gained his 
purpose of returning through a fertile and inhab- 
ited country. 

I^apoleon reached Borodino on October 28 and 
found many thousands of corpses still unburied. 
On the last day of the month he arrived at Viasma. 
The soldiers had by this time no bread and no brandy ; 

MOSCOW. 121 

they had nothing to eat but the flesh of the horses, 
which were constantly dying from fatigue. The 
weather was still fine and bright, but the cold at night 
was severe. The soldiers who wandered away in 
search of food never came back; they either per- 
ished of hunger, were taken by the Cossacks, or were 
killed by the peasantry. Hundreds threw away their 
arms, and hundreds more died by the wayside. The 
first attack of the Kussians upon the retreating army 
was made at Viasma on ISTovember 3. Apparently 
it might have resulted in a terrible disaster for the 
French if Kutusov had displayed a reasonable amount 
of energy. The French had only thirty-seven thou- 
sand men on the field, so seriously had they been 
weakened by the causes which have been enumerated. 

The retreat on Smolensk was continued, 'Nej com- 
manding the rear-guard and performing prodigies of 
valour and endurance, fighting like a common soldier. 
The winter now began in earnest. On November 
6 there was a heavy fall of snow, accompanied by 
a cold wind. The horses died like flies. It was im- 
possible to discover food for them beneath the snow, 
and they were helpless on the frozen ground. Hour 
by hour vehicles had to be abandoned and the num- 
ber of stragglers enormously increased. In the 
passage of the Kiver Vop Eugene's corps was reduced 
from twelve thousand to six thousand, and only 
twelve guns were left out of the ninety with which 
it started from Moscow. 

On November 9 Napoleon arrived at Smolensk, 
his advanced guard having already passed it, not 
having been allowed to enter the town. Here bad 
news awaited him. Baraguay d'Hilliers had lost a 
brigade of two thousand men, and Vitebsk had fallen 
into the hands of the Eussians notwithstanding the 


efforts of Marslial Victor to defend it. It was ob- 
viously impossible to make a long halt at Smolensk, 
still less to make it a nucleus of winter quarters. 
^Napoleon left Smolensk accompanied by the guard 
on ]!^ovember 14. His fighting troops were now re- 
duced to thirty thousand, and detachments of the 
army came up at considerable intervals. He made 
an arrangement for the purpose of resting the sol- 
diers that they should leave the city in detachments, 
Eugene on November 15, Davout on November 16, 
and Ney with the rear-guard on November 17. But 
these arrangements, conceived in the interests of the 
soldiers, proved disastrous for them and for their 




The Russians now determined to intercept the re- 
treat of the Grand Army, and for that purpose Kut- 
usov took up a position in the neighbourhood of Kras- 
noe, half-way between Smolensk and Orsha. He 
allowed Xapoleon to pass unmolested, but when 
Eugene arrived he found the way barred. He at- 
tacked vigorously in three columns, but was repulsed. 
Profiting by the darkness, he made a circuit and 
reached Krasnoe during the night with three thou- 
sand five hundred men out of the six thousand with 
whom he had left Smolensk. Davout, who followed, 
escaped with some difliculty, the attention of the enemy 
having been diverted by the action of Xapoleon and 
Eugene ; but Xev met with terrible difficulties. The 
corps which he commanded had been made up at 
Smolensk to the streng-th of six thousand men. He 
left the town before daylight on Xovember 17, hav- 
ing previously blown up the ancient walls and other 
buildings — a needless act of barbarity. On the 
afternoon of the day following, when not far from 
Krasnoe, Xey found a reserve force posted across the 
road. The day being ioggy, he was unable to see 
the numbers of the enemy and attacked without hesi- 
tation. The struggle only lasted a quarter of an hour ; 
the Erench were repulsed, and nothing was left to 
him but to reach the main army by a circuit. Start- 
ing as soon as it was quite dark, he reached the Dnie- 


per, which was covered with a thin coating of ice 
broken at the edges. Neither gnns or carriages could 
be got across, and in their march they were constant- 
ly attacked by Cossacks. They ultimately reached 
the road which leads from Orsha to Vitebsk at mid- 
night on November 21, and here they met some of 
Eugene's troops. Ney was saved, but only 
brought with him to tlie end nine hundred men out 
of the six thousand with which he set out. 

Napoleon arrived at Orsha on November 19, and 
found considerable magazines from which it was pos- 
sible to supply both food and ammunition. The vehi- 
cles and baggage waggons were destroyed and the 
horses set free for the service of the artillery. The 
Emperor even destroyed his own papers, and by error 
of judgment the pontoon train was also abandoned, 
which might have been useful at the Berezina. The 
Russians were concentrating to dispute the passage 
of the Berezina at Borisov. The army of Finland, 
commanded by Wittgenstein, had defeated the corps 
of Oudinot on October 19, and was pressing the 
French marshal towards that river. Towards the 
south the army of Chichagov passed in front of the 
army of Schwarzenberg, who made no attempt to 
stop it, and marched up the Berezina by the right 
bank, whilst Wittgenstein was passing down the 
river by the left. Tlius the small remnant of in- 
vaders who had escaped from Moscow had to deal 
with three armies, those of Kutusov, Chichagov and 
Wittgenstein. Kutusov for some reason lingered be- 
hind at the bridge of Orsha. 

On November 23 Napoleon placed his headquar- 
ters at Bobr, rather more than half-way between 
Orsha and Borisov; here he learned that Oudinot 
had driven the Russians from Borisov, but had 


failed to seize the bridge. He knew, therefore, that 
Berezina must be bridged afresh, and sent forward 
Eble the engineer for the purpose. A suitable place 
for crossing had been found at Studianka, about ten 
miles above Borisov, and the construction of the 
bridges began in the early morning of November 26. 
It had been originally intended to make three bridges, 
but it was found that the material available was only 
sufficient for two. These were built about two hun- 
dred yards from each other, the lower bridge being in- 
tended for infantry and cavalry, the upper bridge, 
which was of a moi-e solid description, for artillery 
and vehicles. The sappers had to work up to their 
shoulders in the ic}^ water, and few of them sur- 
vived the ordeal. General Eble, although he was 
advanced in years, never quitted the spot day or 
night till the passage was complete. If the pontoon 
train had not been destroyed at Orsha thebridge could 
have been laid much more quickly and with much less 
expenditure of life. 

The lower bridge was finished by midday, and ^'d- 
poleon immediately sent Oudinot's corps across, 
which was seven thousand strong. The Russians 
whom he found on the opposite bank he drove back to 
Borisov. The second bridge was not completed till 
four o'clock in the afternoon, when it was already 
dusk. The artillery of the second corps and the 
guard were sent across at once, and the troops under 
ISTey's command traversed the river during the night. 
Thus on the morning of ISTovember 27 a body of 
eleven thousand troops was established on the right 
bank. In the course of that day the remainder of 
the French army reached Studianka, and Napoleon 
in person, followed by his guard, crossed about mid- 
day. He had personally superintended the construe- 


tion of the bridges, assisted by Miirat and Berthier. 
It was fortunate that during this time Chichagov 
had been absent from Russia bv the orders of Kutu- 
sov, and that he did not return until the bridges were 
comj^leted and the bulk of the army had crossed. 

Wittgenstein reached Borisov on the left bank on 
the evening of I^ovember 27. He repaired the 
bridge across the river and opened communications 
with Chichagov, the result of which was the French 
were to be attacked on the following morning on both 
sides of the stream. On the right bank the fighting 
began early in the morning and continued during the 
whole day without the Russians making any impres- 
sion on the French, who were far inferior in number 
to their enemies. The engagement on the left bank 
was similar in character, Marshal Victor not having 
more than five thousand men, chiefly Germans, un- 
der his command. The Russians attacked at 10 
A.M.^ and tried to cut off Victor from the bridges. 
At the first sound of the cannon the non-combatants 
thronged towards the river, forming a confused mass 
of men, horses and vehicles, extending a thousand 
yards along the river bank and two hundred yards 
deep. The Russians now turned their guns upon 
the huddled throng, and a panic naturally ensued. 
Many were pushed into the river and drowned. The 
space in front of the bridges was covered by a thick 
mass of broken carriages and heaped bodies of men 
and horses through which the engineers had eventu- 
ally to make a regular cutting. 

Victor held his ground with heroic tenacity, the 
Russians being three times his number. At 9 p.m. 
he received orders to retire, but he did not succeed 
in effecting his crossing till after midnight. On 
the following morning the bridges were set on fire, 


leaving of course many to perish. Some tried to 
rush through the fire, others to cross over the ice 
which broke under their weight, and others to swim 
or wade across the icy stream. It is not known how 
many died, but thousands of non-combatants were 
made prisoners. Very few guns, however, and no 
soldiers were captured. 




It is not known how many of Xapoleon^s troops 
were lost at the Berezina, but the army which be- 
fore the passage was numbered by a competent au- 
thority at thirty-one thousand, was estimated at nine 
thousand after it. On December 3 the cold became 
intense, and continued so until the last French sol- 
diers had quitted Russian soil. The thermometer is 
said to have fallen as low as 35 degrees below the zero 
of Fahrenheit, and it seldom or never rose above zero. 
The destrnction of life became terribly rapid. In 
two days the division of Loison which marched out 
of Vilna to meet the remains of the Grand Army 
was reduced by the effect of cold from ten thousand 
men to three thousand. Xey performed prodigies 
of valour with the rear-guard, although it was reduced 
to only a few hundred men. At Molodetschno there 
was a serious encounter with the Russians on Decem- 
ber 4, the cold being intense. On the following day 
Xapoleon arriving at Smorgoni, determined to leave 
the army and to hasten to Paris in order to mitigate 
the consequences of his defeat, and to provide means 
of saving the remnants of his army. This action, 
which had been stigmatised as cowardly and heartless, 
was in reality both wise and courageous. He could 
do nothing more by remaining with his soldiers; he 
was a sovereign as well as a general, and his presence 
at the seat of government was indispensable. He took 


with him only Caulaincoiirt (the brother of the dip- 
lomatist who had been killed at Borodino), Duroc 
and Mouton, and had only a handful of horsemen 
as an escort; indeed, he narrowly escaped being 
taken prisoner. He reached Warsaw on December 
10, and Dresden a few days later, where the sledge in 
which he travelled is still preserved. He crossed the 
Rhine at Mainz with considerable difficulty, and at 
eleven o'clock at night on December ] 8 entered the 
Tuilleries. He was at first refused admission, as 
he was not recognised. Suddenly two men in fur 
clothing burst into the room of the lady-in-waiting. 
One made for the Emperor's door ; the lady attempt- 
ed to stop him and uttered a cry which awoke the 
Empress. She opened the door, recognised her hus- 
band and rushed into his arms. 

Although the departure of iSTapoleon was abso- 
lutely necessary, it reduced the soldiers to despair. 
Murat, as of royal rank, was left in command, but he 
had no other orders except to maintain his ground 
between the Niemen and the Vistula and to wait for 
l^apoleon's return. On December 9 a few thousands 
of tattered stragglers reached Vilna. The maga- 
zines were pillaged, and the Cossacks soon made their 
appearance. Those who did not escape quickly 
enough were killed by them and by the peasants. It 
is supposed that from fifteen thousand to twenty 
thousand w^ere left behind in the town. A body of 
only four thousand three hundred resumed the march 
to Kowno. Xey recrossed the Xiemen almost alone 
on December 13. About eighteen thousand men 
were eventually able to reach Konigsberg, which be- 
fore long became hostile to them. Murat returned 
to his kingdom of Naples in January, 1813. 

Military history contains nothing comparable to 


the catastrophe of this campaign, and it is difficult 
to estimate its extent. Of the 630,058 troops which 
entered Russia, none returned in fighting order ex- 
cept the two wings of Macdonakl and Schwarzen- 
berg, numbering about ten thousand. From the 
main army escaped about eighteen thousand or more, 
entirely disorganised and consisting largely of 
officers. These were of great use in consolidating 
Kapoleon's levies for the campaign of 1813. Thus 
about a million human beings had disappeared ; how 
many of them were made prisoners and how many 
died it is impossible to say. The Russian loss in 
dead is placed at one hundred and fifty thousand. 
It is usless to discuss the cause of this disaster. We 
have seen that on several occasions the French army 
narrowly escaped destruction, as aSTapoleon himself 
narrowly escaped capture. On the other hand, the 
winter was abnormally severe, and with better for- 
tune the loss might have been less disastrous. But 
the enterprise could never have succeeded unless 
Alexander could have been persuaded to give in. 
Napoleon attempted the impossible and failed. The 
only chance of his realising his desires would have 
lain in the limitation of their scope. 


THE WAR OF 1813. 



During the winter of 1812 Xapoleon worked with 
as great energy as he had ever shown during any 
portion of his career. He possessed sufficient re- 
sources in men and in monev to defend France, even 
up to the frontiers of the Rhine. But that did not 
satisfy him. His pride, or perhaps wiser con- 
siderations of policy, forbade him to surrender any 
portion of the dominions which had been declared to 
be integral portions of the Empire by decrees of the 
Senate. He answered to Francis I., who urged him 
to make peace, that he considered Rome, Piedmont, 
Tuscany, Holland, and the Hanseatic Departments 
inseparable from the Empire. Rome and Hamburg 
must remain French Prefectures. In order to fulfil 
the arduous task of defending this enormous territory 
against a hostile Europe, he had to drain the re- 
sources of his Empire even to exhaustion, and to de- 
pend upon allies whose fidelity was more than doubt- 

He had in his depots the conscripts of 1813 who 
had been summoned to arms in October, 1812, and in 
the departments what were called the cohorts, that 



is, a hundred well-drilled battalions of national 
guards. He doubled these battalions; he called up 
conscripts from classes which had been hitherto 
spared, going as far back as the year 1809. The 
Senate voted the raising of one hundred and forty 
thousand men from the conscription of 1814, and he 
withdrew his depots from Spain. The officers who 
straggled back from the defeat of Moscow were found 
extremely useful in training and instructing the 
new recruits and in inspiring them with the tradi- 
tions of the Imj)erial army. 

These measures provided him with a force very 
similar in its comjDosition to the armies of the 
Revolution, but very different in its spirit. It was 
undoubtedly courageous, and was devoted to the 
person of Xapoleon, but it was drawn from a country 
desolated by continual wars and weary of exertion. 
It had no power of keeping itself together or of re- 
forming itself after a check. It was easily dis- 
couraged and difficult to reanimate anew: it had none 
of that political fervour which distinguished the 
conquering hosts of 1793. 

The French army was also lacking in material re- 
sources. It was possible to furnish artillery to supply 
what had been lost in Russia ; but it was not easy to 
procure sufficient horses to mount a j^owerful cavalry, 
and the inferiority of that arm was felt during the 
whole campaign. After three months of incredible 
labour K^apoleonwas able to despatch across the Rhine 
an army of two hundred thousand men, of whom 
however, only twentv-four thousand were cavalrv. 
During the course of the summer these numbers were 
increased to three hundred and fifty thousand men, 
of whom sixty thousand were cavalry, while the 
artillerv numbered six hundred. 


This army was strong enough to resist the first 
efforts of the Coalition, which at present compre- 
hended only Russia and Prussia. Russia, exhausted 
by the last campaign, was only able to send one hun- 
dred thousand men across the Vistula. Bernadotte, 
who had been elected Crown Prince of Sweden with 
the consent of I^apoleon, now deserted his former 
master and joined Russia against him ; but he did 
not take any share in the early part of the campaign. 
Prussia was in a condition to furnish a large number 
of troops, thanks to the admirable policy which she 
had adopted since 1808, and to the wisdom and skill 
with which she had turned to her own advantage 
the harsh restrictions which were designed for her 
destruction. Her population were inflamed by such 
a patriotic zeal that nearly the whole of her able- 
bodied inhabitants served either among the 
volunteers or in the reserve. Austria, although 
ostensibly arming, held herself aloof, and waited to 
see in what direction the fortune of war would de- 
clare itself. Thus, regarded as mere numbers, the 
enemies of Napoleon were not more formidable in 
the spring of 1813 than those whom he had previous- 
ly vanquished. But his task was rendered especially 
difficult by the passionate enthusiasm of the Ger- 
mans, by the general murmurs of revolt which ex- 
tended from the Rhine to the Elbe, and by the in- 
experience of the French army, which had been 
hastily organised to support a cause in which they 
could feel but little interest. 

The Russian campaign had lost Napoleon the half 
of Germany. Prince Eugene had been driven back 
from point to point until he reached the confluence of 
the Saale and the Elbe. The Emperor had promised 
his stepson that as soon as he had organised some new 


legiments he would send sufficient reinforcements to 
maintain him on the Saale. In the month of April 
Prince Eugene occupied on that river some good de- 
fensive positions at the head of sixty thousand men. 

The advance of the allies had begun at the end of 
March. Bliicher came from Silesia with twenty- five 
thousand men and crossed the Elbe on April 3, pre- 
ceded by Winzingerode with an advance guard of 
thirteen thousand men. Wittgenstein, Yorck and 
Borstedt commanded twenty-five thousand men before 
Magdeburg, and in the neighbourhood of that fortress 
were some Russian divisions, six thousand or seven 
thousand strong. The principal Russian army was 
posted at Ivalisch and on the Silesian frontier. The 
fortresses of Danzig, Thorn, Stettin, Glogau, and 
Spandau were either besieged or blockaded. The 
allies had about seventy thousand soldiers on the 
Elbe, but the French possessed on that river the im- 
portant fortresses of Magdeburg and Wittenberg, the 
first occupied by a garrison of about fifty thousand 
French troo23s. 

Napoleon, leaving Paris on April 15, spent a few 
days at Mainz for the purpose of organising his 
forces. He proceeded in a carriage to Weimar, 
which he reached on April 28, and then mounted his 
horse. His forces amounted to one hundred and 
fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry and 
three hundred and fifty guns, the allies being su- 
perior to him in cavalry and artillery. The Russian 
forces may be reckoned at fifty thousand, the Prus- 
sian at forty-six thousand. They were both older 
and better seasoned than the French ; indeed, many 
of the French soldiers were mere boys. I*[apoleon had 
taken great pains to exercise them in forming squares 
to resist the numerous cavalry of the enemy. He 


doubted their powers of endurance, but 'Nej wrote 
to him after the first engagement, " These children 
are heroes ; with them I can carry out anything that 
you may command." 

Napoleon divided his army into four corps; the 
three first were commanded by Xey, Marmont, and 
Bertrand, the Guard formed the fourth. The design 
of Napoleon was to recapture Dresden and the line of 
the Elbe. For this purpose he descended the course 
of the Saale while Eugene marched up the stream to 
meet him. When the junction of their forces was 
once effected, they would cross the river together, seize 
Leipzig, and from that point fall on the right flank of 
the allies. Ney crossed the Saale on April 29 and 
advanced on the road to Liitzen. The youthful con- 
scripts, whom Ney commanded, came into conflict 
with the Russian cavalry, formed into squares, and 
having received the enemy bravely at the point of their 
bayonets, attacked them at the charge and captured 
Weissenfels. The advance was then continued to- 
wards Liitzen, which lies on the main road between 
Weissenfels and Leipzig. 

The battle of Liitzen, the first of the campaign, 
was remarkable for the confusion which prevailed 
in it, the bravery displayed by the armies engaged, 
and the manner in which Napoleon gained the 
victory. The allies were far superior in cavalry, 
but they were badly handled and remained for a con- 
siderable time doing nothing at Rahna, when they 
might have decided the fate of the conflict. It was 
long before Napoleon could discover where the main 
body of the enemy lay, because his feeble force of 
cavalry had to be kept in hand, and could not be used 
for reconnoitring. But when he had learnt what he 
desired to know, by the sound of the cannon, and had 


come to a conclusion as to where the decisive blow 
should be struck, lie wheeled his forces round and at- 
tacked the enemy with such energy that he compelled 
them to retreat. 

The battle of Liitzen was indeed the result of an 
accident. Napoleon had reached Leipzig on May 21, 
after having on the previous day had a successful 
skirmish with the enemy at Kippach, where Marshal 
Bessieres met his death, and having left Ney at 
Liitzen to protect his right flank, Napoleon had little 
difficulty in seizing Leipzig; but whilst he was en- 
gaged in the capture of that city, the battle of Liitzen 
was being fought in his rear. As Napoleon sup- 
posed, the allies to the number of eighty thousand 
were marching from the Elster to the upper waters of 
the Saale, on the right flank of the French army, 
when the sight of Ney's columns advancing upon 
Leipzig suggested the idea of a sudden attack. The 
two sovereigns, who were present in person, deter- 
mined to risk a battle, and the allies wheeling round 
to the right charged the troops before them, imagin- 
ing them to be much weaker than they really were. 

The French occupied in front of Liitzen five 
villages which formed strong points of defence. 
These were Gross-Gorschen, Rahna, Klein- 
Gorschen, Starsiedel, and Kaja. The first of these 
was much exposed; it was violently attacked by the 
Prussians under Bliicher and captured. The allies 
then advanced against the villages which formed the 
second line. Starsiedel was defended by the corps of 
Marmont, who arrived just in time and repulsed the 
enemy, but the French were driven from Rahna and 
Klein-Gorschen. Ney was at this moment with the 
Emperor and Souham had been left in command, but 
Ney soon arrived to take charge of his divisions and 


the villages were again recovered after a severe 

]N^apoleon heard the thunder of the cannonade 
about midday and immediately hurried up, knowing 
that the Russians and Prussians must have joined 
their forces. He gave orders that Macdonald should 
advance on the left, Bertraud on the right, while he 
occupied the centre with his guard. There was con- 
siderable danger in the centre before the guard ar- 
rived on the field, as ITapoleon could only oppose to 
the main body of the allies the young levies of I^^ey's 
corps who were already exhausted by their labours. 
Bllicher was therefore able to retake Rahna, the last 
post of the French in front of Liitzen. The battle 
continued with uncertain fortune till six o'clock in 
the evening. Wherever IS^apoleon appeared he 
stimulated his soldiers to new efforts. At last six- 
teen battalions of the young guard were in a position 
to attack under the command of Lobau, while Drouot 
collected sixty pieces of artillery and opened a 
murderous fire between Kaja and Starsiedel. 
Eugene also captured the villages opposed to him. 
Wittgenstein advanced with the Russian guard and 
the grenadiers, not for a new onslaught but to cover 
the retreat. The daylight was at an end, and the 
close of evening terminated the conflict. The 
French were then surrounding the allies in a half 
circle. Bllicher made one more desperate attempt, 
to reach Kaja, but he found it protected by the guard 
and by a formidable artillery and was forced to re- 
tire. The allies retreated, much to the disgust of 
Bllicher, and we may imagine also to the disappoint- 
ment of Napoleon himself, as he had lost an op- 
portunity of crushing the allied army in a pitched 
battle, and he had no cavalry with which to continue 


the pursuit. Thirty-five thousand killed and 
wounded covered the field, Bllicher was wounded in 
the arm, and at the close of the fight l^apoleon him- 
self disappeared in the confusion for a few minutes, 
some thinking that he had been killed. The French 
troops were obliged to remain the whole night through 
in their squares for fear of being attacked. Both 
sides claimed the victory. 




After the battle of Liitzen the allied armies 
marched towards Dresden, followed by Xapoleon at 
the head of one hundred and twenty thousand troops. 
The Emperor now despatched Xev to Torgau with the 
idea that he should eventually march on Berlin. 
The allies crossed the Elbe and took up a position 
in the Xew Town of Dresden, on the right bank of 
the river, whilst Xapoleon entered the Old Town. 
The keys of the city were presented to the conqueror, 
but he declared that he onlv received them as a 
deposit for their King. In a few days King Ered- 
erick Augustus, who had fled to Prague, returned 
to his capital and was received by Xapoleon with 
signs of exuberant affection. Xapoleon took up 
his abode in the Marcolini Palace just outside the 
town, and the rooms which he occupied existed un- 
changed a few years ago. It may be remarked that 
Xapoleon almost from the outset of his career pre- 
ferred to live outside of the towns which he had con- 
quered, and he generally chose rooms on the 
ground floor looking into a garden. This may be 
attributed to his love of nature and the necessity of 
quiet, but it is more likely that he derived the habit 
from his Corsican days. Accustomed from his youth 
to treachery and deeds of violence, he naturally 
feared assassination, and therefore hesitated to trust 
himself in a town, where he could be captured or per- 


haps killed in a popular rising, and preferred a spot 
which could be easily defended and from which there 
was a ready escape. 

The whole of the German Elbe was now in the 
hands of Napoleon, with the exception of its lower 
waters. He despatched Davout to these regions to 
regain possession of Hamburg, while the Grand 
Army established itself firmly in Saxony. He also 
gav^e orders to Murat to leaye his kingdom of Naples 
in order to take command of the cavalry, and he sent 
Prince Eugene to Italy to levy an army and to form 
a barrier against a possible invasion of that country 
by Austria. After a week's sojourn he quitted Dres- 
den to deal, if possible, a fresh blow upon the allies. 

The armies of Wittgenstein and Bliicher, defeated 
but not destroyed, instead of covering Berlin, re- 
treated along the Austrian frontier through Lusatia, 
thinking it more important to secure the co-operation 
of the Austrians than to protect the Prussian capital 
against a sudden attack. They took up a position 
at Bautzen, near Hochkirch, which had witnessed 
the defeat of Frederick the Great by Marshal Daun. 
They strengthened their ground with trenches well 
furnished with cannon, and awaited the attack of 
Napoleon with one hundred thousand men. 

Napoleon sent against Bautzen the four corps of 
Macdonald, Bertrand, Oudinot, and Marmont. He 
ordered Ney, who had arrived at Torgau, to return 
with sixty thousand men and threaten the right of 
the allies. The battle-field of Bautzen extended 
about fifteen miles, and was much too large for the 
number of the troops employed. The Emperor of 
llussia had his headquarters in Neu-Burschwiz, the 
King of Prussia was in Wurschen, and Napoleon in 
Klein Eorstgen. At midday on May 20, 1813, Na- 


poleon, after reconnoitring the position of the 
enemy, gave orders for the attack, and by five in the 
afternoon the battle became general. The River 
Spree, which passes through Bautzen, formed the 
first line of the defence of the allies, who had their 
left supported by the mountains of Bohemia. Be- 
hind the Spree, the parallel stream of Bloser-Wasser 
formed a second line to the centre and the left, while 
the right was defended by a rising ground between 
the Bloser-Wasser and the Spree. In the judgment 
of Kapoleon the capture of these two lines of de- 
fence would require two battles, and he determined 
to devote the first day to the capture of the line of the 
Spree. The fortified to-^^m of Bautzen was directly 
in front of him; the Russians on his right, and the 
Prussians, commanded by Bllichcr, on his left. 

The Emperor sent Oudinot against the Russians. 
The marshal crossed the river and obtained posses- 
sion of the commanding heights of the Drohnberg. 
In the centre the walls of Bautzen resisted for some 
time, but the bridge across the Spree was at length 
occupied, the defences forced, and the French 
hastened from all sides into the town. On the left 
Marmont and Bertrand similarly crossed the Spree, 
and drove Bliicher back to the hills on which his line 
rested. By nine o'clock in the evening the whole 
line of the river was taken and I^apoleon removed 
his headquarters to Bautzen. ]^ey, in the meantime, 
had arrived at the position appointed to him and was 
ready to take part in the battle of the succeeding 
day. ISTapoleon gave him orders to move in such a 
manner that he would fall upon the rear of the allied 
army whilst he himself attacked them in front. 
This would drive them towards the frontiers of Bo- 
hemia, and compel them either to capitulate or to 


take refuge in the territory of Austria which was at 
this time in alliance with Napoleon. 

On the following day, May 21, 1813, Kapoleon 
delayed the attack until he was certain that the move- 
ments of ISTey were effected. The result fulfilled all 
his expectations. Ney advanced against the extreme 
right of the allies, dispersed the troops with which 
he came into contact, and threatened the communica- 
tions of Bliicher. Here, unfortunately, he stopped, 
and did not carry out his master's orders by march- 
ing upon ITochkirch. He was separated from Na- 
poleon by an interval of nine miles, and did not know 
how the battle was progressing in that quarter. 
Bliicher, seeing the danger which threatened him, 
communicated with Wittgenstein and commenced a 
retreat. Napoleon on his side had pushed Bertrand 
and Oudinot across the stream of the Bloser-Wasser 
and had taken the village of Baschutz. The allies 
retreated to Gorlitz in Silesia, having lost fifteen 
thousand men ; and but for the hesitation of Ney, 
who showed a similar weakness at Waterloo, they 
would have been annihilated. As at Liitzen, Na- 
poleon was unable to follow up his advantages with 
cavalry, and as at Liitzen the battle was not alto- 
gether decisive, although it may be fairly regarded as 
a defeat for the allies. 

Napoleon followed the retreating Russians and 
Prussians into Silesia, gradually driving them be- 
fore him. He thrust them successively from Gor- 
litz and Liegnitz; he crossed the bridge of Glogau, 
and was within one day's march of Breslau, the capi- 
tal of Silesia. The fortunes of Napoleon were in the 
ascendant. Oudinot received orders to march with 
twenty-five thousand men on Berlin, and on May 29 
Davout entered Hamburg. At this moment Austria 


interposed with the offer of an armistice which was 
eventually signed on June 14, 1813, bearing the name 
of the Armistice of Pleiswitz. Most writers are agreed 
that it was against the interests of Napoleon to ac- 
cept it, and that the delay was in every respect favour- 
able to the allies. He was imposed upon by the 
astute policy of Metternich, and should never have 
consented to it unless he had intended that it should 
be the preliminary of a peace. The allies were able 
to utilise the breathing-space given to them far better 
than he was, for they were less well prepared, where- 
as !N"apoleon had exhausted all the available resources 
of his country. By this armistice the success of 
Liitzen and Bautzen seemed to be annulled. The 
line of demarcation between the two armies was fixed 
first by the Katzbach, then by the Oder, then by the 
old frontiers of Saxony and Prussia, and onward by 
the Elbe from Wittenberg to the sea. 




Napoleon had reallj no idea of making peace. 
Trom his headquarters in Dresden he superintended 
the arming of his dominions. Eugene was to form 
a large army in Italy to threaten the Austrians if 
they should join the Coalition. He hoped by the be- 
ginning of September to be at the head of five hun- 
dred thousand men and one thousand cannon. He 
possessed upon the Elbe the strong places of Konig- 
stein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, 
Verden and Hamburg. He was secure against an 
attack either from Silesia or from Bohemia. To the 
Grand Army were added the corps of Victor, Van- 
damme and Gouvion de St. Cyr, as well as the Poles 
of Poniatowski, who joined him in Dresden, and 
the corps of Augereau, whom he had left in Bavaria. 
He had under his command at the expiration of the 
armistice on August 16 not less than three hundred 
and fifty-six thousand men. 

His plan was to send a large force against Berlin 
under Oudinot, who was to be supported by Davout 
advancing from Hamburg. The corps of Gouvion 
de St. Cyr and of Vandamme were to guard the ap- 
proaches from Bohemia, the first on the left, the 
second on the right bank of the Elbe. Four divisions 
under the conunand of ^ej were placed on the 
Bober, to manoeuvre against the allies in Silesia. 
Napoleon was to take up a position with his guard at 


Bautzen, in a condition to succour either of the Elbe 
armies or the army of -STev, according as events 
should dictate. He aimed at nothing less than the 
recovery of his former position and the power of 
dictating jjeace to Euroj)e after gaining a brilliant 

There is scarcely any scene in history more 
moving or more picturesque than the interview which 
took place betweeen Xapoleon and Metternich in the 
Marcolini Palace on June 26, 1813. The memory 
of it lived until his death in the mind of the aged 
diplomatist, and a short time before his decease he 
conducted his son to those same rooms in order to 
show him the spot in which ISTapoleon rejected the 
last offers of safety and in which he formed a de- 
cision of fateful import both to himself and to the 

When midnight struck on August 10, 1813, the 
representatives of Prussia and Russia at Prague de- 
clared the armistice at an end, and Austria an- 
nounced that she had joined the Coalition. The 
allies had a formidable mass of troops at their dis- 
posal. In Bohemia Schwarzenberg commanded an 
army of about two hundred and fifty thousand men 
composed almost entirely of Austrians. The army of 
Silesia, composed of Prussians and Russians, com- 
prised one hundred and twenty thousand troops under 
the orders of Bliicher. The army of the ISTorth 
under Bernadotte, made up of Prussians, Russians, 
and Swedes, numbered one hundred and thirty thou- 
sand. These three armies threatened the position of 
Xapoleon in Saxony. But the plan of the Coalition 
was to avoid as far as possible attacking I^apoleon 
himself, whose presence with the army they knew to 
be worth one hundred thousand men, but to confine 


their attention to his lieutenants, and if possible to 
destroy them in detail. This was not a very heroic 
course, but it was the best for them under the circum- 
stances. Time was on their side. As the cam- 
paign went on the masses of the allies must neces- 
sarily increase, as whole nations were engaged in the 
struggle, whereas the forces of Xapoleon must 
naturally diminish. The army of Xapoleon con- 
sisted of fourteen corps d'armee, each under an ex- 
perienced marshal. They formed forty-four com- 
l^lete divisions. The whole number engaged is 
estimated at four hundred thousand, including 
seventy thousand cavalry, an arm of which the Em- 
peror stood so much in need. Dresden was the 
centre of his operations, and there were his magazines 
and depots. 

At the outbreak of hostilities Xapoleon expected 
to be attacked by the army of Bohemia, an event which 
he ardently desired, and consequently advanced to 
meet them, but finding no trace of them, he turned 
his attention to the army of Silesia, believing that the 
fortifications of Pirna and Dresden would oppose a 
sufiicient obstacle to Schwarzenberg to delav him 
until Bliiclier had been satisfactorily dealt with. 
The Emperor reached the Bober on August 21, threw 
bridges across the river, crossed the stream at mid- 
day, marched hastily forward and drove the army 
of Yorck before him. Bliiclier, knowing from the 
manner of the attack that he had to do with Xapoleon 
in person, in accordance with his instructions, retired 
behind the Katzbach with the loss of two or three 
thousand men. 

In the evening a courier reached Xapoleon from 
Dresden to say that the city was being attacked by 
large numbers, and that apparently the grand army 


of the allies was marching from Peterswalde, with 
the design of capturing either Dresden or Leipzig. 
The fact was that the army of Bohemia had entered 
Saxony in four columns, the Russians marching 
along the road which follows the Elbe by Pirna, the 
Prussians by Teplitz and Dippoldswalde, the Aus- 
trians, some by Chemnitz and some by Zwickau. 
They were accompanied by Moreau, the former sub- 
ordinate, and Jomini, the former friend of Xapoleon. 
The Emperor turned back to crush these new foes and 
hastened on with imheard-of rapidity, his guard 
marching nearly sixty miles in three days. Na- 
poleon's first plan was to take up a position in Pirna, 
so as to intercept the road from Peterswalde, and 
then to attack the allies in the rear as they approached 
Dresden, and enclose them between his own army 
and the Elbe. But the cry of anguish from the cit>' 
was so loud and bitter that he was forced to sur- 
render this scheme. He gave way to entreaties and 
determined to occupy Dresden with one hundred 
thousand men and to meet the allies under its walls. 
In the meantime he gave orders to Macdonald and 
Lauriston to drive the Prussians beyond the Kat>5- 

After posting Vandamme in Pirna with orders to 
close the road to Peterswalde, Xapoleon rode into 
Dresden at nine o'clock on the morning of August 
26, the allies having appeared on the western heights 
on the previous day. The battle had already beg-un ; 
the Russians attacked the redoubts on the right, but 
could not wrest them from the French ; the Prus- 
sians tried to obtain possession of the Great Garden, 
so well known to all visitors to Dresden ; the Aus- 
trians fought in the centre, but were repulsed by the 
young guard. The day ended as a success for the 


French, who had killed four thousand of the enemy 
and had taken two thousand prisoners. Napoleon 
was in a very cheerful mood that evening at supper 
in the Roval Palace. 

In the afternoon Napoleon had ascended a tower 
to survey the ground and had perceived that the posi- 
tion of the Austrians was divided into two parts by 
a deep ravine, the Plauensche Grund, through 
which flows the stream of the Weisseritz. He saw 
that if the left half of the Austrians were driven 
into this ravine, the right would be unable to assist 
them and they would be forced to surrender, and that 
this attack could be carried out by Murat with his 
numerous cavalry supported by infantry, without 
exciting the attention of the allies in other parts of 
the field. jSTapoleon trusted also to drive the allies 
from their position and force them to retreat along 
the road to Peterswalde, where they would be met by 
Vandarnme with a force of forty thousand men. 

On August 27 Napoleon took command in the 
centre, Ney on the right, Murat and Victor on the 
left. He had a force of one hundred and twenty 
thousand men, whereas the allies numbered two hun- 
dred thousand, twenty thousand of which were posted 
at Pirna under the command of Prince Eugen of 
Wiirtemberg. The morning was misty and rainy; 
the battle raged round the Great Garden and the 
village of Strehlen. At eleven o'clock Murat and 
Victor began their operations against the ravine of 
Plauen. The Austrians fought like heroes, but the 
rain rendered their muskets useless, and they could 
only use their bayonets. By two o'clock Murat had 
killed two thousand Austrians and taken twelve thou- 
sand prisoners. In the centre Napoleon himself di- 
rected the firing of the artillery, and it is said that 


one of the shots discharged under his orders broke 
the legs of Moreau, passing through the body of his 
horse, and caused his death. A fitting monument 
of granite still marks the place where he fell. 

At six o'clock the battle was over and the allies 
had suffered a crushing defeat; they had lost forty 
cannon, ten thousand men dead and wounded and 
sixteen thousand men taken prisoners. The French 
loss was considerably less. It seemed at first as if 
iSTapoleon would make full use of his victory. He 
ordered an energetic pursuit and expected that Van- 
damme, posted on the road to Peterswalde, would 
be able to give a good account of the routed fugitives. 
But for some reason he suddenly gave up the chase 
and returned to Dresden. It is said that he suffered 
from a physical breakdown, and that for several days 
was incapable of the slightest exertion. It is pos- 
sible that even his iron frame refused any longer to 
answer to the demands which he made upon it ; some 
have even attributed his illness to poison, given to 
him when he was taking his midday meal at Pirna. 

The cessation of the pursuit had deplorable con- 
sequences for the Trench. Vandamme, who had 
not been able to stop the retreating armies on the 
road to Peterswalde, followed them with what speed 
he could. He hoped to capture the allied monarchs 
and to destroy their armies. On August 29 he over- 
took them in the valley of Kulm, from which he 
could threaten Teplitz, the central point of the roads 
necessary for their retreat. The allies, discovering 
that Vandamme was isolated, determined to attack 
him on the following day. The battle was contested 
on both sides with great vigour, but the superior forces 
of the allies secured them the victory. Vandamme 
had hoped for reinforcements, but instead of this the 


Prussian army of Kleist, which had crossed the 
chain of the Erzgebirge, with great difficulty, attacked 
the rear of the French at Xollendorf and enclosed 
them between two fires. Vandamme with heroic 
courage tried to cut his way through, but only a small 
number succeeded in escaping. The French had 
seven generals killed and two wounded, and the whole 
corps d'armee was nearly annihilated. Tbey lost 
eighty-two guns, twenty eagles, and two hundred 
baggage waggons; about ten thousand of them were 
taken prisoners, amongst whom was Vandamme him- 
self, — a colossal figure led into the sovereign's 
presence without hat or sword. He was left in the 
hands of the Russians, and was sent a prisoner to 
the frontier of Siberia. 




The plan of the allies, which consisted in avoiding 
a battle with ^Napoleon whilst defeating his generals 
in detail, was extremely successful. The Em- 
peror had despatched Oudinot to Berlin with a force 
of sixty-five thousand men, thinking that this was 
sufficient to deal with the army of Bernadotte, which 
he regarded merely as a motley collection of ill-as- 
sorted forces. Bernadotte was, however, a general 
of great merit, trained in the school of Xapoleon, and 
being at first at the head of ninety thousand men, he 
had increased the number to one hundred and thirty 
thousand. Oudinot came close to the gates of Berlin, 
but he was beaten at Gross-Beeren on August 23, 
and driven back upon the Elbe, Davout, who was 
at Hamburg, having been unable to support him. 
Three davs later a new misfortune befel the hard- 
pressed Emperor. As we have seen he had left Mac- 
donald to continue his advance against the army of 
Silesia with an army of eighty thousand men. As 
soon as Bliicher discovered that ]^apoleon had gone 
to the defence of Dresden and was no longer present 
against him in person, he determined to resume the 
offensive, and advanced towards the Katzbach. The 
weather was terrible. There had been a heavy rain 
for three days and the approaches to the Katzbach 
were impassable from mud, so that a large part of 
the Prussian recruits lost their shoes. A strong 


north-west wind drove the rain into the faces of the 
Frencli, and it was so dark that nothing was visible 
at the distance of a hundred yards. The two 
armies were ignorant of each other's position. When 
the French succeeded in crossing the river and reach- 
ing the plateau on the other side, Bliicher determined 
that the moment for the attack had arrived. He 
cried, " Xow you have got enough French before you, 
Forwards ! " The name clung to him, and he was 
ever afterwards known as " Marshal Forwards." 
Bliicher gained a complete victory ; the waters of the 
Katzbach and of the " Raging " I^eisse rose higher 
and higher in the storm ; all the bridges were carried 
awav ; some tried to save themselves bv swimming, 
but that was impossible in the furious torrent. The 
battle lasted till nightfall, but the retreat was as 
disastrous as the defeat, and jMacdonald was driven 
back, first upon the Bober, then upon Gorlitz, and 
then upon Bautzen. 

As soon as Kapoleon heard of this disaster he 
hastened to Bautzen to support Macdonald. He did 
his utmost to conceal the fact of his presence, but he 
was amongst a nation of spies, and Bliicher was 
never without accurate information of his move- 
ments. As soon as " Marshal Forwards " heard of 
IN^apoleon' s approach he left Gorlitz and retired 
upon the ISTeisse, and was soon out of range of Na- 
poleon's dreaded attack. Xo sooner had the great 
conqueror left for Silesia than the heads of the 
Bohemian army began to show themselves in the de- 
files of Peterswalde. As soon as they heard of Na- 
poleon's return to the camp at Pirna they stood still, 
and when he made a demonstration against them they 
retired into Bohemia. The fears of his prowess 
which they thus exhibited might be flattering to the 


Emperor's pride, but these continual marclies and 
countermarches sapped the strength of the French 

A still worse catastrophe was imminent. It had 
been part of Napoleon's design to seize Berlin, and 
we have already narrated the failure of Oudinot 
to achieve this enterprise. After the battle of 
Gross-Beeren, Oudinot had retired to Wittenberg. 
He was joined here on September 3 by Ney, who had 
now under his command a force of sixty-five thousand 
men opposed to a Prussian army of forty thousand. 
On September 6 ISTey prepared to advance to Ber- 
lin, but he was attacked on tlie flank at Dennewitz 
and entirely defeated. The battle occupied four 
hours of the afternoon and was over by six o'clock. 
The French suffered severely ; they lost ten thousand 
killed and wounded and thirteen thousand five hun- 
dred prisoners. ISTey, who had not been vanquished 
by the snows of Kussia, now lost heart, and must be 
added to the number of the marshals who were weary 
of the continuance of the war and longed for peace. 

By this succession of misfortunes the Grand Army 
of Napoleon was reduced from four hundred thou- 
sand to about two hundred thousand men, and the 
plans which he had formed were incapable of realisa- 
tion. Doubtless this was greatly due to the fact 
that his troops consisted largely of very youthful 
levies who had not yet been seasoned to fire. The 
Emperor was forced to content himself with a defen- 
sive position. Instead of conquering Berlin, or in- 
vading Bohemia, or recovering the fortresses of the 
Vistula, he had enough to do to maintain his position 
in Saxony. He therefore concentrated his troops 
around Dresden in a quadrilateral formed by Tor- 
gau, Stolpen, Pirna and Freiberg. He was con- 


demned to a forced inaction, and to be the witness of 
the gradual disintegration of his army, which was 
in a condition of great distress. Since the opening 
of the campaign the soldiers had been placed upon 
half rations, and in September they had no bread 

The allies on the other hand received continual 
reinforcements, and gradually nerved themselves for 
decisive action. On September 23 they were re- 
inforced by fifty thousand Russians under Benning- 
sen. They now determined to give up the idea of 
attacking ISTapoleon directly in his position at Dres- 
den, and to cut off his communications with France, 
concentrating their forces in the neighbourhood of 
Leipzig. For this purpose the army of Bohemia 
was to advance by way of Chemnitz, the army of 
Silesia was to march down the right bank of the Elbe, 
without exciting observation, and to effect a junc- 
tion with the army of the north. It was to cross the 
Elbe in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg and to fol- 
low the course of the Mulda to Leipzig. They ex- 
pected in this manner to crush Napoleon between 
two forces each of equal strength to his own. 

These movements began on September 25, and 
were quickly perceived by Napoleon, who indeed ex- 
pected them. He occupied Leipzig with twelve thou- 
sand men; he despatched Ney towards the north 
to watch the movements of Bernadotte and Bliicher, 
placing Marmont also under his command ; he col- 
lected four corps d'armee at Freiberg to oppose the 
army of Bohemia. For himself, he remained at 
Dresden to watch events and to render assistance 
whenever it might be required. 

At the beginning of October Bliicher crossed the 
Elbe at Wittenberg, and Bernadotte at Dessau, and 


Xey was forced to retire before these superior forces. 
These movements made it impossible for Xapoleon to 
remain at Dresden, and he left it with the King on 
October 7, leaving Saint Cyr in command of the city 
with a force of twenty thousand men. While the 
King of Saxony established himself in Leipzig, Na- 
poleon marched northwards to meet Bernadotte and 
Bliicher. His design was to collect the large gar- 
risons which were still remaining in the Elbe for- 
tresses and to destroy the armv of the ISJ'orth, whilst 
]Vrurat kept the Austrians in check and retreated 
slowly to Leipzig. He placed his headquarters in 
an old castle at Diiben, where he remained for three 
days uncertain of his plans. Those who were with 
him say that they never forgot those days of uncer- 
tainty and inaction: the wind howling in the trees 
and the old timbers of the castle creaking with every 
blast. At last, finding that his generals would not 
support plans which were worthy of bis genius, he 
determined to fight at Leipzig. Indeed, delay had 
made any other decision impossible, if he wished to 
prevent his enemies from concentrating the whole 
of their forces and cutting off his retreat from 




The battle of Leipzig, the " Battl?^ of {he Na- 
tions," as it is sometimes called, is one of the great- 
est as well as one of the most important in history. 
It lasted for six davs, from October l-i to October 
10; but during this week of conflict there w^ere two 
days of comparative rest. On October 14 the fight- 
ing was confined to an engagement of cavalry. On 
October 16 the real battle took place, and it might 
more fitly be called the battle of Wachaii. Xapoleon 
actually won it, and slept on the field of battle, but 
whilst he was engaged on one side of Leipzig, Marmont 
was attacked on the other at Mockern, and could not 
send him the reinforcements he needed to complete 
the victory. By October 18 his cause had become 
hopeless, because the allies had concentrated in over- 
whelming numbers, and the battle fought on that 
day was engaged merely for the purpose of masking 
his disaster and covering his retreat. That night he 
slept in Leipzig in the Hotel de Prusse, and the next 
morning he evacuated the to^vn in good order, the 
allies enterino- it inmiediatelv afterwards. The bat- 
tie is indeed riahtlv called the " Battle of the N^a- 
tions." There fought under the eagles of France, 
Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, 
Swiss, Poles, and Germans. On the other hand, 
ISTapoleon was opposed by Germans, Slavs, Hun- 
garians, ISTorth Germans, Swedes, and English, and 


it is said that Bashkirs and Calmucks, armed with 
bows and arrows, fought in the Kussian ranks. It 
is reckoned that in this battle IsTapoleon commanded 
a force of two hundred thousand men, but the allies 
were certainly superior in numbers. 

Let us briefly follow the main points of the engage- 
ment. ISTapoleon arrived at Leipzig on October l-i 
and posted Murat at Wachau, on some heights com- 
manding a plain suitable in every way for the evolu- 
tions of cavalry; Schwarzenberg reached the place 
of conflict on the same day. Murat attacked the 
Austrians, and a violent cavalry engagement ensued, 
in which the King of N'aples displayed great dash 
and bravery. The struggle was mainly for the pos- 
session of' Liebertwolkwitz, wdiich eventually re- 
mained in possession of the allies. The battle 
came to an end at nightfall owing to heavy rain. 
The French had lost six hundred dead and wounded, 
the Austrians about the same number. 

The following day was spent in preparation for 
the main conflict. IsTapoleon took his stand on the 
heights of Wachau, and was surrounded by names 
famous in history : Murat, Oudinot, Mortier, Lauris- 
ton, Macdonald, Augereau and Poniatowski. The 
allies attacked in three columns directed against the 
three villages of Liebertwolkwitz, Wachau and Mark- 
kleeberg. IS'apoleon attacked them with the fire of 
three hundred guns, and then his infantry made a 
furious onslaught on Wachau. The centre of the 
allies was weak and it began to waver, and the Em- 
peror now prepared to give the coup-de-grace. It 
was one o'clock in the afternoon; the Emperor of 
Austria and the King of Prussia were watching the 
progress of the fight from a neighbouring eminence. 
For this purpose I^apoleon collected a body of twelve 


thousand cavalry divided into two masses, one com- 
manded bj Murat, the other by Kellermann. This 
hnge body moved forwards ; the eartli groaned un- 
der its advance, and the soil shook beneath the hoofs 
of the horses. A Russian regiment which stood in 
their path was absolutely annihilated. Success 
seemed to be imminent, and Xapoleon sent to apprise 
the King of Saxony of the result, with orders to ring 
the bells of the town. The allied sovereigns, who 
were sitting on a hill on Windsor chairs, were in con- 
siderable danger. But just in front of the hill on 
which they stood ran a ditch which checked the on- 
slaught of the cavalry and made the charge in- 
effective. Murat, as was his wont, had ridden too fast 
and the infantrv were too far off to lend the neces- 
sary assistance, nor had he arranged his reserves with 
due prudence. Just at the critical moment the 
weapon broke in l^apoleon's hand. He was, however, 
able to hold his own, and, as has before been said, 
slept on the field of battle. In the meantime 
Bllicher and Bernadotte had attacked the corps of 
]\Iarmont which was securely posted amongst the houses 
of Mockern to the north of the town. Just at the 
moment when his master most urgently needed his 
assistance he was unable to give it, as his position had 
been forced by " Marshal Forwards," who was able 
to sleep in the village which he had captured. 

The following day, which was Sunday, was spent 
in repose on either side, preparing for the final con- 
flict of the morrow. An attempt was made to open 
negotiations with the Austrians by means of General 
Meereveld, who had been taken prisoner, but it led 
to no result. On the same day also Bernadotte ar- 
rived on the scene of action, and the reinforcements 
of Russians were brought up by Benningsen. Thus 


on October 18 the allies had under their command 
three hundred thousand men, whereas the French 
could only meet them with one hundred and sixty- 
five thousand. If he had followed the dictates of 
prudence, ISTapoleon should have retreated from the 
field on the night of October 17, but his pride would 
not allow him to make this confession of failure. 
He strengthened his position round the town, draw- 
ing up his forces in a semicircle with a smaller radius 
than that of the previous day. He omitted to throw 
bridges across the Elster, and reserved for his retreat 
only the road through Lindenau. 

The villages which were prominent on the third 
day of the battle were Dolitz, Probstheida and Stot- 
teritz, the second of these forming the salient point. 
It was defended stubbornly by Victor and Lauris- 
ton. On the other hand, Dolitz to the right of the 
French upon the Pleisse was taken, and the French 
line was moved back to Connewitz. In the mean- 
time Bernadotte was advancing on the east. The 
Saxon troops were posted in this part of the field, 
and when the Swedish Crown Prince approached 
they passed over to his side and began firing upon the 
French, of whom they had just now been the allies. 
This left a terrible gap in the French line, and the 
cavalry and artillery of the guard brought up by 
Napoleon himself had a difficulty in filling it up. 
At about six o'clock in the evening jSJ'apoleon, feeling 
much exhausted, ordered his page to place a carpet 
upon the ground, upon which he slept peacefully for 
some time. The battle, which had been hopeless for 
Napoleon from the beginning, was terminated by a 
furious salvo of artillery, in which it is said that two 
thousand pieces of cannon took part. 

The retreat went on during the night, over the 


bridge of Lindenau, the only one which was available 
for guns, carriages, horses and men. As soon as 
the fog lifted on October 19 the allies made a com- 
bined attack, which was resisted to the best of their 
power by Macdonald, Marmont, Poniatowski, and 
Lauriston. Napoleon took leave of the King of 
Saxony abont eleven o'clock, and an hour later the 
allied sovereigns met him at the door of his palace in 
the market-place and declared him a prisoner of war. 
The Emperor then crossed the bridge of Lindenau 
and remained at a mill on the other side until nearly 
the whole of the army had departed. He then rode 
slowly along the road to Mainz. The empire of iSTa- 
poleon was at an end ; more than one hundred thou- 
sand men had fallen in this supreme struggle, of 
which forty thousand were French. Further, one 
hundred and seventy thousand troops were locked up 
in German fortresses. 

The Bavarians, with base ingratitude, tried to in- 
tercept the French army in their retreat at Hanau on 
October 30, but they were entirely crushed by the 
artillerv of Davout. On Xovember 4 the French 
army recrossed the Rhine in a terrible condition ; the 
retreat from Leipzig had been almost as fatal as the 
retreat from Moscow. Xapoleon himself reached St. 
Cloud on ]^oveniber 9 to prepare for a final effort, 
the results of which will be narrated in succeeding 




The peace of Tilsit and the intimate communica- 
tions which took place in that town between the two 
Emperors of France and Russia may be regarded as 
the culmination of the first part of Napoleon's sove- 
reign care. We do not know, nor shall probably 
ever know, what passed between the two rulers of the 
world during these confidences, still less what plans 
were seething in the mind of Napoleon. We maj 
however conclude from a general survey of his work 
that he had two ends in view, one by subduing Eng- 
land to force her to make peace, and the other to 
form that confederation of the Latin races under the 
leadership of France which was undoubtedly the 
main object of his political activity. In order 
to effect these objects it was necessary first to 
compel Portugal, which had been for more than a 
hundred years the commercial vassal of England, to 
break with her old connections, and to join the system 
of continental blockade which Napoleon inaugurated 
in the Berlin decrees; and secondly, to drive the 
11 161 


Bourbon family from the throne of Spain and re- 
place them by some dynasty more in accordance with 
modern ideas of progress. 

It is probable, however, that I^apoleon in con- 
ceiving these plans had a very inadequate idea of the 
magnitude of the task he was undertaking. He may 
have thought that it would be as easy, or nearly so, 
to deal with Spain as he had found it to deal with 
ISTaples. But he discovered to his cost that when the 
government of Spain was crushed and the rulers of 
Portugal put to flight, the task of subduing these 
countries was by no means accomplished, and that 
there remained to confront the Grand Army a whole 
people in arms favoured by its chains of mountains, 
its rocks, the rigour of its climate and the barrenness 
of its soil. He discovered, also, when it was too late, 
that in Spain and Portugal the English had found a 
means of combating on land the great military power 
which they never could have met upon the Continent 
in the open field. 

On August 12, 1807, jSTapoleon sent a summons to 
the government of Lisbon calling upon them to close 
their harbours to English ships, to join the league 
of the continental powers, and to confiscate all 
British property in their country. Notwithstanding 
the friendly treaties which existed between the two 
powers of the Iberian peninsula, Spain now stood 
on the side of Erance and supj^orted her demands, 
whilst an army of observation of twenty thousand 
men under Junot was posted at Bayonne in order to 
give effect to the Emperor's demands. The govern- 
ment of Portugal was greatlv embarrassed ; she was 
not unwilling to co-operate with France so far as this 
co-operation did not imply a breach ^\ith England. 
But that was impossible. The army of Junot 


crossed the Bidassoa on October 18, and four days 
later the Prince Regent of Portugal signed a treaty 
with England by which that country bound herself 
to assist Portugal in transferring the monarchy, in 
case of need, to Brazil. 

On October 27 two treaties were signed at Fon- 
tainebleau between Duroc representing France and 
Isquierdo representing Spain, by which Portugal was 
to be partitioned, so that the northern part, with the 
town of Oporto, should be formed into a kingdom, 
called ISTorth Lusitania, to be given to the King of 
Etruria in exchange for Tuscany, while the southern 
portion became a principality to be held by Godoy 
with the title of Prince of the Algarves; both these 
dominions were to be under the protection of Spain; 
the centre of Portugal, with a population of two 
millions, was to remain in sequestration, that is, in 
the possession of the French, until the general peace, 
when it could be exchanged for Gibraltar, Trinidad 
or other colonies. The sovereign of this third di- 
vision, whoever he might be, was also to be under the 
protectorate of Spain, and the King of Spain was to 
assume, with ]*^apoleon's approval, the title of '" Em- 
peror of both the Indies." The transatlantic posses- 
sions of Portugal were to be similarly divided be- 
tween France and Spain. It was also arranged that 
a French army should enter Portugal, and that whilst 
the general commanding this army occupied the 
sequestered portions of the monarchy, the northern 
and southern divisions should be similarly occupied 
by Spanish troops. 

Junot, marching rapidly through Sj^ain, crossed 
the frontier of Portugal on November 12. Two 
days later the ]\Iinisters announced that the House 
of Braganza had ceased to reign, and that the Prince 


Regent of Portugal had lost his throne because he had 
listened to English intrigues, and because he had re- 
fused to confiscate English property in Lisbon. " The 
fate of the House of Braganza," they said, " is a 
new indication that no one can escape destruction 
who allies himself with the English." Junot had 
orders to make no concession to the Prince Regent, 
even if he promised to declare war against England, 
and that he was to march with all speed to Lisbon 
and seize ships and docks. 

On November 27 the roval family set sail for 
Brazil, the advanced guard of Junot's army being 
then only a few miles from the city. Three days 
later he entered the caj)ital with a force of twenty- 
six thousand men, and the day following the arms 
of Braganza were supplanted on all public build- 
ings by the Imperial eagle. Under pretext of cover- 
ing the army of Portugal several French corps suc- 
cessively entered Spain. First came Dupont, then 
Moncey, and then Duhesme, so that in a time of 
peace and in an allied country eighty thousand 
French troops had occupied the north of Spain with- 
out striking a blow. 

The gradual extension of French power, the great 
impopularity of Godoy, Prince of the Peace, and the 
domestic quarrels of the royal family, all contributed 
to throw the Spanish people into a fever of excite- 
ment. On March 19, 1808, a revolution broke out 
at Aranjuez, in which the Prince of the Peace nearly 
lost his life. The King, Charles IV., was compelled 
to abdicate, and the Prince of the Asturias was set 
up in his place with the title of Ferdinand VII. 
While these events were proceeding, the French army 
was gradually advancing towards the centre of 
SjDain^and ]\Iurat entered Madrid on March 23. Na- 


poleon now determined to throw off the mask. He 
summoned to Bayonne on April 2. first the young 
King Ferdinand VII. and then the old King Charles 
IV., under tlie pretext of arranging their disputes. 
When he got them both into his power, he persuaded 
Charles IV. to abdicate in favour of his son, and his 
son to abdicate in favour of Napoleon ; he then gave 
the crown of Spain to his brother Joseph, who had 
previously been King of i^aples. 

The answer to this was the outbreak of a formi- 
dable insurrection in Madrid, which was put 
down by Murat with terrible severity. But the 
example of the capital was followed by the 
whole countr3^ Every province, every district, every 
town and nearly every village established its junta 
for the maintenance of independence. The move- 
ment was naturally supported by the Church, and 
priest and monk were formidable opponents. In a 
short time from the Asturias to Cadiz the whole of the 
population was in arms for King Ferdinand VII., 
and the French armies wherever they might be had 
to struggle for their existence. In the meantime 
Joseph could only be conveyed from Bayonne to 
Madrid by force of arms. Entering Spain on July 
9, he found himself opposed by an army of his pre- 
tended subjects, composed of twenty-five thousand 
men and commanded by Blake and Don Gregorio de 
la Cuesta. It was easily crushed by Marshal Bes- 
sieres at Medina del Eio Seco, and on July 20 Joseph 
was able to take up his quarters in the capital. 

Scarcely had he been there a week, when he was 
compelled to withdraw at the news of the capitulation 
of Baylen. Whilst Bessieres was advancing upon 
Madrid, the other divisions of the French army were 
occupied in different parts of Spain in reducing the 


provinces under the authority of King Joseph. The 
division of Dnpont, composed of twenty thousand 
men, was employed for this purpose in Andalusia. 
Dupont obtained possession of Cordova and plun- 
dered it, but at Seville, the capital of the province, 
was established the central junta, which directed the 
operations of the country against the French and 
the army of Castafios, Avhich was composed of the 
best troops of Spain. Dupont now retired to Andu- 
jar, which was soon invested by an army of thirty- 
five thousand Spaniards. They closed the defiles behind 
the array of Dupont and cut him off from his sub- 
ordinate, General Vedel. His force being reduced 
to eleven thousand and left without food or ammuni- 
tion, he signed a capitulation at Baylen on July 21. 
When the pen was in his hand he nearly threw it 
down at the sound of the guns of Vedel, who was in 
the full tide of success, and there is little doubt that 
Vedel could have cut a way for him through the 
opposing forces. But Dupont had included Vedel 
in the capitulation, as well as other French troops in 
the villages of La Mancha. This was the first great 
check which Napoleon had experienced. King 
Joseph had to leave Madrid more quickly than he 
had entered it. The various French armies retired 
towards the Ebro, and the patriotic insurrection re- 
covered possession of three-quarters of their country. 
This disaster in Spain was followed by a similar 
collapse in Portugal. At the beginning of August, 
1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards known as 
the famous Duke of Wellington, disembarked with an 
army of twelve thousand men at the estuary of the 
Kiver Mondego. His first engagement with the 
French took place at Eoliga, but a much more im- 
portant battle was fought at Vimiero on August 21. 


The English occupied a position on commanding 
heights, while their left flank was protected by a 
deep ravine, invisible to the enemy. Junot attacked 
in two columns ; his right hand column came upon 
the ravine above mentioned, and giving the English 
time to strengthen the defence, was eventually re- 
pulsed with heavy loss, including several guns. But 
the main attack was in the centre, where the French 
scaled the heights, sweeping the English skirmishers 
before them, but they had to face a crushing artil- 
lery fire, followed up by charges with the bayonet. 
They were driven back faster than they had climbed, 
but rallied again and returned to the attack. The 
copses, vineyards and ravines were filled with dead 
and wounded; guns were taken, retaken and taken 
again. At last Junot, when he had brought his last 
man into action, realised that his enterprise had 
failed. The result of this was the Convention of 
Cintra, signed on August 30, by which the French 
agreed to evacuate Portugal with the honours of war. 
The troops of Junot were faithfully conveyed back 
to France in English vessels. 




Aftee these two crushing reverses Xapoleon de- 
termined to take the affairs of the Peninsula into his 
own hands. After having, for a time at least, en- 
sured the tranquillity of Central Europe by the Con- 
gress of Erfurt, he directed the best troops of the 
Grand Army and the Imperial Guard upon Bayonne. 
The arm}^ of Sj)ain, as it was called, consisted of two 
hundred thousand of Xapoleon's chosen troops, and 
was divided into eight corps d'armee. The Em- 
peror assumed command of it at Bayonne on Kovem- 
bcr 3. He immcdiateh' crossed the frontier and 
joined King Joseph at Miranda on the Ebro. There 
stretched before him in a long line the tumultuary 
levies which the Spaniards honoured by the name 
of armies: Blake with thirtv-two thousand men to 
the north, Belvedere with twelve thousand men at 
Burgos, Castanos and Palafox with forty thousand 
men on the Ebro at Tudela. Sir John Moore had 
been plaeed by the English government in command 
of thirtv-one thousand infantrv and five thousand 
cavalry on October 6, but at this time he had scarcely 
entered Spain from Portugal. 

ISTapoleon, having despatched Marshals Lefebvre 
and Victor to deal with Blake upon his right, marched 
upon the centre of the Spanish line at Burgos, 
which was very weak. Blake was entirely defeated 
at Espinosa on November 11, and on the same day 


ISTapoleon entered Burgos and made it his head- 
quarters. Unfortunately the Spanish troops were 
very good at running away, and it was more easy to 
defeat them than to destroy them. Napoleon now 
turned his attention to his left, where he w\as 
opposed by Castafios and Palafox. They were de- 
feated by Lannes at Tudela on IsTovember 27; they 
lost about four thousand dead and wounded and all 
their artillery. Thus by the end of the month Old 
Castile and the whole of the line of the Ebro was in 
the possession of the French and the road to Madrid 
was open. 

ISTapoleon now gave orders to Xey to follow Casta- 
fios and not leave a man of his army alive; Moncey 
was to undertake the siege of Saragossa ; St. Cyr was 
to march through Catalonia and relieve Barcelona; 
Lefebvre was to occupy Yalladolid and Segovia. 
Soult was to meet Sir John ]\Ioore in Old Castile and 
drive him back to Portugal. Mortier was to take 
up a position at Burgos. In the meantime ISTa- 
poleon was to march upon the capital with forty 
thousand men before the Spaniards had been able to 
recover from their consternation. The road to 
Madrid was barred by a pass of the Guadarama 
^lountains, wdiich was carefully defended by the 
Junta, They placed three thousand men in the 
little town of Sepulveda and nine thousand on the 
summit of Somo-Sierra, disposing them along the 
winding road, which was also defended by cannon. 
ISTapoleon resolved to attack their position and, as 
often happened, his operations were favoured by 
the morning mist. The neighbouring heights were 
occupied without the enemy perceiving it, and as soon 
as the clouds lifted the assault began. ISTapoleon 
ordered a detachment of Polish cavalry to charge up 


tlie road ao;ainst tlie batterv which defended it. 
Thirty-seven horsemen were killed by the first dis- 
charge, but the Poles re-formed themselves, killed 
the gunners, and captured the guns. A panic seized 
the rest of the Spanish troops; they threw their 
muskets away and fled up the hill and do\vn the 
opposite slope. ISTapoleon took all the guns, all the 
standards, two hundred munition waggons, and al- 
most all the officers. 

The eft'ect which this brilliant passage of arms 
had upon the Junta in Madrid may be imagined, 
for they had deemed this pass to be invincible. 
They first fled to Badajoz and then to Toledo. The 
inhabitants desired to defend Madrid to the utmost 
and to make it a second Saragossa, but milder coun- 
sels prevailed. The town capitulated after a short 
bombardment and the French troojDS entered it on 
December 4. 

It now remained to deal with the army of Sir 
John Moore. He had reached Salamanca on 
November 13, too late to intercept tire advance of l^a- 
poleon on Madrid. When he heard of the capture of 
the capital he retired towards the Asturias with 
twenty-five thousand men in order to engage Soult 
in the Asturias. ISTapoleon left Madrid in pursuit 
of him on December 22, and on the following day 
at Tordesillas received a despatch from Soult saying 
that he had with him twenty thousand infantry and 
three thousand cavalry and that Moore w^as approach- 
ing Sahagun. The Emperor charged him to hold 
out, as, if the English remained a single day longer 
in that position, they would be annihilated. Moore, 
howe^'er, who was well informed as to the condition 
of affairs, determined to retreat towards Corunna. 

Xapoleon pursued the English with such ardour 




that he came up with tlieir rear-gnard, and at the 
River Esla he lost one of his cavalry generals, Le- 
febvre-Desnouettes, who was taken prisoner. He was 
received by Moore with great courtesy, who asked 
him to dinner and presented him with an Indian 
sabre. New Year's Day of the momentous year 
1809 was spent in Astorga, where ISTapoleon re- 
mained to collect his troops. Here he received im- 
portant news, which informed him that Austria was 
arming for war, which would break out in the spring, 
that he could no longer depend upon the co-operation 
of Eussia, and ' that Germany was becoming dis- 
turbed. The chances were, therefore, that he would 
have to fight alone against Austria, Germany, and 
England, and possibly Russia. His resolution was 
quickly taken. He left the pursuit of the English 
to Soult and set out for Valladolid. He rode at full 
gallop, finding everywhere a change of horses, until 
he reached Bayonne and then returned to Paris to 
prepare for that extraordinary campaign, the history 
of which has been related in our third book. 

Moore continued his retreat to Corunna. He 
checked the pursuers at Benavente and at Lugo, and 
having rallied his army on the heights for two days, 
vainly offered battle. The troops were demoralised ; 
the transport animals failed and could not be re- 
placed ; guns and ammunition waggons were aban- 
doned; barrels of dollars were broached and rolled 
down the rocks, the soldiers endangering their lives 
in their attempt to fill their pockets. 

At last Sir John Moore reached Corunna with 
fourteen thousand men ; he looked anxiously out to 
sea, but could descry no fleet in the roadstead or the 
offing, the ships that were expected from Vigo 
having been detained by adverse winds. The French 


were able to occupy the heights which commanded the 
harbour, but the fleet had, at last, come into sight. At 
two in the afternoon of January 16 Soult ordered an 
advance. Moore defended his ground with energy, 
and it may be said that the French attack was not a 
success. The principal stand was made by Baird 
at Elvas. But whilst Moore was watching the fight 
at this place he was struck from his horse by a can- 
non-shot, and was buried by torchlight in the ram- 
parts. The rest of the English army was now em- 
barked without difliculty, two divisions before day- 
break and the garrison of the citadel in the after- 




I*Tapoleok" might have believed that he had placed 
his possession of Spain on a permanent basis, by re- 
storing his brother to Madrid and by driving an Eng- 
lish army into the sea. Bnt the war in the Penin- 
sula was not of such a nature that it could be termi- 
nated by victories. There was no difficulty in routing 
and dispersing the Spanish forces; they fled at the 
first attack like mist driven by the wind. The very 
rapidity of their discomfiture preserved them from 
complete destruction, and permitted them to re-form 
anew, to be again beaten and dispersed. With such 
adversaries to contend with, the French troops had 
no difficulty in marching from one end of Spain to 
the other, but ever victorious in front, they were har- 
assed in their flank and in their rear, bv the continual 
attacks of the guerilleros. 

These were collected in small bands, comnosed of 
adroit and hardy men, who could hide in ditches 
or behind rocks, and wait for the opportunity of sur- 
prising the isolated, cutting off the stragglers, robbing 
the post or intercepting supplies. If they happened 
to come in contact with a superior force, they quick- 
ly dispersed to re-form anew. If they were in suffi- 
cient numbers, they killed every one ojiposed to them 
— soldiers, both sick and wounded, and civilians. 
They delighted in the robbery of munitions and sup- 


plies. All the inhabitants of the country were their 
accomplices and their spies, whereas the French 
never knew anything that was going on a hundred 
yards from their outposts. A body of French troops 
only commanded the actual ground which it occu- 
pied; it might be compared to a movable fortress 
in a per})etual condition of blockade. The Spaniards, 
who were worthless and despicable in a pitched battle, 
were extremely formidable in the changing vicissi- 
tudes of their guerilla warfare. 

The Spaniards also displayed great tenacity of 
courage when fighting behindwalls, whether they were 
the walls of a convent or the ramparts of a town. 
The culminating point of tliis stubborn heroism was 
reached in the defence of Saragossa, the capital of 
Aragon, which lasted from December, 1808, to 
February, 1809. The army of Palafox, vanquished 
at Tudela, had taken refuge within its walls. The 
town was besieged by Lannes, Avho had little diffi- 
culty in making himself master of the outer circle 
of walls. ]3ut this was only the beginning of trouble 
both for besiegers and besieged. Each house had be- 
come a separate fortress ; each street could only be 
crossed by subterraneous thoroughfares ; every roof 
and steeple was occupied by deadly marksmen ; 
mine met mine, and explosions were of hourly occur- 
rence. The convents, enormous cubic masses of stone, 
pierced with embrasures, offered excellent centres of 
resistance. The folios from the monkishlibrarieswere 
piled up as breastworks, the pictures from churches 
or chapels formed a protection against the rain, 
and the parcliment leaves torn from precious manu- 
scripts defended the sleepers from the damp ground. 
Lannes had great difficulty in sustaining the courage 
of his men, and they were on the verge of mutiny. 


Typhus raged in the town ; the corpses filled the cel- 
lars and choked the streets. 

Capitulation at last became a matter of necessity. 
After the sacrifice of fifty thousand lives the brave 
defender of Saragossa surrendered the ruins of the 
town. The French were moved by pity when they 
saw some twelve thousand sickly and starving tatter- 
demalions, survivors of a force four times that num- 
ber, limp painfully out of the city to lay down their 
arms. The sieges of Gerona and Tarragona, though 
less well known in history, offer similar examples of 
tenacity and courage. 

The patriotism and devotion of the Spaniards were 
conspicuous in other ways, and a noble example of 
these qualities was exhibited by the Marquis de la 
Romana. He had been sent by ISTapoleon to the 
north of Denmark with the express purpose of sepa- 
rating him as far as possible from his country; but 
at the news of the rising of Spain he embarked with 
fourteen thousand men in English vessels and landed 
in Galicia, where he was able to assist the insurgents 
and to give valuable aid to the English. 

When l^apoleon left the Peninsula he committed 
the charge of finishing the war to his generals, but it 
was characteristic of them that thev could never act 
together. King Joseph, who possessed excellent 
moral qualities, was incapable of commanding. 
Jourdan, whom Napoleon had attached to him as 
major-general, was old, and was despised by the 
young generation of marshals and generals. They 
gradually acquired the habit of paying no attention 
to their superior officers, and of not co-operating 
with each other. They received, it is true, orders 
and directions from Paris from the Emperor, who 
claimed to regulate their conduct; but at so great a 


distance it was necessary to leave much to their own 
initiative. By degrees the same generals, who in 
other parts of Europe would carry out with humble 
docility the orders transmitted by J^erthier, began in 
Spain to act independently. They conquered and 
occupied territory; they issued edicts and collected 
taxes, just as if they were no longer military chiefs, 
but had become kings in their own departments. 
Soult, especially, conceived the ambition of creating 
for himself a kingdom and becoming the equal of 
Murat. In many ways they anticipated the privi- 
leges of royalty and created a system of plunder. 
Napoleon was perpetually reproaching them with 
their rapacity, but his remonstrances produced no 

Such was the character of the war in the Peninsula 
from the year 1808. It thus came to pass that a 
pitched battle, which in any other part of Europe 
would, with a commander like ISTapoleon, have de- 
cided a campaign, had no significance in Spain. The 
war was a chronic disease which it was impossible 
to bring to a head. All the more credit is due to 
the genius and patience of Wellington, who contrived 
to combine all the forces which were opposed to him 
and to bend them to his will, so as to make them 
eventually the instrument by which the power of iSTa- 
palcon was crushed. 

On leaving Valladolid ISTapoleon had imposed up- 
on Soult the duty of reconquering Portugal, in his 
eye a task of the utmost importance, because it would 
deprive the English of the power of influencing the 
insurrection. Soult, after disposing of Moore's army, 
was to march watli twenty-five thousand men upon 
Oporto and Lisbon, and was to be supported by the 
corps of Victor who was descending the valley of 


the Tagiis. The French passed the Minho aiul ob- 
tained possession of Chaves on ]\Iarch 13. Sonlt 
advanced upon Oj^orto, hy way of Braga, and took it 
by storm on March 29. Victor left Talavera on the 
Tagus, and scattered the guerilla bands of Estre- 
madura at Medcllin on March 28, but he stopped 
short at Merida on the Guadiana. Sebastiani, leaving 
Madrid for La Mancha, won the victory of Ciudad 
Keal on March 27, and established himself in that 
province. If these generals had combined to press 
their successes the cause of the Spanish patriots 
might have become hopeless. 

But all these victories meant but little, because 
behind the advance of the French armies the routed 
Spanish troops formed themselves again, and the 
guerilleros blocked the advance of the conquerors, 
impeded their progress and held them in check. 
This was especially the case with Soult, who lingered 
in Oporto when he ought to have marched on Lisbon, 
hoping that he should be able to create for himself 
the kingdom of ]^orthern Lusitania. When ISTa- 
poleon heard of his conduct he said that he could only 
remember Austerlitz. 




'A NEW complexion was given to affairs by the 
disembarkation of Sir Arthnr Wellesley, with an 
army of twenty-five thousand English at Lisbon, 
on April 22, 1809. He determined immediately 
to attack Sonlt and to drive him from Oporto, and for 
this purpose collected his army at Coimbra, and, 
while he advanced along the direct road with the 
bulk of his army, despatched General Hill along the 
coast road to turn the right flank of the Erench. 
Soult was living at Oporto in a dream of perfect 
security, believing his position assured. Ear before 
him rolled the broad and bridgeless river in flood, and 
every boat upon it had been carefully secured. A 
barber evading the sentries had crossed to the south- 
ern side in a skiff; Colonel Waters, a brave officer, 
offered to go across, and soon arrived with some 
capacious barges from the other bank. The men 
embarked, Soult was surprised, and there was noth- 
ing left for him but to retreat. The dusk found the 
British in possession of the Erench quarters with 
the incredibly slight loss of twenty killed and a hun- 
dred wounded. So was Oporto conquered on May 12. 
Soult made a disastrous retreat and was obliged to 
throw his cannon and baggage down the ravines. On 
May 18 the corps d'armee which had been detained 
for the conquest of Portugal entered Orense in the 
most miserable condition, without shoes, and in tat- 


tered clothes. Instead of summoning to his aid the 
corps of Xey, who was defending North-west Spain 
against the forces of La Komana, and again advanc- 
ing with renewed strength, he turned his back upon 
the mountains of Galicia, and retreated first to 
Zamorra and then to Astorga, without informing 
'Ney of his movements or plans, and this although 
Napoleon had expressly ordered from Schonbrunn 
that the three corps of Soult, Xey and Mortier were 
to be joined into one, the command of which was to 
be given to Soult. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley, being master of Portugal, 
now determined to carry the war into Spain, follow- 
ing the valley of the Tagus. He found thirty-five 
thousand Spanish troops under the command of 
Cuesta, who had been routed at Medellin by Victor, 
but had since re-formed. Joining Cuesta, whom 
with great difficult}' he persuaded to action, he 
marched straight on Talavera, the headquarters of 
Marshal Victor, with an army of sixty thousand 
men. This threatened Madrid, and King Joseph 
exerted himself to repel the enemy. They both made 
appeals to Soult, who from Zamorra might easily have 
attacked the English on their left flank. But in- 
stead of waiting for the arrival of Soult, Joseph and 
Victor attacked the English position on July 27. 
For two davs Wellesley was assailed bv the united 
French armies, the English having eighteen thou- 
sand men and the French forty-eight thousand, not 
including the army of Cuesta, for the English bore 
the whole brunt of the fighting. The battle lasted 
two days. On the first the most important attack 
was made by Jourdan on the left; on the second 
Victor ordered a simultaneous charge along the 
whole of his front. The British line was nearly 



broken at tlie centre when a fierce bayonet charge 
hurled the enemj down the liilL The English loss 
was very heavy, — killed, wounded and missing num- 
bered nearly six thousand, — but its moral effect was 
great, and it is generally regarded as an English vic- 
tory. When, on August 3, Soult appeared with a 
large force in the neighbourhood of Plasencia, Wel- 
lesley evacuated Talavera and reerossed the Tagus, 
returning to the fortress of Badajoz. He had, 
however, with impunity braved the French in tlie 
very heart of Spain which iSTapoleon believed that he 
had conquered. Lord Liverpool wrote to him that 
he had raised the military rej^utation of England to 
a height which it had never reached since the cam- 
paigns of Marlborough. As a reward he was raised 
to the peerage as Viscount Wellington of Talavera 
and of Wellington in Somersetshire. 

J^ajwleon held Jourdan responsible for the ill- 
success of Talavera. He recalled him to France 
and placed Soult at the head of King Joseph's staff, 
a step wliich was not likely to appease discords. In- 
stead of bending all their efforts to the reconquest 
of Portugal, the French continued what they were 
pleased to consider the occupation of the province 
of Spain. St. Cyr laid methodical siege to the strong 
places of Catalonia, and Victor and Sebastiani, in 
the south, penetrated as far as the Sierra Morena 
and kept guard over the outlets from that range of 
mountains. The Central Junta of Seville continued 
to make mistakes which made them an easy prey 
to the French. The capture of Oporto and the suc- 
cess of Talavera, with both of which they had so lit- 
tle to do, swelled their pride in 1809 as the capitula- 
tion of Baylen had done in 1808. Under the ad- 
vice of La Eomana they insisted that the brave but 


youthful and inexperienced General Areizaga should 
march into the plains of La Mancha in order to re- 
conquer Madrid. In vain did Wellington warn 
them not to venture into a country which offered so 
favourable a field for the enemy's cavalry, and recom- 
mended them to confine themselves to the defence 
of the forces of the Sierra Morena. All the regu- 
lar troops of Spain to the number of fifty thousand 
were placed under the command of Areizaga, who 
with them crossed the Sierra Morena and marched 
upon the capital. 

He neglected all reasonable precautions, and only 
I'ealised the consequences of his rashness when from 
the church tower of Ocaiia he saw the French armies 
closing round him under the command of Soult. 
After a cond^at of three hours he was entirely de- 
feated, losing five thousand dead and wounded and 
fifteen thousand prisoners. Guns, baggage, horses, 
and thirty-two standards fell into the hands of the 
French. The result of this waS' that the French 
were again free to threaten Portugal either by Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo or by Badajoz, and Wellington was 
forced to retire from that fortress and take up a posi- 
tion on the Portuguese Tagus. 

It would have been better for the French generals 
in Spain if, after this victory, they had turned their 
attention to the defeat of the English, but instead of 
this Joseph and Soult undertook the invasion of An- 
dalusia. With an army of seventy thousand men 
they invaded that province and entered Cordova 
and Granada in triumph. If they had acted with 
promptness they might have surprised Cadiz, but 
Soult preferred to occupy Seville, and Joseph made 
his entry into that important city on February 1, 
1810, The Central Junta took refuge in the im- 


pregnable position of Cadiz, from which they direct- 
ed an energetic war against the Marshals of France. 
After the battle of Talavera Napoleon determined 
to change the system which he had hitherto followed 
in Spain. lie became convinced that the canse of 
his misfortunes lay in the dispersion of his forces 
and in having given too much power to Joseph, who 
was not a man of war. lie had also become con- 
vinced that it was, for his interests to concentrate 
his attack upon the English. By a decree dated 
February 8, 1810, he took away from Joseph the 
provinces situated to the north of the Ebro and 
formed them into separate military commands. 
Three great armies were created. The first was 
the army of Portugal, whose duty it was to attack 
the English. Massena was placed at its head. Then 
came the army of the centre left to Joseph, to sup- 
port his royalty and to pursue the guerilleros. The 
third was the army of Andalusia, commanded by 
Soult. These measures may have been wise from a 
military point of view, but they reduced Joseph to 
the position of a phantom-king and placed the greater 
part of Spain under military command. The pro- 
ject of uniting Spain under a sovereign of the Na- 
poleon family was abandoned for the present. 

MASSfiNA. 183 



The armj of Portugal, seventy thousand men 
strong, divided into three bodies, came together at 
Salamanca under the command of Massena, ^ej, 
Junot, and Reynier being assigned to him as subor- 
dinate. Massena prepared immediately to march 
upon Lisbon, but he began by taking possession of 
the frontier fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Al- 
meida. Massena crossed the frontier of Portugal 
on September 16, 1810, Wellington retiring before 
him and methodically devastating the valley of Mon- 
dego, so that the French army had to subsist upon the 
bread which they had brought with them from 
Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington now took up a posi- 
tion behind Coimbra on the heights of Busaco. This 
is a range of precipitous hills, eight miles in length, 
sloping down on the south to a ford on the Mondego 
and connected on the north with another sierra by 
a rugged and impracticable country. The allied 
forces, crossing the !Mondego, were in the act of tak- 
ing up their position when the French under Xey 
and Reynier approached the base of the mountains. 
JSTey, with his military instinct, saw that the English 
had not completed their preparations; he therefore 
urged Massena to attack immediately. But Massena 
was ten miles in the rear and did not reach the scene 
of operations till midday. The battle began on 
September 27 before daybreak. The French formed 


in five columns of attack, and showed the most re- 
markable conrage and agility in scaling the iron 
ridges. But each column, as it arrived breathless, 
was shattered bv a withering musketry fire or hurled 
downwards by fierce bayonet charges. The scaling 
columns were also enfiladed by storms of grape which 
drove along the face of the cliffs. The dogged cour- 
age of Key at last succumbed, and in the afternoon 
the French withdrew. They had lost five thousand 
men and the allies thirteen hundred.. 

On the following day Masscna discovered a path 
across the mountains to the right which enabled him 
to turn Wellington's position. The English general 
was forced to retreat and the French entered Coim- 
bra. On October 10 he was approaching Lisbon, 
when to his great surprise he was stopped by a for- 
midable line of earthworks behind which the Eng- 
lish army had entirely disappeared. These were the 
cele1)rated lines of Torres Vedras, which Wellington 
had been carefully constructing for a whole year. 
They stretched from the Atlantic to the Tagus and 
completely enclosed the peninsula on which Lisbon 
is situated. They consisted of three parallel lines 
of entrenchments, of which all were strong, and the 
second was the strongest. Sixty-nine works had been 
constructed along the line and they were armed with 
three hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Where 
there seemed a possibility of the fortifications being 
forced, redoubts at right angles were thrown up to 
the rear to sweep the advancing columns with a 
flanking fire. The length of the lines as the crow 
flies was twenty-five miles. Hills had been scarped, 
streams had been diverted to swamp the low-lying 
country, bridges had been broken down or mined 
and signalling could be conducted by a system of 


telegraphs. It is strange that the French, with their 
many friends and partisan's in Lisbon, were left in 
absolute ignorance of these preparations, and that 
nothing should have been known about them at Paris. 
Massena only heard accidentally of their existence 
from a peasant. s 

Massena waited before the lines for a fortnight, 
and then made up his mind for the assault, but Ney 
refused to obey both his verbal and his written or- 
ders. Even if these fortifications could have been 
captured at first, each day added to their strength. 
Massena was deeply disappointed. He had made a 
rapid march to Lisbon, which he hoped would have 
driven the English to their ships, but he found him- 
self in front of a fortified camp, impregnable to 
storm, and never to be reduced by blockade. He was 
also suffering from hunger, as he had wasted the 
stores taken at Coimbra and Leiria. Trant had 
seized on Coimbra with the sick and wounded in the 
hospitals and the garrison left for their protection. 
Massena was obliged to retreat and retired to San- 
tarem on the Tagus, where he established his head- 
quarters. The army of Portugal was reduced to 
forty thousand men. 

Soult was for a long time ignorant of the position 
of Massena, but it is possible that he might have 
assisted him if he had been so dij?posed. He content- 
ed himself with covering the frontiers of Andalusia, 
by besieging Badajoz, which he took on March 12, 
1811. Wellino'ton now retired to the frontier of 
Spain and laid siege to Almeida, while he sent Beres- 
ford to the south, towards Badajoz, to hold Soult in 
check. Massena was not willing to sacrifice Alme- 
ida without a struggle; he therefore returned and 
attacked Wellington on May 3 at Fuentes d'OHoro. 


This village lies in a valley with hills on either side, 
and the road to Ciudad Kodrigo passes through the 
main street. On one side was a morass and a woodj 
which prevented approach, and the village afforded 
many opportunities of cover. The attack on May 
3 was repulsed, but on the following day Massena 
came up in person. The French were greatly 
superior in numbers, but the English made a gallant 
resistance. The carnage went on till darkness put 
an end to the conflict, and both sides claimed a vic- 
tory. But there is little doubt that the English were 
very glad not to be attacked for the third time, which 
would probably have been the case if Massena had 
not been superseded at this critical moment by 
Marmont. Massena returned to France in disgrace. 
Almeida now surrendered, and the army of Por- 
tuoal retired to Salamanca. In the meantime Beres- 
ford was advancing to the relief of Badajoz. Soult 
advanced to drive him back into Portugal, and a bat- 
tle between them took place at Albuera on May 11. 
Beresford's position was a ridge four miles in length 
traversing the Seville road, with the river of Albuera 
in front and the ravines of a hill torrent behind. 
Soult attacked with great energy and the Spanish 
allies of Beresford were of more hindrance than 
use. The entire defeat of the English was prevented 
by the daring action of Colonel Hardinge, who on 
his own responsibility ordered up a division and a 
brigade which had not yet been brought into action, 
and redeemed the fortunes of the day. Out of six 
thousand English all l)ut tAvo thousand had been 
killed or wounded. Wellington wrote to Beresford 
privately : " Such another battle would ruin us. I 
am labouring to set all right again." * 




Marshal Marmont on arriving to take command 
of the army of Portngal found it in a very bad con- 
dition. He recognised that it wonld be nseless to 
attempt the reconqnest of Portngal or to make an 
attack upon Lisbon. He therefore contented himself 
with keeping guard over the frontier, to preserve 
Spanish territor^^ from the invasion of Wellington 
and his lieutenants. His first success was in pre- 
serving the frontier fortress of Badajoz from the on- 
slaught of Wellington and Beresford, and he showed 
his good sense by hastening to the assistance of Soult. 
The result of this unwonted co-operation between two 
marshals was that the siege of Badajoz was raised 
and that communication between the two armies 
of Andalusia and Portugal was secured by the forti- 
fied post of Almaraz on the Tagus. Driven from 
Badajoz, Wellington attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, but 
Marmont effected a junction between his own army 
and the armv of the Xorth, that is, the divisions of 
Galicia and the Asturias. Wellington surrendered 
the enterprise for the moment and retired into Por- 
tugal without accepting battle. The Portuguese 
frontier was defended by French cavalry. Although 
Marmont had not shown much energy in attack he 
had at least conducted a gallant and successful de- 

The best results in the Peninsula had up to the 


present been obtained by Marshal Suchet in the East. 
Alone of Xapoleon's marshals he succeeded in estab- 
lishing a real domination over the regions he had con- 
quered. Having reduced Catalonia, he undertook 
the subjection of the kingdom of Valencia. Xa- 
poleon, not unnaturally, favoured his enterprise and 
withdrew troops from Andalusia and Portugal for 
the war in Valencia, though it would have been 
undoubtedly wiser to have directed all his efforts 
to the defeat of Wellington. The important city 
of Valencia fell into Suchet's hands on January 9, 

This last date strikes a note of ill-omen for France. 
The year 1812 witnessed the expedition to Russia 
in which the resources of the Empire were strained 
to the utmost. Xapoleon was obliged to recall from 
Spain some of his best troops and some entire de- 
pots. In consequence of tliis he was obliged to 
change the position of liis coi'ps d'armee and to 
assign to them new duties. Wellington profited by 
these circumstances to the full in order to recom- 
mence his attacks. Besides this there was a condi- 
tion of mortal hatred between Soult and Marmont 
which prevented them from acting together. Inex- 
cusable as is the invasion of Russia from all points 
of view, to undertake it until the English army had 
been forced to retreat from the Peninsula was an act 
of incredible rashness. 

Wellington laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo on 
January 8, 1812, and captured it on January 10. 
He then turned his attention to Badajoz. He had 
hoped to have invested it in the early days of ]\rarch, 
when the flooding of the northern rivers -would have 
assisted him, but no means of transport were avail- 
able to move the siege trains and supplies from 


Elvas to Badajoz. The fortress in the meantime 
had been made extremely formidable. Redoubts 
and earthworks had been thrown up and heavily 
armed, there was abundance of provisions, but the 
annnunition was scanty. Ground was broken on 
March 17, and the work was carried on with great 
difficulty and heavy losses. On the morniiig of 
April 5 the breaches were pronounced practicable, 
and there was great excitement as to the result, for 
Soult was kno^\^l to be approacliing. 

The storm of Badajoz on April 6 forms one of the 
most thrilling chapters in military history. The 
commandant, Philli2:)on, had strengthened the for- 
tress in every manner which skill and ingenuity could 
suggest. As the clock struck ten at night the assault 
on the breaches began. The stormers crowded to the 
edge of the glacis and lowered their ladders into the 
ditch. When they had descended the silence was 
broken by a solitary shot from the ramparts. In an 
instant the whole glacis, which had been mined, was 
exploded, and the ditch, which had been paved with 
shells, belched forth its hideous artillery. The heads 
of the storming columns were absolutely annihilated, 
and the French stood on the breaches watching the 
deadly scene. But the alarm of the stormers changed 
to frenzied anger, and they swarmed up the breaches. 
Here they found that the broken parapets had been 
strengthened with sandbags and fascines and that the 
breach had been closed up by chevaux de frise of 
sword-plates, socketed in solid oak and secured by 
chains. Those who were first impaled on these dead- 
ly weapons made a path for the rest. At the same 
time the breaches were defended by a storm of shot, 
both in front and on the flank. The stormers, re- 
pelled by the pitiless cross-fire, retired to the ditch 


and refused to renew the assault. In the meantime, 
however, Picton had been able to take the castle by 
escalade, and Walker had stormed a bastion at the 
other extremity of the town ; the carrison therefore 
abandoned the defence of tlie breaches. The English 
obtained the fortress, but at a loss of five thousand 
dead and wounded. 

This double success, so easily obtained, revealed 
to Wellington the weakness of the French. He 
therefore determined, for the first time since 1809, 
to attempt a direct invasion of Spain. He advanced 
by the basin of the Douro, having the Pyrenees for 
his objective, and for his purpose the severing of the 
Spanish armies from their base of operations. The 
French army in the Peninsula still consisted of two 
hundred thousand men, and in command of this large 
force Napoleon placed his brother Joseph, who again 
received Jourdan as an adviser. Still, the French 
armies were scattered in Castile, in Valencia and in 
Andalusia, and it was hardly to be expected that 
the marshals who had so long enjoyed an independent 
position would suddenly obey a King whom their 
Emperor had so often treated with contempt. Mar- 
mont, who was posted in Leon, with Salamanca as 
his base of operations, with fifty thousand men to 
guard the country between the Douro and the Tagus, 
was the only marshal who preserved cordial relations 
with the King; whereas Soult in Seville and Suchet 
in Valencia paid no attention to commands coming 
from Madrid. Caffarelli, who commanded in the 
Basque provinces, openly declared that he should 
obey no orders except those which were sent from 
Paris. These differences were accentuated by the as- 
tuteness of the English commander-in-chief, who 
succeeded in making Soult believe that Andalusia 


was the object of attack, whereas his efforts were 
directed to the isolation of Marmont. 

Wellington crossed the Agueda and entered Spain 
on June 13, 1812, with an army of fifty-five thousand 
men, comi)Osed of English, Spaniards and Portu- 
guese. After several days' march, in the highest 
spirits, through a delightful country, the allies lit 
their bivouac fires in front of Salamanca, Marmont 
having evacuated the city on the previous day. Wel- 
lington was welcomed in the town with passionate 
demonstrations of devotion. The streets and squares 
were decorated with flags and flowers and illuminated 
after nightfall. The general rode to his quarters, 
with the crowd cheering and the women fall- 
ing on their knees and kissing his stirrups. The 
dread of surrendering again this grateful city to the 
enemy may have induced him to offer immediate 
battle. But having possession of the town it was 
necessary that he should take the forts and hold 
them, for his position was extremely precarious, as, 
if he had been beaten and thrown back upon Eastern 
Castile, he would have been crushed between the 
armies of Marmont and Joseph. Marmont had ap- 
parently no desire to fight a pitched battle, but did 
his best to manoeuvre Wellington into a retreat. 

The forts held out for ten days, and every day 
Marmont was raising reinforcements. After a 
month's wearisome delay Wellington heard at last on 
July 16 that Marmont had suddenly marched upon 
the Douro and was forming troops across the river. 
He rejoiced at the news, but he was in a dangerous 
position ; his left was turned and Marmont had got 
a fair start for Salamanca. If he could reach it be- 
fore the allies he would seize upon the road to Ciudad 
Rodrigo. Although both armies must fight in a flank 


position, everjthing was staked upon the battle, and 
defeat to either would be irretrievable disaster. 
]\Iannont, however, changed his plans and the issues 
became less critical. 

At last the battle which we call Salamanca and 
the French Arapiles was fought on July 23. The 
Arapiles are two isolated hills rising from the high 
uj)land of the battle-field, one of which was in the 
possession of the English and the other of the Trench. 
Marmont had been manceuvring all the morning, and 
had, in attempting to reach the road which led to 
Ciudad Eodrigo, separated his left from his centre. 
Wellington threw his columns into the gap ; Mar- 
mont tried to retrieve the error, but did not see the 
third division of the English which was advancing 
amongst the hills. Just at the critical moment Mar- 
mont was struck down by a shell which shattered his 
arm and inflicted other grievous wounds. Bonnet, 
who succeeded him, suffered a similar fate, and the 
command devolved on Clausel, one of the youngest 
marshals. He made heroic efforts to redeem the 
day, which were nearly successful, and withdrew his 
armv after the defeat with consummate skill. The 
effects of the battle were decisive, for the French had 
lost six thousand men, and they were felt elsewhere 
than in Spain. The news of the defeat of Sala- 
manca reached Napoleon on the Moskva, the night be- 
fore the battle of Borodino, and this to some meas- 
ure accounts for his inertness during its continuance 
and his sluggishness in following it up. 

After the battle of Salamanca the army of Portu- 
gal retreated on Burgos, and it is possible that if 
Wellington had pursued it with energy he might 
have driven it into the Pvrenees. But, under the 
influence of political motives, he turned aside to enter 


Madrid as conqueror. He was received rather as a 
god than as a mortal : he was created a Grandee of 
Spain of the first class, Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, 
and was invested with the command of the Spanish 
armies. While Wellington had made this triumphal 
entry on August 12, King Joseph had taken refuge 
in Valencia amongst the soldiers of Suchet. But 
Soult, urged at last to action, left Andalusia and 
joined the forces of King Joseph and Suchet. The 
French were now in sufficient strength to recover 
possession of the capital. 




On September 1 Wellington left Madrid to pursue 
the army of Clausel, which was retiring on the line 
of the Ebro. Clausel exhibited remarkable capacity 
in his retreat, and Wellington did not care to attack 
him. Burgos was occupied on September 17, Mar- 
mont having only left it a few days before, but this 
also had to be evacuated. Although the city was aban- 
doned, tlie castle was garrisoned by eighteen hundred 
soldiers under Dubreton, a general of rare skill and 
determination. Wellington thought that it could not 
hold out long, for it was a fortress of the third order, 
and was commanded by some heights to the east- 
ward within short gun-range, but it eventually suc- 
ceeded in baffling all his efforts. Four assaults were 
successively delivered upon it, but they were all fruit- 
less. Officers and men began to feel that they were 
engaged in a liopeless task, and they even lost con- 
fidence in their general. The rain had fallen in tor- 
rents, swamping the trenches and parallels; the gar- 
rison also had been extremely active, breaking out 
into furious sorties, which were only repulsed with 
severe loss. After the defences had been breached 
in a third place, a fifth and final assault was de- 
livered, but was as disastrous as the others had been. 
Wellington therefore determined to retreat, and re- 
tired first on the Douro and then to Salamanca. 

On Xovember 2 King Joseph again entered his 


capital. He formed the army of Portugal by the 
valley of the Douro, and was now in command of an 
army of eighty-five thousand men. He advanced 
with this force against Wellington, whom he found 
on the battle-field of Arapiles, where the fortunes of 
the previous disaster might have been retrieved. The 
blame of failure is rightly or wrongly laid on Soult, 
who is said to have lost a day by his sluggishness 
and timidity. It is possible that he had no desire to 
hazard an engagement. However that may be, at the 
moment of projected attack thick fog and heavy rain 
threw a curtain between the French and English 
armies, and when the veil was lifted Wellington was 
nowhere to be seen. His retreat was full of miseries, 
but he safely reached the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, 

The catastrophe of Is'apoleon in Russia, which has 
been narrated in previous chapters, deprived the ar- 
mies of Spain of all hope of reinforcement, and the 
Emperor was also obliged to recall a large number of 
officers and seasoned soldiers to fill up the gaps which 
had been made in his armies in Germany. He 
ordered the concentration of his forces, which re- 
mained in the Peninsula, in the North and the 
Centre, the evacuation of Madrid and the trans- 
ference of the capital to Valladolid. He recalled 
Soult, entrusting future operations to King Joseph 
and to Jourdan as chief of the staff. These measures 
were the best that could be adoj^ted under the circum- 
stances, but unfortunately Clausel was detached with 
a considerable force to put down the guerilla bands 
in the north of Spain. Wellington took full ad- 
vantage of these circumstances. In May, 1813, the 
whole number of combatants for the Spanish cause 
under arms amounted to two hundred thousand men, 
and the force directly under Wellington himself con- 


sisted of seventy thousand English and Portuguese, 
while the flank of the land forces was covered by 
English fleets. The effective fighting forces of the 
French armies may be eetimated at one hundred and 
ten thousand. Wellington crossed the Spanish 
frontier on Mav 20, and marched first on Salamanca 
and then on Valladolid. 

Joseph considered himself, without the aid of 
Clausel's division, too w^eak to oppose Wellington at 
Valladolid, and therefore retired first to Burgos 
and then to Miranda, finally taking up a position 
on the plain of Vittoria. At this town converge the 
three great roads leading from Bilbao, Pamplona, 
and Bayonne. Here, too, were crowded together the 
army trains and stores, the w^ounded, the women and 
children and all the plunder. The French were 
formed in three lines behind the Zadora, Clausel was 
at Logroiio, about thirty miles distant, and King 
Joseph sent him urgent messages to come up, but be- 
fore he could arrive the battle was over and lost. 

The battle began at daybreak on June 21, like so 
many of the battles wdiicli we have narrated, in a 
dense mist. Hill on the English right stormed the 
heights of Puebla and occupied them ; Wellington 
took charge of the centre, and on the left Graham was 
advancing by the road from Bilbao and was opposed 
by Reille. When Wellington saw that the French 
centre vjas weakened by their having detached troops 
to oppose Hill, he made a vigorous attack in tlie 
centre with Picton and the third division. The 
French made a stubborn resistance, but their posi- 
tion was turned on the left and they were obliged 
to fall back, crowding together in confusion, A 
panic ensued and gun after gun was lost ; Reille still 
held his own, but he w^as isolated and in great 


danger. The road to Irun and Bayonne was blocked 
by waggons and fugitives and the flight was directed 
towards Pamplona. The victory was complete and 
the French lost about five thousand killed and 
wounded and eight thousand prisoners. Clausel, 
marching up too late towards the scene of conflict, 
nearly fell a prey to the victorious army. He was, 
however, able to escape and retired into Catalonia 
to cover the retreat of Suchet. This general was 
compelled to evacuate Valencia, which he had con- 
quered with such distinction, and after garrisoning 
the fortress to withdraw his troops gradually 
across the Ebro. 

Spain was now entirely recovered from the 
French. Joseph was recalled to France in disgrace 
and placed under arrest in his country-house of Mor- 
fontaine, whilst Soult was despatched to the South 
to reorganise the defeated armies, lie took up a 
position along the River Nive, from St. Jean Pied- 
de-Port to Bayonne. Wellington was in no hurry 
to cross the French frontier, but undertook the siege 
of St. Sebastian, which was one of the most im- 
portant operations of the war. He did not gain pos- 
session of it till the last day of August. Then en- 
sued a series of struggles between Soult and Wel- 
lington in the defiles of the Pyrenees which are too 
complicated to be described in detail. One incident, 
however, is too picturesque to be omitted. Soult 
was advancing to relieve Pamplona, when Welling- 
ton galloped into the village of Sauroren. The 
French cavalry followed him into the village, and he 
had scarcelv time to save himself and to reach his 
troops. The two armies were confronted on ojDpos- 
ing heights, and the generals were so near to each 
other that Wellington could distinguish the figure 


and even the features of his opponent. When the 
soldiers knew that their commander was on the field, 
lond cheers, taken up by regiment after regiment, 
rang along the line. Wellington said : " Soult is 
a great commander, but a cautious one, and he will 
dela}^ his attack to ascertain the meaning of these 
cheers ; that will give time for the sixth division to 
come up and I shall beat him." The event justified 
the prophecy; Pamplona surrendered to Wellington 
on the last day of October. 

Before this date Wellington had crossed the 
Eidassoa, and on the evening of October 9 the allied 
armies were established in cantonments in France; 
the ]S[ivelle was traversed about a month later. 
Wellington now advanced into France and fought the 
battle of Orthez on February 27, 1814, and thus 
commanded the road to Bordeaux, which was entered 
by the English on March 12. Ten days later King 
Ferdinand VII., restored by N'apoleon to the throne 
of his ancestors, set his foot once more upon Span- 
ish soil and the Peninsular war was at an end. 


THE AVAR OF 1814. 



After the disastrous campaign of Russia !Xa- 
poleon had still great resources left, and he was only 
contending against one-half of Europe, but after the 
battle of Leipzig he could only depend upon him- 
self, and the whole of Europe was in arms against 
him. Xothing was left of the Grand Army except 
a few fragments, mere phantoms of corps d'armee 
and divisions, which made no attempt to defend the 
frontier of the Rhine. Along the course of that 
river, between Basle and Cologne, were posted Mar- 
mont with twelve thousand men, Macdonald with 
twelve thousand, Victor with seven thousand, 'Nej 
with seven thousand, as w^ell as about nine thousand 
cavalry. Belgium was held by a body of fifteen 
thousand troops. The frontier of the Jura was un- 
defended and was falling a prey to the allied forces. 
In Italy Prince Eugene had (piite enough to do in 
defending himself against the attacks of the Aus- 
trians; Soult, as we have seen, was being pressed 



back by Wellington into the south of France, l^ot 
only had the gigantic empire of Napoleon vanished 
like a dream, but the frontiers which France had 
acquired after the Kevolution were being assaulted 
by half a million enemies. 

France had no energy to resist these invasions. 
She had not only been exhausted by the demands so 
incessantly made upon her, but the iron will of her 
sovereign had broken her own resolution, she had 
lost the power of initiative, and could no longer 
oppose to attack the fire of patriotism or the stub- 
born spirit of independence. The only moral qual- 
ity which remained to her was that of resignation. 
It is possible that the allies still overrated the 
strength of their great antagonist, or it may be that 
they hoped for the conclusion of peace on the basis 
of Franco retaining her natural frontiers of the 
Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees, and giving up 
all claims to influence in Germany, Holland, Italy 
and Sjjain. At any rate their forces advanced very 
slowly after the battle of Leipzig, and it was not 
till December 21, 1813, that the army of Schwarzen- 
berg crossed the Rhine by the bridge of Bale, nor 
till January 1, 1814, that the army of Bliicher 
passed the same river between Mainz and Cologne. 
The object of the armies of Bohemia and Silesia was 
to march upon the capital of France. The strength 
of the two united was two hundred and fifty thou- 
sand men. 

After his return to Paris IsTapoleon had worked 
with all the resources of his energy and his genius 
to repel this invasion. He had called up all the 
soldiers he could lay his hands upon as far back as 
the conscription of 1805, and had anticipated the 
conscription of 1815. He had established new 


" cohorts " of national guards, had recalled troops 
from Spain, and thus had collected together a force 
which showed on paj)er as five hundred thousand. 
But he could hardly expect that his orders would be 
literally carried out. The two months' breathing- 
space allowed him after Leipzig was not sufficient to 
drill these conscripts, nor even to collect them to- 
gether. He was badly supplied with money, cloth- 
ing, arms and all material of war. The conscripts, 
when they arrived at the dep(3ts, had but scanty uni- 
forms or none at all, many were dressed in blouses 
and wooden shoes, and these poor children, inex- 
perienced and uninstructed, merely food for the 
enemy's cannon, in spite of the courage and devotion 
which they often exhibited, went by the name of 
" Marie-Louises." 

In the darkness of all these difficulties flamed the 
bright star of the genius of ITapoleon himself. As 
he had been before led from victory to victory by 
his good fortune, so now did the greatest qualities 
of his mind and character seem to derive strength 
from the presence of ill fortune, stimulated to great- 
er efforts by the ever-present feeling that he was 
defending the soil of his country against the pollu- 
tion of an invading foe. Commanding a few veter- 
ans and a few recruits, he thought to supply the de- 
ficiency by his personal qualities, by the rapidity 
of his movements, by the wise application of means 
to ends, by readiness to profit by the smallest division 
amongst the enemy and by the discovery of new re- 
sources. Thus the campaign of 1814 is scarcely less 
brilliant than the campaign of 1796 ; his setting like 
his rising sun was attended by the gorgeous hues 
of victory. But the forces of nature, which are 
more powerful than those of war, which were on 


his side in Italy, were now opposed to him in 
France ; it was impossible to contend successfully 
against an overwhelming fate. 

The army of Schwarzenberg, two hundred thou- 
sand strong, marched into France by Besangon, 
Langres and Chaumont ; Bliicher, with fifty thou- 
sand men, advanced through Lorraine to Vassy 
and St. Dizier. Their design was to join their 
forces and then to march upon Paris by the valleys 
of the Marne and the Seine. They had gradually 
driven back before them the small armies of Victor, 
N^ey, and Marmont, and on January 27 Bliicher 
reached Brienne with thirty thousand men in order 
to join Schwarzenberg, who had arrived at Bar-sur- 
Aube, about ten miles distant. To protect Paris 
Mortier was stationed at Troyes with fifteen thou- 
sand men, while at Chalons were collected about 
forty thousand under the command of Victor, Ney, 
Marmont, and Macdonald. Thus when iSTapoleon 
arrived at Chalons he found himself at the head of 
fifty-five thousand men. The Marie-Louises, who 
came in gradually afterwards, did not double the 
number, and the Imperial army never at any time 
contained more than ninetv thousand combatants. 

The plan of ISTapoleon was to attack Bliicher, who 
had the smaller army, before he could join Schwar- 
zenberg, and for this purpose marched from Chtd- 
ons to Saint Dizier, and from Saint Dizier to 
Brienne, in the valley of the Aube, where he came up 
with the Prussian marshal. After a spirited en- 
gagement he drove the Prussians from Brienne, but 
they retreated towards Bar-sur-Aube, where Schwar- 
zenberg was posted, so that he would have to fight 
against both armies united, which together quad- 
rupled his own. Instead of retiring he established 


himself at La Rothiere and on the hills surround- 
ing Brienne. The Austrian army had already 
moved forward to meet Bliicher, and on February 
1 the small forces of Napoleon were attacked by at 
least one hundred and fifty thousand of the enemy, 
who outflanked him on both sides, and tried to thrust 
him into the Aube. After a struggle of eight hours 
La Rothiere remained in the hands of the allies. Na- 
poleon had lost six thousand men and fifty-four guns, 
and M^as obliged to retreat, first to Troyes and after- 
wards to Nogent-sur-Seine. The allies thought that 
the campaign was at an end and the officers ex- 
pected to be dining in a week's time in the garden 
of the Palais Royal. 

In a council of war held in the chateau of 
Brienne on February 2 the invaders determined to 
march immediately on Paris, and for this purpose 
divided their forces into two parts, Bliicher ad- 
vancing to Chalons, where he was to receive rein- 
forcements, and then by the valley of the Marne ; 
Schwarzenberg by Troyes and the valley of the 
Seine. Bliicher showed that he well merited the 
name of " Marshal Forwards." He pressed on with 
all speed, hoping to arrive at Paris before Schwar- 
zenberg. The consequence of this Avas that his 
troops were distributed over a very long line. On 
February 9 Yorck was at Chateau Thierry with 
eighteen thousand men, Sacken at Montmirail with 
twenty thousand, Olsuvief at Champaubert with six 
thousand, whereas Bliicher with his eighteen thou- 
sand men had not got further than Etoges. 

Napoleon was carefully following from Nogent- 
sur-Seine the movements of the army of Silesia, and 
on February 7 he despatched Marmont to Sezanne 
and joined him there two days later. As he had 


left the corps of Victor and Oudinot on the Seine he 
had with liim onlv a bodv of twenty-five thonsand 
men. He marched bv the road from Sezanne to Eper- 
nay, which passes by Champaubert and would bring 
liini right upon the flank of the Russians. He attacked 
them on the following day and almost entirely anni- 
hilated them, only fifteen hundred escaping. Vt\; 
this action the army of Bliicher was cut completely 
in two, and Xapoleon had the choice of turning to 
the right on Bliicher himself or to left upon his 
lieutenants. He determined upon the latter course. 
He left Marmont at Champaubert to keep Bliicher 
in check, and marched upon the corps of Sacken at 
jMontmirail. Sacken fought bravelv, but was en- 
tirely defeated with the loss of four thousand men. 
Xapoleon then on February 12 marched against the 
division of Yorck at Chtiteau Thierry. This in its 
turn was beaten and driven behind the Ourcq with 
the loss of three thousand men. Thus in three days 
the Emperor had scattered the greater number of 
Bliicher's troops to the winds and had reopened his 
communications with Paris. He now turned upon 
Bliicher himself, who was ignorant of what had 
occurred. He was advancing from Etoges to Mont- 
mi rail, and Marmont was retiring slowly before 
him. Suddenly Marmont turned round and at- 
attacked him as he came out of Vauchamps. Then be- 
hind the troops of Marmont, Bliicher saw the Im- 
perial guard advancing and the cry of " Vive I'Em- 
pereur! " uttered by ten thousand throats came upon 
him like a clap of thunder. Obedient to his old 
caution he determined to retreat and did so at first 
in good order. But Grouchy made a desperate charge 
upon this mass of men with three thousand five hun- 
dred cavalry, cut them down, and huddled them 


up in confusion. Bliiclier retired in disorder Avitbi 
the loss of six thousand men, the French loss being 
only six hundred. 

The intention of jSTapoleon had been to pursue 
Bliicher to Chalons, complete the destruction of his 
armv, and then move backwards to Vitrj, thus threat- 
ening the rear of the army of Bohemia. But he heard 
that Schwarzenberg had driven back the forces of 
Victor and of Oudinot, and was threatening Paris. 
Jomini had indeed advised the allies to march on 
Paris, but, disconcerted by the fate of Bliicher, they 
determined to " wait for the development of the 
manoeuvres of the Emperor l^apoleon." The ])lan 
of these manoeuvres was formed on the battle-field 
of Vauchamjis. On February 14 the army of Bo- 
hemia was much scattered, Wittgenstein was at 
Provins, Wrede at Xangis, the Wiirtembergers at 
Montereau, and the reserve between Bray and ISTo- 
gent. I^apoleon on February 14 and 15 marched 
first back towards Meaux and then south to Guignes, 
where he joined his two marshals, Victor and Oudi- 
not, and brought his numbers up to sixty thousand 
men. On February 17 he fell upon the enemy and 
drove them first on Mornant and then on Nangis ; 
he then sent Oudinot, Macdonald, and Victor in three 
directions to push the enemy before tliem, ordering 
the last to occupy the bridge of Montereau, which 
however he failed to do. On February 18 ISTapoleon 
hastened to repair this error and forced the Wiir- 
tembergers into Montereau, occupying the famous 
bridge, by which he hoped to reach the army of 
Schwarzenberg. The Austrians, however, thought 
it prudent to retire to Troyes. 

On February 22 the grand army of the allies was 
arranged in order of battle, its right on the Seine, 


20d wars of the century. 

its left on the village of St. Germain. It was too 
late for the Emperor to attack it, because all his 
troops had not arrived, but he had great hopes for the 
morrow. True, the allies were one hundred and 
fifty thousand and the French seventy thousand, 
but they were demoralised by their defeat and had 
a river at their back. Bliicher could not come up 
in less than twentv-four hours, and in that time 
Schwarzenberg would have been beaten. Unfor- 
tunately for Xapoleon the Austrians were of the 
same opinion, and did not care to sacrifice a mag- 
nificent army to the glory of France. So on the fol- 
lowing day, at five o'clock in the mornins:, they re- 
treated to Bar-sur-Aube, sending propositions for an 
armistice. On February 24 iSTajDoleon entered 
Troyes, where he was received with the greatest en- 
thusiasm. On February 26 the general position of 
the armies was as follows: J^apoleon at Troyes com- 
manded between the Seine and the Aube a force of 
seventy-four thousand men and three hundred and 
forty guns; the great army of the allies, reduced to 
two hundred and thirty thousand men, was retiring 
before him to Chaumont and Lanores. On his left 
Bliicher with fortv-eiiiht tliousand men was under- 
taking a dangerous flank march, being held in check 
by Marshals Marmont and ]\Iortier with sixteen thou- 
sand men, with the risk of being attacked in his rear 
by the Emperor himself. On the right of Xapoleon, 
General Allix defended the line of the Yonne with 
two thousand soldiers, and was raising the peasants 
of the surrounding country. Every day Paris sent 
fresh supplies both of men and guns; the national 
guards were organising themselves in the prov- 
inces, and the peasants were beginning a guerilla 
Avarf^re. In the South Augereau with twenty-seven 


thousand men had begun to take the offensive against 
the twenty thousand men of Bubna and Lichten- 
stein. Augereau had express orders to occupy a 
position between Bale and Langres so as to cut off 
Schwarzenberg's retreat. The possibility of this 
catastrophe caused continual disquiet to the Austrian 
general, and made him fear that the situation of 
affairs might at any time undergo a sudden change. 




The success of the French arms at this time was 
confined to Champagne, and the enemy was slowly 
advancing on other points of the frontier. In Bel- 
gium General Maison with his small body of fifteen 
thousand men was obliged to retire before the 
Duke of Saxe- Weimar with thirty thousand, sup- 
ported by the army of the Xorth under Bernadotte. 
Antwerp, commanded by the famous Carnot, was be- 
sieged. In the Pyrenees, Marshal Soult, with fifty 
thousand conscripts, was no match foi' the eighty 
thousand soldiers of Wellington. His gradual retreat 
has already been narrated. In Italy, Prince Eu- 
gene was holding his own with difiiculty against the 
Austrians on the Adige. After La Rothiere the 
Emperor thought of recalling him, but his subse- 
quent victories made him change his determination 
and Eugene remained in Italy. On the other hand, 
Marshal Sucliet was in command of fifteen thousand 
men in Spain ; who, after the ratification of the 
treaty of Valengay, would be available for service 
in France. 

Under the pressure of tlie victories of Xapoleon 
the allies formed some important resolutions at 
Bar-sur-Aube on February 25. They determined 
that Bllicher should resume his march on Paris by 
way of Meaux, and that he should be supported by 


the corps of Biilow and Winzingerode, both of them 
forming part of the army of the North, which now 
began to enter upon the scene. Also to support 
Bubna they gave orders for a new corps to enter 
Switzerland under the command of the Prince of 
Hesse, to neutralise the efforts of Augereau. These 
two determinations were of the utmost importance, 
and indeed eventually decided the issue of the cam- 
paign in favour of the allies. 

As soon as the plan of action had been decided 
upon Bliicher put himself in motion to proceed from 
the Aube to the Marne, inclining slightly towards 
the north to meet the reinforcements which he had 
been told to expect. Marmont and Mortier did 
their best to hold him in check, but they were forced 
to retire. On February 28 he crossed the Marne 
at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, while the two French mar- 
shals retired behind the Ourcq, which they held 
against the advancing Prussians. Bliicher on reach- 
ing the right bank of the Marne found no traces 
either of Biilow or of Winzingerode, and he soon 
learnt that he would be attacked by Xapoleon in 

The Emperor had desisted from the pursuit of 
the Austrians on February 26, leaving forty thou- 
sand men on the Aube under the command of Oudi- 
not and Macdonald. Setting out from Troyes on 
February 27, he reached Sezanne on the following 
day and arrived at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre on March 
2, with an army of thirty-five thousand fighting men. 
If Bliicher had not taken the precaution to destroy 
the bridge across the Marne, the army of Silesia 
would have been destroyed. But h3 was now able 
during the next two days to cross the Ourcq and to 
retire upon the Aisne. His soldiers were iu the 


worst extremity of fatigue and misery. In seventy- 
two hours they had fought three battles and made 
three night marches ; they had received no regular 
supply of provisions for a week. Some of the 
cavalry had not unsaddled for ten days, the horses 
were in a terrible condition, the artillery stuck 
hopelessly in the muddy roads, and quantities of 
ammunition had to be abandoned. The infantry 
marched barefooted and in rags, carry iug rusty mus- 
kets, grumbling against their generals. 

There were two bridges across the Aisne in these 
parts, one at Soissons and one at Berry-au-Bac, but 
the fortified town of Soissons was held by a French 
garrison. iSTapoleon moved in the direction of 
Fismes, hoping to intercept the passage at Berry-au- 
Bac, that of Soissons being already closed. If he 
could succeed, Bliicher would have to fight a battle 
under the worst possible conditions, which could 
only result in complete disaster. But the unex- 
pected happened. Winzingerode, instead of march- 
ing to Oulcliy to join Bliicher, had undertaken the 
siege of Soissons with the hope of gaining posses- 
sion of that important bridge. There was but little 
chance of the town surrendering. Indeed, the siege 
was on the point of being raised, when suddenly the 
commandant of the place, an old soldier without 
energy, lost his head at the first sound of the enemy's 
guns and capitulated after twenty-four hours' invest- 
ment. Hardly was the ink of the convention dry 
when the cannon of the Emperor were heard on the 
banks of the Ourcq. Thus was all the fruit of ISTa- 
poleon's brilliant manoeuvres lost. Bliicher crossed 
the Aisne safely on March 5 and retreated towards 

The rage of the Emperor at this cowardly act of 


treason may well be imagined. He wrote to Clarke, 
the Minister of War : "■ The enemy was in the great- 
est embarrassment, and we were hoping to reap the 
fruit of several days of labour, when the treason or 
stupidity of the commandant of Soissons delivered 
this fortress to him. Arrest this miserable wretch, 
and the members of the council of defence, bring them 
before a court-martial composed of generals, and, in 
God's name, have them shot in the Place de Greve 
in twenty-four hours. It is time that example should 
be made." 

Napoleon now crossed the Aisne by the bridge of 
Berry-au-Bac, hoping to reach Laon before Bliicher. 
The Prussian Marshal, wishing to attack the Em- 
peror on the march, occupied the plateau of Craonne 
with thirty thousand men, and it was necessary for 
Napoleon to dislodge them before he marched on to 
the city. This gave occasion to the battle of Craonne, 
fought on March 7, 1814. The Kussians were 
drawn up in three lines on the grand plateau, which 
could only be reached by difficult defiles. During 
several hours' conflict the French troops were not 
able to attain the plateau, until at length the Rus- 
sian lines were broken by the artillery of Davout. 
Bliicher now perceived that a cavalry charge, which 
he had prepared with the design of dealing the 
French a decisive blow, could not be made with suc- 
cess, and he ordered the retreat of the Russians from 
the plateau. The battle was therefore undecided, 
and was certainly not a victory for Napoleon, be- 
cause the allies were able to carry out their original 
intention of retiring to Laon. 

The city of Laon, crowned by its cathedral, is a 
natural fortress which dominates the surrounding 
plain, Bliicher established himself there strongly 


and Napoleon endeavoured to dislodge him, hoping 
in this way to prevent the advance to Paris. He 
therefore attacked the advance posts of the army of 
Silesia, towards the south, on March 9, and ordered 
Marmont to make a similar attack upon the east. 
Marmont did not arrive on the ground till late in 
the day, and with some difficulty established himself 
at Athies. He left his troops there for the night, 
going himself to sleep at the chateau of Eppes, some 
three miles oif. 

In the evening the best soldiers of Marmont, 
wearied by eight hours of march and four of battle, 
were dis2;)ersed looking for food in the neighbouring 
farms, while the larger number, paralysed by cold 
and weakened by hunger, were sleeping like sheep 
in a pen, round the bivouac fires. At seven o'clock 
the Prussians penetrated into the village, and find- 
ing the troops in their first sleep cut them to pieces 
without resistance. In the meantime Kleist at- 
tacked in another direction with cries of " Hurrah ! 
Hurrah ! " Gunners were killed at their posts, and 
the guns were carried off already loaded. Simul- 
taneously there was a third attack of seven thousand 
Prussian cavalry. Marmont, aroused from his 
sleeping-place, arrived on the scene, but could do 
nothing, and it was only by the heroic efforts of 
Colonel Fabier that the rout was converted into a 
retreat. On the following day the corps of Marmont 
reached Berry-au-Bac, but only one- third of his 
troops answered to the roll-call ; seven hundred had 
been killed or wounded, and two thousand five hun- 
dred had been made prisoners. Only eight pieces of 
artillery escaped capture. 

JSTotwithstanding the destruction of Marmont'a 
corps, which made his plan impossible to execute, 


Napoleon still continued to threaten Laon, hoping 
to intimidate Bllicher into a retreat ; but the marshal 
was too sure of his position to be frightened in this 
manner. All the attempts of the French to dislodge 
a vastly superior body of the enemy from extremely 
strong ground proved fruitless, and they at length 
retired to Soissons, having lost, altogether, more 
than six thousand men, killed, wounded and taken 
prisoners, while the loss of the allies had only been 
about half that number. The check of iSTapoleon at 
Laon was the first consequence of the council of war 
at Bar-sur-Aube. Augereau had been compelled to 
stop his movements from Lyons towards the Jura, 
because the army of the Prince of Hesse had beaten 
the French at Poligny on March 4, and Augereau 
had withdrawn his forces in the direction of Lyons. 
It will be remembered that when Napoleon set 
out in pursuit of the army of Bllicher he had left be- 
hind him the corps of Macdonald and Oudinot. 
These were immediately attacked by Schwarzenberg, 
and were beaten at Vernonf ays, upon which they re- 
tired to Troyes. They did not stay there long, but 
retreated first to iSTogent and then to Provins, so that 
Schwarzenberg was again upon the Seine. The im- 
portant town of Rheims also had been captured by 
a body of Russians under the command of Saint 
Priest, a lieutenant of Langeron. As soon as Na- 
poleon heard of this he gave orders for Marmont 
to advance upon Rheims. He sent ISTey there also, 
and left Soissons in person for the same place at day- 
break on March 13. Saint Priest could hardly believe 
that he was being attacked by the French, whom 
he supposed to be a long way off. The Emperor ar- 
rived at Rheims at four o'clock in the afternoon, 
and immediately gave orders for the assault. Saint 


Priest soon recognised by the number of the enemy 
and by the vigour of the attack that Napoleon was 
present in person. He immediately began to give 
orders for the retreat, but was mortallv wounded 
by a fragment of shell which shattered his shoul- 
der. The battle continued during the night, but the 
Russians were eventually defeated and Napoleon 
gained possession of the town, thus establishing him- 
self on the lines of communication of both the hos- 
tile armies. 





When Kapoleon set out to follow Bliiclier on 
February 27, he had formed the whole plan of cam- 
paign in his mind. He intended to crush the army 
of Silesia, and to drive it beyond the upper waters 
of the Oise, then to collect the garrisons of the for- 
tresses in the north-east, and to return with ten thou- 
sand sabres and forty thousand bayonets to the rear 
of the Grand Army of the allies, which was opposed 
in front by Macdonald, and harassed on its left 
flank by Augereau. But everything had turned 
against him. Bliicher had been saved by the capitu- 
lation of Soissons, and the stubborn resistance of 
the army of Silesia at Craonne, and at Laon, as 
well as the retreat of Macdonald on Provins, and of 
Augereau on Lyons, rendered this whole scheme 
impossible. But the capture of Rheims brought his 
original project to the mind of the Emperor. He 
thought that it would be possible to surprise Schwar- 
zenberg in his operations, defeat one or two of his 
divisions, and, when the Grand Army was in retreat, 
march upon Lorraine. 

Between March 11 and 16 Schwarzenberg had 
driven the troops of Macdonald from Xogent to Pro- 
vins and from Provins to Xangis, but when he heard 
of the capture of Rheims he had stopped his advance 
and begun his retreat anew, being afraid of a move- 
ment of Xapoleon on his communications. He 


wrote on March 12 : "I have no news, and I mnst 
confess that I treml^le. If Bliicher is defeated, 
can I risk a battle mvself ? for if I am conquered, 
what a trinmph for Xapoleon, and what hnmiliation 
for the sovereigns to have to recross the Rhine at the 
head of a conquered army!" On Marcli 17 Xa- 
poleon was still hesitating as to whether he should 
join Macdonald and meet the enemy face to face, or 
whether he should march to Troyes in order to fall 
upon the flank or rear of the allies. The first plan was 
in his opinion the safer, but he chose the second be- 
cause it was the bolder. Before setting out he sent 
orders to Marmont and Mortier to use every effort 
to keep Bliicher behind the Aisne ; if he did not suc- 
ceed in this they were to retire towards Paris, disput- 
ing every position on the road. They had with them a 
force of twentv-five thousand men : Mortier was in- 
vested with the command, but the Emperor had more 
confidence in Marmont. 

On Thursday, March 17, the Emperor left 
Rheims with his old guard, that moving citadel, as 
Houssaye calls it, which was always attached to his 
steps, and on the evening of the same day he slept 
at Epernay. The next morning starting early, he 
continued his march southwards, towards Fere- 
Champenoise, whilst Xey was proceeding from 
Chalons to ]\railly, along a parallel road to the east. 
The headquarters of the allies was now at Troyes, 
and they were in great confusion and embarrass- 
ment. Sehwarzenberg was divided between two ob- 
jects, to hold back Macdonald on his front, and to 
engage Xapoleon on his flank; he consequently spread 
his army over a semicircle of eighty miles. The 
Emperor Alexander, seeing the danger of this ar- 
rangement, insisted on an alteration, and gave orders 


which implied a retreat upon Bar-siir-Aube. 
Schwarzenberg passed from the heights of confidence 
to the depths of pnsillanimitj. At 1 p.m. he was 
holding Macdonald behind the Seine, and fighting 
a battle with N^apoleon between the Marne and the 
Aube; at 8 p.m. he left all this ground open to his 
adversaries, and retreated thirty miles with an army 
of one hundred thousand before an army of fifty 

Napoleon was, not unnaturally, ill-informed of the 
situation. He believed that the great army was on 
the right bank of the Seine fighting with Macdonald ; 
he therefore determined to march straight on to 
Arcis-sur-Aube and to traverse its rear. But arriv- 
ing at Fere-Champenoise, he heard of Schwarzen- 
berg's retreat and, changing his plans, prepared to 
cross the Aube at Boulages and the Seine at Mery, 
Ney at the same time making a parallel march. ISTa- 
poleon met with so little resistance at the passage of 
these rivers that he became convinced that the Grand 
Army was retiring by forced marches on Brienne or 
Bar-sur-Aube. This confirmed his opinion that the 
safest plan he could adopt would be to march towards 
the garrisons of Lorraine and, collecting all available 
troops, throw himself on the rear of the allies with 
an army of ninety thousand men. For this purpose 
he determined to march on Vitry-le-Frangois and 
to close the road which passed by Arcis-sur-Aube. 
On the morning of March 20 he wrote to the Minis- 
ter of War : " My moveinent has been perfectly suc- 
cessful. I shall nesiect Troves and march with all 
haste upon my fortresses ; " and again : " I am start- 
ing for Vitry." He contemplated as a possibility 
the capture of Paris, feeling that all measures of 
security had been taken, and that wherever his head- 


quarters were, there was the capital of the Em- 

It happened, from some reason which has not been 
sufHcientlv explained, that Schwarzenberg was on 
March 19 seized with an access of energy, and sud- 
denly determined to stop his retreat and to engage 
Napoleon. Consequently on the following day the 
first columns of the allies fell unexpectedly on the 
French positions at Areis and Torcy, situated on 
either side of the Aube, and drove them back in great 
confusion. jSTapoleon, galloping up, restored order 
at great personal risk. Finding that his troops were 
fleeing pell-mell over the bridge, he rode to the end 
of it, faced the fugitives, and cried in a voice of thun- 
der : " Wlio will dare to cross the bridge before me ? " 
At another time when even the firmness of the guard 
seemed to waver, he rode his horse close up to a shell 
and remained till it exploded. The horse was killed, 
but the Emperor was uninjured. None of the '" bear- 
skins " could show terror after that. 

Night put an end to the conflict. For the space 
of eight hours the French had held their ground, 
under a terrible fire of artillery, first seven thousand 
five hundred against fourteen thousand, then thir- 
teen thousand against twenty thousand, and at last 
sixteen thousand against twenty-five thousand, and 
they had not lost an inch of ground. During the 
whole of this time Napoleon believed that he was 
en£:ao;ed onlv with a detachment of the Grand Armv, 
and therefore determined to continue the battle on 
the following day. But he very soon discovered 
that the whole of the army of Bohemia was before 
him, and that it Avas no good to struggle any longer 
with twenty-seven thousand men against one hundred 
thousand. He therefore retired by the bridge of 


Arcis. The allies attacked the town, but every street 
and every house was defended, and by the time they 
gained possession of it the passage of the Aube was 

After the two battles of Arcis-sur-x\ube jSTapoleon 
continued, with more boldness tlian prudence, his 
march towards the fortresses of Lorraine and upon 
the communications of the allied armies. On the 
afternoon of March 23 he entered St. Dizier, which 
lies between the two routeswhieli the armies of Bliicher 
and Schwarzenberg had followed from Strasburg 
and Bale. He had no doubt that the Grand Army 
would return and fight him, but until he knew which 
route it would follow, he was reduced to inaction. 
Schwarzenberg was equally ignorant of the direction 
of Napoleon's march, and also waited for informa- 
tion. Suddenly an intercepted despatch gave the 
allies the light which they desired. A council of 
war was held at Pougy on March 23, and opinions 
were much divided. Some were in favour of a re- 
treat, others were in favour of abandoning the com- 
munication with Switzerland and marching on Cha- 
lons to approach the army of Bliicher. This im- 
portant resolution was eventually adopted, although 
Schwarzenberg stigmatised it as rash. 

Intercepted despatches had determined the march 
on Chillons; information of a similar character was 
to produce even more important results. This was 
contained in letters from high functionaries of the 
Empire, describing the exhaustion of the treasury, 
the arsenal and the magazines and the growing dis- 
content of the population. Schwarzenberg had not 
paid much attention to these despatches, and having 
opened communications wnth Bliicher, was now pre- 
paring to pursue Napoleon with the two armies unit- 


ed. But tlie letters made a great impression on the 
mind of the Emperor Alexander, and he spent a 
sleepless night in their contemplation. The King 
of Prnssia and Schwarzenberg had already left in 
pursnit of Napoleon, but Alexander remained be- 
hind at Sommepuis. He summoned his Russian 
generals to his presence and asked them : " I^ow that 
onr commnnications with Bliicher are re-established, 
ought Ave to continue the pursuit of ISTapoleon, or 
should we march directly on Paris ? " Barclay de Tol- 
ly was strongly in favour of continuing the pursuit ; 
Diebitsch was in favour of dividing the army into 
two portions, one to pursue ]^apoleon, the other to 
march on Paris — a fatal suggestion. At hearing this 
Barclay cried : " There is only one thing to be done 
under our present circumstances — to march on Paris 
as quickly as possible with all our forces, and to send 
ten thousand cavalry against jSTapoleon to mask our 
movement." Diebitsch then followed on the same 
side. Barclay was at length convinced, and the 
Tsar mounted his horse to join Schwarzenberg. 
After an hour's ride he came up with him between 
Sommepuis and Vitry. The sovereigns and the gen- 
erals held an improvised council of war at the side of 
the road. Alexander having explained his scheme, 
the King of Prussia strongly approved of it, but 
the Austrians still vigorously opposed. At length, 
with great reluctance, Schwarzenberg gave his ad- 
hesion to this new plan of campaign, and it was 
agreed that on the following day, Friday, March 
25, the two united armies should begin their advance 
upon the capital, whilst Winzingerode should follow 
ISTapoleon in the direction of St. Dizier, and do his 
best to make him believe that he was being pursued 
by the whole army of the Coalition. 




Ox March 25 the two armies begau their inarch on 
Paris with a body of two hundred thousand mt-n. 
On the same day they came into conflict with the 
troops of Marshals Marmont and Mortier at Fere- 
Champenoise, which they drove back after some re- 
sistance. On the same day also, a little to the north, 
some thousands of national guards, who were escorted 
by a large convoy of a hundred artillery waggons 
and eighty other vehicles, with munitions of war 
and two hundred thousand rations of bread and 
brandy, were attacked by the army of Silesia, de- 
fended themselves with heroic courage, and rather 
than surrender suffered themselves to be des- 
troyed to a man. The Emperor of Russia, who wit- 
nessed the close of the engagement, never forgot the 
lesson which it taught. The two marshals continued 
their retreat towards Paris, making a long detour 
by Provins, in order to avoid their advancing foes. 
The allies marched up to the outskirts of the capital 
without meeting any resistance except that of a small 
body commanded by Compans, who disputed their 
ground foot by foot for three days from Meaux to 
Pantin. On the evening of March 29 the allies en- 
camped before Paris. 

We left Xapoleon at St. Dizier, waiting for news 
of the march of his enemies. On March 25, being 
Btill ignorant of their advance upon Paris, but hear- 


iug that Bar-sui'-Aube and Troyes had been evacu- 
ated, he decided to occupy these towns, in order more 
effectually to intercept their communications, and 
moved for that purpose to Doulevant, some twelve 
miles to the south ; but hearing that some Austrian 
cavalrv, the one hundred thousand men of Win- 
zingerode, had shown themselves in the direction of 
St. Dizier, he returned and dispersed them. They 
left in his hands two thousand prisoners and 
eighteen guns, and lost five hundred men killed or 
wounded. The victory, however, brought great con- 
fusion to the mind of the Emperor : he believed that 
he was engaged with the army of Schwarzenberg, and 
found that he was fighting the army of Bliicher. 
How could Bliicher, who a few days ago was threat- 
ening Soissons, be now on the frontiers of Lorraine ? 
and how could Schwarzenberg, who was marching 
on Vitry, have disappeared so suddenly ? At length, 
on the afternoon of Sunday, March 27, when before 
Yitrv, he learnt the undoubted news that the allies 
were marching on Paris. He immediately mounted 
his horse, rode off to St. Dizier and buried himself 
in his reports, his maps, and his plans. He knew that 
the sceptre and the sword were trembling in his 

There is little doubt that if left to himself he 
would have abandoned Paris to her fate and have 
continued his operations, but he was overruled by 
the opinion of his generals, and at eleven at night 
orders were issued for an advance on the capital by 
way of Bar-sur-Aube, Troyes and Fontainebleau. He 
reached Troyes on the night of March 29, and after 
a few hours' sleep left again at break of day, com- 
mitting the charge of the army to Berthier, who was 
ordered to lead it to Fontainebleau. He intended 


to sleep at Villeneuve-sur-Vanne, but his impatience 
overcame him. He threw himself into a post-chaise 
with Caulaincourt, and galloped at full speed on 
the road to Paris. 

On that very day, Wednesday, March 30, 1814, 
the decisive battle was being fought under the walls 
of the capital. Paris, at that time, was not forti- 
fied, and during the two months of the campaign 
nothing had been done either by Clarke, the Minister 
of War, or by King Joseph, who was President of 
the Council of Regency, to place it in a condition 
of defence. K'apoleon himself had given no positive 
orders with regard to it. Putting things at their 
very best, not more than forty-three thousand soldiers 
and militia could be got together to oppose the vast 
forces of the allies. Under these circumstances 
honour might be preserved, but victory was impos- 
sible. To make this last effort, Marmont estab- 
lished himself on the plateau of Eomainville, and in 
front of Pantin; Mortier was to the north in front 
of La Villete and La Chapelle. The soldiers of 
Marmont defended their ground with the utmost 
heroism, but the plateau was captured by force of 
numbers, and he withdrew to Belleville and Menil- 
montant, where he held out for several hours. But 
the allies occupied Charonne and drove Mortier back 
to the very gates of the city, capturing Montmartre 
and assaulting the barrier of Clichy, which was 
defended by the aged Marshal Moncey. At four 
o'clock in the afternoon Marmont, using the power 
which Joseph had given to him, began negotiations 
for a capitulation. The French evacuated the city 
during the night and the allies made their triumphal 
entry on the following day. 

Meanwhile Napoleon, hastening with all speed 


towards the capital, was receiving bad news at every 
post-house. At Sens he heard that the enemy were 
approaching Paris ; at Fontainebleaii, that the Em- 
press had left for Blois ; at Essonnes, that a battle 
was being fought. At last, at eleven o'clock at night, 
he reached the post-house of Fromenteau, called 
Cour-de-France, about fourteen miles from Paris. 
Here he learnt the news of the capitulation from 
General Belliard. He refused to yield to circum- 
stances : he would go to Paris, sound the tocsin, 
illuminate the town, call the whole population to 
arms, and he drove on to Athis two miles further. 
From this point he saw the bivouac fires of the 
enemy on the left bank of the Seine and met the ad- 
vanced guard of Mortier. He returned to La Cour- 
de-France, despatched Caulaincourt to Paris with 
full power to treat for peace, shut himself up in a 
room and busied himself with his maps. 

At davbreak he received a messenger from Can- 
laincourt, and shortly afterwards a letter from Mar- 
mont. He now knew that everything was lost, and, 
wearied out with fatigue, returned to Fontainebleau, 
which he reached at six o'clock in the morning. He 
was ioined here in the succeeding davs bv the re- 
mains of his army. On April 2 the Senate, who 
had hitherto been his humble slaves, now carried a 
vote depriving him of the crown, and a provisional 
government was established which proposed the re- 
turn of the Bourbons. On April 5 Marmont passed 
over to the side of the enemy with all his troops and 
robbed Napoleon of one of his armies. On the fol- 
lowing day he signed his abdication and afterward^ 
accepted the sovereignty of the island of Elba. 





It is impossible to write an account of the cam- 
paign of Waterloo without saying something of the 
political occurrences which led to it, the return 
of Xapoleon from Elba, and the rising of united 
Europe for his destruction. The restoration of the 
Bourbons to the throne of France inevitably car- 
ried with it the re-establishment of the Ancien 
Regime. Under any circumstances it would 
have been extremely difficult to reconcile the 
new and the old — the ideas of the Revolution 
with the system which it displaced. But a task 
of this nature, easy at no time, had been ren- 
dered impossible by the twenty years of war 
which had succeeded the Revolution. The partisans 
of the Bourbons regarded evervthing that had been 
done since the abolition of monarchy as a usurpation, 
and were impatiently waiting for the time when they 
were to enjoy their ow^l again. The adherents of 
the new state of things, however much they might de- 
sire a condition of peace and settled government, 
looked upon the Ancien Regime with horror, as 
the embodiment of tyranny and injustice, and its 
15 225 


restoration as a return to barbarism. Napoleon 
said frequently at St. Helena that the Bourbons 
would never again be able to reign in France, and 
experience has shown that he was right. 

Therefore to recount the mistakes of the Bour- 
bons on their return to Paris is merely to narrate 
the inevitable. A reasonable settlement was impos- 
sible, and measures more or less erroneous could not 
appease or exasperate the inherent antagonism of the 
situation. It was soon seen that they had learnt 
nothing and forgotten nothing. They took every 
pains to obliterate tlie memory of the Revolu- 
tion and tlie Empire; the tri-coloured cockade 
was abolislied and the white cockade put in 
its place; the palace of the Tuilleries was filled 
with the old aristocrac}^, who treated those who 
had supplanted them with scorn and contempt, 
and drove them from the court which was dominated 
by the Comte d'Artois and his daughter-in-law, the 
Duchesse d'Angouleme, who had indeed suffered bit- 
terly in the Revolution, but could never forget her 
Avrongs. The luxury of the court was great and the 
taxes of the people heavy. The clergy and the returned 
emigres demanded their lands back again, as well 
as their tithes and their feudal rights, although the 
property which liad formerly belonged to them had 
changed hands by purchase. There was a pro- 
position to declare null all the proj^rietary arrange- 
ments of the last twenty-five years. But perhaps 
more disastrous than anything else to the new state 
of things was the reconstruction of the army. 

The infantry Avas reduced from 206 regiments to 
107, the cavalry from 99 regiments to 61, the artil- 
lery from 339 companies to 184, the horse artillery 
from 32 s(juadrons to 8^ the engineers from 60 com- 


panies to 30. While these reductions were enforced 
a number of officers were admitted into the army 
who had received their military education either in 
the army of Conde or in the service of Aus- 
tria or England. The old royal household 
troops came back with all their privileges; a 
large number of officers were placed upon half- 
pay, which formed a solid nucleus for discon- 
tent. The two Ministers of War — Dupont, who 
was tainted with the disgrace of the capitulation of 
Baylen, and Soult, who had all the zeal of a convert 
— opened wide the gates of promotion to the emigres 
and closed them to the children of the Revolution. 
On the other hand, the worship of the Emperor, the 
memory of his triumphs and the longing for his re- 
turn grew every day more passionate from one end 
of France to the other. 

jSTapoleon, from the island of Elba, followed these 
movements with a watchful eye. He noted the mis- 
takes of the Bourbons, and the growing desire of the 
people and the army for his return. There were 
other reasons why he should not remain where he 
was. The treaty of Fontainebleau had promised him 
a revenue of two million francs a year and propor- 
tionate donations to his mother and other memljers 
of his family. ISTot one penny of this had ever been 
paid, and while the allied sovereigns might urge that 
it would be madness to place the weapon of money 
into his hands, Xapoleon was aware that his resources 
were nearly exhausted and were not sufficient to pro- 
vide for his army or his househould. Schemes were 
also formed at Vienna for kidnapping Napoleon and 
conveying him to the island of St. Helena, or to some 
other safe place of custody, so that if he felt it to be 
for his interests to land in France there was no 


reason why sentiments of honour should hold him 

Animated by these motives and encouraged by 
messages which he received from Paris, [N^apoleon 
left Elba on February 26, 1815, and reached Golfe- 
Juan at one o'clock in the afternoon on March 1. 
He had with him about eleven hundred men, consist- 
ing of about six hundred grenadiers and chasseurs 
of the old guard, about one hundred light Polish 
cavalry, of course without horses, a certain number of 
gunners, four hundred Corsican chasseurs, and a few 
unattached officers who had come to Elba to enter his 
service. It is not necessary to relate the details of 
the march to Paris. iSTapoleon had said that his 
eagles would fly from steeple to steeple until they 
reached the towers of Xotre Dame, and this boastful 
prophecy was fulfilled. His advance was a triumph 
in which the jDeople and the army vied together to 
do him honour. Everywhere the white cockade was 
discarded for the tri-coloured. The most critical 
point of his advance was at Le Mur on March 7, 
when a battalion of the fifth regiment of the line, 
with some artillery and engineers, seemed inclined 
to offer resistance. Xapoleon walked up to them 
and cried : " Soldiers of the fifth regiment, do you 
recognise me ? " " Yes, yes," was replied by hun- 
dreds of voices. Then he opened his coat, laid bare 
his breast and said : " Who is there amongst you 
who will fire at his Emperor ? " There was a 
general shout of " Vive I'Empereur ! " and j^apoleon, 
turning to his companions, said: " It is all settled; 
in ten days we shall be in Paris." 

At Grenoble and at Lyons the people and the sol- 
diers by an irresistible impulse acknowledged their 
Emperor. Marshal Xey, having promised to 


Louis XVIII. to bring bim back in an iron cage, now 
declared that the cause of the Bourbons was lost 
for ever. Napoleon entered Paris on March 20, 
Louis XVIII. having left it the night before, flying 
first to Lille and then to Ghent. The whole of 
France accepted the restored empire ; the high digni- 
taries of the army, who had welcomed the Bourbons 
in 1814, now sang a different note. If a sovereign 
has any right to his crown by a people's vote, Na- 
poleon could, after the return from Elba, feel him- 
self to be the chosen monarch of France. 




Easy as it was -to rally France around the Im- 
perial regime, it was impossible that it should be ac- 
cepted by Europe. By declarations signed on March 
13, the sovereigns at the Congress of Vienna had de- 
clared Xapoleon an outlaw, and a fortnight after- 
wards they had formed a new Coalition. Xot less 
than eight hundred thousand men were advancing 
against the frontier of France ; no representations 
were listened to ; it was necessary to prepare for a 
terrible struggle. When Xapoleon entered the 
Tuillerieson March 20 the annies of France did not 
exceed one hundred and eighty thousand men. He 
boasted that by the first of October be would have 
eight hundred thousand men under arms, and com- 
petent judges are of opinion that he might have justi- 
fied this boast. On beginning the campaign he had 
28,238 of the guard and more than two hundred and 
fifty thousand troops of the line, making a total of 
two hundred and eighty-four thousand men, and he 
had beside this an auxiliary army of 222,624, form- 
ing a grand total of over five hundred thousand men, 
and in a month their number would have been in- 
creased by at least one hundred thousand. The allies 
began to prepare for war at the beginning of April. 
Several plans of campaign were proposed. Wel- 
lington desired to commence hostilities before the 
arrival of the Eussian army and before the allied 


troops had completed their concentration. He wrote 
on April 10 that it would be snfficient to move sixty 
thousand Anglo-Dutch, sixty thousand Prussians and 
one hundred and forty thousand Austro-Bavarians 
into the country between the Sambre and the Mouse 
in order to occupy France with forces superior to the 
enemy and to be able to mancpuvre in the direction of 
Paris. He was anxious above everything for the 
restoration of Louis XVIII. , and thought that de- 
lay would give Xapoleon strength. Schwarzen- 
berg was characteristically anxious for delay. 
Eventuallv it was agreed that six armies should 

t-' Cj 

invade France simultaneously : Wellington with 
the armv of the Low Countries, ninetv-three 
thousand strong, between Maubeuge and Beau- 
mont ; Bliicher with the Prussian army, one 
hundred and seventeen thousand strong, between 
Philippeville and Givet ; the Russian cavalry 
under Barclay de Tolly, with one hundred and fifty 
thousand men, betweeen Saardories and Saarbruch ; 
Schwa rzenbcrg with two hundred and ten thousand 
Austrians and South Germans, partly by Sarregui- 
mines and partly by Bale. These four armies were 
to march concentrically on Paris, by Peronne, 
Laon, ISTancy and Langres respectively. On the 
extreme left the army of Xorth Italy and the army of 
Xaples were to cross the Alps and to advance, one 
on Lyons and the other on Provence, the latter to be 
supported in its operations by the English fleet. 

To meet this attack, Xapoleon, as he has himself 
related, hesitated for a long time between two plans. 
The first was to collect a large body of troops near 
Paris, to concentrate the army of the Alps and the 
corps of the Jura at Lyons, to let the allies march 
against the fortresses, which were well provisioned 


and garrisoned by one hundred and fifty thousand 
men. As the campaign was not intended to com- 
mence till July 1, the enemy could not reach Lyons 
till July 25, or Paris till July 2.5. By that time 
the fortifications of the capital would be completed, 
and would be well furnished with defenders. The 
army of Paris would amount to two hundred thou- 
sand men, and there would be eighty thousand men 
in the depots and one hundred and fifty-eight thou- 
sand recruits. Of the six hundred and fifty-four 
thousand allied troops who entered France seventy- 
five thousand would be engaged in Provence and in 
the territory of Lyons, and not less than one hundred 
and fifty thousand would be left behind to protect 
their communications, so that the four grand armies 
on reaching the Oise and the Seine would not num- 
ber more than four hundred and twenty thousand 
combatants. To these jS^apoleon would oppose two 
hundred thousand soldiers capable of movement, be- 
sides others in the intrenched camp of Paris. He 
would undertake a campaign similar to that of 1814, 
with two hundred thousand soldiers instead of ninety 
thousand, with the capital protected by eighty thou- 
sand men under the capalde command of Davout. 

The second j^lan, which was bolder but much more 
hazardous, was to attack the enemy before his forces 
were collected. He calculated that by June 15 he 
could concentrate on the frontier of the jSTorth an 
army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men. 
He would then march into Belgium, conquer the 
English and the Prussians by attacking them one 
after the other, and then after receiving reinforce- 
ments join the corps of Rapp and go to meet the 
combined army of Austrians and Russians. He was 
led to adoj^t the second j)lan, partly by the character 


of his genius and partly by political considerations. 
He did not think it safe to expose the country again 
to the strain which had been put on it in the previous 
year. Besides, he felt confident that one decisive vic- 
tory would destroy the Coalition ; the Belgians would 
join the French, and if the Whigs came into power 
in England they would make peace. On the other 
hand, if his army were compelled to retreat, he could 
retire on Paris and take up the first plan ; at the 
same time he did not conceal from himself the dis- 
astrous consequences of a signal defeat such as he 
trusted was not likely to happen to him. 

Having decided on the second plan, he next had to 
determine at what point he should make his attack. 
If he moved by Lille on Wellington's right, he would 
drive the English army into the arms of the Prus- 
sians and would soon have to fight them both united ; 
if he debouched by Givet and the valley of the Meuse, 
he would drive the Prussian army into the arms of 
the English. He therefore determined to aim 
straight at the point of juncture of the two armies 
and to commence the campaign from Charleroi. 

l^apoleon left Paris on the night of June 10 and 
reached Laon, that tovni of ill-omen, at midday on 
June 11. On June 13 he slept at Avesnes, and on 
the evening of June 14 moved his headquarters to 
Beaumont, about thirtv miles distant. The next 
dav he addressed them thus : " Soldiers, this dav is 
the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, battles 
which have twice decided the destiny of the Empire. 
Then, as after Austerlitz and after Wagram, we 
were too generous. To-day, in a coalition against 
us, the princes, whom we have left upon their thrones, 
are attacking the independence and the most sacred 
rights of France. They have begun the most un- 


just aggressions. They and ourselves, are we no 
longer the same men i " The French army was now 
concentrated in a line extending f rom Solre-sur- 
Sambre to Philippeville, a distance of about ten 
miles, with Beaumont for its centre, each corps 
having not more than about fifteen or twenty miles 
to march to reach its objective, Charleroi. 

By these operations, in ten days, a body of one 
hundred and twenty-four thousand men, considerably 
scattered, had been brought to the frontier, within 
cannon-range of the enemy's outposts, without the 
allies having adopted any measures of defence. 
JSTever had such a manoeuvre been better conceived, 
and, with some exceptions, better carried out. On 
June 14 the headquarters of Bliicher were at ^amur, 
and those of Wellington at Brussels; each of these 
armies would require three days to concentrate 
on their point of contact, and twice that time to con- 
centrate either on the English right or the Prussian 
left. Wellington defended his action by the diffi- 
culty of obtaining subsistence for his troops and the 
necessity of guarding every point. The truth was 
that it was not intended by the allies that the in- 
vasion of France should begin till the end of June, 
and neither he nor Bliicher believed that Xapoleon 
would begin the attack. 

The advanced guard of the French army crossed 
the Belgian frontier at half-past three on the morn- 
ing of June 15, and the whole army was to proceed 
in three columns to Charleroi, the regulations for the 
march having been carefully considered in every par- 
ticular. Unfortunately some of the generals were 
late in executing their orders, and the corps of 
Gerard was thrown into confusion by the desertion 
of General Bourmont, who rode over to the enemy. 


To his honour be it said, Bliicher, disgusted at see- 
ing a soldier dressed in the uniform of a general of 
division deserting his colours on the morning of 
battle, would scarcely speak to him. ISTot with stand- 
ing these checks the advanced posts of Ziethen were 
driven back to the Sambre, and the French became 
masters of the two bridges over the river, one at 
Marchienne-au-Pont and the other at Charleroi. At 
midday Napoleon rode through the town of Charleroi 
and, sitting in a chair before a small tavern, saw the 
troops defile before him. Tradition says that he fell 
asleep, which is perhaps not to be wondered at on a 
hot day in the middle of June after seven or eight 
hours in the saddle. 

After Charleroi the road branches into two, that 
to the right leading to Fleurus and Sombreffe, that 
to the left to Gosselies, Quatre-Bras and Genappe, the 
first being the road to ISTamur, the second the road 
to Brussels. At 2 p.m. General Gourgaud brought 
the news that the Prussians were visible in force at 
Gosselies, that is, on the Brussels road. Xapoleon 
at once ordered General Reille to march on Gosse- 
lies, and, besides taking other measures, sent D'Erlon 
to support Reille. He was naturally disturbed, be- 
cause the presence of Prussians on the Brussels road 
seemed to indicate a juncture between Bliicher and 

At a little after three o'clock in the afternoon 'Ner 
suddenly arrived upon the scene, to the great delight 
of the troops. The Emperor said to him : " Good 
day, I^ey ; I am very glad to see you. You will take 
command of the first and second corps. I give you 
also the light cavalry of the guard, but do not use 
them. To-morrow you will be joined by the 
cuirassiers of Kellermann. Go and drive the enemy 


along the road to Brussels and take up a position at 
Quatre-Bras." This place, so famous in history, 
lies at the spot where the road from x^amur to 
Nivelles crosses the road from Charleroi to Brussels. 
It is about eleven miles from Charleroi, a little more 
than a mile from Genappe, and about nine miles 
from the battle-field of Waterloo. iSTapoleon had 
now good reason to believe that his plan had suc- 
ceeded beyond his expectations. He would be able 
to place his left wing at Quatre-Bras to meet the 
English, his right wing at Sombreffe to meet the 
Prussians, while, taking his position at Fleurus, the 
apex of the triangle, he would be able on the follow- 
ing day to throw himself with decisive effect on 
whichever of the enemies was the first to show him- 

As Xapoleon was giving his instructions to Ney, 
Grouchy came up, who was destined to take charge 
of the right wing. lie had found that the Prus- 
sians were posted in force at Gilly, about two miles 
and a half from Charleroi. The Emperor rode for- 
ward with him and ordered him to disperse the Prus- 
sians, and to drive them to Sombreffe, where he was 
to take up his position, but unfortunately the Em- 
peror did not wait to see this done, and returned to 
Charleroi. The consequence was that the attack was 
delayed, Vandamme and Grouchy quarrelled, and 
the French did not even occupy Eleurus, much less 
Sombreffe. On the left, jSTey, after driving the 
enemy from Gosselies, left the bulk of his troops 
there, and only took with him on the road to Quatre- 
Bras the lancers and the chasseurs of the guard. He 
arrived at Frasnes, a village about three miles south 
of Quatre-Bras, at half-past five, and found it oc- 
cupied by some ^Nassau troops. They halted just 


before Quatre-Bras and were joined by reinforce- 
ments under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. Ney 
came to the conclusion that he couhl not successfully 
attack this body of four thousand live hundred men 
Avith his seventeen hundred cavalry and a single 
battalion of infantry. Therefore a little before 8 
P.M. he recalled his cavalry to Frasnes and went 
himself to sleep at Gosselies. 

Ko doubt the failure of Xey to occupy Quatre- 
Bras on June 15 was one of the chief causes of Xa- 
poleon's ill success. If, wlien he arrived at Gosse- 
lies at 5 P.M., instead of stopping Keille's corps, 
he had taken with him only part of the troops which 
the Emperor had placed under his orders, he might 
have crushed the forces of Prince Bernard and placed 
himself between the positions of Bliicher and Well- 
ington, but for once " the bravest of the brave " pre- 
ferred caution to hardihood. 




On the morning of June 16, although Sombreffe 
and Quatre-Bras had not been occupied, the French 
army was in a good position. !N^apoleon had thrown 
himself into the centre of the allied position, and 
had one hundred and twenty-four thousand men en- 
camped in a triangle measuring about nine miles 
each way. During the whole day not an English 
uniform had been seen, and the Prussians had no- 
where shown any large number of troops. The Em- 
peror therefore had some reason for supposing that 
both armies had retired on their lines of operation, 
the Prussians towards Liege and Maestricht, the 
English to Ostend and Antwerp. The further they 
were separated, the more easy would it be to beat 
them. With these ideas in his head Napoleon sent 
orders in the early moring for Grouchy to march 
on Sombreffe and Gembloux, driving before him any 
Prussians he might meet with ; he was then to sum- 
mon the reserve from Fleurus to Sombreffe, and 
march with it to join ISTey at Quatre Bras ; they could 
then marcli on together at night and reach Brussels 
at 7 A.M. on the morning of June 17. 

Just as these orders were being sent out a letter 
arrived from Grouchy saying that a large body of 
Prussians was advancing from the I^amur road to- 
wards Brye and St. Amand. This showed the Em- 
peror that Bliicher, instead of retreating, was prepar- 


ing to fight a battle, but he saw no reason to alter 
the orders already given. Just as he was leaving 
for Fleurus news came from the left wing that the 
enemy was appearing in force on the side of Quatre 
Bras, upon which Napoleon sent to Ney the follow- 
ing order : '" Bliicher having been yesterday at 
Namur, it is not probable that he has led his troops 
to Quatre Bras ; therefore you have only to deal with 
those which come from Brussels, join together the 
corps of Comtes Reille and D'Erlon, and that of the 
Comte de Valmy (Kellermann). With these forces 
you will be able to beat and destroy all the strength 
of the enemy which may appear before you." Lobau 
was ordered to remain at Charleroi to assist E'ey if 
necessary. Having given these orders, the Emperor 
set out for Fleurus, which he reached a little before 
11 A.M. He found to his surprise that Grouchy 
had not yet started for Sombreflfe, but that general 
gave as his reason the fact that large masses of the 
enemy were to be seen a little to the north of Fleurus, 
which he had only occupied that morning. Hearing 
this, ISTapoleon took up his position in a brick wind- 
mill which commands the plain, having made a 
breach in its wooden cowl for purposes of observation. 
Bliicher, as soon as he heard of Xapoleon's at- 
tack, had hastened from I^amur to Sombreffe, which 
he reached on June 15 at 4 p.m. He immediately 
took steps to put his troops on the brook of Ligny, a 
j)osition which he had previously selected as a field 
of battle if the French should debouch by Charleroi. 
He was full of ardour and had written to his wife: 
" With one hundred and twenty thousand Prussians 
I would bind myself to take Tripoli, Tunis, and 
Algiers if I had not got to pass the sea." But he 
had some difiiculty in concentrating his forces, which 


were mueli dispersed. At 11 a.:m. only the corps 
of Ziethen was in line, tlie corps of Pirch did not 
arrive till midday, followed by that of Thielmann, 
while the fourth corps, under Billow, was mucli be- 
hind. Still, he determined to fight, hoping for the 
co-operation of Wellington, of which he had re- 
ceived a conditional promise. 

Wellington, who was at Brussels, had been in- 
formed at 8 A.M. on the morning of June 15, by 
Ziethen, that his outposts had been attacked, but not 
being certain that this was not a feint, hesitated to 
concentrate all his troops on his left. That night 
the famous ball of the Duchess of Richmond was 
given at Brussels. Wellington went to it, probably 
that he might not alarm the somewhat doubtful 
courage of the Belgians, and left it after supper at 
3 A.M. He set out at 6 a.m. and reached Quatre 
Bras at 10 a.m., a distance of a little over twenty 
miles; he then rode towards Frasnes to observe the 
French outposts. About 1 p.m. he joined Marshal 
Bllicher on the heights of Brve, and ascended with 
him a Avindmill in front of that village, which gave a 
better view than the windmill of Fleurus. They 
saw the French columns advancing, and recognised 
the Emperor in person surrounded by his staff. 
Gneisenau urged that the Duke should bring up his 
forces to support the Prussians at Brye, which would 
certainly not have been wise, because it would 
have uncovered the road to Brussels. Wellington 
eventually arranged that he would first cut to pieces 
the French troops at Frasnes and push on to Gosse- 
lies, and that he would come to the assistance of 
Bllicher if he were not attacked himself. 

The battle-field of Tigny is traversed by the brook 
La Lig-ne which runs between deep banks. In 


the centre is the village of Ligny with its two large 
farms, the ancient castle of the Counts of Looz, and 
a church with a graveyard enclosed by a wall. By 
the villages which border the stream, the position of 
the Prussians may be described as a continuous ditch 
with ten bastions, some in front of and some behind 
the ditch, the most important, Ligny, being traversed 
throughout its whole length by the brook. From the 
mill at Fleurus jSTapoleon could not see the whole 
strength of the position, because the ravine of the 
Ligny was hidden from him. The ground looked 
like a vast corn-field, sloping down towards the 
centre and gradually rising towards the horizon. 

We have seen that Bliicher was only able to as- 
semble his troops gradually, therefore the Emperor 
had at first only a corps d'armee before him. It 
was plain also that the Prussians M'ere looking for a 
junction with the English army on their right. This 
fact induced Xapoleon to write to Xey at 2 p.m. 
that after having attacked the enemy vigorously at 
Quatre Bras he was to retire towards the Emperor's 
position to take the Prussians on the right flank. A 
copy of this order was also sent to D'Erlon, who was 
under l^ey's command. jS^apoleon soon became 
aware that he had before him the whole of the Prus- 
sian army and he was proportionately delighted. In 
a few hours, if Xey appeared on the heights of Brye, 
Bliicher would be destroyed. He said to Gerard: 
" It is possible that in three hours the fate of the war 
will be decided. If N^ey carries out his orders well, 
not a gun of the army will escape." At 3.15 p.m. 
a more pressing order was sent to Ney. He is told 
that the Prussians are lost if he acts vigorously — 
that the fate of France is in his hands ; but just at 
this moment the Emperor heard that Xey had twenty 


thousand of the enemy before him. He therefore 
came to the conclusion that he must content himself 
with the division of D'Erlon, and sent orders to 
that general to march on the rig'lit of the Prussian 
army, the order to be communicated to jSTey. 

The battle began at 3 p.m. Vandamme ad- 
vanced through the corn-fields upon St. Amand, and 
Gerard upon Ligny. The French succeeded in 
capturing St. Amand, but it was recovered by the 
Prussians. Only half of the village of Ligny was 
taken, the Prussians still holding their own on the 
other side of the stream. They also took particular 
pains to defend their right, by which they could com- 
municate with the English. At last, at 5.30 p. m.^ 
ISTapoleon made preparations for the advance of his 
reserve against the Prussian centre. He expected 
J^ev to arrive at 6 p.m.. and the defeat of Bliicher 
would then be complete. As the attack was forming- 
news was brought that a body of the enemy's troops, 
twenty or thirty thousand strong, was visible on the 
French left and that Gerard was 2:ivin2: wav in con- 
sequence. The Emperor was much disturbed at this 
information, which he could not understand, and he 
suspended the attack until he had further informa- 
tion. At about 6.20 p.m. he received certain in- 
formation that the supposed body of the enemy was 
in reality the corps of D'Erlon, which he had sum- 
moned to his assistance ; he also heard that the di- 
vision had again retired. Feeling now certain that 
he could receive no assistance either from Ney or 
D'Erlon, he determined to advance with his reserve 
on Ligny. This movement, made at 7 p.m., decided 
the fate of the battle. The centre of the enemy was 
completely driven in. Bliicher was thrown from his 
horse and was very nearly taken prisoner. But the 


two wings of the Prussian army were able to re- 
treat in good order, although thev suffered much loss. 
The whole loss of the Prussians amounted to fifteen 
thousand, that of the French to about nine thousand. 
The battle of Ligny was a great success, but the 
victory was not complete. The Prussian army was 
mutilated, but not destroyed, and the plans ela- 
borated for its annihilation by Napoleon had failed. 




During the course of June 16 the Emperor had 
sent nine successive orders to Marshal Ney, the first 
at five o'clock in the morning, the last at five o'clock 
in the evening. It is the opinion of military ex- 
perts that, if Ney had acted with promptitude, he 
might have been in a position to attack Quatre-Bras 
at 9 A.M. with a force of nineteen thousand in- 
fantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry and 
sixty-four guns, and a reserve of twenty thousand 
five hundred men. Eeille also, who was under his 
orders, was very slow in his movements. Quatre- 
Bras was at this time held by the Prince of Orange 
with seven thousand eight hundred infantry and 
fourteen guns, but he was fully convinced of the 
strategical importance of the position, and was deter- 
mined to defend it to the utmost. The hamlet of 
Quatre-Bras consisted at this time of two houses and 
three large farms, each forming admirable points 
of defence, one to the left of the allied position, one 
in the centre and one to the right, this last being 
further strenffthened bv the wood of Bossu. 

Eeille joined Xey at Frasnes at 1.30 p.m.^ but 
the attack did not begin till 2 p.m. The left and 
centre of the enemy were forced and the Prince of 
Orange was nearly taken prisoner, but the troops of 
Prince Bernard of Saxe- Weimar on the right had 


not been attacked. About 3 p.m. Wellington ar- 
rived on the field, after his interview with Bllicher, 
and considered the situation to be critical ; but he 
soon received reinforcements, Picton with eight 
English battalions and four Hanoverian, and Van 
Merlin with some Dutch and Belgian cavalry. 
Picton, with Kempt and Pack under him, marched 
to re-establish the broken left. In the meantime 
the Prince of Orange defended his centre against 
Foy, who was pressing the attack, but was with Wel- 
lington driven into confusion along the Brussels 
road. About tlie same time the farm on the allied 
right was captured, and the wood of Bossu attacked. 
About 4 P.M. 'Nej received the Emperor's order 
to press the enemy vigorously and then to attack 
the flank of the Prussian army at Brye. He there- 
fore made a general movement in advance. The 
allies began to yield on their right and centre; the 
Black Brunswickers were driven back by Foy; they 
charged once more, led by their Duke Frederick Wil- 
lii.m in person, but he was shot in the stomach and 
was carried into a house at Quatre-Bras, where he 
died in the evening. His troops were dressed in 
black, with a badge of a skull and crossed bones in 
memory of the Duke, his father, who had been 
mortally wounded at Auerstadt. On the allied left 
the French column of attack was met by the fire of 
Picton's troops, hidden by the standing corn ; it was 
then charged with the bayonet by Kempt's brigade 
and driven back to the farm. The English could not 
hold his advanced position and retired, gallantly 
followed by the French. The 28th regiment formed 
into square to resist the French cavalry, and when 
they seemed likely to break Picton called out to 
them, " Twenty-eighth, remember Egypt." Pack's 


brigade was less fortunate, and the French opposed 
to them advanced as far as the Namur road. 
. For the success of his attack Ney had reckoned 
on the twenty thousand men forming the corps of 
D'Erlon, who formed the reserve, but by a strange 
fatality this body was to prove equally useless to 
himself and to his master. D'Erlon had, from 
various reasons, been retarded in his march, and at 
4 P.M. was still about five miles from Quatre-Bras, 
when the order came from Napoleon ordering him to 
march to the heights of St. Amand and fall upon 
Ligny. Unfortunately he misread the order, and in- 
stead*^ of taking the direction of Brye and Ligny to 
attack the Prussians in the rear, he marched to- 
wards St. Amand and Fleurus, which merely had 
the effect of prolonging Napoleon's left, first 
sending a message to Ney to inform him of what he 
was doing. Ney on receiving the news was beside 
himself with rage, especially when he received the 
despatch of Soult a few minutes afterwards telling 
him that the fate of France was in his hands. He 
entirely lost his self-command and prayed that he 
might he speedily killed by an English bullet. In 
this condition it is hardly strange if he sent an im- 
perative order to D'Erlon to return at once, although 
he must have been aware that he could be of no use. 
Animated by the same feeling of desperation, he 
ordered Kellermann to charge the allied forces with 
his single brigade. In this attack, which was after- 
wards paralleled by the charge of the Light Brigade 
at Balaclava, the cuirassiers actually reached 
Quatre-Bras, but they then found themselves in the 
middle of Wellington's army, swept by the fire of 
the Dutch from the wood of Bossu, of the English 
from the causeway of the ISTamur road, of the Bruns- 


wickers from tlie houses of Quatre-Bras, and of other 
Germans from the Brussels road. Kellermann's 
horse was killed, and his soldiers broke and fled. 

At this moment Ney, having had tw^o horses killed 
under him, Avas standing in the most exposed posi- 
tion, transported with rage, his face suffused wnth 
blood, brandishing his sword like a madman. An 
orderly sent by iSTapoleon found him in this condi- 
tion, and expressed the Emperor's wish that D'Erlon 
should support him at all hazards, so that he might 
make an end of the Prussian army. ISTey admitted 
that he had just sent D'Erlon an imperative order 
to return, and it was impossible to make him recall 
it. Wellington received reinforcements between six 
and seven in the evening, but the battle continued till 
nine o'clock, the two armies continuing to occupy 
the positions which they had held in the morning. 
Just at this moment D'Erlon advanced from Frasnes 
along the Brussels road. In this bloody but in- 
decisive battle the French had lost four thousand 
three hundred men, and the allies four thousand 
seven hundred. 

As we have already narrated, although the centre 
of the Prussians had been broken at Ligny,''the two 
wings were able to retreat in good order, and there- 
fore the Emperor did not at first think of pursuing 
them beyond Sombreffe. Also he was anxious about 
his left wins:, as durinc; the wdiole of the dav he had 
not received a single despatch from ^ey. So when 
Grouchy came to him at Fleurus at 11 p.m. to ask 
for orders, he told him to pursue the enemy at day- 
break with the cavalry of Pajol and Exelmans. 
Wliilst N'apoleon was at breakfast about seven 
o'clock in the morning of June 17, he received a re- 
port of the battle of Quatre-Bras, and also a despatch 


from Pujol, reporting that the Prussians were re- 
treating in the direction of Liege and Namiir, and 
that he had already made a number of prisoners. 
At the same time Grouchy came for orders and was 
told to accomi^any the Emperor to the mill of Brye ; 
Soult also wrote to ISTey ahout the same time, that 
he was to send accurate information about his posi- 
tion. If the English army was at Quatre-Bras, the 
Emperor would attack it from the l^amur road, but 
if there w^as only a rear-guard, Ney was to attack it 
and take possession. A little before 9 a.m. Na- 
poleon left Fleurus to visit the field of battle. Ar- 
riving at the mill of Bussy, he passed his troops in 
review, and the shouts of " Vive I'Empereur ! " were 
heard by the enemy two miles off. He then had a 
long discussion with Grouchy about politics, ap- 
parently adjourning the moment of decisive military 

About 11 A.M. he received three pieces of in- 
formation, one from ISTey that the English were hold- 
ing Quatre-Bras in force, another from Pajol that he 
had captured guns and carriages on the Namur road, 
and a third from Exelmans that the enemy was 
massing at Gembloux. Thereupon he sent Lobau 
and Drouot to support jSTey at Quatre-Bras, while he 
gave the following order to Grouchy : " Whilst I 
am marching against the English, you will pursue 
the Prussians ; you will have under your orders the 
corps of Vandamme and Gerard, the division of 
Teste and the cavalry of Pajol, Exelmans, and Mil- 
haud." On second thoughts, however, he transferred 
some of Grouchy's cavalry to himself. A short 
time afterwards he expanded in writing the verbal 
orders given to Grouchy, commanding him to con- 
centrate all his forces at Gembloux, which was a 


middle point between l^amur, Liege, and Wavre ; to 
send scouts in the direction of Namur and Maes- 
tricht to ascertain the line of the enemy's retreat ; to 
follow the Prussians and to discover their plans in 
the pursuit ; to ascertain whether Bliicher is intend- 
ing to join the English. Pie also stated that his 
headquarters would be at Quatre-Bras, about ten 
miles distant from Gembloux, and that Grouchy 
was to communicate with him by the Namur road. 

It will be remembered that in the battle of Ligny 
Bliicher was thrown from his horse and nearly made 
prisoner. He was carried into a cottage, bruised 
and fainting, and his staff did not know whether 
he was a prisoner or free, dead or alive. The com- 
mand devolved upon Gneisenau, and the responsi- 
bility of determining the line of retreat depended 
upon him. On horseback, in the middle of the road 
from Brye, he consulted his map by the light of the 
moon, and gave the order that the retreat would be 
on Tilly and Wavre. Wellington wrote a few dciys 
afterwards to the King of Holland that this was 
" the decisive moment of the generation." Following 
the letter of his instructions but not the spirit, 
Grouchy occupied Gembloux on the night of June 
17, and prepared to follow the Prussians, partly on 
the road to Wavre, and partly on that to Liege on 
the morning of June 18. 

At Quatre-Bras French and English remained in 
their positions during the morning of June 17. 
Wellington had slept at Genappe, but returned to 
Quatre-Bras early in the morning. He sent a 
messenger who heard from Ziethen that the Prus- 
si am army had been beaten and was retiring on 
Wavre, and delivered the information to Wellington 
about 7.30 a.m. Wellington now knew that he 


must retreat, to avoid being attacked by ^ey iu 
front and i^apoleon in the flank, and he determined 
to take up a position on the plateau of Mont-Saint- 
Jean which he had carefully reconnoitred in the 
preceding year, but was ol)liged to delay the retreat 
till 10 A.M. At this moment a Prussian officer ar- 
rived, sent by Gneisenau to inform Wellington that 
it was intended to concentrate the whole Prussian 
army at Wavre. The Duke replied : " I am going 
to take up a position at Mont-Saint-Jean, and shall 
there await ISTapoleon and engage a battle, if I have 
the hope of being supported by a single Prussian 
corps. But if this support fails me, I shall be com- 
pelled to sacrifice Brussels and to retreat behind the 

The English now retired from the position of 
Quatre-Bras, leaving the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge 
to cover their retreat. About 1 p.m. Xapoleon ar- 
rived at Marbais, about three miles from Quatre- 
Bras, expecting to hear the sound of Xey's guns. 
When he heard nothing he determined to push on to 
Quatre-Bras, and formed his troops in order of 
battle; but he soon received information that no 
troops remained in that position except the cavalry 
of Lord LTxbridge. It was now 2 p.m. and a heavy 
storm was coming up. Suddenly Lord LTxbridge 
saw appear on a ridge of rising ground a horseman, 
followed by a small escort, who stood out against 
the sky like a statue. Lord Uxbridge recognised 
ISTapoleon and cried, " Fire, and aim well." The 
English gims were replied to by the artillery of the 
guard. Then the lightning flashed and the rain be- 
gan to fall in torrents. The English galloped away, 
the French following like a fox-hunt, hussars and 
artillery going like mad, blinded by the lightning 


and lashed by the rain. Lord Uxbridge rode by the 
side of his troops crying, " Faster, faster, for the 
love of God, gallop or you will be taken," the 
French lancers following quickly at their heels. 

The English arrived at Genappe, crossed the Dyle, 
and took up a position to the north. A combat en- 
sued in the streetsoftlie village, and the English were 
slowly driven back. Napoleon arrived upon the 
scene, dripping wet, and, placing a battery in posi- 
tion, called out to the gunners in accents of rage and 
hatred, " Fire ! fire ! they are English." After pass- 
ing Genappe the pace slackened considerably and the 
roads became almost impassable from the rain. N^a- 
poleon arrived at an inn called the " Belle Alliance," 
so named because the old and ugly innkeeper had 
married a young and pretty peasant. At 6.30 p.m. 
the French hussars were pursuing the Brunswick in- 
fantry down the hollow, when they were brought up 
by the firing of the English artillery. The rain 
had ceased, but a damp fog enveloped the plain. 
The Emperor at last became certain that he had the 
whole of Wellington's army before him and deter- 
mined to halt. 

After marking out the bivouacs for the different 
divisions the Emperor retired to sleep at the farm of 
Le CailloUj where the rooms which he occupied are 
still to be seen. The French passed a terrible night 
in the wet corn-fields ; the English were better off 
because the bulk of their armv had reached their 
position before the rain began. The cavalry of Lord 
Uxbridge suffered most. Both commanders spent 
the night in anxiety ; iSI apoleon felt certain that he 
conld destroy the English, provided that they did not 
retreat, and if the Prussians did not come up in 
force to assist them. Wellington scarcely dared to 


fight unless he was sure of Prussian co-operation, but 
lie received a letter from Bliicher at his headquarters 
in the village of Waterloo about 2 a.m. saying that 
he should be able to give the English some assistance. 
ISTapoleon slept but little; at about 1 a.m. he visited 
the outposts with Bertrand, the rain falling in tor- 
rents. The army of the allies was plunged in sleep^^ 
l)ut red fires gleamed on the horizon. There was no 
sign of retreat, and the Emperor knew that the 
day would witness a decisive battle. He felt certain 
of victory, and that the pale sun wliich now began to 
pierce the clouds would witness the destruction of 
tlie English, but his patience was sorely tried by 
having to delay the attack. The rain had ceased, but 
the ground was extremely heavy ; orders, however, 
were given to be ready for the battle at nine o'clock. 





The battle of Waterloo was fought between two 
heights, each rising to the elevation of about sixty or 
eighty feet, running parallel to each other from 
west to east. They are separated by two valleys, 
traversed by the high-road from Charleroi to Brus- 
sels, the valley of Smohain to the east, and that of 
Braine-l'Alleud to the west ; the distance between 
Belle Alliance and Mont St. Jean is about three- 
quarters of a mile as the crow flies. The British 
position was well protected by hedges and a deep 
road ; there were two outlying natural fortresses, 
the chateau of Hougoumont in front of the British 
right, and La Haye Sainte in front of their centre ; 
behind their position the ground sloped considerably, 
£0 that neither the position nor the movement of 
troops in their rear could be observed by the enemy. 

The British troops woke at break of day, liglited 
their fires, prepared their breakfast, cleaned their 
uniforms and their arms, and at about 6 a.m. took 
up their position for the battle. The first line was 
drawn up behind the road to Ohain, deep and lined 
by hedges, the guards of Byng and Maitland, then 
Colin Halkett and Kielmansegge,, and Onipteda, 
stretching from the Nivelles road to the Brussels road. 
On the other side of the road followed Kempt, Pack 
and Picton, the Dutch of Bylandt and the Hano- 
verians of Best. These nine brigades formed the 


front of the allied army, which was drawn up with 
a right and left centre and two wings. The right 
wing, consisting of the troops of Adams, Mitchell, 
Williams, Halkett, and Dnplat, w^as drawn up at 
right angles on the other side of the Nivelle road, 
the Belgians of Chasse being at the extreme right 
in front of Braine I'Alleud. The left consisted of 
the Nassau brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, 
and the Hanoverian brigade of Wincke, flanked by 
the cavalry of Vandeleur and Vivian. There were 
also two lines of reserve, the composition of which 
we need not particularise. 

Wellington, who had experienced in Spain the 
impetuosity of the French attacks, employed special 
tactics to resist them. He placed his first line of 
infantry behind a ridge, so that it might be invisi- 
ble before the attack and during the attack itself. 
Not till the assailants had actually gained the sum- 
mit of the ridge, confused by the fire of skirmishers 
and of artillery, did the line of soldiers discover it- 
self, firing point-blank at a short distance, and fol- 
lowing up with a bayonet charge. This manoeuvre 
was used with special jjersistence at Waterloo, and 
the English troops were all drawn up a hundred or 
two hundred yards behind the road w^hich constituted 
their front. By this means they, as well as the re- 
serves, were comj^letely concealed from view. 
Hougoumont was strongly occupied by seven com- 
panies of the guards and other troops. The Duke 
commanded seventeen thousand men and one hun- 
dred and eighty-four cannon, having left seventeen 
thousand men and thirty guns at Hal to protect his 
right. He rode that day his favourite horse 
" Copenhagen," who died at a good old age in the 
paddocks of Strathfieldsaye. 


This was the first occasion on which IsTapoleon 
had ever come into direct conflict with English troops, 
and the confidence which he felt was not shared by 
those of his generals who had had experience of them. 
Soult deeply regretted the separation of thirty thou- 
sand men under Grouchy and pressed Napoleon to 
recall them, but the Emperor replied with temper: 
" Because you have been beaten by Wellington you 
consider him a good general, but I tell you that 
Wellington is a bad general, that the English are bad 
troops, and that it will all be over before dinner." 
"' I only hope so," replied Soult. Soon afterwards 
General Keille, who had so often fought against the 
English in Spain, entered the room, and Napoleon 
asked him his opinion about the English army. He 
said : " Well posted, according to Wellington's usual 
manner, and attacked in front I consider the English 
infantry as invincible, on account of their calm tena- 
city, and the superiority of their fire; before charg- 
ing with the bayonet, you will have to wait till half 
the attacking party is killed. But the English army 
is less agile, less supple and less able to manoeuvre 
than our own ; if it cannot be conquered by a direct 
attack, it miglit be by manoeuvring." Napoleon 
seemed to be irritated by these remarks and refused 
to believe them. 

Napoleon now rode forward in front of La Belle 
Alliance ; he employed as guide a man named Decos- 
ter, who was tied upon a horse, which was itself at- 
tached to the saddle of one of the escort. It is said 
that he purposely gave false information. He then 
took up his position on a little hill, about a mile to the 
rear of La Belle Alliance, where he had chairs placed 
and a table upon which he could spread his maps. 
^Jerome Bonaparte about this time told his brother 


that a junction was expected between the English and 
the Prussians arriving from Wavre, but the Emperor 
said that they were certain to be stopped by Grouchy. 
Napoleon now proceeded to pass his troops in review, 
the drums beat, the trumpets brayed, the bands 
played a patriotic air; as they passed their com- 
mander the ensigns dipped their colours, the cavalry 
brandished their sabres, the infantry hoisted their 
caps on the point of their bayonets; while cries of 
" Vive I'Empereur " drowned all other sounds. 
Never was greater enthusiasm exhibited than in this 
last review, and far away in the distance was seen 
tlie dark red line of the English troops. Napoleon 
had under his command seventv-four thousand men 
and two hundred and forty-six guns against the 
sixty-seven thousand soldiers of Wellington. Never 
up to that time had so large a number of combatants 
been confined in so small a space ; the distance from 
the last reserve of Wellington to the position of the 
Emperor's baggage was only about two miles and a 
half, and the front of each army did not exceed two 
miles in length. 

The battle began at 11.30 a.m. by an artillery 
duel and by an attack on the Chateau of Hougoumont 
made by Jerome Bonaparte. It had been intended 
that this should be merely a feint to cover the main 
attack upon the centre of the allied position, but 
Hougoumont liad been strongly garrisoned and the 
walls were pierced for musketry, so that it offered 
serious resistance. Jerome, contrary to orders, per- 
sisted in the attack, but was at last forced to retire, 
partly into the wood, and partly on the Nivelles road. 
About 1 P.M. Napoleon was preparing to make his 
main attack, which he hoped would speedily finish the 
battle, but just at this moment he perceived a dark 


mass appearing about six miles to the nortli-east, and 
at the same time an intercepted letter from Billow to 
Wellington was brought in which he announced the 
arrival of his corps. Kapoleon also heard that the 
whole Prussian army had passed the night at Wavre. 
Upon this the Emperor sent fresh instructions to 
Grouchy, telling him to manoeuvre in his direction, 
and to lose no time in attacking Billow's corps. He 
was not much put out by this unwelcome news, but 
said to Soult: " This morning we had ninety chances 
out of a hundred in our favour, we now have sixty, 
and if Grouchy repairs his errors, we shall gain a still 
more decisive victory, because Billow's corps will 
be entirely destroyed." At the same time he de- 
tached some divisions to protect his right flank. 

It was not till 1.30 p.m. that ISTapoleon gave ^ey 
the order to attack, and after half an hour's cannon- 
ade, the assaultontheEnglishpositionbegan. Thesol- 
diers descended into the valley under an arch of bul- 
lets which passed over their heads. Allix attacked 
the farm of La Haye Sainte, which like Hougoumont 
was strongly defended. Wellington watched the 
fight from the foot of a large elm tree, which grew 
in the angle between the Ohain and the Brussels 
roads. At first everything seemed to go well for the 
French, and if they could only reach the ridge and 
hold it long enough for the cavalry to come up the 
battle would be over. But, as we have said, the 
English troops were withdrawn a hundred yards 
from the ridge and were lying down in the corn to 
avoid the bullets. At the critical moment Picton 
called on his men to rise; they fired at forty paces, 
the French wavered ; Picton cried, " Charge ! 
Charge ! Hurrah ! " and drove the French back, 
but fell in the moment of success, pierced by a ball 


in the temple. In a similar manner the third column 
was rcpnlscd by the Highlanders of Pack. At the 
same instant Somerset's cavalry, consisting of the 
first and second Life Guards, the Blues and the Royal 
Dragoons, chased the French cuirassiers and drove 
the brigade of Travers down the valley. Ponson- 
by's brigade also fell upon the column of Donzalot, 
the Highlanders and the Scots Greys exchanging 
shouts of " Scotland for ever ! " The French troops, 
much too thickly massed, were slaughtered like sheep, 
till at last not a single Frenchman was left standing 
on the slopes of Mont St. Jean. The English now 
galloped down the valley and up the opposite slope, 
but they were received by the French reserve and re- 
pulsed with considerable loss, the gallant Ponsonby 
being killed by a lancer. The slopes of the hill, 
lately instinct with vigorous life, w^ere now covered 
with corpses, as they would be on the day after a 
battle, although the battle was only just beginning. 
Hougoumont was set on fire, but without much ad- 
vantage to either party. 

The object of Wellington was to hold his position 
until the Prussians could come up ; that of ISTapoleon 
was to finish with the English before he had to deal 
with Bliicher. About 3.30 p.m. the Emperor or- 
dered iSTey to attack La Ilaye Sainte a second time, 
hoping to use this post as a point of support for a gen- 
eral assault. The onslaught was accompanied by 
a violent cannonade, the like of which had not been 
heard by the oldest soldiers. The English, to 
avoid it, retired behind the slope, and Ney, think-- 
ing that they were retreating, ordered the cavalry 
to advance, a movement of which it is possible that 
ISTapoleon was ignorant. Wellington was much re- 
lieved when he saw the French cavalry advancing 


to attack his troops, which were waiting, perfectly 
fresh, behind the ridge. The men were formed into 
squares, cannon placed before them with orders to 
fire, and then leaving their guns, to retire into the 
squares. The cavalry rode against the artillery, 
exposed to a murderous fire upon their flank, as they 
laboriously mounted the slope. The guns were for 
the moment captured, but the French had no means 
of spiking them or carrying them off. Twenty bat- 
talions of the allies were thus formed into squares, 
their fire rattled upon the cuirasses of the enemy like 
hail on a slated roof, but no efforts of the French 
cavalry could break the British squares. They were 
at last driven from the plateau by a charge of Ux- 
bridge's horse, and the gunners recovering their 
pieces turned them with murderous effect against the 

Once more the brave cavalry of Milhaud and Le- 
febvre-Desnouettes, re-forming in the hollow, re- 
s-amed the charge, once more they laboriously climbed 
the heights and captured the guns. Some of the 
English thought the day was lost. The Emperor, 
when at last he saw what had occurred, remarked to 
Soult that this premature attack might lose the bat- 
tle; it should have been made an hour later, still it 
was necessary to support what had been done. He 
gave orders to Kellermann to charge with his heavy 
brigade, but at this very time he was being attacked 
by the Prussians on his right flank. 

Bllicher joined Billow about 1 p.m. and the two 
generals marched in the direction of Plancenoit, ar- 
riving within three miles of it at 4 p.m. The vil- 
lage was defended by Lobau, but he was compelled 
to evacuate it just as the direct attacks on Mont St. 
Jean were seen to be a failure. At about 5.30 p.m. 


more than sixty squadrons of cavalry were mounting 
the slopes', eight or nine thousand horsemen in a 
space only large enough for one thousand to deploy 
in ; they covered the whole ground between Hougou- 
mont and La Haye Sainte, and their files were so 
close that the horses were pushed upwards by the 
pressure. The mass of cuirasses, helmets, and sabres 
resembled a sea of steel. They were met by the same 
tactics as before — abandonment of the guns, and for- 
mation into squares upon which the French produced 
noeffect, although some squares were charged as many 
as thirteen times, l^ey, after having three horses 
killed under him, stood close to the side of an aban- 
doned battery, striking the mouth of an English 
gun with the flat of his- sword. At last Wellington, 
having left the square of the 73d regiment in which 
he had sought refuge, urged his cavalry once more 
upon the broken French, and they were driven down 
the slope for the third time. Once more they 
charged again, with Xey at their head shouting, 
" Vive I'Emj^ereur ! " — a charge as fruitless as those 
which had preceded it. They crossed the line of 
guns, threw themselves against the rampart of 
corpses by which each square was protected, and re- 
tired of their own accord to the bottom of the vallev. 
In these furious attacks ISTey had forgotten his prin- 
cipal duty, which was to capture La Haye Sainte, 
and he was now at p.m. ordered by ISTapoleon io 
take it at all hazards. The task was at length 
achieved when the ammunition of the garrison who 
held it was exhausted, and Baring led back to the 
presence of his chief only forty-two men out of his 
nine companies. 

The centre of the allies was holding firm, but on 
the left the line was wavering. Wellington became 


anxious; he saw the Prussians on the French flank 
hut received no support himself ; when asked for or- 
ders he replied, " I have no orders to give but to re- 
sist till the last man." Ney saw the opportunity, 
but he had no troops at his disposal. He sent an 
orderly to the Emperor to ask for some infantry, 
but Kapoleon replied : " Soldiers ! where do you 
think I can get them from ? Do you wish me to 
make them ? " It is true that Xapoleon had at his 
disposal at this moment eight battalions of the old 
guard and six of the middle guard, and it is possible 
that if he had used them just at that moment, the 
English line might have been forced. But, having 
no reserve of cavalrv, he needed them to defend his 
own position. The Prussian artillery were already 
playing upon the heights of La Belle Alliance, and 
the guard was needed to drive the Prussians out of 
Plancenoit, which they had just captured from 

It was now past 7 p.m.^ but there were still two 
hours more of daylight, and the cannon of Grouchy 
were heard seven miles to the right. It was natural 
to suppose that he was engaged with the Prussians 
and would be able to prevent them from effectively 
helping the English. The Emperor imagined that 
Wellington had engaged the whole of his troops, 
while he still held in his hand the old guard, that 
army of invincibles. He gave orders to Drouot to 
advance with nine battalions of the guard, formed 
into squares, leaving two at Plancenoit and three on 
the ridge. ISTapoleon put himself at the head of the 
first square and descended the slope down to La Have 
Sainte. It is just possible that the attack might 
have succeeded if undertaken half an hour earlier, 
but the decisive moment was now past, and dur- 


iiig the recapture of Planeenoit and tlie prerpara- 
tions for the final attack Wellington had been able 
to strengthen his position. 

Just at this moment a fresh body of Prussians was 
seen to be approaching the field of battle on the Eng- 
lish left at Smohain, and the first effect of their ar- 
rival was to set free the cavalry of Vandeleur and 
Vivian which were covering that side of the British 
army. Ziethen, whose corps it was, had arrived at 
Ohain, with his van-guard, at 6 p.m. Here Colonel 
Freemantle came to him, sent by Wellington, and 
begged him to send his chief three thousand 
men without delay, Ziethen was unwilling to 
run the risk of having his army beaten in de- 
tail, and he was not persuaded until Miiffling, a 
Prussian general attached to the English army, had 
pressed the request in person. The Prussians were 
marching over Smohain just as the guard was de- 
scending to La Haye Sainte. The troops began to 
waver at the sight of this new enemy, appearing in 
the most critical quarter ; but the Emperor ad- 
dressed them and tliev moved forward aeain. The 
arrival of these fresh forces made the defeat of the 
French almost certain ; but it is doubtful whether 
l^apoleon could at this moment have broken off the 
battle, and it was probably wiser to make a last su- 
preme effort than to anticipate a rout, which could 
hardly be v;orse if it followed a defeat. 

The effect of Ziethen's arrival was to precipitate 
the Emperor's attack. When six battalions of the 
guard had reached La Haye Sainte, he placed one of 
them on a little hill between that farm and Hougou- 
mont, and gave the command of the rest to Xey, or- 
dering him to attack the right centre of the English. 
At the same time he commanded the artillery to 


quicken their fire and the cavalry to support the ad- 
vance of the guard. He also charged La Bedoyere to 
pass among the soldiers and to announce the speedy 
arrival of Grouchy. The troops were encouraged 
by this news and reiterated cries of " Vive I'Em- 
pereur ! " whilst the wounded made way for the 
march of the columns. Wellington made full pre- 
parations to meet the attack. He brought up his 
reserve artillery and charged the gunners not to re- 
ply to the French cannon, but to concentrate their 
fire on the columns of attack. 

The five battalions of the guard, formed into 
squares, marched in echelons with the right fore- 
most, an oblique formation which has been blamed 
by military critics. The consequence of this was 
that they attacked the English line at five different 
points, and at each of those points, except one, the 
attack was at the first moment successful, although 
the guard was speedily overpowered by the steadi- 
ness of their opponents and the deadly artillery fire. 
The third echelon reached the ridge without meeting 
any infantry, and they were approaching the Ohain 
road, when suddenly at twenty paces the guards of 
Maitland stood up in the corn, four deep, like a red 
brick wall. Their first volley killed three hundred 
men; the French hesitated and wavered, then the 
English guards were ordered to advance, and they 
drove the enemy victoriously down the slope to 
Hougoumont, French and English being in such 
confusion that firing became impossible. 

The cry which was raised of " The guard gives 
way " sounded the knell of the Grand Army. The 
cavalry of the guard who were to support the attack 
were paralysed. There was a shout of " Sauve qui 
pent," " We are betrayed," and a general rout began. 


The Prussians pressed on to the pursuit, and on the 
east of the great road there was the wildest confusion. 
There was the moment for which Wellington had 
waited so long. He rode to the edge of the ridge, 
took off his hat and waved it in the air. Immedi- 
ately the whole British line advanced just as they 
happened to stand, passing over dead and wounded 
alike, forty thousand men, of all arms and many 
nations, marching to the sound of drums, trumpets, 
and bagpipes in the first shades of the evening twi- 
light. The French made no resistance. La Haye 
Sainte was abandoned, so was Hougoumont and its 
wood. The cavalrv of Vivian and Vandeleur cut 
the fugitives to pieces with cries of " No quar- 
ter ! " ^ 

The Emperor was forming his best troops in 
columns of attack when he saw his line of battle 
suddenly collapse. He knew that he was irremedi- 
ably defeated, but he still had hope of organising 
the retreat, and for this purpose he formed three 
squares of the old guard, placing them about a hun- 
dred yards above La Llaye Sainte, but they were not 
able to make head against the English cavalry. I*^ey 
was standing near the road, his head bare, his face 
blue watli powder, his uniform in tatters, his epau- 
lettes cut in two, and the fragment of a sword in his 
hand. He had done marvels that day, but he could 
not find tlie death which he was so anxious to meet. 

The Lnperial Guard, now at the end of its exist- 
ence, signalised itself bv one final act of braverv 
and endeavour. The two battalions of the first 
grenadiers, commanded by General Petit, were 
posted in squares on either side of the wood, near the 
house of Decoster. They were the chosen troops 
of all, a living and moving fortress, and with them 


it might still be possible to cover the retreat. The 
Emperor was seated on horseback in the centre of 
the square of the first battalion, and for some time 
they held their own against all attacks. At length 
they were compelled to give way, and the Emperor 
rode before them, accompanied by Sonlt, Drouot, 
Bertrand and Loban. At the farm of Lo Caillou 
he found that his baggage liad been sent on to 

At 9.15 P.M., when it was already dusk, Welling- 
ton and Bliicher met outside the tavern of La Belle 
Alliance, and it was decided that the pursuit should 
be continued throughout the night. The English 
were worn out with ten hours of fighting, and the 
Prussians had marched fifteen miles over bad roads. 
Nevertheless Bliicher ordered his cavalry to pursue 
the enemy so long as they had a man or a horse able 
to stand. Wellington's troops stood still, and as the 
Prussians marched past them saluted them with a 
"Hip! Ilip! Hurrah!" The pursuit continued 
past Genappe, past Frasnes, the remains of the old 
guard alone preserving any order, and at five o'clock 
on the following morning N^apoleon reached Char- 
leroi, from which he had set out with such high hopes 
three days before. 




The causes of the Crimean War, and the strange 
series of events which brought into close alliance 
the two European powers whose hatreds and struggles 
have been the subject of tlie preceding book, belong 
to political history, and even if it fell within our 
purpose to narrate them, it may be doubted whether 
material for a true account or for an impartial 
judgment is yet available. It is enough to say that 
in April, 1854, twenty thousand English troops, 
under the command of Lord Raglan, who as Lord 
Eitzroy Somerset had been the intimate friend of 
Wellington and had lost an arm at Waterloo, and a 
Erench armv of more than twice that strenc:th under 
Marshal St. Arnaud, landed at Gallipoli in the Dar- 
danelles and eventually bombarded Odessa. A coun- 
cil of Avar was held in Varna to decide upon further 
operations. Eerkat Pasha recommended a landing 
in Asia with the purpose of driving the Russians 
from the Caucasus, a proposition which met with 
favour from the English ; but St. Arnaud was in 
favour of an attack upon Sebastopol, and Lord Rag- 


Ian agreed with him, as being the best method of 
annihilating the naval powers of Russia in the Black 
Sea. Fifteen hundred men of the allied armies had 
already perished in the pestilential swamps of the 
Dobrudsha, but the remaining forces, to the number 
of fifty-five thousand with seven thousand Turks, 
landed on September 14 at a short distance from 
Eupatoria, on the west coast of the Peninsula. 

This point had been chosen because there was suffi- 
cient space for the two armies to land together and be- 
cause the troops would be protected by the fire of the 
ships. It was four days before the whole of the 
forces were disembarked and in a condition to ad- 
vance. The British force numbered about twenty- 
six thousand infantry, sixty guns, and the Light 
Brigade of cavalry about one thousand strong. The 
French had twenty-eight thousand infantry and the 
Turks seven thousand, with sixty-eight guns, but no 

The advance of the armies began on September 
19, the French being on the right, next the sea. 
They were moving straight for Sebastopol, about 
twenty-five miles distant. Through their front ran 
the post-road to Eupatoria, but the ground was such 
that the army could move any^vhere and roads were 
needless. The cattle, sheep, carriages and pack- 
mules were in the rear, and the cavalry still further 
behind kept everything moving. Early in the after- 
noon the Bulganak was reached, and it was here that 
the enemy was first seen. After a few shots had 
been interchanged, the army bivouacked on the 
stream and passed the night unmolested. On the 
next morning the army moved onward, crossing a 
succession of grassy ridges, and about noon from the 
top of a ridge they looked down upon the valley of 


the Alma, on the opposite side of which the Russians 
had taken up a defensive position, their army of 
thirty-three thousand infantry, three thousand four 
hundred cavalry and one hundred and twenty guns be- 
ing commanded by Prince Menchikoff. The allies 
halted for some time on coming in sight of the enemy, 
whilst Lord Raglan and St. Arnaud arranged the 
general order of attack. The position before them 
was, according to General Ilamley, very difficult of 
access on the right, very advantageous for defence 
in the centre, and with open and undefended ground 
on their left. It would probably therefore have been 
better to have neglected the j^art near the sea, to 
have carried tlieir whole line inland until their rieht 
was across the post-road, and their left extended be- 
vond the Russian ric-ht, in which case a defeat would 
have been destructive to the Russians. Menchikoff, 
on the other hand, could with advantage have formed 
across the English left upon the road to Simpheropol, 
and thus made up for his deficiency in numbers. 
But the battle showed a want of tactical skill on both 

As the allied columns advanced towards the 
stream the enemy retired, first setting fire to the 
village of Burliuk; unfortunately, as they proceeded, 
the ground was too much restricted to deploy with 
advantage, and the efficiency of the troops was spoilt 
by crowding. The stream was in inost places shal- 
low, with occasional deep pools in which the soldiers 
stood up to their necks in water. As the troops 
climbed up the slope on the other side they suffered 
much loss from the fire of the Russian batteries, 
especially one of heavy guns, which plunged into 
Codrington's division. But strangely enough, just 
as Codrington's men were touching the earthwork 


in front of this battery, the guns were Avithdra^m, 
excepting two which were captured. Notwithstand- 
ing this, the first onset failed, for Codrington's 
troops, being without support, surrounded by fresh 
masses of the enemy and threatened by a hirge body 
of cavalry, gave way and descended the hill. On 
the other hand, the Grenadier Guards and the Cold- 
streams continued to advance in lines absolutely un- 
broken, except when they were struck by the enemy's 
shot, their advance producing a great effect on the 
minds of the French. The Highlanders also climbed 
the hill to the left of the Guards and the whole of 
the English army began to close upon the enemy. 
This advance of the Guards and the Highlanders 
finallv decided the battle, and the Russian forces 
soon began to retreat all over the ground. In the 
meantime Canrobert's division of the French had 
occupied the Telegraph Hill, and the allied forces 
which had been separated in the engagement were 
now connected again. Lord Raglan would have 
liked to have pursued the enemy in their retreat, 
but St. Arnaud objected that the men could not march 
without their knapsacks, which they had left behind 
them. In the battle the English lost two thousand 
and two killed and wounded ; the French, probably 
a much smaller number. The Russian losses 
•amounted to nearly six thousand. 

The next two days were passed on the Alma, and 
the advance was resumed on September 23, and on 
the following day the army crossed the Belbek. 
They had now reached the point from which the 
town and fortifications of Sebastopol could be seen 
at no great distance, and the question arose whether 
the city should be attacked at once from the north 
side. The best authorities were strongly opposed 


to such an attempt. The harbour of Sebastopol is 
over a thousand yards wide, and the city and all the 
principal fortifications Avere to the south, while the 
harbour was full of war-ships, and was protected by 
seven line-of-battle ships sent by Menchikoff on his 
arrival from the Alma. So, on the afternoon of 
September 24, a flank march was determined upon. 
The march began at noon on the following day, the 
army passing Mackenzie's farm and the Traktir 
bridge, where the road to Balaclava crosses the 
Tchernaia. The next day from a high ground was 
seen the harbour of Balaclava, a deep pool, lying 
between enclosing cliifs, crowned with walls and 
towers. An English steamer soon made its appear- 
ance in the port, showing that the harbour had been 
captured, and communication with the fleet estab- 
lished. Onlv four shots had been fired bv the garri- 
son, and the commandant being asked why he had 
fired at all, said that he thought he was bound to 
do so until summoned to surrender ; no one was 
wounded on either side. The French crossed the 
Tchernaia on the same dav. It was soon seen that 
Balaclava was very different to what the map rep- 
resented it to be, and was little worth having. But 
as the English were in possession of it the French 
gave up their position on the right, which was occu- 
pied by the English, together with the harbour, an 
arrangement which proved a fruitful cause of dis- 
aster. The armies now took up the positions which 
they were to occupy till the end of the war. Above 
them was the broad plateau of the Tauric Cherso- 
nesus, on which for nearly a year their lives were to 
be passed and upon which many were to die. 




The outer harbour of Sebastopol is about four 
miles long from its entrance up to the point where 
the River Tchernaia flows into it. It is extremely 
deep even close to the shore. It was at this time de- 
fended at its entrance by two stone forts, named 
Constantine and Alexander, by the quarantine fort 
outside, and the artillery fort inside. There was 
also an inner harbour, running at about a mile from 
the entrance into the southern shore for a mile and a 
half, defended also at its mouth by two forts, 
Ilficholas and Paul. On the western shore of this 
inner creek stood the city of Sebastopol, and on the 
eastern shore the Karabelnaia suburb which con- 
tained the garrison barracks. There w-as also on this 
side a creek on which the dock-yards were built, and 
about a mile from the inner harbour, on the same 
side, ran Careenage Bay, terminated by Careenage 
Creek. The plateau on which the allied armies 
were posted was cut off from the valley of the 
Tchernaia by a wall of cliff, which eventually formed 
the boundary of the valley of Balaclava. The 
plateau is channelled by many chasms and ravines, 
and is reached by elevations which afterwards be- 
came historically famous as the Malakoff, the Redan, 
and other names. The extreme point of the 
Chersonesus in this direction has the name of Capo 


Cherson, and just to the north of it lie the two inlets 
of Kazatch and Kamicsch which were used by the 
French for their harbour base and were in every re- 
spect superior to Balaclava, which was assigned to 
the English. Tliese two harbours were connected 
with the French positions by the paved road. A great 
ravine continues the depression of the inner harbour, 
and this for some time formed the line of separation 
between the French and the English armies. 

Another feature of importance was the so-called 
Woronzoff Road, which connected the Woronzoff 
estate at Yalta with Sebastopol, crossing the valley 
of Balaclava ; a branch of this road crossed the 
Tchernaia and went along the heights by Mackenzie's 
farm to Bakshisherai. The effect of this was that 
the Russians could approach Balaclava out of range 
of our guns posted on the plateau. 

The defence of Sebastopol was directed by Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Todleben, then thirtv-six vears old, 
haviug 35,850 men under his command. Besides 
building the Star fort on the north side, he quickly 
completed the defences on the south side, which had 
been traced vears before. Thev consisted of the Redan, 
the Little Redan, batteries at Bastion Xo. 1 on 
Careenage Bay, and the semi-circular Malakoff 
Tower, built of stone, five feet thick, fifty feet across 
and twenty-eight feet higli. On September 26 the 
place was armed with one hundred and seventy-two 
pieces of ordnance. On October 2, before the siege 
began, all non-combatants were sent out of the town, 
and the works were strengthened everv dav ; while 
a ship of eighty-four guns was moored at the head 
of the inner harbour. 

The siege operations of the English were directed 
by Sir John Burgoyne, who had seen much service 


in the Peninsular War, and he was in favour of em- 
ploying the siege trains before commencing the as- 
sault. The system of fortification perfected by 
Vauban in the reign of Louis XIV. was still in vogue 
at the time of the Crimean War. It had been modi- 
fied to meet the altered range of artillery and 
musketry fire, and it prescribed that the first parallel 
should be traced at six hundred yards from the 
enemy's works, but for special reasons our first bat- 
tery was at a much greater distance. 

At 6.30 A.M. on October 17, 1S54, the signal 
being given by three French shells, the allied bat- 
teries opened, the Kussian works replied, and the 
most tremendous conflict of artillery which up to 
that time the world had ever witnessed began. It con- 
tinued unabated for four hours, with no obvious re- 
sult. About ten o'clock an explosion took place on 
Mont Kodolph, held by the French, which blew up 
the principal magazine, killed about fifty men, and 
silenced the fire of the French battery. The con- 
sequence of this was that in half an hour the French 
batteries were reduced to silence, and the hope of de- 
livering a general assault had disappeared. The 
English fire was more successful. At 11.30 a.m. 
Admiral Kozniloff was mortally wounded in the 
Malakoff, and the batteries in the surrounding earth- 
works gradually ceased fire. By 3 p.m. a third 
of the guns in the Redan were silenced, and a maga- 
zine then was blown uj), which did much damage. 
Todleben, in his history of the siege, admits that in 
that part of the line the defence was completely 
paralysed, and that an assault was expected. The 
English fire continued till dusk, and then the can- 
nonade entirely ceased. If the Frencli had been as 
successful as ourselves the allies might thus early 


have secured a lodffraent on the main works of the 

The bombardment was renewed by the English 
on the following day, but the Russian position had 
been enormously strengthened, and the principal 
damage repaired by the energy of Todleben. The 
loss on the English side was slight.. Up to October 
25 the number of killed and wounded did not average 
more than seventeen a day, whereas the Russian loss 
up to that time amounted to 3,834 men. 

The valley between Balaclava and tlie Tchernaia 
is crossed by a line of low hills, and along their 
course lies the Woronzoff road. Four of these hills 
had been crowned with earthworks of a very slight 
description, armed with nine 12-pounder guns, the 
garrison having but very slight support. On Octo- 
ber 25, the Russians, whose force now amounted to 
twenty-two thousand infantry, three thousand four 
hundred cavalry and seventy-eight guns, crossed the^ 
Tchernaia, and began to bombard what was called 
Canrobert's Hill, named from the general who had 
succeeded to the command of the French army on the 
death of St. x^rnaud. The fire was returned by the 
forts, and afterwards by two batteries of artillery 
supported by the Scots Greys. 

When it was seen that the attack was more 
formidable than appeared at first, two English di- 
visions and a French brigade were sent to the scene 
of action, but instead of descending into the vallev, 
they marched along the heights. They saw the Rus- 
sians storm Canrobert's Hill, killing one hundred 
and seventy Turks who Avere occupying the forts. 
These events gave rise to the famous charges of 
Balaclava, of the Heavy Brigade, and of the Light 
Brigade. These two brigades were moving on 
different sides of the ridge, the Light Brigade on the 


side towards the Tchernaia, numbering six hundred 
and seventy men, and the Heavy Brigade on the side 
towards Balaehiva, numbering nine hundred. Sud- 
denly a large body of Russian cavalry attacked the 
Heavy Brigade, leaving the Liglit Brigade un- 
noticed, but, checked by the fire of a Turkish fort, 
wavered, some halting and galloping back. The 
English regiments charged in succession. The Rus- 
sians were far superior in number, and the event of 
the combat appeared doubtful until the 4th Dragoon 
Guards charged the Russian flank, and the whole 
of the English troops came uj). Then suddenly the 
complete Russian mass gave way and fled behind 
the hill, disappearing beyond the slope some four or 
five minutes after they were first seen upon it. 

The Heavy Brigade of cavalry was under the 
command of General Scarlett, the Light Brigade 
under Lord Cardigan, while the whole cavalry di- 
vision was commanded by Lord Lucan, to whom 
Lord Raglan now sent the following order: 
" Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any 
opportunity to recover the heights. They will be 
supported by the infantry, which have been ordered 
to advance on two fronts." On receiving this order 
Lord Lucan moved the Heavy Brigade to the other 
side of the ridge, to await the promised sup- 
port of the infantry. As it was seen that the Rus- 
sians were attempting to carry off the guns they had 
captured, a second order was sent to Lord Lucan in 
the following words : " Lord Raglan wishes the 
cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, and try to 
prevent the enemy carrying ^away the guns. Troops 
of artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on 
your left. Immediate." The order was carried by 
Captain ISTolan, who found Lord Lucan between his 
two brigades, divided by the Woronzoff road. 


Lord Raglan had intended the charge to be made 
against the defeated Russian cavalry who had re- 
treated down the valley towards the Tchernaia; but 
Lord Lucan, strengthened in his opinion by some 
blunderofjSTolan's, understood it to be directed against 
a large body of Russians posted right in front, sup- 
ported on either side by large numbers of artillery. 
Although both Lord Cardigan and Lord Lucan knew 
the charge to be desperate they did not hesitate, and 
the order was given for the brigade to advance. 
They moved at a steady trot, and in a minute came 
within the range of fire. After five minutes they 
came under the fire of twelve guns in front, and the 
pace was increased, but when they reached the bat- 
tery more than half the brigade were dead or wound- 
ed, the rest were now lost to view in the smoke of the 
guns. The Heavy Brigade moved in support, but 
soon had to retire with heavy loss ; a brilliant diver- 
sion was effected by a regiment of Chasseurs 
d'Afrique, sent by the French General Morris, whose 
well-directed charge saved many English lives. Be- 
hind the smoke of the guns, the light cavalry drove 
the gunners off, and charged parties of Russian 
cavalry who retreated, but they soon had to retreat 
themselves. They rode back, as Hamley says, singly 
or in twos and threes, some wounded, some support- 
ing; wounded comrades. But when the Russian 
lancers drew up across tlie valley to cut off the re- 
treat of the English, the 8tli Hussars and some of 
the iTtli Lancers scattered them right and left. The 
brigade had lost two hundred and forty-seven men 
killed and wounded, while four hundred and seventy- 
five horses were killed and forty-two wounded. The 
Russians were left in undisturbed possession of the 
three hills they had captured with their seven guns. 




The plateau above Sebastopol was accessible to the 
Russians at many points, but especially by the 
Careenage Ravine, which was a continuation of the 
Careenage Harbour. At noon on October 26 a Russian 
force of six battalions and four light field-guns came 
out of the town, and ascended the ravine and the 
slope which led to the camp of the Second Division. 
In a short time both the artillery and the infantry 
were swept back into the walls of Sebastopol. It is 
probable that their intention was to establish a re- 
doubt on Shell Hill, in order to cover a more serious 
attack to be made at a future time. In order to pre- 
vent a similar movement on the part of the Russians, 
the English built a battery on an advanced ridge, 
armed with two eighteen-poanders, and called the 
" Sand-bag Battery." When it had done its work 
of alarming the Russians, the guns were removed, 
but the point afterwards became important in the 
liistory of the battle. 

On November 4 it was known on both sides that a 
crisis was impending. The allied infantry before 
Sebastopol consisted of thirty-one thousand French, 
sixteen thousand English, and eleven thousand 
Turks. The French siege corps was retrieving its 
disaster of the previous months. The English were 
strengthening their batteries and replenishing their 


maffazines, and the dailv Russian loss far exceeded 
theirs. A meeting of the allied commanders had been 
arranged for i^ovember 5 to concert measures for de- 
livering the final assault. The total of Menchikoff's 
forces in and around Sebastopol were not less than 
one hundred thousand men, without counting the 
seamen, so that about one hundred and fifteen thou- 
sand men were opposed to sixty- five thousand. 

In the early dawn of Sunday, November 5, the 
bells of the Sebastopol churches were celebrating 
the arrival in the town of the young Grand Dukes 
Michael and Nicholas. Menchikoff's plan was to 
make a combined attack upon the English position 
on the plateau, by Soimonoif moving up the Careen- 
age Ravine with a force of nineteen thousand infantry 
and thirty-eight guns, and PaulofI advancing across 
the causeway and bridge of the Tchernaia with six- 
teen thousand infantry and ninety-six guns. Gor- 
tschakoff in the valley was to support the general 
attack by a diversion, and an attempt to seize one 
of the heights, and the garrison of Sebastopol was 
to cover the right flank of the attacking force with 
its artillery fire. As soon as the two bodies had ef- 
fected their juncture they were to be under the com- 
mand of General Dannenberg. 

The ground chiefly threatened was occupied by 
about three thousand men of the Second Division, 
and three-quarters of a mile behind was the brigade 
of Guards numbering thirteen hundred and 
thirty men. Two miles in the rear of the Second 
Division were the nearest troops of Bosquet's army 
corps. Soimonoff left Sebastopol in the middle of 
the night, and passing up the Careenage Ravine, be- 
gan to form the order of battle on the heights at about 
6 A.M. He did not wait for Pauloff, but at once began 


the attack. He posted twenty-two heavy guns on 
Shell Hill and opened fire, and attacked with his 
columns at about 7 a.m. The pickets of the Second 
Division were at once driven back, but the main body 
was pushed forwards to support the pickets, the crest 
only being held by twelve nine-pounder guns. The 
morning was foggy and the ground muddy; the mist 
was very partial, but sufficient to conceal from the 
Russians the fact that the troops attacked had no 
immediate support. 

The first attack took place on the English left. 
Luckily the strength of the Russian forces was not 
known, and the troops fought in ignorance of the 
enormous odds against them. By extraordinary acts 
of individual prowess and daring seven of Soimon- 
off's fourteen battalions were repulsed and Soimonoff 
himself was killed. Of the seven which remained, 
one joined the forces of Pauloff, and six advancing 
against the English centre were also defeated. Paul- 
off advanced by what was called the Quarry Ravine, 
leading up from the Tchernaia. When a regiment 
on the right reached a wall of stones placed across 
the head of the road, called the Barrier, a wing of 
the 30th regiment, two hundred strong, leapt over it 
and charged the two leading battalions with the bayo- 
net. The charge proved decisive and the whole body 
were swept off the field. Against the remaining five 
battalions which numbered four thousand, the 41st 
regiment, in number five Inindred and twenty-five, 
descended in extended order^ drove the Russians 
down the hill until they reached the banks of the 
Tchernaia. " Thus," says Hamley, " in open ground, 
affording to the defenders none of the defensive ad- 
vantages, walls, hedges or enclosures of any kind 
which most battle-fields have been found to offer, 


these fifteen thousand Tinssians had been repulsed 
by less than a fourth of their number." 

A new action commenced with the arrival of 
General Dannenberg. He had under his command 
about nineteen thousand infantry and ninety guns. 
He directed his main attack against the centre and 
right of the English position in order the better to 
co-operate with Gortschakoff. By this time the Eng- 
lish had received reinforcements, the Guard had 
turned out at the sound of battle, and others were 
coming up. The battle raged furiously about the 
Sand-bag Battery, the Russian troops now fighting 
better than they had done earlier in the day. The 
Russians repulsed returned again and again to the 
encounter, until the two lines were separated by a 
rampart of fallen men. At last Cathcart arrived 
witli about four hundred men of the Fourth Division, 
and descended the slope beyond the English right; 
but he was suddenly assailed by a body of Russians 
coming down the heights from which he had himself 
descended ; his troops suffered heavily and he was 
shot dead. The unfortunate example of Cathcart 
was followed by others, and our right was in con- 
siderable danger when a French regiment^ which hap- 
pened to be posted there, took the Russians in flank 
and drove them back into the place from which they 
had come. 

The Russians now made a third attack with a body 
of six thousand men, the allies having increased their 
numbers to five thousand, the Russian artillery, how- 
ever, still having the predominance. Issuing from 
the Quarry Ravine the columns attacked the English 
centre and left, and met with greater success than 
any other which they attempted. They penetrated 
as far as the Careenage Ravine, drove back the troops 


there, and captured and spiked some English guns. 
This attack was finally repulsed by the combined 
efforts of the French and English. It was by this 
time eleven o'clock, and the fortunes of the day were 
turning decidedly in favour of the allies, as none of 
their artillery had come up and the French were 
taking an important share in the battle; Bosquet 
having been before held back from fear of being at- 
tacked by Gortschakoff. 

This ended the battle of Inkerman with no appar- 
ent decisive results on either side; the English had 
not the numbers nor the French the desire to turn 
the defeat into a rout. The gloom of the November 
evening descended upon the gloomy hosts. The 
Russian losses in the battle were twelve tliousand, of 
whom the greater number were killed. The English 
lost 597 killed and 1,700 woimded ; the French, 143 
killed and 786 w^ounded. The battle, how- 
ever, had a great moral effect, and the Russians lost 
all hope of driving the allies from the plateau which 
they had occupied. 




Three davs after the battle of Inkerman it was 
determined that the allied armies should winter in 
the Crimea. Up to this time the troops had under- 
gone no great privation. " The weather," Hamley, 
who was present, tells us, " had been mild and sunny 
with cool nights ; the tents stood on dry and level 
spaces of turf. The surface of the plains had been 
good for transit, and rations for men and horses had 
been supplied with sufficient regularity." But on 
November 14 arose a fearful storm, which dispersed 
whole camps and scattered them over the plain, so 
that there was no shelter for men returning from 
the trenches. The sick and wounded were left bare 
of protection, quantities of food and forage were 
spoiled, and the communication with Balaclava was 
stopped by the wind. Twenty-one vessels in or near 
the harbour of Balaclava were dashed to pieces, and 
eight others disabled, among them the Prince, a 
magnificent steamer which contained stores of every 
kind which the Government could design for the 
comfort of the troops. Twenty days' liay for the 
horses was destroyed by the tempest. The French 
lost the Henri IV., the most beautiful vessel in their 
navy, and the garrison of Sebastopol was also griev- 
ously afflicted. 

After the storm came the snow; the sick or 
wounded reposed in mud; the trenches w^e often 


deep in water; the soldiers feared to draw off their 
boots lest they should not be able to put them on 
again. The difficulty of cooking made the men eat 
their food raw, and this largely increased the number 
of the sick. There was generally a sufficient supply 
of salt meat, biscuits, and rum, but the fare was 
monotonous, and means for preparing it were want- 
ing. The most painful reflection was that there was 
stored at Balaclava plenty of fuel, rice, flour, vege- 
tables, and tea, supplies which might have made the 
condition of the army happy, but which were not 
available from the absence of an army corps. The 
sufferings of the animals were frightful, they died 
all round the camp and on the road to Balaclava, and, 
when dead, lay unburied. The labour of toiling 
through the muddy roads to Balaclava to fetch their 
ovm forage killed many horses on each journey. 

The result of all this was that at the end of ISTovem- 
ber the English had nearly eight thousand men in 
hospital. The journey to the great hospital at Scutari 
was the death of many. The hospital itself was 
" crammed with misery, overflowing with despair." 
Thousands of brave men lay in the wards and cor- 
ridors, crowded in a manner to increase their misery. 
Great efforts were made both at home and on the spot 
to remedy these disasters, and on January 13 Lord 
"Raglan was able to write, '' I believe I mav assert 
that every man in this army has received a second 
blanket, a jersey frock, flannel drawers and socks, 
and some kind of winter coat in addition to his ordi- 
nary great coat ; " but still the number of sick 
mounted up till it reached fourteen thousand. 

During this time the French had been better off 
because their harbours were more convenient, they 
had made a paved road from the shore to their camp, 


their transport was well organised, while the English 
was not, and thej were at a shorter distance from 
their naval ports. On the other hand, their tents 
were a very imperfect protection against the weather, 
and their rations were hardly sufficient to keep them 
in good health during severe labour. For these rea- 
sons tli3y lost many men from sickness, especially 
from frostbite. The streno-th of their armv went on 

O t.' 

increasing from forty-five thousand in October to 
fifty-six thousand in Xovember, sixtv-five thousand in 
December and seventy-eight thousand in January. 
In this month England had only eleven thousand 
men fit to bear arms on the plateau, and Lord Rag- 
lan estimated the strength of the French army to 
be four times that of his ovrn. General Canrobert 
in consequence relieved the English troops from the 
duty of guarding part of their ground, and thus set 
free fifteen hundred men. 

The narrative of these s^ifferinffs would not be 
complete without some account of the efTorts made in 
England to relieve them. One of these was the 
Crimean Armv Fund, bv whose energy not only 
necessaries but luxuries were poured into the camps, 
and another was the provision of Mr. Sidney Herbert, 
the Secretary of War, to obtain a staff of ladies and 
paid nurses who should introduce a better system into 
the hospitals at Constantinople. Miss Florence jSTight- 
ingale, whose name must ever be held in reverence by 
English-speaking people, arrived at her sphere of 
labour on Xovember 4, 1854, accompanied by 
eighteen Protestant sisters and nurses and twenty 
trained nurses. She especially devoted her atten- 
tion to organising relief and the management of the 
hospital, and she was shortly after assisted by the 
Times Crimean Fund, which was established by that 


journal, to its great credit, for the benefit of the 
sick and wounded. Improvements, however, were 
slow to take effect, and in the four winter months 
nearly nine thousand soldiers died in the hospitals, 
while at the end of February lo six hundred men 
were lying sick there. 

Meanwhile the business of the siege was proceeding 
slowly; the transports, which ought to have been 
used for bringing up guns and munitions of war, were 
employed in conveying food, clothing and shelter. 
In the trenches the men stood ankle- or knee-deep 
in mud and snow ; there was great deficiency of fuel, 
the brushwood and the roots of vines having been 
exhausted. The consequence was that the men used 
the gabions and fascines of the parapets to boil their 
coffee with, which they ground with 7)ortions of the 
enemy's shells, and roasted in their nicr^s tins. 

The slow progress of the siege encouraged the Em- 
peror of Russia to a more obstinate resistance. He 
rejected the four points which were offered to him 
as conditions of peace, although they were supported 
by Austria and Prussia. In consequence of this 
Austria joined the allies at the beginning of Decem- 
ber, although she did not send any troops. A few 
weeks later the kingdom of Sardinia made an alli- 
ance with France and England and sent General 
La Marmora to the Crimea with an army of fifteen 
thousand men. Prussia remained steadfast in her 
neutrality. In England Lord Aberdeen, who had 
been known as the friend of the Emperor jSTicholas 
and peace, left the Ministry, giving place to Lord 
Palmerston, whose energy and capacity were well 
kno\\Ti. France nerved herself to new exertions 
under the direction of Prince Napoleon, and Russia 
strained every nerve to meet the activity of her ene- 


mies. There was a general levy of troops throTigh- 
oiit the Kussiaii Empire, but the allies had rightly 
calculated the results of an attack upon so distant a 
territory as the Crimea, which was at the same time 
extremely difficult to defend and impossible to sur- 
render. In order to reach the scene of action the new 
levies had to march over the long stretches of southern 
Kussia covered with snow, and countless numbers 
found their grave upon, the march. On February 
10, 1855, the Russians made an attack upon Eupato- 
ria, which was repulsed by the bravery of the Turk- 
ish garrison under Omar Pasha, assisted by excellent 
earthworks by which the place was strengthened. 
The Emperor Xicholas had long been suffering from 
the demands made upon him by the difficulty of de- 
feTiding the Crimea and of meeting the new enemies 
wlio were arising against him. It is thought that 
the defeat of Eupatoria gave the final blow, felt 
more keenly by that proud spirit as it was a vic- 
tory of the Turks over Russians. His strength sud- 
denly collapsed as he was reviewing his troops. He 
returned from the parade ground on February 27, 
extremely ill, and died on March 2, leaving his 
crown to his son Alexander IL, a less stubborn and 
more peaceful character. 

Russia had by this time lost twenty-five thousand 
men in this terrible war, and was sincerely desirous 
of peace, but the honour of the nation, and the respect 
due to the departed Emperor and to public opinion 
in Russia, demanded that the war should continue 
for the present. The new Emperor in an address to 
the diplomatic body declared that he, like his father, 
Avas sincerely desirous of peace, but if no honour- 
able conclusion was forthcoming he would march 
forth into the struggle with his beloved Russia, and 


prefer to j^erish than to yield. In a similar manner 
the honour of France, especially of the Napoleonic 
Empire, required a creditable and digiiified termina- 
tion of this murderous conflict, and it was felt that 
peace would be impossible until after the fall of 

In January, 1855, the Emperor Napoleon III. 
despatched General Niel to the Crimea, an experi- 
enced and w^ell-instructcd engineer, with orders to 
investigate the condition of things, and to report 
to his master. Kiel soon came to a conclusion as to 
the right spot upon which to direct the principal at- 
tack, and recommended the besiegers to advance 
their parallels and batteries in the direction of the 
Karabelnaia, the southern suburb of the city. In 
the meantime Todleben gave additional strength to 
the fortifications on his side. In the front of the 
Malakhof, about five hundred yards from it, was a 
conical hill known as the Mamelon. The English 
w^ould have undoubtedly occupied it if their num- 
bers had been sufficient, and the allies now prepared 
two batteries, with the object of placing it under a 
new fire. But on February 22 the French saw that 
new works had been erected on a part of Mount Inker- 
man, which flanked the approaches to the Malakhof 
and the Mamelon, and was itself powerfully pro- 
tected. A vigorous attack was made on this new 
work by the French, but it was repulsed with consid- 
erable loss. Todleben, therefore, was left to arm 
and complete this work, and another not far from 
it, the two being known as the " white works," from 
the chalky soil on which they were constructed. 

On the night of March 22 a great sortie was made 
against the French, between five and six tliousand 
men attacking the French trenches before the Mame- 


Ion and for a time entering them, driving in theguards 
and Avorking parties. A simultaneous attack was 
made upon the British right, which was, however, 
easily repulsed, and another of less importance upon 
the left. The object of these attacks was, probably, 
to obtain an opportunity for executing further works, 
and on the following night they connected their riile- 
pits in front of the ]\Iamelon by a trench, thus form- 
ing or occupying an entrenched line within eighty 
vards of the French, covering' and at the same time 
supported by the ]\ramelon. 

On February 2-i a truce was agreed upon for bury- 
ing the slain, of which Ilauiley, who was an eye- 
witness, gives an interesting account. W^hitc flags 
were floating from the Mamelon and the works of 
the allies, while the hillside was crowded with spec- 
tators. Hundreds of Russians came from behind 
the Mamelon, and the soldiers of both parties mingled 
on friendly terms. The Tlii'^sians looked dirty and 
shabby, but healthy and well-fed. The parapet of 
the ^lamelon was crowded with curious groups, the 
Malakhof rose at the distance of eight hundred yards, 
and between it and the liedan could be seen the citv, 
with people walking in the streets, the gardens and the 
line of sunken ships. In two hours the truce was 
over, the flags were lowered and the fire recommenced. 

By this time the condition of the allied armies 
had greatly imf)roved. With the advance of spring 
the plains were covered with grass; the men were 
well-fed, well-clothed and well-housed; the horses 
were recovering their condition and were brought up 
to their proper strength; the plateau was covered 
with huts ; supplies were forwarded by railway, and 
an eflicient land transport had been erected. Vast 
stores of ordnance and ammunition had been col- 


lected, and both sides were expecting a bombardment 
and an assault. The cannonade began on Easter 
Monday, April 9 ; the Russians were so much unpre- 
pared that they did not reply for twenty minutes, 
while the wind carried the smoke of the allied bat- 
teries over the enemy and impeded their fire. At sun- 
set the guns were silent, but all through the night 
the mortars continued to play, and their huge shells 
were seen cleaving the sky. 

This terrific fire continued for ten davs, the Rus- 
sian troops suffering severely as they were massed 
in the trenches expecting an immediate assault. 
During this time they lost more than six thousand 
men in killed and wounded, whereas the French lost 
only 1,585 men and the English 265. The suffering 
in Sebastopol was terrible, and heartrending scenes 
have been described by eyewitnesses. !N'or was the 
state of things outside of the walls any better, as 
the route from Simpheropol to Sebastopol was so 
encumbered with dead bodies, dead horses and dead 
cattle, that no vehicle could pass, while the air was 
infected with pestilential vapours. 

At this time a portion of the allied fleet sailed to 
the Sea of Azoff with the purpose of destroying the 
provisions and supplies which were collected in the 
towns of Kertsch, Yenikale, Mariopol, Taganrog, and 
Anapa, an enterprise successfully carried out, but 
it is said with unnecessary cruelty and barbarity. 
Plans were also formed for the investment of Sebasto- 
pol and cutting off its communications with the rest 
of Russia, and also for the journey of the Emperor 
N^apoleon to the Crimea to take command of his army 
"'tn person. This last idea was prevented by the strong 
opposition of the English, and as these schemes were 
never carried to a conclusion thev need not receive 


further attention in oiir narrative. It was, however, 
thought that Marshal Canrobert, who had hitherto 
conducted the operations of the allies in conjunc- 
tion with Lord Raglan, Avas not of that hard, un- 
compromising nature which could secure success in 
the face of the difficulties which we have described, 
nor was he on the best of terras with his English col- 
leagues. Therefore the resignation of his command 
was accepted, and General Pelissier, who had 
acquired a great but a not altogether enviable reputa- 
tion in Africa, was sent out to take his place, Can- 
robert, with admirable self-denial, placing himself 
under the orders of his new chief. 

After changes had been made consequent upon the 
new command, a fresh bombardment began on June 
6, IS 55, the English guns being mainly directed on 
the Redan and the Malakhof, the French upon the 
Mamelon ; another important object of attack being 
the so-called Quarries in front of the Redan. The 
fire of the siege batteries was such as had never been 
seen before. On the side of the allies 544 great guns 
boreon the Russian works, and were opposed by nearly 
an equal number. On the second day the Mame- 
lon was reduced to absolute silence, and in two hours 
the Malakhof was no longer in a condition to support 
it, whilst by 6 p.m. the White works were ruined 
and the parapets destroyed. The time for the as- 
sault had been fixed at 6.30 p.m.^ and at the ap- 
pointed hour Rosquet captured the White works; 
soon afterwards the Mamelon was taken by storm 
and the tricolour flag waved over it, its defenders 
retiring to the Malakhof; but after a time the Rus- 
sians roturned and drove the French out, who, how- 
ever, strengthened by reinforcements, recaptured and 
held it. At the same time the English assaulted the 


Quarries, and drove out the defenders; but could not 
hold them, as they were open to the fire of the Rus- 
sian batteries. It was found in the morning that 
Pelissier had succeeded in driving the enemy from all 
their outworks, and restricting them to their main 
line of defence, and that the siege works had been 
advanced by the ground which had thus been gained. 
These advantages had been won with the loss of 5,440 
French, 693 English and 5,000 Russians. 

A new assault was prepared for June 18, the anni- 
versary of the battle of Waterloo, but it ended in 
disastrous failure, and all the attaekii;g troops were 
recalled to the trenches, after suffering heavy loss. 
However, on this day Todleben, who was the soul 
of the Russian defence, was slightly wounded, and 
two days later was disabled by a shot through the 
leg and had to be removed from Sebastopol. The 
failure of this attack, from M'hich so much had been 
expected, also cost the life of Lord Raglan. Five 
da^'s after the event an officer of the Staff wrote: 
" I fear it has affected Lord Raglan's health ; he looks 
far from well, and has aged very much latterly." 
On June 26 he was seized with cholera and died 
without much suffering two days afterwards. The 
next morning General Pelissier, who greatly re- 
spected his colleague, stood by the side of the bed on 
which the corpse was laid for upwards of an hour, 
crying like a child. 

The defenders of Sebastopol, under Prince Gor- 
tschakoff, now determined to attack the allies in the 
field, and on August 16 they advanced against the 
upper Tchernaia, which was defended by about sixty 
thousand men, consisting of Sardinians, Turks and 
a certain number of French. The Sardinian out- 
posts were driven back, and an attack was launched 


on the heights held by the French. This attack 
reached the French lines, but could proceed no fur- 
tlier. It was driven down the hill and across the river 
with great slaughter. Assaults in other parts of the 
position were equally fruitless, and early in the after- 
noon Gortschakoff left the field. His losses had been 
very heavy — 2,3G9 men killed, and 4,160 wounded, 
a large number having also disappeared. The 
French loss of killed and wounded amounted to one 
thousand five hundred ; that of the Sardinians who 
conducted themselves with credit, two hundred. 
This defeat took away from the Russians the last 
hope they had of redeeming their misfortune. Their 
losses in the war had been enormous and were esti- 
mated from official sources at two hundred and forty 
thousand. It is said that in the six months from. 
!March to Aui>;ust eie;htv-one thousand men had been 
killed and wounded in and around Sebastopol. 

From this moment the bombardment went on con- 
tinuously, the defenders having no time to repair 
their defences, and the garrison being subject to per- 
petual devastation from the hail of cannon-balls. 
On September 5, in preparation for the intended 
storm, the bombardment assumed still greater pro- 
portions, about five thousand Russians being killed 
in the trenches and in the town. The storm began 
at midday on September 8, that hour having been 
chosen because it was the Russian habit to relieve 
guard at that time, and because they were accustomed 
to march the old troops out before the new came in. 
The heaviest share of the work fell to the French, 
who were to attack the Malakhof tower, whereas 
the assault of the English was directed against the 
Redan. The storm columns of Bosquet and Mac- 
Mahon climbed the heights without much difficulty 


and planted the tricolour on the walls, but inside the 
struggle was most obstinate, and every traverse was 
taken, retaken, and taken again ; nor could the 
works be considered as captured until the attack upon 
the eastern face had been successful. The Malakhof 
fell at 4 P.M. with a loss of e3,026 killed and wounded. 
The English attack on the Redan failed, and the less 
said about it the better, as, although the troops 
fought bravely, their efforts were neutralised by a 
series of blunders. In their final efforts which 
brought about the capture of Sebastopol, the French 
lost in all 7,567, the English 2,271, and the Rus- 
sians as many as 12,913. 

With the fall of the Malakhof tower the fate of 
Sebastopol was decided. During the night Gor-- 
tschakoff blew up all the fortifications which still re- 
mained uncaptured on the south side, and sunk in 
the harbour the remaining ships of the Russian fleet. 
He then led the remnants of his army across the 
harbour to the north side, destroying the bridge of 
boats by which he had crossed. Thus ended the 
Crimean War, which, although it was a death strug- 
gle between some of the most powerful nations in 
the world, was yet confined almost entirely to a con- 
flict in a distant and obscure part of Europe, a com- 
paratively late acquisition of the Russian Empire, 
and to the cajiture of a single fortress to the de- 
fence and attack of which the resources of that 
mighty Empire were ungrudgingly devoted. 





Omitting, for reasons which we have already 
given, the political causes which produced the war 
between France and Sardinia on the one side and 
Austria on the other, it will be sufficient to say that 
Austria had presented an ultimatum to Sardinia 
requiring her to disarm, and that the final date fixed 
for the answer was on the evening of April 26, 1859. 
At this time the Sardinian army was concentrated 
around Alexandria, and the French troops were 
entering Piedmont, partly by Genoa, and partly by 
the passes of the Mont Cenis and the Mont Genevre. 
It might have been expected that hostilities would 
have commenced on the Austrian side as soon as a 
negative answer had been received from Sardinia, 
that is, on the night of April 20-27, but the Austrian 
army did not pass the frontier river, the Ticino, 
until the afternoon of April 29. 

At this time the Austrian forces in Italy consisted 

of five corps d'armee, the permanent or normal army 

posted in Lombardy and Venetia, called the second 

army, consisting of three corps d'armee under the 



command of Stadion, Zobel,and Benedek respectively, 
the corps of Schwarzenberg which had arrived from 
Vienna in the first days of January, and that of 
Lichtenstein in the middle of April; Weigl's corps 
was just reaching Veuetia, and that of Clam Gallas, 
coming from Bohemia, was not expected till the end 
of May. These five corps gave a force amonnting 
in all to two hundred thousand men, of which sixty 
thousand or eighty thousand were employed in gar- 
risons and detachments, leaving one hundred and 
twenty thousand or one hundred and forty thousand 
for the operations in Piedmont. All these troops 
were under the general command of Field-Marshal 
Giulay. They advanced in four columns by Pavia, 
Bereguardo, Vigevano and Buffalora ; a detached 
column to the right passing by Sesto Calende, and 
another to the left crossing the Po at Piacenza. 

The Austrians did not reach the line of the Sesia 
and the Po till May 1, and by this time the French 
had occupied the two points of Genoa and Susa in 
strength and had made them their base. Three 
divisions of French infantry, with their accompany- 
ing artillery, were at Alessandria, having the whole 
of the Piedmontese army on their left; every day 
added from Susa and Genoa some twenty thousand 
men more, and it is difficult to understand why the 
Austrians moved so slowly. 

The Sardinian army consisted at this time of 
seventy-six thousand infantry, five thousand four 
hundred cavalry and two thousand seven hundred 
artillery, making a total of eiglity-four thousand 
men ; but this strength was not really present in the 
field; and after making the necessary deduction, the 
forces of the Sub-Alpine kingdom cannot be placed 
higher than 62,332 men with ninety guns. Be- 


sides these we must reckon three regiments of Free 
Corps under Garibaldi, and a ISJ^ational Guard of 
twentv-six thousand. The French troops consisted 
of the Guard and five army corps, the component 
parts of which, as well as their generals, had been 
very carefully chosen. The Emperor assumed the 
chief command, with Marshal Vaillant as chief of the 
staff, and the other generals were Regnaud de St. 
Jean d'Angely, who had served in the Russian Cam- 
paign of 1812 ; Baraguay d'Hilliers, who had also 
fought under Xapoleon I. ; MacMahon, who had dis- 
tinguished himself in Algiers and in the Crimea; 
Marshal Canrobert, a soldier of great merit, and 
General Xiel. The force of the French may be 
reckoned at 107,656 infantry, 9,708 cavalry, 
10,000 artillery and 362 guns. Thus the allies to- 
gether numbered not less than one hundred and 
eighty-seven thousand, considerably more than the 

On May 14 the Emperor Xapoleon arrived at 
Alessandria, where General Frossard was employed 
in streugtliening the fortress. The French army 
may now be considered to have joined the Pied- 
montese, and the object of their strategical advance 
to have been attained. The conduct of the Austrians 
during this period is blamed by every writer and is 
indeed regarded as inexplicable. Instead of attack- 
ing the right wing of the Sardinian army or hinder- 
ing the march of the French, they did nothing but 
threaten the left wing of the Sardinians, and con- 
demned themselves to remain henceforth on the de- 
fensive. It would have been better if they had 
never crossed the Ticino, but spent the time in com- 
pleting their own preparations. The only advantage 
which they had gained was that they were established 


in the enemy's country and were living at the enemy's 
expense. On the other hand, the enemy obtained 
full knowledge of their movements, whereas their 
own information was verv defective, and the head- 
quarters were frequently better informed by the 
newspapers than by their own agents. At first they 
had spent their spare time in healthy exercise, but 
on the evening of May 14 it began to rain and they 
withdrew into their camps. 

As the Austrians were almost entirely without in- 
formation as to the movements of the allies, Count 
Stadion was sent forward with eighteen thousand 
men to reconnoitre. This led to the first encounter 
between the two armies on Mav 20, an affair which 
is generally known as the Battle of Montebello. The 
Austrians reached Casteggio about midday and found 
the place entirely deserted, with windows and doors 
shut as if no one were living" in it. The infantry 
took possession of it, and the hussars of the ad- 
vanced guard went on to Genestrello. When the 
hussars reported that the village was held by the 
enemy's infantry. Count Schaffgotsche determined to 
drive them out, although contrary to orders, that he 
might not be attacked himself. Genestrello was 
occupied without difficulty, when Scliaffgotsche ob- 
served that he had a strong body of the enemy in 
front of him. He therefore began a new attack at 
about 1 r.]\r. These were the troops of General 
Forey, who had marched up from Voghera to de- 
iend his outposts. The first French cannon-shot was 
fired at 1.15 p.m.;, and the Austrians, up to this time 
superior in numbers to the French, continued to ad- 
vance, but by 2 P.M. the rest of General Forey's di- 
vision had arrived on the field and the conditions of 
the battle were changed. 


At 3 P.M. Scliaffgotsclie was compelled to retire 
from Genestrello, and an hour later the Austrians 
had taken up their position at Montebello, situated 
on a hill of considerable strength. The strength of 
the two opposing forces was now about equal at 
Montebello, but the Austrian troops were fresh, 
and they were able to support themselves by several 
walled country-houses in the south, and a walled 
graveyard to the north. Forey, however, did not 
hesitate to attack this formidable place. The 
cavalry, artillery and two battalions of foot-soldiers 
advanced along the main road, while the bulk of the 
infantry, leaving their knapsacks behind them, 
climbed the precipitous and wooded slope to the 
southern point of Montel^ello, from which the village 
descends into one long street towards the high-road. 
As the ridge is too steep for flank movements, the 
French were obliged to capture house after house, to 
fight hand to hand in narrow streets with great loss 
of life. Tiittle assistance could be given from the 
troops in the place, and the artillery took scarcely 
any part in the engagement. At last the village was 
won and the churchyard reached which overhangs 
the high-road, and at G p.m. the Austrians retreated 
to Casteggio. 

General Forey had thus in four hours driven back, 
first a brigade of three thousand, and then one of 
four thousand men. But Count Stadion had 
eighteen thousand men at his disposal, and even if 
some of his forces were too far from the battle-field 
to be of use, still at least four or five thousand fresh 
troops were standing on the flank of those who were 
engaged and might have been employed. It is true 
that Stadion had given order* to halt after reaching 
Casteggio, because he did not desire to encounter the 





enemy with troops tired with a hot and weary march ; 
but the battle once begun, Schaffgotsche should have 
been supported at all hazards, and not to do this was 
to court defeat. The loss of the Austrians on this 
occasion was 1,293 men, that of the French 723. 




GiULAY had in the beginning confined his atten- 
tion to the north side of the Po, bnt the affair of 
Montebello made him imagine that the main attack 
of the French wonld be directed towards the south, 
in the direction of Piacenza and he began to con- 
centrate under that impression. Xapoleon had, 
however, determined to march towards the north, 
to attack the ric'ht wing of tlie Austrians and to ad- 
vauce upon Milan. The orders for the march of 
the French army on the left flank were issued on 
May 27: this movement wa? to be masked bv the 
Sardinian army, who, for their purpose, were to push 
on towards Pobbio, by way of Palestro. The object 
was to deceive the Austrians as to the real move- 
ments of the French army, and the greatest secrecy 
was observed with regard to the operations. On 
May 30 a detachment of Austrians under Colonel 
Ceschi was posted in Xovara in order to cover the 
road to Milan, while other portions of the Austrian 
army occupied Robbio and Palestro. 

The valley of the Sesia is in this part of its course 
so covered with forest and brushwood that the Aus- 
trians were entirely unable to see what was being 
done on the opposite bank. On the Austrian side 
the roads, bordered by lofty trees, alone gave a pass- 
age to cavalry and artillery, while the infantry were 


little better off, as it was almost impossible to traverse 
the rice-fields cut up by ditches and canals. 
Only a few raised points offered a view over 
the plain, one of which is the village of Palestro, 
which rises about ten feet above the ordinary level. 
It appeared to the Sardinian attack a somewhat steep 
elevation to the south-west, but sank into the level 
plain on the north-east. Palestro is about six miles 
distant from Vercelli, on the other side of the River 
Sesia. It happened at this time that the Sesia, 
which is usually dry, was very full of water, and 
a bridge was constructed with some difficulty about 
a mile below the railway bridge of Vercelli which 
had been destroyed. 

Although the bridge had been very badly con- 
structed. King Victor Emnumuel would wait no 
longer, and for several hourS; until another bridge 
had been formed lower down the stream, the Sar- 
dinian army defiled across it. The passage con- 
tinued during the whole morning without attracting 
the attention of the Austrians. The passing having 
been effected, shortly after midday the King made 
an attack on Palestro. At first all assaults were re- 
pulsed, the Austrians being greatly assisted by the 
naxure of the ground, and not until, by the bridging 
of the Cavo del Lago, an attack on the north side of 
the village as well as on the south became possible 
did the Austrians retire. An attempt was made to 
retake it, but this was repulsed by Cialdini, who ad- 
vanced with superior forces, and the Austrians re- 
treated to Robbio ; the Austrians having lost 460 men 
and the Sardinians 140. Simultaneously with this 
attack another Austrian division was driven out of 
Vinzaglio, and a third out of Borgo Vercelli, all the 
troops retiring to Robbio, so that in the night of May 


30 the Sardinian army occupied a strong position 
behind the Bnsca. 

The King, however, did not feel himself com- 
fortable in this position, and knowing that Palestro 
was the key of the situation^ asked for reinforce- 
ments from the French. His request was granted 
and Palestro was soon occupied by fourteen thou- 
sand men. On the following day the French were 
to cross the river ; if Palestro were taken the passage 
became impossible. The Austrians, at last realising 
the importance of the crisis, prepared to make the 
assault with a force of about seventeen thousand, the 
reserves remaining in Robbio. The first gun was 
fired at 10.30 a.m.^ and the battalion of Jagers rushed 
to storm the village. Although the Sardinians had 
thrown up earthworks in the night, the Jagers pene- 
trated to the first houses of the village, but they could 
not become masters of them or of the churchyard. 
They were compelled to yield ground and drew with 
them the other battalions, the Sardinians pursuing 
them as they fled. While this was the fate of the 
centre column, that on the left met with no better 
success in an attack on Confienza. The left column 
under General Szabo reached a point from which he 
could see the bridges thrown across the Sesia by the 
French and tlieir passage of the river. He was 
able to assail the crossing troops with a battery of 
artillery, and they suffered some loss. The main 
conflict, however, took place on the Cavo Scotti, and 
a large number of Austrians were drowned in this 
canal and in the Sesia itself^ and Szabo was com- 
pelled to retire with great loss. Zobel had no better 
fortune in storming Palestro, but had to give way to 
superior numbers. The result of the battle was en- 
tirely in favour of the allies, and the Austrians had 
in the two days lost more than two thousand men< 


In the meantime Garibaldi, who had been made a 
general in the Sardinian army, assembled his troops 
in Varese, rei:)ulsed an attack made upon him by the 
Austrian general, Urban, occupied Como, and 
threatened Monza; failing, however, in an assault 
upon the strong frontier of Laveno on the shores of 
the Lago Maggiore. The Austrians were now in full 
retreat towards the Ticino. Their circumstances 
were in no way better than if, without declaring war, 
they had passively waited to be attacked. They 
might in that case have completed their arrange- 
ments and met the allies with seven full army corps 
at the passages either of the Po or of the Ticino. As 
it was, they were dispersed in a long line from 
Varese to Piacenza ; these troops were weary witli 
marching, weakened by fighting and disheartened by 

The decisive battle of Magenta took place on June 
4, the day on which the Emperor had determined to 
cross the Ticino. Magenta is a small town of about 
four thousand inhabitants, situated on the high-road 
between ^ovara and Milan, about four miles from 
ihe left bank of the Ticino. About half-way between 
it and the river runs the canal of the Xaviglio Grande 
which carries the waters of the Ticino to Milan. 
The canal is deep and runs between high banks so as 
to be very difficult to cross. The canal in this part 
of its course is crossed by six bridges, that of Bernato 
in the north, Buffalora about a mile below, and Ponte 
ITuovo di Magenta on the high-road ; by the railway 
bridge about a third of a mile below, by Ponte 
Vecchio di Magenta and Pobecco to the south. All 
these bridges had been mined and placed in a condi- 
tion of defence; a strong redoubt having been built 
at the railway bridge. Buffalora and Ponte Xuovo 


had also special defences. From the bridge of St. 
Martino on the Ticino four roads diverge: in the 
middle the right road to Milan by Magenta, to the 
left the road to Buifalora, to the right the railway 
and still further to the right the road to Ponte 
Yecchio and Robecco. 

Magenta thus formed a formidable defensive 
position. Giulay had intended to concentrate the 
whole of his forces there ; but he was not able from 
various circumstances to get tojjether more than a 
third of them, but at the same time the French were 
not able to dispose of more than a quarter of their 
entire strength for the attack. The morning of June 
4 was passed by the Austrian army in perfect peace. 
The troops cooked their food without interruption 
and had finished eating it when news came that the 
heads of the French column were, advancing upon 
Buffalora. x\ brigade was immediately sent to pro- 
tect the two- bridges which had not been destroyed, 
those of the high-road and of the railway. The 
execution of these orders was rendered possible by 
the tardy advance of the French. 

The heads of the French column advanced at 10.30 
A.M. The first shots were fired on the roads which 
lead from the bridge over the Ticino to that over the 
Xaviglio. Wimpffen led his troops partly by the 
Buffalora road and partly by the railway, while the 
Zouaves with two pieces of artillery marched along 
the central causeway. The Austrians fired at the 
advancing troops, gradually retiring at the same time 
on the railway. The French skirmishers were 
stopped by a heavy fire, and Wimpffen found the 
!N^aviglio well defended. But Canrobert had not ar- 
rived and nothing had been heard of MacMahon, so 
the Emperor suspended the attack and withdrew 


Wimpffen to a position five hundred yards in ad- 
vance of the Ticino. 

At midday MacMahon's firing was heard on the 
left, and Wimpffen resumed his advance. Buffalora 
was attacked with such spirit that the French were 
driven back across the Canal, without having time to 
explode the mines which were designed to blow up 
the bridge. Attacks in other directions were re- 
pelled by the arrival of Austrian reinforcements, 
again the French assault was invigorated by similar 
aid, and again the allies found themselves over- 
powered by superior numbers. The battle swayed 
backwards and forwards as the forces were relatively 
greater or smaller on either side. At 2 p.m. two 
important points on the ]Sraviglio, the redoubt of 
Monte Rotondo and the Ponte ]^uovo Avere in tho 
possession of Mellinet's division. But that division 
contained only five thousand men and had no reserve 
to support it. Nothing had been heard of Can- 
robert or Niel and the advance of MacMahon had 
been arrested. 

Giulay coming up from Abbiategrasso now sent 
two divisions against Mellinet at Buffalora and Ponte 
I^uovo, and drove them back with great loss ; indeed 
the guard lost one of its guns. The houses on the 
left bank of the ISTaviglio were retaken, those on the 
right were steadily held by the Zouaves and the grena- 
diers. At this critical moment the fortunes of the 
French were restored by the arrival of Picard's 
brigade, forming a part of Canrobert's corps. Ar- 
riving at full speed, they reached the bridge of St. 
Martino at 2 p.m., and immediately supported 
Wimpffen, who was in great difficulties. The rush 
of Picard's columns was irresistible, and they had 
credit which seldom falls to the lot of a French regi- 


ment, that of saving the guard. They succeeded in 
getting possession of the village of Ponte Vecchio, 
making numerous prisoners, but they could not pene- 
trate to the left bank. It was now about 3.30 p.m., 
and the aspect of affairs had undergone much altera- 
tion in the last hour and a half. 

At the same time the position of the Emperor was 
verv serious. The Austrians threatened to force 
the passages both of Ponte !Nuovo and of the railway. 
The Emperor, when asked for reinforcements, re- 
plied, " I have no one to send. Bar the passage, 
keep your ground." The French columns on the 
Ponte Xuovo bridge were visibly thinning; they 
could not advance and would not retreat. Eor hours 
nothing had been heard of iVIacMahon on the left, 
and the enemy Avas pressing with terrible force on 
the right. Just at this moment MacJMahon's cannon 
was heard again on the left, and Canrobert came up 
in person to announce that reinforcements were at 
hand. The fact was that MacMahon, who had 
crossed both the Sesia and the !N^aviglio higher up at 
Turbigo and was to attack the right flank of the Aus- 
trians at Robecchetta and Cuogiono, had met with 

CO ' 

great difficulties. Leaving Turbigo at about 9.30 
A.M.^ he advanced towards Baffalora and Magenta in 
two columns, the right column under La Motterouge 
and Camou, the left under Espinasse. The right 
column met the enemv on comine; out of Cuo;o;iono, 
and drove them to Casate, after capturing which 
they advanced on Buffalora. But they met with 
considerable resistance in the shape of the main Aus- 
trian reserves. Lebrun, the chief of the staff, climb- 
ing the steeple of Cuggiono, perceived that the coun- 
try around Buffalora was full of troops and that 
columns were moving in the direction of Cuggiono, 


which the division of Monteroiige would not be 
strona: enoush to resist. He also saw that the right 
and left divisions were getting too far separated and 
that Camou's division was in the rear. He there- 
fore ordered Motterouge to retreat towards Cuggio- 
no, and orders were sent to Camou to hasten his 
march and to Espinasse to advance quickly upon Mar- 
cello. The division of Motterouge remained in their 
position for two hours, isolated and exposed to an at- 
tack on the left flank. 

The Austrians had indeed met MacMahon's at- 
tack by proceeding from Magenta in three columns, 
one directed against Motterouge, one against Espi- 
nasse, and a third in the centre between the two. The 
situation was critical until Camou's division coming 
up filled up the gap between the two columns of 
the French attack. But MacMahon could do nothing 
until Espinasse had reached his objective; he per- 
fectly understood the situation, and was as anxious 
to reach the Emperor as the Emperor was to receive 
his assistance. He and his staff had to remain still 
in a condition of feverish impatience whilst tlie 
musketry and cannon fire sounded fiercely from the 
iN'avifflio and the south wind brought the smell of 
powder to their nostrils. 

MacMahon rode in search of Espinasse, to whom 
he explained the situation, ordering liim to take a 
firm position with his left at IMarcello, to extend his 
rifi-ht in the direction of Buffalora, and to march to- 
wards the steeple of Magenta. Motterouge received 
similar orders, and at Buffalora joined some French 
troops who had crossed at St. Martino. Uniting 
with them, La Motterouge advanced upon Magenta. 
There was heavy fighting at Cassino Xuovo and at 
a brickfield in the rear. Espinasse accomplished the 


task allotted to bim with great difficulty and con- 
siderable loss ; and it was not till 5 p.m. tbat tbe 
junction of tbe two columns was effected. 

Mac^Slabon now reformed bis line and, placing 
Camou in reserve, gave tbe order to advance from all 
sides on tbe steeple of Magenta. His troops marcbed 
forward witb drums beating and colours flying. 
Little resistance was made until Magenta itself was 
readied, but bere every bouse was pierced for 
musketry; tbe streets were barred by barricades, tbe 
gardens were turned into redoubts, tbe cburcbyard 
and even tbe spire were armed witb artillery and 
riflemen. Tbe battle raged witb especial fury at tbe 
open space of tbe railway station, and Espinasse was 
killed. Tbe struggle was maintained witb equal 
rigour on tbe iSTaviglio canal, and no essential pro- 
gress was made until tbe arrival of Trocbu at tbe 
Ponte Veccbio at 7 p.m. It was not till 9 p.m. tbat 
tbe field of battle was completely in tbe possession of 
the French, who encamped upon tbe ground which 
they had so bravely won. In this hotly contested 
battle the allies lost four thousand five hundred men, 
of whom a hundred were taken prisoners, and tbe 
Austrians ten thousand men, of whom five thousand 
were prisoners. MacMahon received the title of 
Duke of Magenta, which be richly deserved for his 
boldness in helping to unite bis two divisions, and 
his sagacity in concentrating on Marcello rather tbaii 
on Buffalora, thus attacking the Austrian reserve and 
taking many prisoners. 




On June 5 the Austrian army began its retreat 
without much interference from the French, who on 
their side expected to be attacked. But on June 6 it 
was evident that the Austrians were intending to 
sacrifice Lombardy without further struggle, and on 
this day the Emperor moved his headquarters to 
Magenta. On June 7 a French corps d'armee 
marched rapidly through Milan, and on the follow- 
ing morning the allied sovereigns entered the capital 
of Lombardy in triumph amidst the enthusiastic joy 
of the population. It w^as now evident that Giulay 
intended to withdraw to the Mincio, where he would 
be protected by the famous quadrilateral of for- 
tresses, Mantua, Verona, Pesehiera,and Legnago. To 
impede this movement the Emperor despatched the 
first and second corps in the direction of Lodi, hoping 
that they would reach the Adda before the rear-guard 
of the enemy and would then cut them in two. This 
operation was entrusted to Paraguay d'Hilliers, 
under whose orders MacMahon was placed, both of 
these generals having been created marshals after the 
battle of Magenta. This movement failed ; Giulay's 
rear-guard passed the Lambro a few hours before the 
French reached that river, and a brigade which he 
left there encountered the French at Melegnano in 
the evening of June 8, and by their firm countenance 


stopped the march of the allies, and allowed the Aus- 
trians to continue their retreat in peace. 

Xo other event of military importance occurred 
till the battle of Solferino, fought on June 24, 1859, 
which put an end to the war. This was fought in a 
space bounded to the north by the Lake of Garda and 
the railway, to the south by the Oglio, to the west 
bv the Chiese and the east bv the Mincio ; beins' 
about twenty miles in deplli and twelve miles in 
length. South of the Lake of Garda run three parallel 
chains of hills, in the southernmost of which, over- 
hanging the plain, are the heights of Valsana, Monte 
Fenile, Solferino and Cavriana, which played an 
important part in the battle. On the central chain 
are the heights of Castel-venzago and Madonna della 
Scoperta, and on the northern line of bills, San Mar- 
tino, Ostaglio and Feuiletto, which lay in the sphere 
of the operations of the Sardinian army. The cul- 
minating point of the field is the tower of Solferino, 
from which there is an extensive view over the Lom- 
bard-Venetian plain, and which is therefore called 
by the natives the Spia d'ltalia. 

The plain is traversed by the high-road which leads 
from Castiglione to Mantua by way of Guidizzolo 
and Goito. The traveller proceeding along this road 
sees first the hamlet of Le Fontane, then the village of 
Le Grote, half hidden under a fold of Monte Fenile, 
then some of the houses of Cavriana^ in the moun- 
tains, and then Volta, with a conspicuous campanile, 
at some distance. Bye-roads lead to three various 
villages, and the fields are planted with rice, mul- 
berries and maize. The larire villao-e of Guidizzolo 
is then reached, a place of military importance, be- 
cause from it issue three carriageable roads, one to 
Cavriana, one to Volta and one to Cenesara in the 


south. On the right of the high-road lie the villages 
of Carpenedolo, to the south-west of Castiglione, 
Medole, to the west of Guiiizzolo and Cenesara be- 
fore mentioned. The ground between Guidizzolo 
and Medole is covered with many houses, whose red- 
tiled roofs are visible through the trees, the hamlet 
of Kebeeco forming the principal group. Still fur- 
ther to the right are situated Acqua Fredda, the 
walls and towers of Castel Goffredo. due east of 
Acqua Fredda, and south of Medole and other 
villages. We should also mention the Strada 
Lugina, which leaves the Lake of Garda east of 
Kivoltelle, passes the railway and reaches Pozzo- 
lengo by San Martino, the ordinary road from Eivol- 
telle to Pozzolengo, and the road from Lonato to the 
same place. 

The forces on either side were as follows: The 
French army consisted of five corps d'armee, as be- 
fore, with the Guard, and five Sardinian divisions, 
the losses in previous operations having been made 
up. Thus the allied army contained seventeen di- 
visions of infantry and five of cavalry wdth a large 
number of cannon, making a total of one hundred 
and sixty thousand men. The Austrian army had 
been entirely reorganised. It possessed now eight 
corps of infantry besides a detached brigade, and one 
corps of cavalry, forming one hundred and twenty- 
four battalions "of infantry, and sixty squadrons of 
cavalry, amounting altogether to about the same num- 
ber of one hundred and sixty thousand, under the 
command of the Emperor Francis Joseph in person. 
On the morning of June 23 the headquarters of the 
Emperor of Austria were at Villaf ranca ; those of 
the first army, under Wimpffen, were at Mantua; 
and those of the second army, under Schlick, w^ere 


at Custozza. The eighth corps, under Benedek, 
forming the extreme right, was at Peschiera, and the 
second, under Lichtenstein, forming the extreme left, 
at Mantua. 

It was intended that, on the morning of June 23, 
the Austrians should advance from these positions 
to surprise the allies, falling on their right flank and 
driving them towards the Alps ; it was hoped that 
the decisive battle would be fought on June 24. 
Therefore on that day the army crossed the Mincio 
at six different points, and occupied on the evening 
the line of Pozzolengo, Solferino, Cavriana, 
Guidizzolo, Rebecco and Medole, their advanced 
posts being at Madonna della Scoperta, Le Grote, 
Camarino, Mcdole and Castel Goffredo, the reserves 
at Foresto and Castel Grimaldo. On the following 
morning at 9 a.m. the army was to advance to the 

But before that could be done the Chiese had been 
passed by the great bulk of the allied troops, the inten- 
tion of the Emperor of the French being to occupy 
the hilly regions of which we have just given a 
description and to force a passage across the Mincio, 
where the corps of Prince l^apoleon had arrived, and 
the flotilla could act upon the Lake of Garda. His 
headquarters on the evening of June 23 were at Mon- 
techiaro. It was intended that on the following day 
the French army should reach the banks of the Min- 
cio, the headquarters being removed to Castiglione. 
The army was to commence its march at 2 a.m. in 
order to avoid the great heat of the sun. It 
thus happened that the two armies came into 
collision while they were both preparing to make an 
offensive attack in opposite directions, neither having 
the intention of fighting a decisive battle on that 


particular day. The victory would be likely to rest 
with that army who could most rapidly transform 
its line of march into a line of battle. 

The battle of Solferino may be divided into two 
principal periods, the first of which contains the en- 
gagement resulting from the fortuitous shock of two 
hosts neither of whom expected to meet the other, 
and before the orders given for the march on either 
side had been modified. The second period begins 
when the action of the battle becomes general and 
concentrated, and may again be divided into two 
smaller periods, the attack of the French on the 
centre, and that of the Austrians on the left. The 
Sardinians and the eighth Austrian corps had as it 
were a battle to themselves. To describe the battle 
shortly we may say that the two armies, nearly equal 
in strength, marching towards each on a front of 
equal depth, without knowing each other's position, 
met on the line of San Martino, Solferino, Guidiz- 
zolo and Medole. The Austrian army tried at first 
to execute its original plan of turning the French 
right. The army of the allies concentrated towards 
its centre, a movement which was hastened and em- 
phasised by the Emperor. Thus it happened that 
the positions of Solferino and San Casciano were at- 
tacked by three French corps, and were also de- 
fended by three Austrian corps. The French suc- 
ceeded in piercing the centre of the Austrian army, 
because their three corps attacked simultaneously, 
whereas the Austrian corps only came up to the de- 
fence in succession. At the same time the four 
Austrian corps which acted on the left wing were de- 
feated by two French corps, because they could not 
manage to act together, and one corps, which was 
intended to strike a decisive blow, was never engaged 


at all. On the Austrian right the eighth corps suc- 
ceeded in holding back the Sardinians till nightfall, 
but this could not redress their failure in other parts 
of the field. The capture of Cavriana finally put an 
end to the battle and the Austrians retired behind 
the Mincio. 

Let us now amplify this sketch more in detail. 
The allies began their march in the early morning 
of June 24. By the orders issued the night before, 
the Sardinians were to march on Pozzolengo, Bara- 
guay d'Hilliers on Solferino, MacMahon on Cavri- 
ana, Xiel on Guidizzolo, Canrobert on Medole, the 
Imperial Guard on Castiglione, while the cavalry 
were to act in the plains between Solferino and 
Medole. Setting out at 3 a.m. the French en- 
countered no serious opjiosition till 5 a.m.^ when 
MacMahon saw that the situation was more serious 
than lie had expected. He therefore halted and 
waited for the arrival of the French troops at Medole, 
remaining inactive for the space of two hours. About 
7 A.M. MacMahon was informed that Niel had ar- 
rived before Medole, and that he would concentrate 
on his left as soon as he had captured that village, 
and that he would take measures for Canrobert con- 
centrating in the same direction. MacMahon there- 
fore, at about 8.30 a.m., took possession of Casa 
Marino on the high-road to Mantua commanding the 
lower ground of Guidizzolo, and thus gained a better 
front for the second corps. He was here immedi- 
ately assailed by a strong Austrian column advanc- 
ing from Guidizzolo, which caused him considerable 
loss, but did not succeed in driving him back. It 
was not till 11 a.m. that the Due de Magenta was 
informed that jSTiel's corps was in a position to join 
him and was therefore able to advance in the direc- 


tion of Solferino, where a vigorous battle had been 
for some time proceeding. It had thus taken six 
hours in this part of the field for the order of march 
to be changed to an order of battle. 

What had been the fate in the meantime of the 
corps of Niel and Canrobert ? Niel had set out for 
JMedole at 3 a.m. in a single column. He met the 
Austrian cavalry just in front of Medole at about 
6 A.M., and drove them back to the village. Medole 
itself was taken at 7 a.m., and the Austrians retired 
to Guidizzolo. Niel then succeeded in advancing 
as far as a farm called Casa ISTuova, a short distance 
from Guidizzolo. From this point he could see the 
difiiculties in which MacMahon was placed and the 
forces against which he had to contend, and he made 
preparations for joining him. But he was obliged 
to wait for his artillery and for the division of Failly 
which was marching in its rear. There was there- 
fore a long delay before he could make a forward 
movement. Canrobert, in command of the third 
corps, had started at 2.30 a.m., also for Medole. He 
had passed the Chiese at Visano, but the march was 
a difficult one, and it was 7 a.m. before his first col- 
umns reached Castel GofFredo, a small to^v^^ defended 
by walls. Medole was not reached till 9.15 a.m. 
Canrobert had then great difficulty in determining 
whether he should be justified in diverging towards 
the left when his instructions specially ordered him 
to give his chief attention to his right. Eventually 
he despatched General Renault Avith five battalions 
on the road to Cenesara and with the remainder of 
his force gave support to ITiel. These movements 
took place at about 10.30 a.m., so that before 11 a.m. 
Niel could announce to MacMahon that he was able 
to follow the second corps in its movement towards 
the left. 


The Sardinians, on the extreme left, under the 
command of the King, were charged with an inde- 
pendent operation. Four divisions were to take pos- 
session of Pozzolengo and the environs of Peschiera, 
whilst the division of Cialdini and the chasseurs of 
Garibaldi were to watch the passages of the Alps. 
In the earlv morning of June 24 the first division set 
out ]>v various mountain roads, and met the 
Austrians first at La Madonna della Scoperta, and 
at the farm of Casellino ^uovo. The Emperor sum- 
moned them to Solferino, but it was necessary first 
to get possession of La Madonna, and many lives 
were lost in the attempt to do so. The divisions who 
marched on Pozzolengo were engaged with the Austri- 
ans at about 7.30 a.m.^ and the struggle then initiated 
lasted for thirteen or fourteen hours, the Sardinians 
being eventually repulsed. 

We have thus seen that at 10 a.m. the battle was 
engaged along the whole front of the allies, from the 
Lake of Garda to Castel Goffredo. As early as Y 
A.M. the Emperor of the French could observe, from 
a lieight in the neighbourhood of Castiglione, that 
his troops had found themselves in the presence of 
the enemy and were seriously fighting. It was im- 
portant for him to know in what part of the field 
the Austrians were in greatest force, and whether 
he should concentrate his army on the centre, the 
right or the left. He determined that it should be 
on the centre, and he determined rigktly. He there- 
fore took measures for directing the efforts of his 
army against the heights of Solferino and Cavriana. 
This gave rise to the orders which we have already 
mentioned given to Niel and Canrobert to move 
towards their left, and to the King Victor Emmanuel 
to move towards his right. 


At this moment Baragiiay d'Hilliers was assault- 
ing the strong position of Solferino held by Count 
Stadion, the hill covered with cypresses, the grave- 
yard and the castle dominated by the well-known 
tower, the Spy of Italy, all important points, being 
in excellent condition of defence and well supplied 
with artillery. The walls of the cemetery defended 
in flank by the cypress hill defied all efforts, and the 
Austrians were able to act with energy on the offen- 
sive. The struggle on either side was terrific and it 
was not till 3 p.m. that the French could place their 
victorious flags on the tower and on the cypress hill. 
The Austrians were then driven from Solferino and 
an important point had been gained. 

There still remained the heights of Cavriana to 
the east, a village furnished with ancient walls, and 
strengthened by a castle. The French arrived at this 
point at 4 p.m.^ and the struggle of Solferino could 
be here renewed. Fortunately the Due de Magenta 
was engaged in assaulting this strong position from 
another side, from the farm of San Cassiano. In 
consequence of this double attack Cavriana was taken 
at about 4.30 p.m.^ and the Austrians were in full 
retreat towards Yolta. In spite of the vigorous de- 
fence made by the rear-guard under Zobel they would 
have been relentlessly pursued, if a very violent storm 
had not burst upon the combatants, as often hap- 
pens in seriously contested battles, and stopped fur- 
ther operations. At about 6.30 p.m. the Austrians 
began to retreat in all directions, and their centre was 
entirely in the power of the French. 

In the meantime important conflicts had been 
taking place on the two wings. Niel, on the right, 
trying to force his way from Medole to Guidizzolo, 
.was attacked in force by Schwarzenberg, and the 


Aiistrians retained possessior* of this place till 10 
P.M. Victor Emmanuel on the left was fighting for 
his life at San Martino, situated on the Strada Lu- 
gone, between Rivoltella and Pozzolengo. This was 
not taken until sunset, after the capture of Solferino 
had become already known. Cannon were immedi- 
ately placed on the San Martino heights, and at night- 
fall the Austrians resigned the whole plateau to the 
Piedmontese. At those towns the Sardinian divi- 
sions, which had been engaged at Madonna della 
Scoperta, joined with those who had I'ust conquered 
at San Martino, having had great difficulties to en- 
counter from the opposition of the enemy and the 
nature of the ground. The Sardinians had thus 
achieved the conquest and were able to maintain 
the possession of the high plateau at which they had 
arrived, but they had lost six thousand men, consider- 
ably more than their opponents. Indeed both sides 
claimed the credit of the victory. 

The general retreat of the left of tlie Austrian 
ai"ray began at a little after 5 p.m.^ just at the moment 
when the storm burst ; Benedek on the right had been 
able to hold out against the Sardinians for two hours 
longer. Driven from San ^Martino he occupied Poz- 
zolengo till 7 P.M. and covered the retreat of the 
Austrians during the niglit. N^either here nor in the 
centre was there any pursuJt ; the Emperor of the 
French occupied the quarters in which the Emperor 
of Austria had slept the night before. On June 25 
the headquarters of Francis Joseph were at Villa- 
franca, and on June 27 at Verona, and on that day 
the French occupied the line of the Mincio. In the 
battle of Solferino the Austrians lost a total of 21,500 
men; the allies a total of 18,500, made up of 13,000 
French and 5,300 Sardinians. 


We need not pursue the history of this campaign 
anv further. Sufficient to sav that for reasons partly 
political and partly military the Emperor iSTapoleon 
determined not to proceed to the reduction of the 
Quadrilateral, or with the conquest of Venetia, An 
armistice was signed between the French and Austri- 
ans on July 8, 1859, by which Victor Emmanuel 
obtained possession of the !^^ilanese. 


THE WAR OF secessio:n^ in ameeica. 



It has been said on several occasion'^ that it is not 
within the province of this work to deal with politi- 
cal history except so far as it cannot be distinguished 
from military history. This rule must be specially 
observed in narrating the War of Secession in 
America, where fundamental principles were called 
into question, as to the right of a State seceding or 
withdrawing from the Union, about which opinions 
are still divided. Suffice it to say that the Presi- 
dential Election of 1860 turned upon the question of 
Slaverv, and that when it was known that Abraham 
Lincoln, the Republican candidate, was elected. 
South Carolina called a convention to consider the 
question of secession, and that on December 20, 1860, 
the convention passed an ordinance declaring that 
the union between South Carolina and the other 
States was dissolved. Six other vStates passed ordi- 
nances of a similar character within two months, 
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana 
and Texas. All these were cotton States, in which 
cotton was gro%\ai with the assistance of slaves. 


These ordinances were followed by the seizure of 
forts, arsenals and custom-houses, belonging to the 
Federal, or Central Government, by the formation 
of a Confederate Government^ and by the perma- 
nent election of Jefferson Davis to be President. The 
Confederacy then formed was afterwards joined by 
Virginia, Arkansas and Xorth Carolina, Kentucky 
refusing to secede. For the adhesion of Tennessee 
and Missouri to the secession, there was a prolonged 

The first action of the Civil War was the capture 
of Fort Sumter, situated on an island in Charles- 
ton Harbour, and belonging to the Federal Govern- 
ment. Its surrender was demanded, and when this 
was refused the Confederate batteries opened fire 
upon it on April 12, 1861. The bombardment con- 
tinued for two days, and on Sunday morning, April 
14, the fort surrendered, the garrison being allowed 
to march out with the honours of war. Xo life was 
lost on either side, but the flames of civil war were 

At the beginning of the war the Confederates 
stood upon the defensive ; this attitude was not chosen 
from weakness, as is shown by the successes which 
they met with in their earlier operations. But in 
separating from the Union they had declared that 
their object was to gain their own independence and 
not to effect the subjugation of other States. Had 
they made war in the Northern States, as the Fed- 
erals made war in Virginia, Louisiana and Georgia, 
they would have falsified the principles for which 
they took up arms. Therefore their defensive atti- 
tude is to be attributed ratlier to political than to 
military considerations. 

On the dav after the fall of Fort Sumter 


President Lincoln called out the militia to 
the number of seventy-five thousand from the 
several States of the Union, and appealed 
to all loval citizens to favour the federal 
cause. The response to this appeal was much 
stronger and more unanimous than could have been 
expected; recruiting offices were opened in every 
town, men of all sorts and conditions left their busi- 
ness to step into the ranks, and in a few days the 
Government was offered several times as many ti"Oops 
as had been called for. All kinds of buildings, even 
churches, were turned into temporary barracks ; vil- 
lage greens and city squares were occupied by drill- 
ing soldiers, but there was a irreat scarcitv of arms. 

The first blood was shed at Baltimore, where four 
companies of a Pennsylvanlan regiment, who were 
attempting to march across the city, met a riotous 
procession following a Secession flag. After some 
provocation had been given, orders were issued to 
tire into the mob, and many of the victims fell. 
Three militiamen were killed, and their bodies were 
sent home to their native Stnte, the first-fruits of a 
long course of sacrifices. On the night of May 2-i 
four regiments of Northern troops crossed the Poto- 
mac, and took possession of Arlington Heights, which 
commanded Washington. One regiment commanded 
by Ellsworth, who had distinguished himself by 
teaching a Chicago comp^my the Zouave drill, 
marched to i^\lexandria, where a secessional flag was 
flying over the principal hotel. Accompanied by 
two soldiers he went to the top of the house and 
seized the flag, but as he was returning with it, he 
was shot by the hotel-keeper on the stairs. Ellsworth 
became the hero of the national movement. 

The first troops called for by President Lincoln 


had only been engaged for three months ; but on May 
3 another proclamation called out forty-two thousand 
volunteers for three years^ and assumed power to 
raise ten new regiments for the regular army, as well 
as for eighteen thousand volunteer seamen for the 
navy. When Congress met on July 4 the President 
asked for four hundred thousand men and four hun- 
dred million dollars, and received five hundred thou- 
sand men and five hundred million dollars. By this 
time Richmond in Virginia bad been made the capi- 
tal of the Confederacy. A cry Avas immediately 
raised of " On to Richmond." Some experienced 
generals were opposed to undertaking an offensive 
movement with raw troops, and advised that they 
should only be used to protect Washington and keep 
Maryland from seceding ; but political considerations 
determined an onward course, and the first result was 
the battle of Bull Run, which was fought on July 21, 

A Confederate army commanded by General Beau- 
regard had been sent to occupy Manassas Junction, 
which was the railroad centre of northern Virginia, 
but he determined, for tactical reasons, to move for- 
ward to the stream of Bull Run. There are six pas- 
sages over this river from Union Mills, which is on 
the Alexandrian railway, to Stone Bridge, which is 
on the high-road from Alexandria to W^arrentown 
tlij'ough Centreville. On Julv 17 the Confederate 
army was distributed along this space, seven or eight 
miles in extent, a brigade being posted at each point 
of passage and two held behind in reserve. The plan 
of General Scott, who commanded the Federal army, 
was to turn Beauregard's right flank, to seize the 
railroads in rear of his position, and defeat him. 
It was important that he should not be assisted by 


the army of nine thousand men commanded by Gen- 
eral Johnson in the Shenandoah Vallev, and Gen- 
eral Patterson had been told off to prevent this junc- 
tion. Tlie Federal army was under the immediate 
command of General McDowell, and the number 
which advanced against Beauregard was twenty- 
ei2:ht thousand infantrv M'ith fortv-nine guns and a 
battalion of cavalrv. 

McDowell reached Bull Run on July IS, and the 
first engagement took place at Blackburn's Ford, 
Avhere about sixty men perished on either side. Find- 
ing that Beauregard was stron2;lv entrenched to his 
right, McDowell determined to attack on the left 
wing; he also wished to seize a point on the Manas- 
sas Gap railway, which would prevent the junction 
of Johnston and Beauregard. Two days were spent 
in reconnoitring and searching for a ford higher up 
the stream. Such a passage was discovered called 
Sudlev's Ford, and on Sundav, Julv 21, the Fed- 
eral armv advanced, one division towards Mitchell's 
Ford, another to the Stone Bridge, and a third to 
the newly-discovered ford, the reserve remaining at 
Centreville. McDowell did not know that John- 
ston had easily evaded Patterson, and Avith part of 
his forces had joined Beauregard on the previous 

Two of the brigades of the Confederate Keserve 
wTre in the rear of the right and the right centre of 
their line: Jackson's brigade, which had arrived from 
Johnston's army the night before, was posted in rear 
of the central at Mitchell's Ford ; and Bee's brigade 
Avas in the rear of Bell's Ford, between Mitchell's 
Ford and Stone Bridge. Part of McDowell's force 
marched to the Stone Brid2,e, but a heavy column 
turned to the right and crossed at Sudley's Ford, 


two miles and a half further up the streaDi. The 
Federals passed the ford without opposition, but were 
soon met by the Confederates, arriving from Stone 
Bride-e. The rear of the Federal column tried to 
cross at Red House between Stone Bridge and Sud- 
ley's, but were opposed by Bee's reserve, and eventu- 
ally the Federal army, driving the Confederates 
back, took up a position on the left bank of the 

As the Confederate line fell back it was able to 
reach better ground, more capable of defence, and 
it received reinforcements from the right ; on the 
other hand, the Federal army, from want of experi- 
ence, became separated and fought in detachments. 
At this critical moment Kirby Smith's brigade, num- 
bering five thousand, arrived near the field, brought 
by th« railway. As soon as they detrained they went 
round to the left to form at right angles to the Fed- 
eral right and fell upon them, the movement being 
completed at about 4: p.m. The Federals broke and 
fled over Bull Run, and the Confederate reserves, 
crossing the river at McLean's Ford and Union Mills, 
oTithe right, advanced upon Centreville and threatened 
the reserves posted there and the line of retreat, so 
that the retreat l)ecame a rout and a race for Wash- 
ington. Arms and accoutrements were thrown away, 
drivers of army waggons cut the traces, leapt upon 
the backs of horses and rode through the crowd of 
fugitives, abandoning gmns and trains. The loss of 
the Confederates was about nineteen hundred, and 
that of the Federals about fifteen hundred killed 
and wounded, and as many more taken prisoners. 
The Confederates remained in possession of the 
battle-field for weeks. 

We need not enter upon the details of the struggle 


which took place for the co-operation of Missouri, 
Kentucky, Maryland, and Tennessee. Virginia came 
to be divided into two parts, as the inhabitants of 
the mountainous western districts, having but little 
interest in slavery and great interest in iron, coal, 
and timber, held firm to the Union. In consequence 
of this a new State of West Virginia was formed 
and admitted into the Union in May, 1862. France 
and England had recognised the Confederates as 
belligerents, and there was great fear of their also 
acknowledging their independence. Indeed England 
was very nearly taking the side of the South from 
the capture by the Federals of Mason and Slidell, 
accredited Ministers from the South to London and 
Paris, while on board the Trent, an English vessel. 
War was averted by the inter^^ention of the American 
Government and by the statesmanlike advice of the 
Prince Consort, whose participation in the English 
Privv Council which settled this matter was one of 
his last public acts before his death. 




One of the first actions of the Federal Govern- 
ment was to complete the blockade of the Southern 
ports. Vessels could at all times pass through, but 
ijlockade-running became more and more dangerous. 
At the same time in the battle of Paintville, in Ken- 
tucky, Colonel James A. Garfield, afterwards Presi- 
dent, with eighteen hundred infantry and three hun- 
dred cavalry, drove Humphry Marshall out of that 
town, although he was in command of a much larger 
force; a stubborn battle also took place at Mill 
Springs, in which the Federals lost 246 and the Con- 
federates 471. Another important action was the 
capture of Fort Henry, on the Tennessee Piver, in 
January, 1862, and that of Fort Donelson on the 
Cumberland, both these being effected by General 
Grant, one of the most celebrated of the American 
Presidents. Buckner, who commanded Fort Donel- 
son, asked for terms of capitulation, but Grant re- 
plied : " 1^0 terms other ihun an unconditional and 
immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to 
move immediately upon your works." Buckner at 
once surrendered the fort with the garrison of four- 
teen thousand men. These successes formed the 
foundation of Grant's reputation. 

The city of E"ew Orleans was by far -the largest 
and richest in the Confederacv; and its strategic 
value in the war was greater than that of any other 


point ill the Southern States. Its possession bv the 
Federals would cut the Confederacy in two, and 
make it difficult to bring supplies from Texas and 
Arkansas to feed the armies in Tennessee and Vir- 
ginia. Xew Orleans was defended towards the sea 
by two forts, St. Philip and Fort Jackson, now gar- 
risoned by tifteen hundred Confederate soldiers. 
There was also a fleet of fifteen vessels, including an 
iron ram and a large floating battery, and below the 
fort a heavy chain was hung across the river. A 
large fleet was fitted out under the command of 
Captain Farragut, then about sixty years of age. 
lie was a Southerner by birth, but from conscien- 
tious reasons took the side of the Korth. A bom- 
bardment was opened on April 18 and continued for 
six diiys and six nights. Six thousand shells fell in 
and around the forts, a shell falling about every 
minute and a half, but the forts were not rendered 
untenable nor were their guns silenced; not more 
than fifty nien were killed and wounded inside the 

In the meantime the Confederates prepared fire- 
ships, boats loaded with dry wood satu- 
rated with tar and turpentine, which they set fire to 
and sent down the stream. Farragut, however, inter- 
cepted them and got rid of them without suffering 
damage. Farragut now formed the plan of running 
by the forts, destroying and capturing the Confed- 
erate fleets and bringing the city wdthin range of 
his guns. He started at 3.30 a.m. on April 24, just 
before the sun rose, an opening having been made in 
the chain to let him through. After passing the forts 
he found himself ene-aced with eleven American 
vessels. The details of the battle need not detain 
us. ]^ew Orleans was captured and in a few days 


both Forts Jackson and St. Philip surrendered. This 
victory was of the greatest importance and it set the 
name of Farragut beside that of Grant. 

On April 7, 1862, was fought one of the bloodiest 
battles of the war, that of Shiloh, called after a little 
log church in the south-west of Tennessee. The 
Memphis and Charleston railway crosses the Mobile 
and Ohio railway at Corinth in northern Mississippi, 
vvhich, being at that time a point of great strategic 
importance, was fortified and held by a large Con- 
federate force commanded b\ General Albert Sidney 
Johnston. General Grant with forty thousand men 
under his command advanced to capture Corinth, ex- 
pecting to be joined by reinforcements from Xash- 
ville of equal number. On April 6 Grant's main 
force was at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank 
of the broad Tennessee River, about twenty miles 
north of Corinth, and a subordinate force was at 
Crump's Landing, five miles further north ; the army 
from Xashville had just reached the shore opposite 
the Landings. On that morning Grant was suddenly 
attacked by Johnston, his line being about two miles 
long between Lick Creek and Owl Creek. The 
ground was undulating, and on a ridge stood Shiloh 
church, which was an important point in the battle- 
field. Grant, on hearing the firing, hurried up to the 
scene of action. He had expected to be attacked at 
Crump's Landing, and now ordered the troops posted 
there to march towards Shiloh, but they did not 
arrive till after dark, nor did any of the Xashville 
army cross the river till the evening. The attack was 
extremely violent, but the Federal troops held their 
ground; at least they never surrendered the road 
and the bridge by which the troops from Crump's 
Landing would advance. Grant described one part 


of the field in tliese words : " It was so covered with 
dead that it would have been possible to walk across 
the clearing in any direction, stepping on dead 
bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On one 
side jSTational and Confederate troops were min- 
gled together in nearly equal proportions, but on the 
remainder of the lield nearly all were Confederates. 
On one part which had evidently not been ploughed 
for several years, bushes had grown up, some to the 
height of eight or ten feet. ISTot one of them was 
left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller 
ones were all cut down." In the battle General 
Sherman greatly distinguished himself; one bullet 
struck him in the hand, another grazed his shoulder, 
another went through his boot, and several horses 
were killed under him. At about 2.30 p.m. General 
Johnston was struck in the leg by a rifle-ball, and re- 
fusing to leave the field, bled to death. The command 
devolved upon General Beauregard. Beauregard 
discontinued the attack at nightfall, intending to 
renew it and finish the victory in the morning. 

During the night the troops from ISrashville, com- 
manded by General Buell, crossed the river, and 
at daylight Grant resumed the offensive. Beauregard 
must have known that resistance was hopeless, but 
he did his best to hold the road which passes by 
Shiloh church, in order to secure his retreat. Sher- 
man advanced and recaptured his camp, which had 
been taken by the eneni}^ on the previous day. Shiloh 
church was the centre round which the battle raged 
with the greatest fury. At last Beauregard withdrew 
liis army, leaving his dead on the field ; there was no 
attempt at pursuit. The total losses on the Federal 
side were 10,699, and those on the side of the Con- 
federates must have been much larger. After the 


battle General Halleck laid siege to Corinth, which 
was defended by Beauregard, and it was not evacu- 
ated till May 29. By some the battle of Shiloh is 
considered to be the critical struggle of the Con- 
federacy, as it opened the way for the Federals to the 
sea. There was nothing now to prevent an army 
from marching to the rear and cutting off the sup- 
plies of the troops that held Richmond and compel 
their surrender. vSome partisans of the South are 
of opinion that if General Johnston had lived the 
result of the war might have been different. 




After the disastrous battlo of Bull Run the Fed- 
eral administration summoned General ^EcClellau to 
Washington with the duty of fortifying the capital 
and organising the army. He took command of 
tifty thousand men \vithout uniforms, and in three 
months was at the head of an army of more than 
one hundred thousand, fully organised, equipped and 
furnished with every necessary. On November 1 
General Scott retired and McClellan succeeded him 
as General-in-Chief of all the armies. For reasons 
which may have been good, but which were much 
censured at the time, McC^lellan made no movement 
till the middle of March, when he marched to Monroe 
and proceeded to attack Yorktown, the place where 
Cornwallis had surrendered eighty years before. 
Here he remained for a month, and when he was at 
last ready to open fire with his siege guns, he found 
that the enemy had departed, leaving dummy guns 
in the embrasures. 

He followed the Confederate army and came up 
with it at Williamsburg, about twelve miles distant, 
and a battle took place on May 5. After a stubborn 
engagement the Confederates retired, the Federal 
loss having been about twenty-two hundred and the 
Confederate about eighteen hundred. Another battle 
was fought at Fair Oaks on May 31, which cost the 


Federals over five thousand men and the Confede- 
rates nearly seven thousand. After this, heavy rain 
prevented both armies from making any serious 
movcm.ent on Richmond. At the beginning of June 
the command of the Confederate army in Virginia 
devolved upon General Robert E. Lee, a position 
which he held till the close of the war. He adopted 
the plan of bringing large bodies of troops from 
!N^orth Carolina, Georgia, and the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, so as to form a massive army and fall upon 
McClellan. The number of fighting men under 
him was estimated at 80,760, but his total effective 
force drawing pay was 92,500. 

Lee's ablest lieutenant was " Stonewall " Jackson, 
so called from an incident in the battle of Bull Run, 
when General Bee, of South Carolina, who was killed 
later in the day, rallied his wavering men by appeal- 
ing to them to follow the example of Jackson's 
brigade, " standing there like a stone wall." He 
moved very swiftly and astonished his adversaries 
by his marvellous rapidity and his appearance in 
unexpected places. 

The beautiful valley of the Shenandoah, which lies 
between the Blue and the Alleghany Mountains, was 
favourable to an army tlireatening Washington and 
unfavourable to one advancing on Richmond. The 
Confederates as they marched down the vallev came 
at every step nearer to the Federal capital, whereas 
a Federal army marching up the valley w^as grad- 
ually carried to a further distance from Richmond. 
Lee now began to make preparations for driving 
llcClellan from the peninsula, and wrote to Jack- 
son that unless McClellan could be driven out of 
his entrenchments he would come so near to Rich- 
mond that he could bombard it. All pains were 


taken to conceal from the Federals the fact that 
Jackson's armv was to be joined to Lee's. 

There now ensued the seven days' battle of Rich- 
mond (June 26 — July 3), which ended in the re- 
treat of McClellan. On June 25 McClellan had ad- 
vanced liis outposts to w^ithiu four miles from Rich- 
mond. But before this, Lee, leaving about thirty 
tkousand men to defend Richmond, crossed the 
Chickahominy with about tliirty-five thousand, in- 
tending to join Jackson's twenty-five thousand, and 
with this overwhelming force to make a sud- 
den attack on the twenty thousand Federals 
who were posted on the north side of the 
river, and destroying them before help could 
reach them to seize McClellan's base. The in- 
habitants of Richmond Avere expecting that the city 
would be taken, and consequently the archives of 
the Confederate Government were packed. Jackson, 
for once in his life, was late, and all that the Con- 
federates could do was to drive a Federal force out 
of Mechanicsville and attack McColl's strong posi- 
tion on Beaver Do^vn Creek. In this they lost 
three thousand men, whereas McColl maintained his 
j)osition and only lost three hundred. 

The next day followed the battle of Gaines ]\rills, 
in which General Porter had eighteen thousand in- 
fantry, twenty-five hundred artillery, and a small 
force of cavalry, to meet tlie attack of at least fifty- 
five thousand. The fighting began about two o'clock 
in the afternoon, and was at first in favour of the 
Federals; but after Jackson's arrival a more vigor- 
ous assault was made; the Federal li-'ie w^as broken 
at the left centre and the whole gave way and slowly 
retired. Two Federal regiments were made prisoners 
and two guns were captured. This battle is also 


called the battle of Chickahominy, or the first battle 
of Cold Harbour. McClellan now changed his base 
from the Chickahominy to the James River, where 
it wiis attacked by General Magruder, who had been 
left behind to defend Richmond, first at Allen's Farm 
and then at Savage's Station. However, the attack 
failed and he suffered severely, the Federal generals 
being able to defend the road which leads through 
White Oak Swamp. 

Jackson now crossed th^ Chickahominy and at- 
tejnpted to follow McClellnn's rear-guard through 
White Oak Swamp, but was unable to do so. Hill 
and Longstreet, however, had crossed the river fur- 
ther up the stream and marched round the swamp, 
striking the retreating army near Charles City Cross 
Roads on June 30. There was terrific fighting all 
the afternoon, but the Federals held their ground. 
General McColl, how^ever, was captured and carried 
off to Richmond. Darkness put an end to the fight- 
ing, and McClellan retreated to Malvern Hill. 
This battle is now generally called by the 
name of Frazier's Farm. McClellan lost ten guns, 
and the other losses must have been very severe. 

The last battle of this series was fought at Mal- 
vern Hill, where McClellan made his final stand. 
It is a plateau on the side of the James River, about 
eighty feet high, a mile and a half long and a mile 
broad. It is only approachable by its north-western 
face. McGlellan's army was arranged in a semicircle 
with his right wing thrown back so as to reach Hax- 
all's Landing on the James River. His position was 
strongly defended by artillery. Lee was not in a 
position to make the assault till Juh' 1. It began 
with an artillery duel, which was not very effective 
on the Confederate side. The infantry attack was 


made with too little regard to concentration, and 
broke up into a number of separate charges; and 
although fighting was kept up till 9 p.m., the line 
Avas never broken nor were the guns in danger. The 
battle cost Lee five thousand men, and after it he de- 
sisted from the pursuit. McClellan was able in the 
night to retire to Harrison's Landing on the James 
River, where he was protected by gunboats, and where 
he collected his supplies. The losses during those 
seven days' fighting are estimated at 15,249 on the 
Federal and over 19,000 on the Confederate side. 

The troops of Sigel, Fremont, Banks, and Mc- 
Dowell were now united in an armv under General 
Po])e, whose instructions were to advance southwards 
on Gordonville and take the pressure off McClellan 
with a force of thirty-eight thousand men. It was 
soon found that these two commanders could not 
act in harmony together, and the President sum- 
moned General Halleck, the Avell-known writer on 
International Law, to Washhigton to command them 
both, but his abilities were better suited for the studv 
than foi' the field. Pope's object in marching to 
Gordonville was to cut off Lee's connection with the 
Shenandoah Vallev. On Julv 18 he got as far as 
Orange Court House, but, being opposed by Confed- 
erate troops, he halted. In the meantime McClellan 
had been fortifying his position on the James, and 
was meditating another advance bv that river on 
Kichmond, which was still covered by the main Con- 
federate armv. On August 5 Jackson's force, which 
had been detached by Lee, approached Pope's front. 
On August 8 he crossed the Papidan and moved 
towards Culpeper, where Pope attempted to concen- 
trate the corps of Banks and Sigel. On July 9 
Banks engaged Jackson at Cedar Mountain, but was 


not supported bj Sigel. He first struck the right 
wing, then furiously attacked the left, opened fire ia 
the rear and threw the whole of Jackson's line into 
confusion. But the Confederates were much stronger, 
and Banks was not able to 7naintain his advantage, 
and both armies fell back, Jackson with the loss of 
thirteen hundred men and Banks with a loss of 
eighteen hundred. 

On August 17 Lee, setting out for Richmond, ar- 
rived on the Rapidan. McClellan in the meantime 
Avas leaving the Peninsula and embarking his troops 
for Alexandria. Lee and Ji,^ckson had now together 
a force of seventy thousand men, and Pope, who had 
only fifty thousand, retired beyond the Rappahan- 

On August 25 Jackson with a body of eighteen 
thousand men moved up the Rappahannock, and 
then along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge by 
Orleans and Salem, covered by the hills of Bull 
Run. Having completed his circle round Pope's 
right, he passed through Thoroughfare Gap, on the 
Bull Run Mountains, on July 26, and destroyed 
Bristol Station on the Orange and Alexandria rail- 
road in the rear of the Federals. Pope, thus threat- 
ened, advanced by the Worcester Road and the rail- 
way upon Jackson to clear the line to Alexandria, 
but at his approach Jackson retired along the rail- 
way to Manassas Junction, where he took a large 
number of prisoners and commissariat stores. 

Pope was now reinforced by two of McClellan's 
brigades from Alexandria, and on July 27 he sent 
McDowell with forty thousand men towards Thor- 
oughfare Gap to occupy the road by which Lee with 
Longstreet's division was marching to join Jackson, 
and at the same time moved with the remainder of his 


army to fall upon Jackson at Bristol Station. Here 
his advance-guard bad an engagement with Jack- 
son's rear-guard, while the main body of Jackson's 
army retired to Manassas Junction. On July 28 
Pope ordered McDowell to make a retrograde move- 
ment, saying, " If you will march promptly and 
rapidly at the earliest dawn upon Manassas Junc- 
tion we shall bag the whole crowd." This gave an 
opportunity for Jackson to march to meet Lee, and 
he placed himself on the high ground near Grove- 
ton, near the battle-field of Bull Run. Here a 
division of McDowell's army came into contact with 
him, and a battle ensued wiih severe loss on either 
side. Jackson was now in possession of the Wor- 
cester turnpike, the road by which Longstreet was to 
join him. Here on July 29 took place an indecisive 
action which is called the battle of Groveton. 

On the following day Lee's army, having defiled 
through Thoroughfare Gap, formed line on Jackson's 
right, reaching beyond Pope's left, while Pope 
formed his right wing obliquely across the Alexan- 
dria Road at Centreville, Lee attacked Pope and 
defeated him with heavy lo?:^., thus gaining what is 
called the Second Battle of Bull Run. After dark 
Pope's army crossed the Stone Bridge near Bull Run 
and encamped upon the heights round Centreville. 
At the same time two other corps of McClellan's 
army, numbering twenty thousand men, under Gen- 
erals Sumner and Franklin, joined Pope, and the 
whole army fell back still further, taking up a posi- 
tion round Fairfax Court House and Germanto-wn. 
Lee now ordered Jackson to make a flank march, 
with a view of striking Pope's right and attempting 
to interrupt his communications with Washington, 
and on the evening of September 1 he fell heavily on 



Pope's flank, who resumed his retreat, till at last on 
September 2 Halleck ordered him to withdraw to the 
fortifications of Washington, where his army was 
merged with that of the Potomac. The exact losses 
in this campaign are not known. Lee claimed that 
he had captured nine thousand j)visoners and thirty 
guns, and it is probable that Pope's killed and 
wounded did not fall short of ten thousand men. 

After the retirement of Pope's army to the de- 
fences of Washington, General Lee pushed north- 
ward into Maryland with his whole force. He 
reached Frederick, on a level with Baltimore, on Sep- 
tember 8, and issued a proclamation urging the people 
of Maryland to join the Confederation ; but the ap- 
peal was without result ; indeed all the Marylanders 
who intended to join the South had done so already. 
The President now called upon General McClellan 
and asked him to take command of the army of the 
Potomac, in which Pope's army had been merged. 
As soon as he heard of the invasion of Marvland 
McClellan marched his army to the N^orth, to cover 
Washington and Baltimore, and, if jDossible, to fight 
a decisive battle. He arrived at Frederick on Sep- 
tember 12, Lee's army having left the town two days 
before. Here also he was fortunate enough to find 
a sketch of the campaign which Lee had carefully 
prepared. Jackson was to cross the Potomac, cap- 
ture the Federal force at Martinsburg, and to assist 
in the attack upon the troops at Harper's Ferry; 
McLaws was to march to Harper's Ferry and take 
it ; Walker was to approach from the other side and 
assist McLaws; Hill's divison was to form the rear- 
guard. After these operations all the forces were 
to unite together again at Hagerstown. 

On the approach of Jackson's corps General White 


evacuated Martinsburg, and joined Miles at Harper's 
Ferry with two thousand men. The place was 
speedily taken and about eleven thousand men were 
included in the capitulation, with seventy-three guns 
and much camp equipage. Jackson now hurried on 
to join Lee and reached Sliarpsburg on the morning 
of September 16. McClellan on the other hand, 
being cognisant of Lee's plans, endeavoured to thwart 
them to the best of his ability. ISTorth of the Poto- 
mac, opposite Harper's Ferry, runs a range of hills, 
about one thousand feet high, and kno\\ai as the South 
Mountains. They are crossed by two passes, Cramp- 
ton's Gap to the south, and Turner's Gap to the 
north. The general ordered Franklin's corps to 
pass through Crampton's Gap, to relieve Harper's 
Ferry, and Burnside's troops to cross Turner's Gap. 
He did not arrive at these Gaps till September 14, 
when Lee had taken measures for their defence. The 
actions which ensued are called the battle of South 
Mountain, fought on September 14, 18G2, and the 
result of it was doubtful. McClellan held the passes, 
but Lee had delayed the advance of the enemy. 

Three davs later, followed the battle of Antietam. 
Lee had his army concentrated, but it did not num- 
ber more than forty thousand men, as it had been 
much diminished by stragglers. He occupied a 
strong position, both wings resting on the Potomac, 
and the Antietam Creek flowing in front. The 
Creek was passed by four stone bridges and a ford,- 
and all, except the northernmost bridge, were strongly 
guarded. Mc(^lellan determined to throw his right 
wing across tlie unguarded bridge, ajid assail the 
Confederate left, and Avhen this had succeeded to 
force the remainine; brido-es wnth his loft and centre. 
This movement was begun on the afternoon of Sep- 


tember 16, and the bridj^'e was crossed by Hooker. 
The next morning Hooker's advance was violently 
opposed by Jackson, and the struggle between the 
Federal right and the Confederate left went on 
dnring the whole day without any decisive result. 
About 1 P.M. Burnside carried the bridge opposite to 
him and attacked the Confederate right, and two 
hours later he had made himself master of the ridge 
commanding Sharpsburg and had captured the Con- 
federate battery there. Lee, however, came up with 
fresh forces, drove Burnside from his position and 
re-took the battery. The battle of Antietam is gen- 
erally regarded as a decisive victory for McClellan, 
but Mr. Rossiter Johnston, whose authority has been 
])rincipally followed in this narrative, says that the 
battle ended, not because the day was closed, or be- 
cause any apparent victory liad been achieved, but 
because both sides had suffered so severely that 
neither was inclined to resume the struggle. He is 
of opinion that the Confederate army ought to have 
been annihilated or captured, and that while every 
man of Lee's force had been actively engaged, not 
more than two-thirds of McClellan's were in action. 
]\Iaking the attack in driblets had neutralised the 
advantage which McClellan had of being double his 
adversary in numbers. McClellan reported his en- 
tire loss at 12,469, of Avhom 2,010 were killed, and 
2,700 Confederate corpses were counted and buried 
upon the battle-field. 

After the battle of Antietam Lee withdrew to Win- 
chester, and at the end of a month found himself 
at the head of sixty-eight thousand men; while Mc- 
Clellan took uj) his quarters on the Potomac. Here, at 
the beginning of October, he was visited by the Presi- 
dent^who ordered him to cross the river, give battle to 


the enemy, or drive him south. He went on to sav : 
" Your ariuv must move now while the roads are 
"•nod. If vou cross the river between the enemv and 
Washington, and cover the litter by your operations, 
you can be reinforced with thirty thousand men." 
jMcClellan, however, remained inactive, alleging that 
his army was in want of shoes and clothing. 

At last on October 2G, 1862, McClellan crossed the 
Potomac, leaving a corps at Harper's Ferry and 
marching southward on the eastern side of the Blue 
Ridge, while Lee moved parallel to him on the west- 
ern side. 

On j^ovember 7 the President, losing patience, 
relieved him of his command and sent up General 
Ambrose E. Burnside in his place. At this time the 
right wing of Lee's army, under Longstreet, was at 
Culpeper, and the left wing under Jackson was in 
the Shenandoah Valley, being distant from each other 
about two days' march. McClellan said that he in- 
tended either to get between them and to beat them 
separately, or to prevent their union further north 
than Gordonville. Burnside, on the other hand, 
after reorganising his army into three great divisions, 
under Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin, aimed directly 
at the city of Richmond and set out for that place 
by way of the north bank of the Rappahannock and 
the city of Fredericksburg. He left Worcester on 
jSToveraber 15, and by i^ovember 20 had collected his 
whole army at Falmouth. 

Lee immediately marched to cover the Confederate 
capital and placed his army on the heights south and 
west of Fredericksburg, which he began to fortify. 
His line was five miles and a half long and very 
strongly defended. Lee could not prevent Burn- 
side from crossing the river, because the left bank is 


commanded bv heights on which Burnside had placed 
147 gims. ISTot imtil December 10 was Burnside 
ready to cross the Rappahannock. His plan was to 
lay down five bridges, three opposite the city, and 
two some distance below, the workmen being pro- 
tected bv artillery. He began to lay the pontoons in 
the early morning of December 11, when the river 
was concealed by a thick fog; but before the work was 
half completed the fog lifted and revealed the opera- 
tions to the enemy. Lee had posted his riflemen in 
the streets and houses of Fredericksburg in such a 
way that the engineers had found it impossible to 
carry on the work owing to their heavy losses. Mean- 
while the two lower bridges were completed by noon. 
Burnside, unable to complete his bridges, bombarded 
the town and set it on fire, but the attack of the 
sharpshooters on the engineers still continued. At 
last three regiments, who volunteered for the service, 
crossed the river in pontoon boats, and drove the rifle- 
men out of their hiding-places, capturing a hundred 
of them. The bridges were then completed and the 
crossing was begun, but the entire army was not on 
the Fredericksburg side of the river till the evening 
of December 12. 

The attack upon the heights held by Lee was un- 
dertaken on the following morning. Here the whole 
of the Confederate army was concentrated. Long- 
street being on the left, and Jackson on the right, 
with every gun in position. The weak point of the line 
was on the right where the elevation of the heights 
was not so great, and here the principal attack ought 
to have been made ; but Burnside weakened his forces 
in this spot, and when his advancing troops had 
pierced the Confederate line and taken many pris- 
oners, they came face to face with the second line of 


the enemy and were driven back. Other columns 
fared even worse. In one place there was a broken 
road, and the Confederates Avere here so nnmerons 
that each man posted at the stone wall, which flanked 
the road, had two or ihree men behind him to load 
his muskets, and all he had to do was to lay them in 
turn upon the wall and fire them rapidly without 
exposing himself. At this point nearly half the at- 
tacking force was shot down, and the remainder fell 
back. The other divisions did not fare much better. 
Burnside was beside himself with wrath at this 
continued ill-success, and he ordered Hooker to ad- 
vance with the reserve ; but that general assured him 
that the attempt was useless. Upon the commander 
insisting, four thousand troops rushed forward with 
fixed bavonets, but soon returned with the loss of 
seventeen hundred dead or vrounded. The Federal 
loss in this fearful struggle was 12,353 killed, wound- 
ed, or missing, although some of the missing after- 
wards regained their colours. The Confederate 
loss was 5,309. Burnside was anxious to make a 
further attempt next day, but he was dissuaded by 
General Sumner. During the night of December 15, 
in the midst of a storm, the army crossed to the right 
bank of the Rappahannock, and the campaign was at 
an end. As a memorial of this fight the great Xa- 
tional Cemetery on Mavne'p Hill contains fifteen 
thousand graves. 




General Burnside was superseded after his de- 
feat at Fredericksburg-, and on January 25, 1863, 
General Joseph Hooker was given the command of 
the army of the Potomac in his phice. On this 
occasion President Lincoln wrote to him in the fol- 
lowing terms : " 1 have placed you at the head of the 
armj^ of the Potomac. Of course I have done this 
upon what appear to me sufficient reasons, and yet I 
think it best for you to know that there are some 
things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied 
with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful 
soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do 
not mix politics with your profession, in which you 
are right. You have contidence in yourself, which 
is a valuable if not indispensable quality. You are 
ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, dues 
rather good than harm; but I think that during 
General Burnside's command of the army you have 
taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as 
:nucli as you could, in which you did a great w^rong to 
the country and to a most meritorious and honorable 
brotherofficer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe 
it, of your recently saying that both the army and the 
Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not 
for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the 
command. Only those generals who gain successes 


can set up as dictators. What I now ask of you is 
military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The 
Government will support you to the utmost of its 
ability, which is neithermore nor less than it has done 
and will do for its commanders. I much fear that 
the spirit which you have assisted to infuse into the 
army of criticising their commander and withholding 
confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I 
shall assist you, as far as I can, to put it down. 
Neither you nor J^apoleon, were he alive again, could 
get any good out of any army while such a spirit pre- 
vails in it. And now, beware of rashness ! Beware 
of rashness ! But with energy and sleepless vigilance 
go forward and give us victories." 

Hooker began by restoring the discipline of the 
army of the Potomac, which had been greatly re- 
laxed, and opened the spring campaign with every 
promise of success. His army was between the 
Rappahannock and the Potomac, having Aquia as its 
base. He determined to aim again at Richmond and 
broke up his camp. He moved his right wing, consist- 
ing of Meade, Howard, and Slocum,up the Rappahan- 
nock to cross that stream and the Rapidan, which 
runs into it, and to turn the Confederate left. At 
the same time Sedgwick, with the corps of Sickles 
and Reynolds, besides his own, was to cross below 
Fredericksburg and menace Lee's front. On April 
28 and 29 the right wing, having crossed the Rappa- 
hannock, passed the Rapidan almost unopposed, How- 
ard and Slocum at Germanna Ford above, and Meade 
at Ely's Ford below, all moving on Chancellors- 
ville, where Hooker soon had forty-six thou- 
sand men collected; and at the same time Sedge- 
wick crossed below Fredericksburg. On April 30 
Couch's corps from the reserve crossed at Banks' Ford 




just above Fredericksburg, and Sickles from Fal- 
mouth, which is opposite Fredericksburg, at United 
States Ford, a short distance higher up, both pro- 
ceeding to Chancellorsville. 

On May 1 Hooker formed his line and entrenched 
it, placing Howard on the r-ight as outward flank, 
Slocuni and Couch in the centre, and Meade next the 
river, while the corps of Sickle was held in reserve. 
On the same day Lee moved towards Hooker with all 
his armv, and attacked at various points with the 
object of discovering Hooker's position. On May 
2 Lee sent General Jackson twenty-six thousand men 
to make a long detour, to pass into the '" Wilder- 
ness," a great thicket which lay to the west of 
Chancellorsville, and coming out of it to take 
Howard by surprise. Jackson's men were seen and 
counted whilst they were passing over a hill, and 
Howard was warned to take precautions, but he ne- 
glected to do this, and in the afternoon the enemy 
came down upon him preceded by a rush of fright- 
ened wild animals. Howard's corps w^as thrown into 
confusion and completely routed. 

During this engagement the Confederates suffered 
a severe loss. At the close of the evening General 
" Stonewall " Jackson went to the front to recon- 
noitre, and as he rode back again with his staff, some 
of his own men, mistaking the horsemen for Federal 
cavalry, fired a volley at them by which several were 
killed. A second vollev inflicted three w^ounds on 
Jackson, and as his horse dashed into the wood, he 
was thrown violently against the limb of a tree and 
injured more. Whilst his men were bearing him off 
severely wounded on a litter, a Federal battery 
opened fire down the roads and struck one of the men 
who was bearing him, ujDon which he fell heavily to 


the ground. He finally reached the hospital where 
his arm was amputated, but he died within the week. 

Oil the following day, May 3, Lee attacked the 
angle and left face of the Federal line, and drove 
Hooker entirely back upon tJie river, his right below 
Ely's Ford, his left below United States Ford. This 
success was partly due to the fact that General 
Hooker had been rendered insensible by a shot strik- 
ing the pillar of the Chancellorsville house, against 
which he was leaning, so that all proper command 
of the Federal troops was lost. In the meantime 
Sedgwick had attacked the Fredericksburg heights, 
of which we have heard so much, carried them and 
advanced along the road to Richmond, thus threaten- 
ing the Confederate rear. On the following day 
Lee drew off a large detachment of his army and 
turned upon Sedgwick, who after a heavy fight was 
stopped, and driven over Banks' Ford, being able, 
however, to rejoin Hooker bv the L'nited States Ford. 
On the nioht of ]\Iav 5 the Federal armv all re- 
crossed the Rappahannock, leaving on the field four- 
teen guns, thousands of small arms, all their dea'l 
and many of their wounded. 

In this series of battles the Federals lost about 
seventeen thousand men, the Confederates thirteen 
thousand. Hooker had commanded altogether about 
one hundred and thirteen thousand five hundred men 
and Lee sixty-two thousand, but the generalship of 
the Confederates was so admirable that they con- 
trived in every engagement to be superior in num- 
bers at the particular point \vhere the attack was 
made. Ilamley remarks that in this war, as at Bull 
Run, the forces which had succeeded in crossing a 
river beyond the enemy's flank, and which there- 
upon aimed at his rear, advanced on a front perj^en- 


dicular to the course of the river, thus exposing 
their outward flank, and that thej only escaped de- 
struction because they contrived to hokl, at the time 
of the attack, certain point>=; of passage. He says: 
" Had the Federals at Bull Run let go their hold of 
Stone Bridge, by a continued advance, without gain- 
ing MitchelFs Ford, or had Hooker, moving down 
the stream, passed by United States Ford without 
gaining Banks' Ford, they would in either case have 
been in great peril of being driven not across but into 
the river." 

After these successes public opinion in the South 
began to demand that Lee should invade the Xorth, 
or at least threaten Washington. His armv had re- 
ceived a lieavy reinforcement by the arrival of Long- 
street's corps. Losses had been supplied by a uni- 
versal levy of conscripts, which called even boys of 
sixteen from school, and tlic army had unbounded 
confidence in itself. Vicksburg was being besieged by 
Grant, and its fall would deal a deadly blow to the 
Confederac}^ unless it were neutralised by a victory 
in the East. Finally, there was a hope that if a great 
battle were won by the Confederates thev would re- 
ceive recognition, if not active assistance, from Eng- 
land and France. 

Lee collected a body of ninety thousand men at 
Culpeper, including General Stuart's body of 
cavalry, which was ten thousand strong, while Hooker 
was still posted on the Kappahannock, opposite 
Fredericksburg. Lee crossed the Potomac between 
June 22 and 25, and marched to the Xorth. Hooker 
was somewhat late in hearing of the movement, but 
followed him after a few days. He desired to add 
to his army the body of eleven thousand men under 
French, who were lying useless at Harper's Ferry, 


but Halleck would not consent to this, the con- 
sequence of which was that he resigned his com- 
mand and his place was taken by General Meade. 
His first step was to order the evacuation of Harper'^ 
Ferrv and remove its earrison to the citv of Fred- 
erick as a reserve. 

The Confederates concentrated themselves in 
Hagerstown, and spread over the whole country as 
iar as the Susquehanna, Avliile the advanced guard 
under Ewell pushed on to Carlisle and threatened 
Harrisburg, the main part of Lee's army remaining 
at Chambersburg, or between that place and 
Gettysburg. Lee seems to have expected that 
the Federal armv would have stayed on the 
south side of the Potomac, but when he 
heard that the Federal armv was marching he de- 
termined to get before it and ordered the concentra- 
tion of all his forces at Gettvsburg. Meade was also 
directins; his advance towards the same citv, to which 
manv different roads converse. Meade's advanced 
cavalry guard under the command of Burford 
reached Gettysburg on June 30, whilst the rest of 
ifeade's army was extended sixty miles to the rear as 
far back as the Potomac. Meade's first design was to 
concentrate his army in a strong position on the Pipe 
Creek Hills in Marvland, about fifteen miles south 
of Gettysburg. 

The battle began on July 1, by the first corps 
under Kcynolds meeting the advance-guard of the 
enemy who were advancing through the passes of the 
South Momitains. Lee had about seventy-three 
thousand five hundred infantry and artillery and 
Meade about eighty-two thousand, while the cavalry 
numbered about eleven thousand on each side. The 
battle-field is about twenty-five square miles in ex- 


tent, and lies for the most part to the south and west 
of the town. About a mile from the town stretches 
the long Seminary Ridge, so called from a theological 
seminary which stood upon it. About a mile from 
this is another ridge, named Cemetery Kidge, 
separated from the first ridge by a valley. This 
second ridge bends a little towards the east, and at 
the point where the curve begins lies the town ceme- 
tery. The eastern point of this is called Gulp's Hill, 
and at the other end of the ridge, about three miles 
from Gettysburg, lie two little rounded hills called 
respectively Little Eound Top and Big Round Top. 
The stress of the battle was most felt on these two 
hills and in the valleys lying between them. 

It is doubtful whether either commander intended 
to bring on a battle on July 1, but when the engage- 
ment first began both sides were heavily reinforced, 
and both fought with determination. There was an 
obstinate struggle for the possession of the Cham- 
bersburg road, especially after the Confederates had 
planted several guns to sweep it. The Federals 
Avere at first successful, but they were soon driven 
back by superior forces, and were driven through 
the town to the Cemetery Ridge and Culp's HilL 
When Meade lieard of the defeat of his troops under 
Reynolds and of that general's death, he transferred 
the command to Hancock, who determined to take up 
his position on the Cemetery Ridge. Ewell had in 
the meantime extended his left wing to the east of 
Culp's Hill and occupied Gettysburg, but no further 
engagement took place that evening, and the night 
was occupied by both j)arties taking wp their posi- 

On July 2 both armies stood in order of battle, 
the Federal troops along the Cemetery Ridge", and 


tlie Confederates on the Seminary Ridge and beyond 
it to the other side of Gettysburg. Lee opened the 
attack by ordering Longstreet, who was on his right, 
to attack both the isolated hills. There was a mur- 
derous struggle for the possession of Little Round 
Lop, bayonets, clubbed muskets, and even stones 
being used, officers joining in the melee; but at 
length the Texans who were attacking it were re- 
pulsed and the position was secured. Sickles, wish- 
ing to improve his position, advanced for about half 
a mile against the Seminary Hill, but was attacked 
both in front and rear in the " Peach orchard," and 
was driven back, himself bidly wounded, with the 
loss of a lari>;e number of his men. Just at dusk 
Ewcll made an attack from Gettysburg on the Ceme- 
tery and Gulp's Hill with the so-called Louisiana 
Tigers and other troops. The Tigers had the repu- 
tation of having never failed in a charge, and in spite 
of the frightful losses caused by the artillery and by 
vollevs of musketrv thev kept on till thev reached 
the guns and fought for them hand to hand. Car- 
roll's brigade now came to the rescue, and the re- 
mains of the Confederate column fled down the hill 
in the darkness, twelve liundred of the seventeen 
hundred Tigers having been struck down, and the ex- 
istence of the corps annihilated. The battle now came 
to an end, but Lee determined to renew the attack on 
the following morning. 

On July 3 Meade began the battle in the early 
morning by drivingEwell's troops out of Gulp's Hill. 
Lee was not aware of this, but was under the im- 
pression that the centre and right wing of the Union 
troops had been considerablv weakened by the en- 
gagements of tlie previous day. He determined 
therefore to attempt to pierce the centre of ]\[eade's 


line and to support his attack by a cavalry charge 
made by Stuart in the rear. In order to give this 
general time to get round to the right wing of the 
Federals the attack was put oft" till the afternoon. A 
large number of cannon had been placed in position 
on both sides during the morning. Lee had one 
hundred and twenty along the Seminary Ridge and 
Meade eighty on the Cemetery Ridge and along a 
low irregular stone wall which lies on the road from 
Gettysburg to Toney Town. The Confederates 
opened fire at 1 p.m., and the artillery duel com- 
menced. There was a continuous and deafening roar 
which was heard fifty miles away. The shot and 
shells ploughed up the ground, shattered gravestones 
in the cemetery, sent their fragments flying among 
the troops, exploded caissons, and dismounted guns. 
At the end of two hours Meade's chief of artillery 
ordered the firing to cease, with the object of cool- 
ing the guns, and to save ammunition for future use 
in repelling the infantry charge. Lee now organised 
his famous attack, and with fourteen thousand of his 
best troops, including Pickett's division, which had 
not arrived in time for the previous day's fighting, 
came out of the wood, formed in heavy columns, and 
moved forward to the charge. They were obliged to 
pass a mile of ground at full speed, but before they 
had got half-wav the Federal artillerv was directed 
against them. Their ranks were ploughed through 
and through, but the gaps were closed up and the 
column did not halt. As they drew nearer, the bat- 
teries used grape and canister, and some infantry 
posted in front of the main line rose to its feet and 
fired vollevs of mnsketrv into their risrht flank. The 
attack was directed towards a clump of trees on a 
depression in the Cemetery Ridge where a stone 


wall made an angle with its point outwards. This 
has been always known since as '' Bloody Angle," 
and it represents the only point in the Federal line 
which was penetrated by the Confederates. About 
one hundred and fifty of General Armistead's sol- 
diers sprung over the stone '.vail in order to capture 
the Federal guns. A murderous conflict ensued in 
which Armistead fell. Webb and Hancock were 
wounded and the result was the entire defeat of the 
Confederates. Of the magnificent column, only a 
broken fragment returned, nearly every officer in it, 
except Pickett, having been killed or wounded. 

Stuart's cavalry, which had been intended to co- 
operate with the movement in the centre, was unable 
to effect anything, because he met a force of Federal 
cavalry about four miles east of Gettysburg and was 
unable to make his attack at the proper time. After 
Pickett's defeat there was, as at Waterloo, which this 
battle in some respects resembles, a general advance 
of the whole Federal line which brought the struggle 
to a close. Lee gave orders for a retreat during the 
night, and on the following day, July 4, the Con- 
federates, favoured by the heavy rain which so often 
accompanies a battle, retired through the mountain 
passes to ITagerstown and then across the Potomac. 
It is said that the retreat was very pitiful, as the 
roads were in bad condition. Few of the wounded 
had been properly cared for, and as they were jolted 
along in agony, they were groaning, cursing, babbling 
of their homes, and calling upon their friends to put 
them out of their misery ; while they were in constant 
apprehension of an attack in the rear. The loss of 
the Federals was 3,072 dead, 14,497 wounded, and 
5,434 prisoners, making a total of 23,003 men ; that 
of the Confederates was 23,761 men, composed of 


2,592 dead, 12,702 wounded, and 7,467 prisoners. 
Lee left seven thousand of his wounded amongst the 
unburied dead, and twenty-seven thousand muskets 
were picked up on the field. 

On the very day of Lee's retreat Vicksburg, on the 
Mississippi, the largest town of the Mississippi 
State, capitulated. It is situated on a high bluff 
overlooking the river where it makes a sharp bend 
ending in a long narrow peninsula. It is about forty- 
five miles distant from Jackson, the capital of the 
State. About one hundred railes below Vicksburg is 
Port Hudson, and between these two points the great 
Ked Hiver, which drains Texas, Arkansas, and Louis- 
iana, flows into the Mississippi. Vicksburg was of 
great importance to the Confederates because they 
drew a large portion of their supplies from Texas 
and the Red River basin ; especially as they had lost 
ISTew Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Memphis. The 
first attempt to capture Vicl.sburg for the Federals 
was when after taking New Orleans in April, 1862, 
Admiral Farragut had gone up the river in the fol- 
lowing month and demanded its surrender; the de- 
mand was refused and he could not capture the city 
without a land force. 

The attack was only renewed at the close of 1862 
by the united operations of Grant and Sherman. 
Grant established his depot of supplies at Holly 
Springs, but on December 2 Van Dorn made a dash 
at this place, which was held by fifteen hundred 
men, and captured it with its garrison. Grant was 
obliged to give up his plan and retire to Memphis. 
Sherman had reached Vicksburg, but when he heard 
of the disaster was obliged to surrender his enter- 
prise. Operations were resumed in the spring of 
1863, and the battle of Champion Hill, the bloodiest 


of the campaign, was fought on May 15. Grant 
found Pemberton with twenty-three thousand men on 
high ground well selected for defence, covering the 
three roads which led westward. After a struggle 
of four hours Pemberton retreated to the crossing of 
the Big Black River, leaving his dead and wounded 
and thirty guns on the field. Grant lost in killed 
and wounded and missing 2,441, Pemberton over 
three thousand killed and wounded and as many 
taken prisoners. 

Shortly after this Sherman came up and Grant 
ordered the building of three bridges over the Big 
Black River; one was a floating or raft bridge, one 
was made by felling trees on both sides of the stream 
and letting them fall so that their boughs would in- 
terlace over the channel, the trunks not being en- 
tirely cut through and so hanging to the stumps; 
planks were laid crosswise on these trees and a good 
roadway was formed. In the third bridge cotton 
bales were used for pontoons. Sherman made a 
fourth bridge higher up tlie stream, and during that 
night he and Grant sat on a log together and saw the 
long procession of blue-coated men pass over by the 
light of torches. The next day, May 18, the whole 
army was west of the river. 

Pemberton marched straight into Vicksbnrg and 
shut himself up there, followed closely by Grant, 
who invested the town on May 19, Sherman being 
placed on the right at Haines' Bluff. Grant had 
now with him about thirty thousand men. The 
line of defences before him was eight miles long, and 
it was likely that he would be attacked in the rear. 
He therefore ordered an assault on May 22, hoping 
to carry the place by storm; but this was found im- 
possible, and the assault ended with a loss of two 


thousand five hundred men. He now settled down 
to a regular siege. Thousands of shells were thrown 
into the city, the inhabitants finding refuge in caves. 
Provisions became scarce, and mules were used for 
food. At last the besiegers brought their trenches 
so close to the defences that the soldiers bandied jests 
with each other across the narrow space. After 
forty-seven days spent in this manner, when a grand 
assault was imminent, Pemberton unconditionally 
surrendered both the city and his army of thirty-one 
thousand six hundred men on July 4, 1863. By 
the capture of this city the Mississippi was open to 
the Federals and the forces of the Confederates were 
cut completely in two. 




The vicissitudes of the war now carry us into 
another region, Chattanooga is in Tennessee, not 
far from the frontiers of Alabama and Georgia, and 
General Rosecrans was niancenvring to get possession 
of it, being opposed by the Confederate Gen- 
eral Bragg. Rosecrans obtained possession of 
the town, and proceeded in pursuit of Bragg. After 
a week's mana?uvring the two armies came up 
with each other, and there was fought on September 
19 and 20, 1863, a great battle on the banks of the 
Chickamauga Creek. Rosecrans had about fifty-five 
thousand men, and Bragg after being reinforced by 
Long-street, about seventy thousand. Bragg took 
the offensive, and his plan was to make a feigned 
attack on the Federal right, while he directed his 
main strength towards the left with the intention of 
crushing it and seizing the roads which led to Chat- 
tanooga. The first day's battle began at 10 a.m. 
and lasted all day. The projected attack upon the 
left failed, and although the Federal positions were 
for a time forced back, they were recovered before 
night and the situation was unchanged by the day's 

The night was spent by both sides in preparation 
for a renewal of the struggle, and Bragg's design 
was to carry out the plan of the day before, but the 
fighting did not begin till the day was well advanced. 


snd the Confederates could make no permanent im- 
pression. At last, apparently through an accident, the 
centre of the Federal line was weakened by the re- 
moval of troops to the rear, and Longstreet seizing his 
« pportunity pressed six divisions of his men through 
the gap. Rosecrans believed himself to be de- 
feated and rode back to Chattanooga, but Thomas 
on the left wing held his ground and the Con- 
federates were entirely unable to shake him. At 
the same time the battle must be regarded as a Con- 
federate victory. The Federal loss was sixteen hun- 
dred, -that of the other side perhaps slightly more. 

A montli later the Federal forces in the West were 
reorganised and a Military Division of the Missis- 
sippi was created, at the head of which was placed 
General Grant. Grant arrived to take up his com- 
mand on October 23, and found the army in a very 
bad condition, Chattanooga being seriously threat- 
ened by Bragg's army. In the middle of November 
Grant was joined by Sherman, their united forces 
amounting to eighty thousand men. Bragg's army 
occupied a position twelve miles long, the flank being 
on the northern ends of Look-out Mountain and Mis- 
sionary Ridge, while the centre stretched across 
the Chattanooga Valley. The greater part of the 
line was well entrenched. Grant placed Sherman 
on his left, on the north side of the Tennessee, 
opposite the bend of Missionary Ridge, Thomas in 
the centre across the Chattanooga Valley, and Hooker 
on his right at the base of Look-out Mountain. His 
plan was to attack Bragg's right with Sherman's 
forces, to capture the heights of Missionary Ridge, 
v/hile Thomas and Hooker should occupy the atten- 
tion of the centre and left so as to prevent them from 
sending any reinforcements against Sherman. Mis- 


sionary Kidge was the key of the position, and if that 
were taken his whole array would be compelled to 

Sherman met with unexpected difficulties and was 
only partially successful. Hooker advanced to the 
base of Look-out Mountain, a lofty hill more than 
two thousand feet high, from which there is a magni- 
ficent view extending over seven States. Disregard- 
ing, or rather going beyond his orders, he climbed 
the steep heights in the rain, and his soldiers disap- 
peared in a thick mist which hung round the moun- 
tain. At the very summit he routed the enemy and 
captured many guns and prisoners. This is known 
as " The battle above the clouds." 

The plan for the next day was that Hooker should 
descend the Look-out Mountain on the eastern side 
and arrive at the left of Bragg's position on Mission- 
ary Ridge ; but the destruction of a bridge delayed 
him, and Grant saw that Bragg was weakening his 
centre to strengthen his right against Sherman's at- 
tack. He therefore ordered the centre to advance. 
Thej crossed the valley, reached the summit of the 
ridge and swept everything before them. Bragg's 
army was completely defeated and his captured guns 
were turned against his troops as they fled. In this 
series of battles the loss of the Federals was nearly 
six thousand men, that of the Confederates ten thou- 
sand, of whom six thousand were taken prisoners, 
and forty-two guns. 

In February, 1864, a new complexion was given 
to the war by Grant being given the title of Lieuten- 
ant-General, with the command of all the armies, of 
course under the supreme command of the President 
— a rank which had only been held previously by 
Washington and Scott. Grant took up his head- 


quarters with the army of the Potomac. For the 
purposes of the campaign he considered that army 
as his centre, the army of the James River under 
Butler as his left wing, the western armies under 
Sherman as his right wing, and the army of Banks 
in Louisiana as a force to operate in the enemy's 
rear. His design was that all the armies should 
move simultaneously: Butler against Petersburg, 
to cut off the communications of Richmond with the 
South; Sherman against the army of Johnston in 
Georgia;, with the view of capturing Atlanta ; Banks 
to take Mobile and to close its harbour to blockade- 
runners; Sigel to drive back the Confederates from 
the Shenandoah Valley and to wrest that fertile 
region from them; while the army of the Potomac 
should follow Lee's army and fight it wherever it 

The principal scene of the war is now laid in the 
Wilderness, a district about twelve or fifteen miles 
square, south of the River Rapidan. The ground 
was formerly the site of numerous iron-works, mines 
having been opened to dig the ore, and the woods 
cut down to supply fuel for smelting. When the 
mines were abandoned a tangled growth of under- 
wood made its appearance, and the whole region 
was deserted excepting a few open spots, and a few 
roadside taverns. In Mav, IS 64, the main bodv of 
Lee's army lay upon the western edge of the Wilder- 
ness, with a line of observation along the Rapidan, 
and headquarters at Orange Court House. The 
army of the Potomac was north of the Rapidan, op- 
posite the Wilderness; it consisted of three infantry 
corps under Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick, and a 
cavalry corps commanded by Sheridan, Meade being 
in command of the whole. Burnside with twenty 


thousand men was at Annapolis. The Confederate 
army was under the command of Lee and consisted 
of the infantry corps of Ewell and Hill and the 
cavalry of Stuart, Long-street's force being at no 
great distance. Lee's force was reckoned at about 
sixty-five tliousand men, Grant's at about one hun- 
dred and sixteen thousand. 

At midnight on May 3 the army of the Potomac 
crossed the Rapidan on five pontoon bridges and 
plunged into the Wilderness. Through this forest 
two roads run north and south, which are crossed 
by two others running east and west, the Orange turn- 
pike road and the Orange plank road. There are 
also numerous cross roads and wood paths. The 
army by itself could have passed through these woods 
in a few hours and have reached the open country 
beyond ; but there was a train of four thousand wag- 
gons for commissariat and ammunition, and reserve 
artillery of more than one hundred guns, so that the 
army remained in the Wilderness during the whole 
of ^fay 4. Grant slept that night at the Wilderness 
Tavern, situated where the Germania plank road 
crosses the Orange turnpike road. As Lee had not 
disputed the passage of the Eapidan, Grant believed 
that he would not fight in the Wilderness at all. 

However, on the morning of ]\Iay 5, his lines were 
attacked, and it was evident that Lee had formed the 
plan of sending his whole army dovm the two 
parallel roads, and attacking the army of the Poto- 
mac whilst it was engaged on this difiicult ground. 
Grant immediately recalled Hancock's corps, which 
liad gained the open ground, and hurried up Burn- 
side from the rear. Neither artillery nor cavalry 
could be used in the thick wood, and the battle as- 
sumed the form of a hand-to-hand engagement be- 


tween individuals; when night fell no decisive ad- 
vantage had been gained on either side. Lee had 
succeeded better on the left than on the right, and 
Longstreet's corps had not arrived in time to take 
part in the engagement. The night was spent in 
cutting down trees, piling up logs for breastworks, 
and digging trenches. 

On the morning of May G Hancock attacked the 
enemy's right, and at first drove the enemy before 
him, but on Longstrcct coming up, the Federals were 
obliged to retire, Longstreet being seriously wounded 
in exactly the same way as "- Stonewall " Jackson 
had been, a year before. As he was riding with his 
staff some of his own men mistook them for Federal 
troops and fired upon them; he was wounded in the 
head and neck and had to be carried from the field. 
The conflict continued throughout the day with no 
very tangible result ; the losses on each side had been 
severe, numbering about fifteen thousand. 

On the afternoon of May 7 Grant gave the order 
for the army to move forward by the left flank to- 
wards Spottsylvania, wishing to place his army be- 
tween the Confederates and the capital. Spottsyl- 
vania Court House is fifteen miles south-east of the 
battle-field of the Wilderness and about twelve miles 
south-west of Fredericksburg. On the morning of 
Sunday, May 8, the Federal cavalry reached 
Spottsylvania Court House and easily dispersed the 
small force of the enemy's cavalry which they found 
there, but on Anderson's force coming up they were 
compelled to retire, and when Warren reached the 
same spot he found the Confederates entrenched in 
his front. Owing to other circumstances the whole 
of Lee's forces took possession of the ground before 
Grant's army could reach it. 


On the same day Grant despatched Sheridan with 
his cavalry to ride ronnd the Confederate army, tear- 
iiiij; up railroads, destroying bridges and depots, and 
captnring trains. lie succeeded in destroying ten 
miles of railroad and several railway trains, cutting 
all the telegraph wires, and recovering four hundred 
Federal prisoners who were being conducted to Rich- 
mond. This last engagement took place at Yellow 
Tavern, seven miles north of the capital, and in it 
General Stuart, the famous cavalry officer, was 
mortally wounded. He went so far as to break into 
the defences of Richmond and capture some pris- 
oners ; he then crossed the Chickahominy and re- 
I'oined the main armv on May 25. 

The Federal troops wqvq now posted in such a 
manner that Hancock was on the extreme right, then 
came Warren, then Sedgwick, and then Burnside on 
the left. The western part of the Confederate en- 
trenchments Avas the salient angle at the extreme 
northern point. It was determined to assault this, 
but in spite of vigorous attacks it was not carried till 
^lay 12, when Hancock made an assault upon it in 
the early morning. Johnston's entire division of 
nearly four thousand men were taken prisoners, as 
well as twenty guns, thousands of small arms, and 
thirty standards. The guns were immediately 
turned against their previous possessors, who were 
chased through the woods towards Spottsylvania 
Court House, until they gained safety in another 
line of earthworks. Simultaneously with Hancock's 
attack, the two sides of the entrenchments had been 
assailed bv Warren and Burnside, but with less sue- 

Lee made vigorous attem.pts to recapture the 
salient anfle, and the fight was kept up till past 


midnight, when he was compelled to retire to his in- 
terior line. The carnage was terrible. The dead 
were not only piled in heaps, but their bodies were 
torn and mangled by the shots which continued to 
be fired ; every tree or bush was cut down or riddled 
by the balls. The Federal loss amounted to thir- 
teen thousand six hundred and the Confederate loss 
was about equal in number. 

After this Grant a2:ain determined to move bv his 
left, and to reach the Xorth Anna Eiver. He 
wished to engage the enemy without their having 
the great advantage of entrenchments. He there- 
fore sent Hancock's corps towards Richmond, hoping 
that Lee would attack it with his whole army, upon 
which the otlier corps would come up and fall upon 
the enemy before they had time to entrench. Han- 
cock's corps marched on the night of May 20, fol- 
lowed by Warren's corps twelve hours later, and by 
the corps of Burnside and Wright at a similar in- 
terval of time. The Confederates were, however, 
able to defend their capital by moving in a shorter 
line. Having effected this they took up a very 
strong position. Their line extended for a mile and 
a half from Little River to the Korth Anna River 
at Oxford, then down stream for three-quarters of a 
mile, and then in a straight line to Hanover Junc- 
tion. The Confederate line, forming itself in a 
curve, touched the Xorth Anna where it also makes 
a curve in such a wav that the tAvo curves met at a 
point from which they both receded in opposite di- 
rections. This critical position was assailed by Burn- 
side, who endeavoured to force a passage, but he was 
prevented from doing so by very strong entrench- 
ments. Further advances were made by the left 
flank, and at last the two armies were opposed to 


each other at Cold Harbour, about eight or ten miles 
from Richmond. An attack was planned for June 
3, but the enemv's artillery was skilfully placed, and 
it was impossible to proceed further than the first 
line. The struggle continued in and about Cold 
Harbour during the first twelve days of June, and 
the Federal loss amounted to 10,058, the Con- 
federate loss being much smaller. 

Once more Grant determined to move by his left 
flank and to pass his army across the James River 
and invest Richmond from the south, attempting to 
gain possession of Petersburg, which was the centre 
of its railway communication. 

Grant, whose reputation had suffered from the 
fatal attack of June 3, performed this difficult 
operation with masterly skill, having to withdraw 
his armv from the front of the enemv, march it 
fifty miles, cross two rivers and bring it into a new 
position. As a preparation for the movement he 
made a demonstration with his cavalry on the James 
River above Richmond, constructed a line of en- 
trenchments from his position at Cold Harbour close 
to the point where he expected to cross, and sunk 
vessels loaded with stone in the stream of the James 
River in order to prevent Confederate gunboats from 

hindering the passage. 

Grant left Cold Harbour on June 12, and at noon 
on the following day a pontoon bridge was thrown 
across the Chickahominy, fifteen miles away, by 
which Wilson's cavalry crossed. On June 14 the 
whole army had reached the James River. A pon- 
toon bridge was then thrown across the wide stream, 
and by June 17 the whole of Grant's army was on 
the other side. Thus an army of more than one hun- 
dred thousand men had been removed from trenches 


which were only a few yards from the enemy, carried 
with all its baggage across two rivers, and placed 
in a position to threaten the enemy's capital from the 
other side without any mishap. There were some 
who thought that after this feat of generalship and 
the substantial advantages gained by it the Con- 
federate cause was hopeless and that peace ought to 
be made. 



Sherman's march. 

We have said above that it was part of Grant's 
])lan, when he assnmed command of the United 
States army, that Sherman should move southwards 
from Chattanooga, and capture Atlanta, thus strik- 
ing at the Confederacy in a direction where it had 
never been assailed, and taking a city important as 
a railway centre and as a manufacturing place of 
military supplies. The distance between these two 
points, in a straight line, is a hundred miles, and the 
road was defended by General Johnston at Dalton 
with an army of about 43,150 infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery. To meet this Sherman had a force of 
about one hundred thousand men. 

Sherman left Chattanooga on May 5, the very 
day that Grant entered the Wilderness, and followed 
the line of railway to Atlanta. Johnston had forti- 
fied a position on the railway, called Tunnel Hill, 
so Sherman was unable to march straight to Dal- 
ton, but was oljliged to detach a force to his right 
to pass through the hills and strike at Resaca, thiis 
cutting the railway over which Johnston drew his 
supplies. McPherson, who commanded this de- 
tachment, found Resaca fortified and was afraid to 
attack, and when Sherman came up he discovered 
that Johnston had retired from Dalton to Resaca 
and was established there in a strong position. Sher- 
man eventually gained possession of Resaca without 


a battle, and five davs later reached Kingston, where 
he halted to get his army well together, supply .'t 
with provisions, and repair the railroad in his rear. 
Advancing further south, but bending towards the 
right, his forces came into conflict with those of 
Johnston at Xew Hope Church, where there was con- 
tinuous fighting for six days, the general advantage 
being with Sherman. When the month of May came 
to an end it was found that with the loss of ten 
thousand men on each side, Sherman had successive- 
ly stormed strong positions and was gradually draw- 
ing nearer to Atlanta. 

For the first fortnight of June the two armies 
remained opposite to each other at Pine Mountain, 
crossing the railway above Marietta. Here General 
Polk was killed, who had passed through a strange 
career. He had been educated for a soldier at West 
Point, but afterwards studied theology, and at the 
outbreak of the war was Protestant Bishop of 
Louisiana. On June 27 Sherman made a vigorous 
attempt to capture Johnston's position in the battle 
of Kenesaw, but it ended in failure and the loss of 
twenty-five hundred men, while the loss on the other 
side was only a little over eight hundred. He there- 
fore determined to sacrifice his communications, to 
leave the railway, taking ten days' provisions in 
waggons, and move his whole army southward to 
attack below Marietta. This would compel John- 
ston either to retire to Atlanta or to come out to bat- 
tle. Py this manoeuvre Johnston was eventually 
forced behind Chattachoochee, and was superseded 
by Hood, who was a far less formidable antagonist. 

The result of this was the battle of Atlanta, which 
consisted chieflv of vigorous assaults bravelv re- 
pulsed, but without any decisive result. Eventuallv, 



after trying tlie effect of cavalry raids, which were 
not very successful, Sherman succeeded in swinging 
his army into a position south of Atlanta, where they 
tore up the railroad, rendering it useless, and then 
advanced to the city, which eventually fell on Sep- 
temhor 2, 1864, having cost four months of hard 
fighting and clever strategy to win. 

Sherman remained at Atlanta for some time, and 
whilst he was there Lincoln was re-elected President 
by a large majority, being opposed by General Mc- 
Clellan. There are many reasons why this election 
should have been the wisest course, but perhaps the 
best of them was given bv Lincoln himself, who a 
day or two after his nomination replied to the ad- 
dress of a delegation in the following words : " I 
have not permitted myself to conclude that I am the 
best man in the country, but I am reminded in this 
connection of the story of an old Dutch farmer who 
once remarked to a companion that it was not best 
to swap horses when crossing streams." 

Before Sherman had been a week in Atlanta he 
determined to send away all the civil inhabitants 
of the city, offering them the choice of proceeding 
either north or south, and furnishing means of trans- 
port for a certain distance. He gave a reason for this 
rather severe measure that he was resolved to make 
Atlanta a purely military garrison or depot, with 
no civil population to influence military measures. 
By the beginning of November Sherman had, in 
council with the President and General Grant, de- 
termined upon his great march through Georgia, 
from Atlanta to Savannah on the sea, which eventu- 
ally put an end to the war. Sherman was at this 
time threatened by the Confederate General Hoodj 
who was on the south of Atlanta, and who might at 


any time attack the railway and sever Sherman's 
communications with Chattanooga. Indeed, Grant 
was of opinion that the march should not be under- 
taken until Hood's army had been destroyed, but 
he eventually came to agree with the opinion of Sher- 
man, and the care of defending Tennessee against 
Hood was committed to General Thomas. Sherman 
made careful preparations for his enterprise, and 
sent to the north all the sick and disabled men and 
all baggage that could be spared. When the last 
train had passed over the railroad to Chattanooga, 
the rails w'cre pulled up and destroyed, the bridges 
burned, the electric wires pulled do\^T;i, and all re- 
maining troops concentrated in Atlanta. On Novem- 
ber 2 Sherman left Atlanta, and nothing was heard of 
him for six weeks. 

Sherman had now at his disposal 55,329 infantry, 
5,063 cavalry, 1,812 artillery and 68 guns. There 
were four teams of horses to each gun, with its 
caisson and forage, six hundred ambulances, each 
drawn by tw^o horses, twenty-five hundred waggons 
with six mules to each. Every soldier carried forty 
rounds of ammunition, and a plentiful supply of 
wheat was carried in the waggons, as well as 1,200,- 
000 rations with oats and corn enough to last five 
days. The army was chiefly composed of veteran 
troops and each of them had confidence in the abili- 
ties of " Uncle Billv," their leader. The march 
began on November 15, and the goal was nearly 
three hundred miles distant. The infantry consisted 
of four corjis, two to each wing. The right v/ing 
was commanded by General Howard, and the left 
by General Slocum, the cavalry being under the 
command of General Kirkpatrick. The two wings 
marched by parallel routes, generally a few miles 


apart, each oorjis having its own proportion of cav- 
alry and trains. 

Minnte orders were given for tlie conduct of the 
troops during the march. " The habitual order of 
march will be, whenevei- practicable, by four roads, 
a-s nearly parallel as possible. The separate columns 
will start habitually at 7 a.m. and make about fifteen 
miles a day. Behind each regiment should follow 
one waggon and one ambulance. Army command- 
ers should practise the habit of giving the artillery 
and waggons the road, marching the troops on one 
side. To this end each brigade commander will 
organise a good and sufficient foraging party, who 
will gather corn or forage of any kind, meat of any 
kind, vegetables, corn, meal, or whatever is needed 
by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the 
waggons at least ten days' provisions. Soldiers must 
not enter dwellings or conmiit any trespass ; but dur- 
ing a halt or camp they may be permitted to gather 
turnips, potatoes and other vegetables, and to drive 
in stock in sight of their camp. To corps command- 
ers alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, 
houses, cotton, guns, etc. When the army is unmo- 
lested no destruction of such projierty should be 
permitted; but should guerillas or bushwhackers 
molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn 
bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local 
hostility, the armv commanders should make and 
enforce a devastation more or less relentless, accord- 
ing to tlie measure of svich hostility. As for horses, 
mules, and waggons belonging to the inhabitants, 
the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and 
without limit, discriminating, however, between the 
rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and in- 
dustrious, usually neutral or friendly. In all forag- 


ing, the parties engaged will endeavour to leave 
with each family a reasonable portion for their main- 

Following these instructions, the army marched 
from day to day, occupying a space from forty to 
sixty miles wide. The wealthier inhabitants, gen- 
erally, made their escape, but the negroes swarmed 
after tlie army, believing that the day of Jubilee 
had come. The foraging parties went out for miles 
on each side, gathering large quantities of provisions 
and bringing them to the line of march, where each 
stood guard over his pile till his own brigade came 
along ; flankers were thrown out on either side, pass- 
ing through the woods to prevent any surprise by 
the enemy. There was scarcely any fighting except 
within a few miles of Savannah and at the citv itself, 
in tlie capture of Fort Me \lister. The city was oc- 
cupied en December 21, and Sherman wrote to the 
President : " I beg to present you as a Christmas 
gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and 
fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also 
about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton." Sher- 
man's entire loss during the march was only 764 

Sherman^s successful march may be regarded as 
the beginning of the end, if indeed it was not the 
end itself. Grant's first idea had been to remove the 
victorious army by sea to the James Eiver, and 
place it where it could act in connection with the 
army of the Potomac against Petersburg and Eich- 
mond, but it was thought better, on second thought, 
to organise a march through the Carolinas. The 
Confederate army was suffering severely from want 
of supplies, the region across the Mississippi had been 
cut off; the seaports were strongly blockaded, the 

374 Wars of the century. 

Shenandoali Valley had been desolated by Sheri- 
dan, and Georgia by Sherman. If the Carolinas were 
treated in the same way Lee's position before Rich- 
mond wonld become uid)earable. 

The march northwards towards Columbia was be- 
gun on February 1, 1805 ; it was more difficult and 
dangerous than the ])revious march and required 
more military skill. Many rivers had to be crossed, 
and there was danger of being attacked both by Hood 
and Lee. Sherman took measures for securing the 
co-o])eration of the fleet along the coast, which 
watched his progress, established points where sup- 
plies could be obtained and offered a place of refuge 
if it were needed. Columbia was captured on Feb- 
ruary 17 without opposition, and Charleston was 
evacuated on the following day. 

Leaving Columbia on February 20, Sherman's 
army marched for Fayetteville, the right wing pass- 
ing through Chcraw, where a great deal of property 
was destroyed and much arms and munition cap- 
tured. Reaching Fayetteville on March 11, Sher- 
man was aide to open communication with General 
Terry, who had captured Fort Fisher below Wil- 
mington in January and afterwards the city itself. 
The last battle engaged by this army was fought at 
Bentonville on the way to Goldsboro', where the Con- 
federates were entrenched across the roi^d and were 
commanded by General Johnston. The battle was 
won by the Federals with a loss of 1,60-4 men, the 
loss of the other side being 2,342, and Sherman 
reached Goldsboro' on the direct road to Petersburg 
and Riclimond. He was joined by Schofleld's corps, 
which had been transferred from the army com- 
manded by General Thomas. 

In the meantime the other portions of Grant's plan 


were being gradually carried out. Late in February/; 
Sheridan with ten thousand cavalry moved up the 
Shenandoah Valley and defeated General Early, 
capturing eighteen hundred men, all his guns and 
trains, and then joined Grant on the James River. 
Grant at the head of the army of the Potomac was 
opposed to Lee, who was defending Eichmond and 
Petersburg. The decisive battle was fought on the 
two first days of April, 1865. Sheridan, wdio was 
posted at Dinwiddle Court House, w^as ordered by 
Grant to attack the Confederate right at Five Forks. 
The movement was at first unsuccessful, but after re- 
ceiving reinforcements Sheridan was able to take 
Five Forks, with a loss of one thousand men, five 
thousand prisoners being captured. 

On Sunday, April 2, Gj-ant made an attack upon 
Lee's centre with two corps, and broke through the 
Confederate lines. Sheridan moved up on the left, 
and consequently the outer defences of Petersburg 
were in the possession of the Federal forces, who com- 
pletely encircled the city. Petersburg is only twenty- 
three miles from Richmond, and Lee now sent a tele- 
graphic despatch to the capital saying that both 
cities must be evacuated. The news reached Rich- 
mond at the hour of the morning service, and the 
greatest confusion prevailed. All the liquor on which 
hands could be laid w^as poured into the gutter, the 
great tobacco warehouses were set on fire, and the 
iron-clad rams in the river were blown up. The next 
morning the city was taken possession of by a de- 
tachment of black troops belonging to the Federal 

Lee now retreated to the west. Grant following in 
close pursuit, and moving to the south in a parallel 
line, daring which many engagements took place, in 
one of which Ewell and the whole of his corps was 


captured. After a week of tliis warfare Lee reached 
Appoiuatox Court House, and here his further prog- 
ress was stopped by a large Federal force. On 
A])ril 9, 18(15, Grant and Lee arranged the surrender 
of tlie army of Virginia, the terms being that the men 
were to lay down their arms and return to their 
homes, and that they should not be molested so long 
as they did not again take up arms against the United 
States. They were even permitted to take their 
horses with them for the reason that they would need 
them for the ploughing. The number of ofheers 
and men included in the surrender was 28,365. 
General Johnston, who was opposed to Sherman in 
Xoi'th Carolina, surrendered in a similar manner 
at Durham Station near Raleigh on April 26, receiv- 
ing the same terms which had been granted to Lee, 
the number included in the capitulation being 
greater than those under Lee, reaching the amount 
of 36,817, besides 52,453 who were in Georgia and 
Florida. The surrender of the remaining Confed- 
erate armies was completed b}' the end of May, 
Jeiferson Davis, who had been President of the Con- 
federate TJepublic, having himself been taken 
prisoner on ^lay 11. 

The war was now at an end, but before the final 
triumph was consummated, the man to whom more 
than to any one else victory had been due was basely 
ijiurdered on April 15, 1865, He had lived to enter 
the captured city of Richmond, to see the authority 
of the United States extended again over the whole 
country, luit at the moment when, by the inscrutable 
designs of Providence, he was removed from the 
scene of his labours, the people were in need of his 
genius as much as ever for the solution of the new 
problems^ caused by the war and by the victory, 
which continued to press for settlement. 





TnE comparative strengtli of the belligerents at 
the outbreak of the war of 1866 between Prussia 
and Austria has been estimated by a competent ob- 
server in tlie following manner. The Prussian army 
consisted of eight corps d'annee of troops of the line, 
and of the corps d'armee of the guard, each corps 
d'armee consisting of two divisions of infantry, one 
division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, 
and a militarv train. Each division of infantrv 

*j «... 

was composed of two brigades, each brigade of two 
regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. 
Further, each division had a regiment of 
cavalry, consisting of four squadrons, and -a 
division of artillery of four batteries, so that 
every infantry general commanding a division had 
under his command twelve battalions, four squadrons 
and four batteries, A cavalry division consisted of 
two brigades, each containing two regiments, and 
every regiment four squadrons ; it had also attached 
to it two batteries of horse artillery. The reserve 
of artillerv consisted of one division of field artillery, 



forming four batteries, and of two batteries of horse 
artillery, besides an artillery train for the supply of 
annnunition. Thus a corps d'armee had twenty- 
four battalions of infantry, twenty-four squadrons 
of cavalrv and sixteen batteries of artillery, besides 
a battalion of rifles and one of engineers, and pon- 
toon trains, and a large military train for the pur- 
pose of hospital service and of commissariat. 

A corps d'armee might thus be reckoned as con- 
sisting of 26,000 infantry and about 3,300 cavalry^ 
together with 2,300 artillery, in all 31,000. The 
corps d'armee of the guard was larger by about 5,000 
men. Thus, at the beginning of the war, the total 
infantry consisted of 253,506 men, the total cavalry 
30,000 men, and the total of field artillery 864 guns, 
together with 0,018 pioneers and 11,034 of military 
trains. To these must be added the depot troops 
numbering 100,512 with 228 guns and 13,000 depot 
officers, making a total of 473,600 men with 100,000 
horses and 1,092 guns. 

The Austrian army at the outbreak of the war con- 
sisted of 80 infantry rco-iments of the line and 1 
Imperial regiment, 32 battalions of field Jiigers, 14 
Border infantry regiments, 1 Border infantry bat- 
talion ; the cayalry comprised 12 regimentsof Cuiras- 
siers, 29 of Dragoons, 14 of Hussars and 13 of 
Uhlans ; the artillery, 12 regiments, besides one for 
coast defences ; besides these there were 2 regiments 
of Engineers, 6 battalions of Pioneers, 10 Sanitary 
companies and 48 Transport squadrons, not counting 
troops for provincial defence. The whole number 
of avail.ible infantry was 321.410; of cavalry, 26,- 
621; of artillery, 24,600, with 1,036 guns; and of 
special troops, 11,194, making a total of 383,556 
men. "We will defer the consideration of the strength 


of the other German States and of Italy until they 
respectively enter on the scene of action. 

Prussia commenced her preparations for war on 
March 27, 1866, by placing live divisions upon a war 
footing, strengthening five brigades of artillery, and 
arming the fortresses in Silesia and the province of 
Saxony. The mobilisation of the whole army was 
decreed on May 7, and on May 19 troops were con- 
centrated in Silesia, Thuringia, and Lusatia. On 
June 1 the coi^ps d'armee of the guard was sent to 
Silesia, and other troops to Halle, a reserve corps 
being formed at Berlin. There were three main 
Prussian armies, besides the reserve at Berlin; the 
First army under Prince Frederick Charles, whicli 
was posted at Hoyerswerda and Gorlitz in Lusatia, 
the Second army under the Crown Prince of Prus- 
sia, posted in Silesia, and the ami}' of the Elbe. By 
June 15 Prussia had prepared troops for the in- 
vasion of Saxony, Hanover, and Cassel. 

On ]\ray 18 the command of the Austrian army of 
the north was assumed by Field-Marshal Benodek, 
the seven corps d'armee and five divisions of which it 
was composed being spread between Cracow and the 
Elbe, along the principal lines of railway. The 
Austrian army of the south consisted of three corps 
d'armee, under the command of Archduke Albrechr, 
part of it being in eastern Venetia and Istria and 
part holding the Quadrilateral formed by the four 
great fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, Verona 
and Legnano. A third Austrian corps d'armee under 
Archduke Ernest was to be used as a general reserve 
which might be directed against Italy or sent into 
Bohemia as circumstances required. 

The total strength of the Italian armv in the field 
consisted of 202,720 infantry, 25,120 Bersaglieri 


with 480 pjuiis aiui 13,000 cavalry. It was divided 
into four corps d'armee, the first under the command 
of Durando being at Lodi, the second under Cuchiari 
at Cremona, the third under Delhi Rocca at Pia- 
cenza and the fourth under Ciahlini at Bologna. 
As Italy did not declare war against Austria till 
June 20 we may neglect the operations of the Italian 
army for the })resent. 

The army of Saxony had been mobilised and w^as 
by the end of the first fortnight of June ready to take 
the field. Its main strength was in Dresden and 
Pirna. It consisted of 19,752 infantry, 3,217 cav- 
alry, and 70 guns, as well as a company of engineers 
and two of pioneers. The army of Hanover, wdiich 
contained eighteen thousand infantry and three thou- 
sand cavah'y, was totally unprepared for war, and 
was garrisoned, for the most part, in the neighbour- 
hood of Hanover. 

On the evening of June 15 Prussia declared war 
against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony. This 
event caused great excitement in Hanover, and it 
was determined to save the army by a movement 
towards the south, so that it might unite with the 
Bavarians. The blind King of Hanover collected 
his troops round G(»ttingen, but it was unable to move 
from want of organisation. If preparations had 
])een made in time it might have pushed on to Cassel 
and then to the south, but it had to submit to a catas- 
trophe which will be related in its proper place. On 
receiving the same news the army of Ilesse-Cassel 
retreated, reaching Hanau on June 19 and securing 
its communication with the eighth corps of the Fed- 
eral army at Frankfort. This corps, under the com- 
iTiand of Prince Alexander of Hesse, consisted of 
fifty-three thousand infantry, thirty-three squadrons 


of cavalry, and one hundred and fourteen guns. It 
was composed of troops from Wiirtemberg, Baden, 
Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau, as well as an Aus- 
trian division of twelve thousand men. 

General Bayer invaded Hesse-Cassel at 2 a.m. on 
June 16, with seventeen thousand men. At Giessen 
he issued a proclamation saying that Prussia had 
been compelled to declare war against the Elector, 
and that his operations were not directed against the 
country. He reached Cassel on June 19, and found 
the Elector in the Palace of Wilhelmshohe. The 
Elector was made a prisoner of war and was con- 
fined in the Prussian fortress of Stettin. 

It had been arranged that Saxony should be in- 
vaded by two corps, the army of the Elbe and the 
First army, one advancing from the north, the other 
from the east. The Saxon army began its retreat 
on the evening of June 1, proceeding towards Bo- 
hemia by way of Bodenbach in order to join the Aus- 
trians. The two Prussian armies converging on 
the capital entered it without opposition on the after- 
noon of June IS, and in two davs the whole countrv 
was occupied, with the exception of the fortress of 
Konigstein. We are told by an eyewitness that the 
Prussian troops were well received by the popula- 
tion, and that had it not been for the swords and 
bayonets of patrols which glittered in the sun along 
every road, the scene would have been one of per- 
fect peace. The soldiers helped the peasants to carry 
the hay harvest, worked in the cottage gardens, spent 
money in the village shops ; the bare-legged country 
urchins got rides on the cavalry or artillery horses 
as they went to be watered, or were invited to peep 
into the muzzle of a rifled gun, and only if some ad- 
venturous child ventured to place a handful of corn- 


flowers in the inoutli of a cannon was lie warned off 
the battery by the sentry. Passenger traffic on the 
railways Avas soon resumed, and telegraphic messages 
were regularly delivered. 

The occupation of the kingdom of Saxony gave the 
Prussians very great advantage. They were able to 
attack the Austrians on a narrow front if they came 
out of the mountains and an invasion of Bohemia 
became possible. This step naturally caused a decla- 
ration of war on the jiart of Austria, which had not 
been prepared for the celerity of the Prussian move- 
ments. Benedek had concentrated his army in such 
a way as to be able to strike a deadly blow at the 
heart of the Prussian kingdom, while he was sup- 
ported on the flank by the Bavarians and the other 
troops of the federation. But this scheme had now 
been rendered impossible. Instead of setting Saxony 
free by a rapid march and dictating peace in Berlin, 
the Austrian Field-Marshal saw three Prussian 
armies march through the passes of the mountains 
into north-eastern Bohemia. The Austrian prepara- 
tions were not pushed forward with that speed and 
eners'v which characterised the Prussians and the 
commanders were without any clear plans and were 
insufficiently equipped. At the same time the north- 
ern army of the alliss was nearly equal in strength 
to the united forces of Prussia, and the whole 
strength of the confederation was visibly superior to 
them. The confederation had been further strength- 
ened by the adhesion of the Grand Duchy of Baden, 
so that fifteen thousand fresh troops were added to 
the eight corps, which, as we have said, was under 
the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse. 




On June 22 Prince Frederick Charles broke up 
his quarters at Gorlitz and marched towards the 
Austrian frontier by the two roads leading through 
Zittau and Seidenberg, the frontier being crossed 
on the following dav. At the same time General 
Herwarth von Bitterfeld, in command of the armv of 
the Elbe, marched bj the high-r^ad from Schlucheim 
to Rumburg. Reichenberg was occupied on June 
24, and the possession of this place enabled Prince 
Frederick Charles to open communications with the 
Silesian and Saxon lines of railway, which were of 
great importance for the commissariat. The first 
action of any importance took place at Podol upon 
the Iser, which is here about one hundred yards wide. 
It did not begin till 8 p.m., when the evening was 
closing in, and it continued into the night, every 
house in the village being obstinately disputed. At 
last both the town bridge and the railway bridge 
were captured by the Prussians, and the Austrians 
drew off sullenly on the road to Miinchengratz. The 
last dropping shots did not cease till 4 a.m., when 
there were no Austrian soldiers within three miles 
of the bridges, except the wounded and the prison- 
ers, ^o artillery was engaged on either side, and the 
Prussians owed much of their success to their breech- 
loading rifles. 

Bj the retreat of the Austrians to Miinchengratz 


full communication was opened between the army 
of Prince Frederick Charles and that of the Elbe, 
and the two armies were able on the following day 
to take possession of the whole line of the Iser. A 
combat took place at ^Miinchengriitz, but Prince Fred- 
erick Charles, by a series of tactical movements, and 
the loss of only one hundred men, gained twelve 
miles of country, captured one thousand prisoners, 
and effected his second juncture with the corps of 
Bitterfeld, the headquarters of both armies being 
established in the same town. A more serious battle 
took place at Gitschin on June 29, about tAventy miles 
distant from Miincheuffriitz. The Austrians were 
strongly posted, their artillery and sharpshooters 
being carefully placed. It consisted in the steady 
driving back of the young Austrian soldiers, by the 
heavier and more mature troops of their opponents. 
It began at 5 p.m.^ and it was not till near midnight 
that General von Werder occupied Gitschin. An- 
other struggle took place on the same evening on the 
northern side of the town, between the Austrians 
and the Prussians who were advancing from the 
direction of Tiirnau. In this part of the fight the 
loss of the Saxons was very heavy, and the Prussians 
also suffered severely, for they had to carry a strong 
position held by a superior force, the Prussians num- 
bering sixteen thousand men, the allies thirty thou- 
sand. The Prussian headquarters were now moved 
to Gitschin, and on the afternoon of June 30 the 
strategic object of the movements of the two Prussian 
armies was achieved by communications being opened 
in Bohemia between Prince Frederick Charles and 
the Crown Prince, who was advancing by Arnau. 

The army of the Crown Prince had crossed the 
Austrian frontier on the evening of June 26, his 


first action taking place at Trautenau on the fol- 
lowing: day, in which the Prussians lost 63 officers 
and 1,214 men, the Austrians 196 officers and 5,530 
men. The Austrians gained the victory, w^hicli was, 
however, of but little use to them, the balance being 
redeemed by an action at Soor, which allowed the 
two portions of the Prussian army to unite whilst 
Goblenz, the Austrian general, retired to Koniginhof. 
This town was captured on June 29 after a hot con- 
test, each vard of everv street and each window of 
every house being stoutly defended. In the mean- 
time the left column of the armv had to advance from 
Glatz to Xachod, along a narrow road, through a 
difficult defile, forming a column of march twenty 
miles long. This defile was defended by the Aus- 
trians in front of Skalitz, but after an obstinate 
struggle they were driven back by General ^tein- 
metz, the Crown Prince being also present in person. 
Another battle took place at Skalitz itself on June 
28, and another at Schweinschadel on the following 
day, so that the Crown Prince was able to concen- 
trate his army on the left bank of the Elbe, and on 
the last day of the month, as we have seen above, 
communications between the two commanders were 

By this time King William of Prussia had arrived 
at Reichenberg and assumed the chief command of 
his armies in person. The Prussian armies were now 
united at Horsitz and Jaromierz, and the King 
moved his quarters first to Sichrow and then to Gits- 
chin. Benedek after vainly attempting to prevent 
the issue of the army of the Crown Prince from the 
mountains by his resistance at Soor and Skalitz de- 
termined to take up a strong position on the right 
bank of the upper Elbe in order to prevent the army 


of Silesia from crossing that stream. On the after- 
noon of Jvme 30 he issued orders for the whole army 
to retire towards Koniggratz and to concentrate in 
front of that fortress ; but it was not till the night of 
July 2 that his whole force was assembled there, 
when it took up a position between that town and 
the Eiver Bistritz. Of the armies opposed to him 
that of Prince Frederick Charles had fought five 
severe combats without a reverse and had secured 
a favourable position in which to engage a great 
battle; that of the Crown Prince had fought severe 
actions on June 27, 28 and 29, and had now secured 
his juncture with the other army, bringing with him 
as trophies of his victories fifteen thousand prisoners, 
twenty-four captured guns, six stands of colours and 
two standards. The position of Benedek was pro- 
tected by the wooded hills of Chlum and Lipa, and 
by the marshy valley of the Bistritz. 

On July 3, 1866, the position of Benedek was at- 
tacked by the united forces of Prince Frederick 
Charles and General Herwarth von Bitterfeld. The 
troops were all in motion long before midnight, and 
at 1.30 A.M. the staff left Kammeritz. With the 
dawoi of day a drizzling rain came on which 
lasted till late in the afternoon, while a keen wind 
blew sharply upon the soldiers, who were short both 
of sleep and food. At 6 a.m. the army had reached 
the hill of Dub, but it was not allowed to mount the 
summit of the slope which had hitherto concealed 
its movements from the Austrians. From this point 
the ground slopes gently down to the Bistritz and 
the road crosses it at the village of Sadowa, a mile 
and a quarter from Dub. The ground then rises 
until it reaches the village of Chlum, which is a mile 
and a quarter from Sadowa. About a mile and a 


half from Sadowa down the Bistritz stood the village 
of Mokrovous, and a little way above it on a knoll 
the church of Doholicka. Above this church was 
the village of Dohalitz, and between it and Sadowa a 
large thick Avood, difficult to pass. 

At 7 A.M. Prince Frederick Charles pushed over 
the hill with some of his cavalry and horse artillery, 
and at 7.30 a.m. the first shot was fired. The Prus- 
sian horse artillery, close down to the river, replied 
to the Austrian guns, but neither side fired heavily, 
and for half an hour the cannonade consisted of 
single shots. At 7.45 a.m. the King of Prussia ap- 
peared upon the scene and the battle became more 
vigorous on both sides. AYhile the cannonade had 
been going on the infantry had been moved down 
towards the river, and at 10 a.m. they were ordered 
to attack Sadowa, Dohalitz, and Mokrovous. They 
had to contest every inch of the way, as the Austrians 
fired fast upon them as they approached. In and 
around the villages the fighting continued for nearly 
an hour and but little progress was made. One of 
the sharpest engagements was l)etween the seventh 
division under Franzeskv and the Austrians in the 
wood above Benatek. By 11 a.m. the Prussian in- 
fantry had taken Sadowa, Dohalitz, and Dohalicka, 
and efforts were now made against the wood which 
ran along the sides of the Sadowa and Lipa roads, 
but the struggle became stationary and remained so 
for about two hours. 

News now came to Benedck that the Crown Prince 
was threatening his right flank, he therefore did his 
utmost to inflict a severe blow on Prince Frederick 
Charles, before the Crown Prince could come up. 
At about 1 p.m. the whole battle line of the Prussians 
could gain no more ground and was obliged to fight 


hard to retain the position it had won. Indeed the 
battle appeared to be lost, for Prussian guns had,been 
dismounted by Austrian fire, and in the wooded ground 
tlie needle-gun was of little effect. Herwarth also 
was checked on the right, and things were not going 
much better for the Prussians in the centre. The 
Prussians were becoming very uneasy and were pre- 
paring for a disaster. 

The night before the Crown Prince had promised 
Prince Frederick Charles that he would be on the 
field at 2 p.m., but was engaged with the xlustrian 
right as early as 12.30 p.m. The army of the Crown 
Prince was occupying a position with regard to the 
First army, similar to that which the Prussian troops 
held towards Wellington on the day of Waterloo. 
By 1 P.M. he obtained possession of the villages of 
Hovenarves and Rasitz, the Austrians offering but 
little resistance, because they were engaged with the 
corps of Franzesky, who was carrying the village of 
Benatek. The Prussian guards then proceeded to 
attack the strong position of Chlum, and when they 
arrived on the pursuit they saw between themselves 
and the fortress of Koniggriitz the whole of the Aus- 
trian reserves to the number of forty thousand men, 
while between them and their comrades of the First 
army were the Austrians engaged near Lipa and in 
the Sadowa wood. There were only twelve battal- 
ions of the Prussian guard to hold the key of the 
battle against the whole reserve of the enemy. It was 
at 2.55 that Benedek, who was between Chlum and 
Lipa, heard that the Prussians had occupied (Jhluni. 
He could not believe the news, but on moving up to 
ascertain its truth was received by a withering voile}' 
which told severely on his staff. 

The j)osition of the Prussian guard became more 


critical every moment, but at last a reserve of fifty 
thousand fresh troops arrived, and the main body 
of the second division of the guards attacked the wood 
of Lipa and the batteries of Chlum. During this 
time the Prussian guards at Sadowa were in ignor- 
ance of the progress of the Crown Prince, because 
his movements could be only imperfectly seen ; but 
they at last became aware of the attack of his in- 
fantry upon the wood of Lipa. 

The First army then sprang forward and with 
loud cheers and drum-beating went at full speed up 
the hill. The Sadowa road was cleared, and the 
Austrian batteries were attacked, the summit of the 
hill was gained, and they saw the white uniforms 
running before them. The Crown Prince's soldiers 
took the fugitives in flank and raked them as they 
fled. The Prussian artillery opened fire from the 
summit of the ridge upon the retreating Austrians, 
who, notwithstanding the odds against them, suc- 
ceeding in preserving good order. Benedek saw that 
the battle was lost and that nothing remained but to 
retire to KoniggrJitz with the fragments of his beaten 
armies, but the pursuit continued, and safety was 
sought on both sides of the Elbe, till at last the Aus- 
trian cavalry reached Pardubitz, and the army got 
across the river during the night without severe loss. 
In this battle the Prussians captured 17-i guns, 
20,000 prisoners and 11 standards, their loss being 
10,000 men, whereas that of the Austrians was nearly 
40,000. The morale of the Austrian army w^as de- 
stroyed, and they had to acknowledge that they could 
not stand against the better-armed Prussians. The 
number of the Austrians engaged was 200,000 men 
with 600 guns, that of the Prussians 261,000 with 
816 guns. 




The melancholy news which arrived from the 
field of Koniggriitz caused the greatest dismay iu 
Vienna, because they had shortly before received 
favourable accounts from the scene of war in Italy. 
We must now give an account of the struggle which 
had in the meantime been raging on the banks of the 
]\Iincio. On June 20 General La Marmora sent an 
intimation to the Austi-ians in Mantua that hostilities 
would commence on June 23, and Archduke Al- 
breclit prepared to receive the attack. The strength 
of the Austrian position in Italy lay in what was 
called the (Quadrilateral, that is, the square enclosed 
by the strongly entrenched camp on the Adige, in 
the neighbourhood of Verona, the smaller and less 
important fortress of Legnano, on the same river, 
the fortifications of Peschiera, at the point where 
the River Mincio issues from the Lago di Garda, and 
the strong; fortress of Mantua lower down the IMin- 


cio. The Italians had the choice eitlier of attacking 
the Quadrilateral in front, or of advancing by the 
Lower Po and cutting the communications with 
Vienna. La Marmora determined that the main 
army should advance against the Mincio and the 
Adige under the personal command of King Victor 
Emanuel, the army numbering 140,000 men with 
228 guns. lie believed that the Archduke would 
await the Italian attack behind the Adige, so that 


his troops could cross the Miiicio and enter the 
Quadrilateral without resistance. His intention was 
after having thus separated the fortresses, to combine 
with General Cialdini, who was to cross the Lower 
Po in the direction of Ferrara. Garibaldi, with his 
mountain troops, was to attack the passes which led 
from Lombardy into the Tyrol. 

On June 23 the headquarters of the King were 
at Goito, and early in the morning the passage of 
the Mincio commenced, very few signs of the Aus- 
trians being apparent. The Italians, confirmed in 
their opinion that the Archduke was not contem- 
plating resistance on the west side of the Adige, pro- 
ceeded to occupy the heights between Valeggio, 
Castelnuovo, and Somma Campagna. La Marmora 
employed no scouts, his troops did not breakfast be- 
fore starting, proper rations were not served out to 
them, and no preparations seemed to have been made 
for combat. In the meantime the Archduke was also 
moving towards Somma Campagna with the view 
of attacking the Italians on the flank, whom he im- 
agined to be marching towards Albaredo on the 
Adige. Thus a collision between the two armies was 

The two armies met on the morning of June 24. 
Custozza and Somma Campagna iire situated on the 
south-eastern slopes of the chain of liills which stretch 
between Verona and Peschiera, and the Italian army 
was marching towards Villa Franca in the plain 
without securing possession of these hills. The x\us- 
trians were well acquainted with the ground from 
their constant use of it in manoeuvres, and the Arch- 
duke Albert was a worthy son of the Archduke 
Charles who had beaten Napoleon at Aspern. The 
hills consist of deep ravines and isolated summits 


and are drained by the little River Tieino. The 
battle of Cnstozza was fought during the greater 
part of the hot midsummer day and ended in a 
brilliant victory for the Austrians. The Italians did 
their utmost to sustain the fight nnder the eyes of 
their sovereign until 3 p.m.^ when the Austrians 
stormed jMonte Vento and the chapel of Santa Lucia 
on the right bank of the Tione. In the evening they 
were driven back across the Mincio ; but the con- 
querors were so much exhausted that they could not 
continue the pursuit. The loss of killed, wounded, 
and prisoners was on the Austrian side about five 
thousand, and on the Italian side about eight thou- 

The Italian army was now withdrawn behind the 
Oglio, and Cialdini, on hearing of the battle of Cus- 
tozza, gave up his intention of crossing the Lower Po 
and moved towards his left, posting his troops near 
Mirandola and Modena so as to be in close communi- 
cation with the King's army. The Archduke had no 
intention of invading Lombardy. 

Garibaldi's force consisted of about six thousand 
men, divided into three bodies, one of which occupied 
Eocca d'Anfo on the Lake of Idro, a second Edolo on 
the Tonale road, and a third Bormio in the Stelvio 
pass. His operations were nni'm])ortant, and he 
found the population of the so-called Italian Tyrol 
not inclined to desert the Austrian cause. He was 
twice worsted in small engagements, in the second of 
which he was wounded. 

The Italians rested for some time after the battle 
of Custozza, but having promised to support the 
armies of Prussia they crossed the Lower Po and 
advanced against the Tyrol and the eastern part of 


Venetia, under the command of Cialdini, who had 
succeeded to La Marmora. Cialdini effected these 
operations on July 9, and five days afterward reached 
Padua. For political reasons the Italians were 
anxious to occupy as much of the Austrian territory 
as possible. His army consisted of seventy thousand 
men and he was expecting reinforcements which 
would double its numbers, whereas the Austrian s 
could not place more than thirty thousand men in the 
field. The tz'oops were extended from Vicenza on the 
left to Mestre, not far from Venice, on the right, 
while his centre threatened the communications of 
the Austrians with Friuli. At Cialdini's advance 
the Austrians gradually evacuated the Quadrilateral 
and retired beyond the Isonzo, and on July 24 the 
Italians occupied Udine. 

In the meantime General ^ledici was advancing 
against Bassano, and Garibaldi was attempting the 
conquest of the Italian Tyrol. It was obvious that 
the Italians were not willing to content themselves 
with Venetia, but aimed at occupying all territories in 
which the Italian language was spoken. Their ardour 
was checked by the result of the naval battle of Lissa 
in which the Italian fleet under Persano was entirely 
destroyed by the Austrian Admiral Tegethoff on Jul}' 
20, 1866. Five days later Victor Emmanuel agreed 
to an armistice, and the Austrians ceded Venetia to 
the Emperor Xapoleon, who made it over to the 
Italians, and thus completed the promise which he 
had left unredeemed in 1859. 




We must now pursue the fortunes of the war in 
other parts of Germany. We have already seen the 
forced retreat of the Hanoverian army to Gottingen. 
Much was expected from the co-operation of the Ba- 
varian army, but its efficiency was spoiled by the 
vacillation of its commander, Prince Charles, who 
liad opposed to him a most competent general in the 
person of Vogel von Falckenstein, while the eighth 
corps, made up of a motley collection of contingents 
from different States, lacked that unity and enthusi- 
asm which are the first conditions of success. The 
Hanoverian army had lost the opportunity of uniting 
successfully with the Bavarians by the necessity which 
!t felt of rest and refreshment, and it was forced 
to effect that union by passing through the Thurin- 
gian forest. Even then there was a want of energy 
in the leaders on both sides. There is little doubt 
that if the King of Hanover had marched vigorously 
on Gotha on June 24 he could not have been op- 
posed with any success by the Coburg army which 
was on the side of the Prussians ; but instead of this 
he entered into negotiations which led to no satis- 
factory result. 

The decisive battle took place at Langensalza on 
June 27. The Hanoverians occupied a position on 
the gently sloping hills which rise from the left bank 



of the River Unstrut. They had, however, detach- 
ments on the other side of the stream, notably in 
Langensalza, from which the battle derives its name. 
Their troops were gradually driven across the river 
and the Prussians occupied Langensalza before 10 
A.M. Shortly after this the signal for the battle was 
given by the Hanoverians, and in a few minutes the 
M'hole of the Prussian and the greater part of the 
Hanoverian forces were engaged. In the attack 
upon the Hanoverian position the Prussian line had 
become very widely extended, and the King deter- 
mined to take advantage of this fault. The advance 
was made at midday, but was impeded by the steep 
banks of the river. The Prussians, however, re- 
treated and many prisoners were taken, but owing 
to the nature of the river, flowing deeply through high 
banks, the Hanoverian cavalry were not able to fol- 
low up the victory. Therefore at 5 p.m. the pursuit 
came to an end and the Hanoverians remained 
masters of the field of battle. Their loss in killed 
and wounded was 1,372. The Prussians lost about 
the same number and nearly a thousand prisoners. 

This victory was, however, soon found to be of no 
use. On the following day the King of Hanover 
discovered that he was hemmed in on all sides by an 
army of forty thousand enemies. He determined 
therefore not to sacrifice his soldiers, and accepted 
the terms which had been previously proposed by 
Prussia. Arms, carriages, and military stores were 
handed over to the Prussians, the Hanoverian sol- 
diers were dismissed to their homes, the ofiicers en- 
gaged not to serve against Prussia during the war, 
while the King and the Crown Prince were permit- 
ted to go where they pleased so long as they did not 
remain in the territories of their former kingdom. 


After the capitulation of the Hanoverians General 
Vogel von Falckenstein was in a position to unite 
the several bodies of troops which had been led to 
his assistance by Generals Goeben, Manteuffel, and 
Beyer, into a single force, called the army of the 
Main, and to attack the Federal troops composed of 
the seventh and eighth army corps. The first, as we 
have already seen, was composed of the Bavarians, 
wlio were fiftv thousand strong under the command 
of Prince Charles, who had served in the Napoleonic 
wars, and in the Schleswig-Holstein campaign of 
1848. The second, made up from contingents from 
Wiirtemberg, Darmstadt, Baden, and J^assau, and 
strengthened by Austrian troops drawn from differ- 
ent garrisons, was commanded by Prince Alexander 
of Hesse, brother of the Empress of Bussia and the 
father of the Princes of Battenberg, but in order to 
gain the advantage of greater unity the supreme 
control of the whole was committed to the hands of 
Prince Charles. This unity,however,wasnotattained. 
The blight which had marred the national strength 
throughout a long series of vears, the canker of the 
old German Empire, was now potent to destroy the 
effieiency of these motley groups. Local jealousies 
and local interests could not be forgotten, and the 
superior numbers of these combined forces could not 
prevail against the more scanty but better disci- 
])lined and more enthusiastic legions of the Prus- 

The Federal army was not in a position to take 
the field till the beginning of July. The Bavarians 
were posted in northern Franconia between the 
Ehon and the Thuringian forests, while the eighth 
army corps occupied the Wetterau to the north of 


Frankfort, and contented itself with taking posses- 
sion of Giessen and the Prussian enclave of Wetzlar. 
A plan which had been originally formed for a con- 
centration in Hersfeld was not carried out, as the 
several combatants were reluctant to sever connec- 
tion with the countries to which they belonged. 

Falckenstein conceived the plan of pushing a wedge 
between these two armies in such a manner that thev 
would be prevented from undertaking any action in 
combination. For this purjiose he despatched Goc- 
ben's divisions in an easterly direction against the 
Bavarians, who had advanced from Coburg and 
Meiningen as far as Kaltennordheim and had occu- 
pied ISTeidhardtshausen and Rorsdorf in the valley of 
the Fulda. The two armies came into collision on 
July 4 in the battle of Dombach or Wiesenthal, as it 
is variously called, and the field was obstinately con- 
tested with great bravery on either side. Although 
the Bavarians were superior in numbers the conflict 
had no decisive conclusion, and the losses sustained 
by the combatants on either side were nearly equal. 
The result was that Prince Charles gave up the 
idea of uniting with the eighth army corps in this 
direction and marched southwards towards the Fran- 
conian Saale, followed by the Prussian army, which 
advanced along the Fulda valley towards Hanau, so 
that after several days' marching in parallel lines both 
sides reached the valley of the Main. Falckenstein's 
object had been so far attained that while on July 5 
the Bavarians and the eighth Federal corps were 
only thirty miles distant, on July 7 seventy lay be- 
tween them. 

After a difficult march through the Rhon moun- 
tains the Prussian army came up with the Bavarians 


in the valley of the Saale, and on July 10 fought 
the battles of Kissingen and Hammelburg. In the 
first the town was bravely defended bv the Bavarians, 
who stood their ground bravely on the bridge which 
crosses the Saale, notwithstanding the burning houses 
and the heavy cannonade. The position was at last 
stormed by the advance of the Jiigers, and the de- 
fenders could not withstand the vigour of the assault 
and the quick firing of the needle-gun. The Ba- 
varians drew off to the south-east and the Prussians 
gained the passage of the Saale at Hammelburg. In 
the second the fashionable watering-place was taken 
by surprise; the visitors and the inhabitants had no 
opportunity of retiring, although those lodging in 
the Hotel Sauner, which is situated on the right bank 
of the Saale, were allowed to remove to a less danger- 
ous position ; otherwise none w^ere permitted to quit 
the place for fear of their giving intelligence to the 
enemy. The Prussians made their appearance in the 
earlv mornina; of Julv 10, and the Saale was crossed 
without serious loss. After the passage of the stream 
the invaders pushed forward into the heart of the 
towTi, but met with a stout resistance. The Kur- 
garten, the centre of the social life of the place, was 
only carried after a fourth assault, and a little after 
3 P.M. the whole of the town was in the possession 
of the Prussians. Even then the Bavarians con- 
tinued the contest on the hills and the fight lasted till 
the evening. 

There is no doubt that the Bavarians were sur- 
prised on the Saale, and that they had not exj)ected 
an attack till the following day, and consequently 
had not concentrated their forces on the river. The 
troops which held Kissingen and Hammelburg were 
unsupported, and the reserves were too far off to be 


of any service; indeed they did not arrive till their 
comrades had been defeated, and then, .naturall}^, 
shared their fate. The Bavarian staff was un- 
prepared and had no proper maps of the country, 
whereas the movements of the Prussians had been 
extremely rapid. 

Falckenstein now turned his attention to the 
eighth army corps, which was placed in entrenched 
positions on the Fulda. When the news of the Aus- 
trian defeat reached the headquarters at Bornheim 
it appeared of the first importance to defend Frank- 
furt. Prince Alexander therefore sent a Hessian 
and Austrian division under General N"eipperg to 
Aschaffenburg to hold back the Prussians who were 
advancing from Gemiinden, and at the same time 
occupied the passes at Gelnhausen. This, however, 
resulted in the victory of Goeben at Lauffach on July 
13 and the capture of Aschaffenburg on the follow- 
ing day, and Prince Alexander was compelled to sur- 
render Frankfurt, which was occupied by the Prus- 
sians on July 16, and to retire with his whole army 
southwards to the Odenwald. Falckenstein had thus 
in a space of fourteen days defeated two armies, each 
of which was as strong as his own, in two great and 
several minor actions. He was now able to report 
to the King that all lands north of the Main were in 
the possession of the Prussians. Falckenstein 
established his headquarters in the old Imperial city 
and issued a proclamation announcing that he had 
temporarily assumed the government of the duchy 
of ^N'assau, of the town and territory of Frankfurt, 
and of the portions of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt 
which his troops had occupied. 

After the victory of Koniggratz the main Prus- 
sian army rested for a few days and then advanced 


by tlic railway to Pardubitz, leaving a corps of ob- 
servation before the fortresses of Koniggriitz and 
Josephstadt, and pursuing the beaten Austrians in 
their retreat to Olmiitz. In the meantime the im- 
portant city of Prague, the capital of Bohemia, had 
been occupied, without a conflict, on July 8. At the 
news of these events terror reigned in Vienna, and 
there was a movement to summon the whole nation 
to arms. On July 13 Archduke Albert took com- 
mand of the whole forces of the Empire ; he brought 
a portion of the army of the south to the capital and 
united it with the remains of the army of the north. 
In the meantime the Crowai Prince was holding 
Benedek and his troops fast in Olmiitz, whilst the 
armies of the Elbe and of Prince Frederick Charles 
advanced towards the capital by the shortest road. 
The Emperor demanded an armistice, but this was 
refused because he insisted on the conditions that the 
Federal States should also be included in it, and 
that no obstacle should be placed to the movements 
of the armv of the south. 

The Prussians were not able to take up positions 
which would threaten an interruption of the com- 
munications between Vienna and Olmiitz. Archduke 
Albert, therefore, issued ord(jrs to Field-Marshal 
Benedek to send his six army corps by railway to 
Vienna. But before half of them were despatched 
the railroad w^as broken up and Benedek had to retire 
with the remainder on the road to Presburg, which 
he only reached after fighting with considerable loss. 
An eyewitness, ]\[r. Hozier, gives an interesting ac- 
count of the incident, telling us that when the lead- 
ing horsemen came within sight of the railway at 
Coding they saw two trains, one close behind the 
other, with engines puffing and snorting violently, as 


if drawing a heavy load, steaming slowly in the 
direction of Lindenburg, carrying Austrian troops 
from Olmiitz to Vienna. It was immediately re- 
solved to break up the line. Pickaxes and spades 
were found in the neighbouring cottages, and the 
men set to work on foot whilst others held their 
horses. Soon the rails were wrenched out of their 
places, thrown on one side, and in a few minutes 
the line was useless for railway traffic. Scarcely was 
the work complete before another train came up, but 
when the engine-driver saw the Prussian cavalry he 
reversed his engine and backed slowly in the direc- 
tion from which he had come. 

The same authority also remarks that railways 
in an enemy's country are of no use for the troops 
of an invader during his advance, as the army of 
the defence always breaks them up and they cannot 
be repaired quickly enough to allow of troops being 
moved by them. But for the carriage of provisions 
and stores thev are invaluable, the line of railway 
being the great artery which, leading from the heart, 
supplies the extremities of the army with means of 
life and motion. At the same time a broken bridge, 
even a few yards wide, would cause a dead stoppage, 
and the time lost in shifting stores from one side to 
the other would be very great. An engineer, he 
says, who would find means of rapidly constructing 
field-bridges which would bear the weight of a rail- 
Avay train would cause an advance in the art of war. 

On July 18, 1866, King William took up his 
quarters in the little Moravian town of Xikolsburg, 
and slept in the very room which Xapoleon had occu- 
pied before the battle of Austerlitz. At this time 
the advanced guard of the invaders saw the Imperial 
city, conspicuous by the spire of St. Stephen's 
church and the tower of the palace of Schonbrunn, 


while before them lay the Marchfeld with the 
villages of Aspern, Esslingen, and Wagram, the 
scenes of ISTapoleon's defeat and of his ultimate vic- 
tory. They were situated, Hozier tells us, in the 
midst of rich corn-land and fields of bright poppies, 
which from a distance looked like pieces of dazzling 
mosaic let into a golden pavement, fringed by the 
silver band of the Danube, studded with emerald 
islets. In the distance the dark blue Carpathian 
mountains bounded the view towards Hungary, ^o 
Prussian army, not even that of the Great Frederick, 
had ever gazed upon this view before. Floridsdorf 
and Presburg were the only strong places which the 
Austrians now had in their possession on the north 
bank of the Danube. This last-named fortress, 
which is the key of the passage between Austria and 
Hungary, was on the point of being captured on July 
23, when a few moments after midday an Austrian 
came out from Blumenau, and advanced with a flag 
of truce to the Prussian lines. He reported to a 
Prussian officer who went out to meet him that an 
armistice had been agreed upon to date from mid- 
day and that the hoiir was already past. The signal 
to cease firing sounded along the Prussian ranks, and 
then ensued a sudden stillness, a hum of conversa- 
tion from the astonished soldiers taking the place of 
the roar of artillery and the patter of small arms. 

This was the end of the war. The Emperor of the 
French had offered his mediation and had sent M. 
Benedetti, his ambassador at Paris, to the King's 
headquarters at Nikolsburg to propose terms of 
peace. The cessation of hostilities agreed upon for 
July 23 was changed into a definite truce on July 
26, which included the settlement of preliminaries 
of peace, the definite Peace of Prague being signed 
four weeks later on August 23, 1866, 


THE WAK OF 1870. 



We must again remind our readers that it is no 
part of the object of this volume to deal M'ith politi- 
cal history. We must, therefore, omit all discussion 
as to the origin of the war of 1870, and proceed di- 
rectly to the war itself, giving, however, such an 
account of the composition and mobilisation of the 
two armies as may throw light upon the develop- 
ment of military science as compared with its con- 
dition in the other campaigns which we have de- 
scribed. The French army had been for a long 
time looked uj^on as a pattern for all European 
armies ; its organisation was carefully studied in 
other countries. An idea prevailed that the French 
had a genius for warfare which was the backbone of 
their strength, whereas Prussia Avas frequently held 
up to ridicule from its supposed pedantry in time 
of war. No one, either in France or outside of it, 
had any idea that the core of this magnificent 
growth was hollow, and that when opposed to a 
better organised adversary would crumble into frag- 



In 1870 the principle of liability to military 
service was acknowledged by French law jnst as 
fnlly as in Germany, bnt in France any one was 
allowed to 2)rocnre a snbstitutc who could afford to 
])ay for it, whereas in Germany personal service was 
insisted upon. The result of this was that the 
French army, being recruited from the poorer and 
more ignorant classes of society, lacked the elements 
of intelligence and culture which entered so largely 
into the German armies. Further, in France pains 
were taken to keep the soldiers from contact with 
the citizens, to isolate them in barracks and camps, 
and to avoid billeting tliem upon the inhabitants, so 
tliat the army gradually became a military caste. 
The Germany army, on the other hand, remained 
in close contact witli the classes of society from which 
it was recruited. France had undoubtedly learnt 
something from the wars of 1859 and 1866. She 
had found in 1851) that whereas the French army 
consisted on paper of not less than four hundred 
thousand men, and although not more than one hun- 
dred and twenty thousand infantry and ten thou- 
sand cavalry had been employed in the Italian cam- 
paign, still it was impossible to march an army on 
to the Rhine when Prussia mobilised her army and 
threatened France in favour of Austria. There- 
fore in 1861 the French determined to create such a 
reserve as would raise the army from four hundred 
thousand to six hundred thousand. The war of 18G6 
showed that an army of six hundred thousand men 
Avould be quite inadequate to face the Prussian and 
North German armies, including the Landwehr. 
It was, therefore, resolved to increase the war estab- 
lishment to eight hundred thousand men, and to 
create a mobile National Guard. 


It being impossible to increase the peace establish- 
ment of the armv, this was effected by reducing thcj 
period of military service from seven to five years, 
and by providing that all men who had hitherto re- 
ceived a final discharge at the end of seven years 
should in future be liable to four years' reserve obli- 
gation on furlough after the expiration of five years. 
This, it was reckoned, would provide about two hun- 
dred and forty thousand well-trained reserves. 
There was also a second class who were liable as re- 
serves for nine years, and these would add an addi- 
tional body of one hundred thousand, less carefully 
trained, which would bring up the whole reserve to 
a total of three hundred and forty thousand men. 

The Mobile Xational Guard was created in 1862. 
It consisted of all persons who for one reason or an- 
other had not been enrolled in the active army or 
the reserve or who had paid for substitutes. They 
were liable for five years with fifteen days' annual 
training in time of peace, which gives a force of 
four hundred and twenty-five thousand men. Their 
duty was to be auxiliary to the active army, especial- 
ly in garrisoning fortresses, in the defence of coasts 
andfrontiersandinthemaintenanceof internal order. 
This new organisation was at first popular with the 
nation, but popular zeal cooled down as soon as the 
necessity of sacrifice became apparent, and the 
Mobiles were of little use in the war. 

The military organisation of Prussia, which dates 
from 1861, had been proved to be sound in the war 
against Denmark in 1863 and Austria in 1866. After 
the latter war it had been extended to the Xorth 
German States, and was gradually introduced into 
the South German States as well. Its main prin- 
ciple was to secure that in time of peace all those 


who are liable to field service should also be fit for 
it ; so that the soldiers sent to meet the enemy should 
be perfectly trained and instructed. For this pur- 
pose a twelve years' period of service was imposed 
upon the nation, consisting of three years in the 
standing army, four years in the Reserve and five in 
the Landwehr, the Reserve having in the four years 
two terms of training of eight weeks each, and the 
Landwehr during their five years two periods of 
shorter duration, from eight to fourteen days. 

The contrast between the organisation of the two 
armies was still more apparent in their mobilisation. 
In Germany the plan which had been formed for 
placing a maximum force under arms at a given 
time, originally excellent, had been improved from 
day to day and brought down to the last moment. 
It depended upon the most elaborate decentralisa- 
tion, each unit of the German military system being 
organised bv itself, but yet with due subordination 
to the whole. Whenever a branch or section of a 
railway line was open for traffic the entire series of 
time-tables were altered, if need be, to include this 
new facility for transport. The same diligence was 
exhibited in the attainment of information; the Ger- 
man Staff maps of France, especially east of Paris, 
laid down roads which in July, 1870, had not been 
marked upon any map issued by the French War 
Office ; yet although the central departments in Ber- 
lin exercised an active supervision, they did not 
meddle with the local military authorities, who had 
large discretionary powers. 

In 1870 the army of the North German Con- 
federation, with a peace establishment of about 
twelve thousand officers, two hundred and eight-five 
thousand men and seventy-three thousand horses, had 


to be augmented in the short space of from eight to 
ten days to a war establishment of twenty-two thou- 
sand officers, nine hundred and thirty-two thousand 
combatants, and one hundred and ninety-two thou- 
sand horses, equipped with everything which an army 
requires on the field. This gigantic task could never 
have ])een performed unless every comjDonent part 
had performed its share of the work with the greatest 
diligence and rapidity, each wheel working into its 
fellow with punctuality and precision, nor could this 
be effected without decentralisation of the military 
administration, division and repartition of labour, 
and constant conscientious provision in peace for the 
exigencies of war. 

When King William of Prussia arrived at Berlin 
on the evening of June 15, 1870, he at once sanc- 
tioned the orders prepared by General Moltke, and 
they were immediately transmitted to the officer.? 
commanding the several army corps. By regular 
stages each corps was gradually but swiftly devel- 
oped into its full proportions and ready to start for 
the frontier as a finished product. The reserves and, 
if necessary, the landwehr men filled out the battal- 
ions, squadrons and batteries to the fixed strength, 
and they were provided with the arms, clothing and 
equipments which were stored in the local depots. 
Horses were called in, requisitioned or bought and 
transport was obtained. All the wants of a complete 
army corps were easily supplied, as they had been 
ascertained and provided for beforehand. Thus the 
whole operation of bringing a great army from a 
peace to a war footing, in absolute readiness to meet 
an enemy advancing on his own soil, was carried out 
with unparalleled order and quickness in the short 
period of eighteen days. This included the transport 


of men, guns, horses, carriages, chiefly by railway, 
from all parts of the country to the Rhine and the 
jNloselle; indeed more than three hundred thousand 
combatants with all their appurtenances were con- 
veyed to the places on the days specified, in fulfil- 
ment of a scheme reasoned, specified and drawn out 
two years before. 

The mobilisation of the French army was an 
entire contrast to that of its antagonist. In France 
the minute territorial organisation of the army, 
which prevailed in Germany, did not exist. A 
peasant residing in Provence might be summoned 
to join a regiment quartered in Brittany, or a work- 
man employed in Bordeaux called up to the Pas de 
Calais ; when they arrived they might discover that 
their regiments had marched to Alsace or to Lor- 
raine. During the first fortnight after the declara- 
tion of war thousands of reserve men w^ere travelling 
to and fro over France in search of their comrades. 
Before war was declared Marshal Leboeuf, the War 
Minister, declared in the Council of Ministers that 
the army was perfectly prepared for war, and when 
asked to explain himself he said : " I mean that the 
army is perfectly equipped in every respect, that it 
will not require even the purchase of a single gaiter 
luitton for a year to come. EJIe est archiprete." 
This boast was soon discovered to be completely un- 
founded. At the opening of tlie war the French 
only possessed one completely formed corps d'armee; 
a second, stationed in the camp of Chalons, was com- 
manded by General Frossard ; all the other corps had 
to be made out of garrison troops and the entire staff 
had to be provided in haste. The armament of 
Straslmrg was not commenced till August 4 ; on July 
20 there was no food in the fortresses of Metz and 


Thionville, and a million rations had to be sent from 
Paris. On Jnly 25 there was neither biscuit nor 
salt meat in the fortresses of Mezieres and Sedan. 
All the regiments were hundreds short of their 
proper strength. 

There was also great deficiency of ready money; 
General de Failly at Bitsch had no coin wherewith 
to pay his troops. The German soldiers were 
adequately supplied with first-rate maps of France, 
the French only had maps of Germany intended for 
the invasion of that country. The German officers 
had a far more intimate knowledge of the country 
through which they were marching than had the 
French inhabitants themselves. On July 21 General 
Michel sent the following telegram to Paris : " Have 
arrived at Belfort ; cannot find my brigade ; cannot 
find the General of Division ; what shall I do ?" 
The German army rested on solid foundations, and 
nothing was left to chance; the French army was 
loosely put together. It consisted of uncertain ele- 
ments, was not easily collected, and was never in 
formed bodies, and yet the national character of 
the French is perhaps better suited for minute and 
careful organisation than that of the Germans. 

Let us now consider the disposition of the two 
armies at the end of Julv. The main French armv, 
two hundred thousand strong, was placed in and 
around Metz under IMarshals Bazaine and Canrobert 
and under General Bourbaki, who commanded the 
Imperial Guard. It was called the Army of the Rhine, 
but it had little to do with that river. On July 
27 it was joined by the Emperor and his son and by 
Marshal Leboeuf, the too confident ^linister of War. 
To the east was the Army of the South under Mac- 
Mahon, Duke of Magenta, about one hundred thou- 


sand strong. To this army were attached the Afri- 
can troops and the Zouaves, who were mainly of 
Parisian origin. This army was thrown forward 
towards Alsace, and its advanced guard under Gen- 
eral Douay was on the Rhine. In the camp at 
Chalons was a third army consisting of reservists 
and mobiles, who were not completely collected and 
were very imperfectly drilled. Besides these armies 
a well-manned and equipped fleet was sailing from 
Cherbourg through the Channel with the object of 
cruising in the North Sea and the Baltic, to blockade 
the harbours and to land on the coasts. 

The German forces were also divided into three 
great sections. The first under General Steinmetz, 
sixty-one thousand strong, contained the first, seventh 
and eighth army corps, under Manteuffel, Zastrow, 
and Goeben respectively, and formed the right wing. 
The second, under Prince Frederick Charles, with a 
strength of two hundred and six thousand men and 
534 guns, together with the third, numbering one 
hundred and eighty thousand men and 480 guns, 
under the Crown Prince of Prussia, with Blmnen- 
thal as head of the staff, formed the left wing. The 
Central army, under the command of the King him- 
self, with Moltke as head of the staff, contained the 
second army corps under Fransecky, the third and 
fourth each commanded by an Alvensleben, the ninth 
under Manstein, and the tenth under Voigts-Rhetz, 
and the twelfth, composed of Saxons, under the 
Crown Prince of that countrv, Albert. With the 
Central army also marched Count Bismarck, and 
Roon, the Minister of War. General Vogel von Falck- 
enstein directed from Hanover the defence of the Ger- 
man coasts against the hostile fleet. It has been cal- 
culated that the whole of the troops of the Xorth Ger- 




man Confederates amounted to nine hundred and 
eigbty-four thousand five hundred men, and that of 
the French to seven hundred and ninety-eight thou- 
sand men ; but the numbers actually brought into the 
field were considerably smaller. 




The Emperor left St. Cloud to join the armv on 
the morning of July 28, ISTO, taking the Prince Im- 
perial with him. It has been reported by an eye- 
witness that he was silent and out of spirits, seem- 
ing to anticipate disaster. As he picked up various 
well-loved trinkets to place them in his travelling-bag 
his eyes were full of tears. On the other hand, the 
Empress was radiant with joy and hope, and did her 
best to rouse him by reading extracts from the last 
English papers. She was passionate for the war. 
" It is my war," she proudly claimed, but she had 
little to be proud of in the sequel. The Erench plan 
was to separate Xorth from South Germany by a 
rapid passage of the Rhine, and by winning a decisive 
battle to induce Austria and Italy to abandon their 
neutrality and to take part with France. For this 
purpose one hundred thousand men were to be con- 
centrated at Strasburg, and one hundred and fifty 
thousand at Metz, and these united armies were to 
cross the Rhine at ^Maxau, between Rastadt and Ger- 
mershein and occupy the Grand Duchy of Baden. 
Meanwhile :Marshal Canrobert was to assemble fifty 
thousand men at Chalons, to bring this force to Metz, 
and to protect the north-western frontier of France 
while the so-called Rhine army advanced into Ger- 
many. These operations could only be carried out 
under conditions of the greatest rapidity and the 


fullest preparation, but Xapoleon found at Metz, 
that not only were supplies of all kinds deficient, but 
that Metz was short of its complement by fifty thou- 
sand men and Strasburg by sixty thousand, whereas 
Canrobert's troops not having been concentrated at 
Chalons were unable to march to Metz. 

The first engagement took place on August 2 at 
Saarbriicken, a small German commercial frontier" 
town, defended by a Prussian detachment fifteen 
hundred strong. To attack this place Greneral Fros- 
sard advanced with the whole of the second army 
corps. The small Prussian force under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Pestel skirmished with this overwhelming 
force for two hours, and kept it in check for half a 
day. It then retired, in perfect order, over the 
bridges at 12.30 p.m. The town of Saarbriicken 
was then occupied ; and the open town and railway 
station of St. Joliann, on the opposite side of the 
river, was furiously shelled. Less than a hundred 
men were killed or wounded on either side, but the 
French papers boasted, '" Saarbriicken has once more 
become a French city, the splendid coal district on 
the Saar is French property, Saarbriicken is the first 
station, we shall soon reach the last one, Berlin." 
The Emperor wrote to his wife that the Prince Ini- 
j^erial had received his baptism of fire, and that the 
first shots from the mitrailleuses had produced a 
wonderful effect. The French made no further ad- 
vance, but fortified their position on the left bank 
of the Saar, the Emperor returning to Metz. 

The next engagement was of a very different char- 
acter. A division of MacMahon's army under 
General Abel Douay had advanced to the frontiers 
of Rhenish Bavaria, and had occupied the fortified 
town of Weissenburg, which lies in the centre of the 


Weisspnburs; lines, traces of which mav still be seen 
from the railway, so celebrated as a place of combat 
between the French and Germans in the War of the 
Spanish Succession, and in the Revolutionary War 
of 1793. General Douay placed two battalions, con- 
sisting one of his infantry and the other of Turcos, 
in the town and occupied, with the remaining nine 
battalions of his division, a camp with tents on the 
heights to the south of Weissenburg. The third 
army, under the command of the Crown Prince, had 
pressed forward to the River Lauter, and was ad- 
vanciug southwards between Weissenburg and 
Lauterburg. The troops of Douay's division were 
employed in preparing their coffee at 9 a.m. in their 
camp, when intelligence came that the enemy was ad- 
vancing in great masses and were close at hand ; upon 
which, the troops, leaving their tents standing, moved 
forward to occupy the river. The Prussian force 
consisted of Bavarians under Von der Tann, as well 
as Silesians, Poles, Hessians, Thuringians, and 
troops of I»[assau, so that by midday the French were 
threatened by far superior forces, and Douay ought 
to have retreated, having learned by this time that 
he could not expect assistance from Ducrot, wdio 
was posted at Worth, twelve miles distant. At noon 
the town of Weissenburg was stormed and taken 
after a gallant resistance. An attack was then made 
ujiou the heights of the Gaisberg, which dominated 
the surrounding country and was crowned by a strong 
castle. Eventually the French lines were broken 
and the neighbouring heiglits stormed, a Fi'ench gun, 
the first trophy of the war, being captured by the 
Silesian Jiigers. General Douay was killed and the 
Frencli sullenly retired from their camp, and the 
remaining companies who were posted in the castle 


were compelled to surrender at 2 p.m.^ having lost 
seventv-four men killed and wounded in defence 
of it ; seven hundred men were taken prisoners. This 
was the first victory gained bj the German troops 
on French soil. 

Two days later, on August 6, 1870, was fought the 
important battle of Worth, when MacMahon, having 
concentrated all his troops on the main line of com- 
munication leading by Bitsch and Saargemiind to 
Metz, determined to accept a battle, although by 
doing so he abandoned possession of Alsace. The 
position chosen was a strong one, as the chain of steep 
hills, partly wooded, completely dominates the 
ground on the left bank of the Sauer, which is a deep 
rivulet with steep banks, offering a considerable ob- 
stacle to the advance of an enemy and only passable 
by the bridges at Gorsdorff, Worth, and Gunstett. 
The position was strengthened by rifle-pits, trenches, 
abattis, field-works, batteries, and wire fences. Mac- 
Mahon had no information as to the line of the 
enemy's approach ; however, he took up the following 
positions on the morning of August 6. lie placed 
Ducrot on the left wing with the first division, Raoult 
with the third division in the centre, holding the 
village of Worth at the passage over the Sauer, 
strongly occupied. The fourth division, under De 
L'Artigue was on the right, holding the lower wood, 
with a flank formed en potencc opposite to the vil- 
lage of Morsbrunn. lie had at first intended to figlit 
a purely defensive battle and had ordered the bridges 
over the Sauer to be destroyed, but he changed his 
mind and left tliem standing. 

The Crown Prince held the heights on the left 
bank of tlie Sauer, from Worth to Gunstett, liaving 
ninety thousand men opposed to forty thousand. The 


attack on Worth beffan soon after 8 a.m. Bv 11 a.m. 
the superiority of the Prussian artillery had become 
evident, and orders were given to storm the village. 
In the meantime the French made an attack upon 
Guustett, Avhich was, however, repulsed. Soon after 
noon Worth was carried by storm, after an obstinate 
resistance, and was subsequently held against two 
vigorous attempts to recover it. The Crown Prince 
had at first intended to defer the main battle till 
August 7, but at 1.30 p.m. he gave orders to continue 
the fighting. The hardest part of the fight, after 
crossing the stream, was in storming the heights east 
of Froschweiler, which were strongly occupied and 
partly fortified. The third French division, whose 
commandant. General Kaoult, was killed, fought 
with passionate courage, and only at the fourth on- 
slaught did the Prussians gain possession of the cov- 
eted ground. On the French side a desperate attempt 
was made to retake Elssasshausen, but the village 
remained in the hands of the Prussians. It now 
became possible to make a concentric attack on 
Froschweiler, which was the last strong point of the 
centre which remained in the hands of the French. 
Although the French fought with the fury of despair, 
the village was stormed at 3.30 p.m. and several 
thousand prisoners were taken in it. After the loss 
of Froschweiler further resistance became impossible. 
The French army broke up and fled in two directions, 
some to Reichshofen and some to Jiigerthal. The 
Prussians bivouacked on the field of battle, the cav- 
alry being pushed forward to Reichshofen. The 
troops which fled to Ilagenau Avere forwarded by 
rail to Strasburg, where they produced the utmost 
consternation. The remainder of the defeated army 
was concentrated at Saverne, which is situated on 
the main passage over the Vosges. 


On the same day that the Crown Prince of Prussia 
gained the victory of Worth with the left wing of 
the German armies, August 6, 1870, the right wing 
also gained at Saarbriicken a victory which eventu- 
ally had the most decisive consequences. The army 
corps of General Frossard had evacuated Saar- 
briicken as well as the exercise-ground of the place, 
which lies upon a height, and had taken up a position 
further to the south in the wooded range of Spichereu 
and Forbach. The position, naturally strong, was 
also fortified by walls and entrenchments, and was 
thought to be impregnable. Frossard had placed 
concealed batteries down the slope as far as the val- 
ley, which divides the exercise-ground from the 
heights. For the space of several hours the advanced 
guard of the first Prussian army under Zastrow and 
Kanieke attempted to scale the heights in front and 
flank ; two attacks were repulsed, and the German 
losses were severe. But at 5 p.m. General von Alvens- 
leben came up with some troops from the second 
armv, so that Goeben could now order a fresh attack 
upon the enemy's position. 

The day was extremely hot and the new troops 
"were exhausted by their long march, but they climbed 
the steep heights with shouts of Hurrah ! until they 
reached the Plateau. The French made extra- 
ordinary exertions, combining infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery, in their resistance, and fouaht with the 
courage of despair to recover the position tliey had 
lost, and it became necessary to bring up the Prussian 
cavalry and artillery to the Plateau, which was ef- 
fected by means of steep paths through wooded hills. 
On both wings new bodies of troops came up, directed 
by the sound of the cannon. The French were 
driven back in the direction of Spicheren and Es- 


lingen, and being quite exhausted, began to give way 
along the whole line. Finally, at about 9 p.m.^ they 
withdrew in a southerly direction to Saargemiind. 

In the evening of the same day General von Golz 
attacked the Kaninchenberg, a hill which overlooks 
the town of Forbach, and took it, being then able 
to fire some rounds of shot upon the town of Forbach 
and the retreating masses of the enemy, w^ho sub- 
sequently abandoned the tow^n. Xight, however, put 
an end to the engagement. Marshal Bazaine was 
posted with the third corps about six miles from 
Spicheren, with the purpose of supporting Frossard. 
He offered his co-operation, but it was declined as 
being unnecessary. This indifference and want of 
judgment on the part of the French is in strong con- 
trast to the energy of their opponents. The battle 
was w'on, by the rapid concentration on the scene of 
action of bodies of troops belonging to a great variety 
of corps and divisions. If every leader in the Prus- 
sian armv had not been zealous to hurrv forward 
without hesitation on hearing the roar of the can- 
nonade the achievements of August 6 could never 
have been accomplished, and the day might have 
marked a defeat in the Prussian annals. It is also 
remarkable that the command in the battle was four 
times chanfjed, and was held successively bv Kameke, 
Stiilpnagel, Goeben,and Zastrow; there was, however, 
the most perfect unity and harmony in the conduct 
of the fighting, showing the absence of jealousy and 
the uniformity of tactical system. 




The crushing defeats of Worth and Saarbriicken 
opened the north-eastern gate of France to the Ger- 
man armies without any further struggle. From 
August 6 the movements of the invading hosts were 
exclusively on French soil and all danger of an in- 
vasion from the west, either in N^orth or South Ger- 
many, was at an end. General consternation was felt 
at Paris. Tlie movements of the victorious troops 
who occupied the passes of the Vosges, and who, after 
the capture of the little fortress of Liitzelstein, 
pressed even to the Moselle, were so swift and ir- 
resistible that it became necessary to take measures 
for the security of the capital itself. The investment 
of the frontier city of Strasburg by General Beyer 
added to the terror. On August 7 and 8 the Emperor 
and the Ministry issued proclamations calling for a 
general rallying of the people under the national 
banner to save the national honour. At the same 
time the Chambers were summoned, and so strong an 
opposition was displayed towards the Government 
that Ollivier and Gramont were forced to resign, 
and the Empress entrusted General MacMahon with 
the formation of a new Cabinet, whose principal 
task should be to conduct the national defence against 
tlie invasion of the enemy. 

The new Ministry displayed great celerity in per- 
forming the task which they had undertaken. All 


unmarried men between twenty-five and thirty-five 
years of age, who had hitherto been legally dis- 
]>cnsed from military service, and widowers without 
children, were called in to the colours, excepting 
those who had been previously enrolled in the 
Xational Guard. Volunteers were accepted up to 
the age of forty-five. Free Corps were formed 
throughout the country, which created a guerilla 
warfare, and gave the struggle a character of inhu- 
manitv and crueltv which was unnecessary and use- 
less. At the same time all German families were 
expelled from France. The Emperor laid down his 
command in chief and transferred the care of the 
Rhine Army to Marshal Bazaine. Leboeuf was re- 
moved from his post of Minister of War. Bazaine 
recalled the beaten army of Frossard to Metz, whilst 
Mac]\[ahon retired with the remains of the Vosges 
army to Cln'dons, where fresh troops were being as- 
sembled. The original " Army of the Rhine " was 
divided into two parts. With Bazaine in Metz were 
Changarnier, Canrobert, Bourbaki, Ladmirault, and 
Decaen ; with MacMahon, whose army now began to 
be called the Army of Paris, were De Failly, Felix 
Douav, Ducrot, and Lebrun. The organisation of 
the Garde Mobile, neglected for so many years, was 
now taken up in a hurry, but with little result ; all 
the old soldiers between twenty-five and thirty-eight 
years of age, whose legal term of service had expired, 
were recalled to their regiments; the project of in- 
vading the sea-coast of Germany was given up, and 
a division of twelve thousand marines was incor- 
porated in the army, the marine artillery being sent 
to man the Paris forts. 

The Prussian army, together with the troops from 
the Xorth German States and from Hesse-Darm- 


stadt, now marched into Lorraine and took possession 
of !N^ancy and the whole of the flat country. When 
the King entered upon French territory at St. Avoid 
he issued a proclamation to the French people, in 
which he said that he was fighting against the French 
army and not against French citizens. They would 
continue to enjoy full security for their persons 
and their property, so long as they did not under- 
take any hostile proceedings against the German 
troops, and so deprive the King of the power of 
giving them his protection. These intentions were 
rendered nugatory by the creation of the Free Corps 
throughout France. Perhaps it was inevitable, under 
the circumstances, that every passion should be 
roused to deal vengeance and destruction on the in- 
vaders. But the war rapidly assumed an internecine 
character, and very few " peaceable " inhabitants, as 
defined by the Emperor's proclamation, could be 
found in the country. 

The Crown Prince entered Xancy on August 12, 
and, in possession of the capital, he could consider 
Lorraine as a conquered country, although Metz, 
Thionville, and some smaller frontier fortresses lav 
in the possession of the enemy. German governors 
were appointed in Alsace and Lorraine which seemed 
to point to a design already formed for revindicating 
these ancient German provinces for the Prussian 
Crown. The world looked on with amazement at 
the success of the German arms and the breaking-up 
of the Napoleonic system which had dazzled the eyes 
of Europe for twenty years. 

The portion of the Army of the Rhine concen- 
trated in and about Metz since August 11 amounted 
at least to one hundred and seventy thousand men. 
It remained inactive for seve;*al days, but, at the 


moment when Bazaine assumed the command, the 
steady advance of the German armies along the whole 
line demanded energetic action. It had to be de- 
cided whether this armv should await an attack on 
Metz or, avoiding a battle, withdraw to Chalons or 
Paris in order to defend the capital. Unfortunately 
the French had omitted to protect their flank, so that 
the first course had become impossible, and Bazaine 
was compelled to carry his army across the Moselle 
and lead it towards Verdun. On the night of August 
13 the army was still encamped on the right bank 
of the Moselle in a wide semicircle round Metz, the 
corps of Canrobert being on the right, those of 
Frossard and Decaen in the centre, and Ladmirault's 
on the left ; Bourbaki's guards were posted at Remy, 
Forton's reserve cavalrv at Moiitignv, and Barral's 
reserve cavalry on the island of Chambiere. The 
guards had apparently no idea that the first army 
of the Germans was onlv about four miles distant, 
concentrated in divisions. 

The Emperor left ]\Ietz at noon on August 14 and 
proceeded to the Moselle, intending to witness the 
passage of the river by the army and then to precede 
it to Verdun and Chalons. After organising at 
Chalons the army destined for the defence of the 
capital, he would return to Paris and resume the 
reins of government. General von der Goltz had re- 
ceived intelligence in the morning that the second 
army under Prince Frederick Charles had crossei 
the Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson, and came to the con- 
clusion that if he could manage to detain the French 
a little longer on the right bank, their plans might 
be disconcerted, and their passage of the river ren- 
dered impossible. He therefore advanced, under his 
own responsibility, at 3.30 p.m,^ but was brought to 


a check at Colombey. The French were not only 
superior in numbers, but were strongly posted behind 
trenches, abattis,and other field-works, and the Prus- 
sians found themselves in a very critical position ; 
but at 6 P.M. reinforcements came up. General 
Zastrow arrived about 5 p.m. and assumed command 
of his corps, but did not produce much effect, till 
at 7 P.M. General Kameke brought up four battalions 
on the left wing, and turned the fortune of the day. 
The French fell back upon Remy, and were forced 
out of their strong positions. Darkness ended the 
battle about 8 p.m., and the Prussians maintained 
the ground they had conquered, while the French 
withdrew to lletz. The object of keeping part of 
the French army on the right bank and preventing 
it from joining the troops which had already passed 
had been attained, so that the French had lost a day, 
whilst the second German army was able to continue 
its turning movement without interruption. The 
losses on both sides were considerable. 

On the following day, August 15, the great festival 
of the Xapoleon dynasty, the birthday of its founder, 
the day which the sanguine Imperialists had des- 
tined for the entry into Berlin, the whole French 
army set out from Metz towards Verdun, marching 
by the two southern roads, one of which passes by 
Rezonville, Vionville, and^ Mars-la-Tour, the other 
by Doncourt, Jarny, and Etain. The Emperor and 
his son accompanied the march, and spent the night 
in Gravelotte, but on the following morning set out 
by bye-roads for the camp at Chalons. But Bazaine 
could onlv move slowlv with his enormous train, and 
by the evening of that day the advanced guard of the 
second army, which had crossed the flooded Moselle 
at Pont-a-Mousson and other points, reached, after 


forced marches, the positions of Tronville, Mars-la- 
Tour, and Vionville. As it was part of Moltke's 
plan to detain the French army between the Meuso 
and the Moselle and to force them to a decisive bat- 
tle, this advanced guard, weary as they were, were 
compelled to take the field at daybreak on the follow- 
ing morning, August 1 6. 

The road from Gravelotte to Verdun passes by the 
villages of Rezonville, Vionville, and Mars-la-Tour, 
through an open and undulating country, dotted 
with small woods. Suddenly the cavalry brigade 
which was encamped west of Vionville were struck 
by shells fired from a battery close in their neigh- 
bourhood. More batteries followed suit, and the 
dragoons broke and fled, gallojjing off to Rezon- 
ville. The infantry camps were soon attacked in a 
similar manner, but Frossard's corps replied with 
great and successful vigour. The artillery which 
caused this panic belonged to the advanced guard of 
the army of Prince Frederick Charles, who did not 
anticipate a battle, but hoped to fall in with the rear- 
guard of the French, or to compel the French army to 
halt and fight before it reached the Meuse. The 
sound of the cannonade startled Lebopuf at Verne- 
ville and Marshal Bazaine in his headquarters at 

By this time Alvensleben had ascertained that the 
French outposts were at Tronville and Vionville and 
that great encampments were visible behind these 
two villages. Having thus learnt that the French 
had not begun their march to Verdun, he determined 
to attack them with the third corps and the sixth 
cavalry division in order to hold them fast. A ter- 
rible struggle ensued, the right wing under Stiilp- 
nagel advanced from the south, the left wing under 


Alvensleben himself from the south-west, while Von 
Billow attacked in the centre. Vionville and Fla- 
vigny were carried, and the French were compelled to 
retreat towards Rezonville. Stiilpnagers division 
had the greatest difficulty in maintaining its position 
to the west of the wood of Vionville, continuing the 
combat without being relieved, and suffering heavy 
losses from the enemy's long-range fire. But it was 
a combat for life or death, and every Prussian soldier 
felt convinced of the necessity of not yielding an 
inch of ground. 

Just as Frossard's infantry was retreating behind 
Bezonville, Bazaine appeared upon the scene and 
rode into the thick of the battle. He sent a line regi- 
ment to charge and check the pursuers ; but they 
were decimated by the fire of the infantry. Bazaine 
himself was nearly taken prisoner, being separated 
for a moment from his staff, and compelled to defend 
himself. The crisis of the battle came about 2 p.m.^ 
when every man and gun upon the German side was 
engaged and the greater part of the tenth corps was 
still distant from the field. Luckily for the Ger- 
mans Bazaine began to fear lest he might be turned 
on his left flank and detached troops to prevent it. 
At this time Alvensleben directed the brilliant charge 
of Bredow's corps, with the view of gaining time and 
relieving the infantry and the artillery. The charge 
effected its object, but with the terrible loss of l-i 
officers and 363 men ; indeed the French bulletins 
asserted that the cuirassier regiment of Count Bis- 
marck had been annihilated. During the next three 
hours the struggle on the German right and centre 
remained stationary, as they were unable to win 
ground from the grenadiers of the Imperial Guard. 

About 4 P.M. Prince Frederick Charles arrived on 


tlie field, having ridden straight from Pont-a-Mousson. 
He soon saw that the stress of the battle was on the 
left wing, where the tenth corps had appeared just 
in time to meet the fresh troops which were under 
the command of Leboeuf and Ladmirault. The artil- 
lery took the lead, then the infantry went into the 
wood and drove out the French. Ladmirault was 
driven back. Another cavalry cliarge took place in 
which Count Bismarck's two sons rode as privates; 
one of them was wounded, and the other lifted a 
Avounded comrade on to his horse and carried him 
from the field. The last event of the battle was a 
great combat of cavalry. 

It was now past 7 p.m.,, and both sides were ex- 
hausted by the tremendous strain to which they had 
been subjected, but the contest continued until dark- 
ness fell. At the very last moment a violent cannon- 
ade, the origin of which is still uncertain, burst forth 
on both sides. The French slept on the ground they 
held, that is in the village of Rezonville or on the 
heights to the south of it, and on the ridge on the 
north overlooking the u])per road to Verdun. In the 
battle the French had lost seventeen thousand men 
and the Germans sixteen thousand, there being one 
hundred and twenty-five thousand French engaged in 
the battle against seventy-seven thousand of their 
antagonists. The result was not so much a tactical 
as a moral victory. At the close of the fight neither 
party was able to move a step further towards the 
enemy. But during the night the French army was 
ordered to retire towards Metz. This was a surprise 
to the French, because they imagined that they had 
gained a great vi<^tory; but Bazaine had no confi- 
dence in the supplies either of ammunition or of 


Bazaine now took up a purely defensive position, 
with his front towards the west. But he had not 
given up the idea of retiring to Chalons, because he 
reported to the Emperor on x\ugust 17 that he would, 
if it were possible, in two days, after the army had 
been supplied with victuals and ammunition, march 
towards Verdun by the northern road. As a matter 
of fact, if he had begun this march in the morning or 
even the night of August 17, the Germans would 
not have been able to oppose the movement, but only 
to harass his flank, whereas his remaining inactive 
at Metz during the whole of that day enabled his 
enemies to concentrate a superior force against him 
and eventually to cut him off from retreat altogether. 
The reason for this delay was, apparently, as we have 
before said, the deficiency of food and ammunition. 




We have already mentioned that Bazaine an- 
nounced to his Government the battle of Vionville, 
or, as the Germans call it, Mars-la-Tonr, as a victory, 
and that his withdrawal nnder the walls of IMetz after 
its conclusion had merely been for the reasons we 
have described. The day of August 17, w^hieh was 
wasted by the French, was employed by the Prussians 
in bringing up all available troops, whether from 
the first or from the second army. We have seen 
that the French army had entirely changed its 
method of fighting. In the days of Napoleon and 
after, it was chiefly distinguished for its viggrous 
attacks and firm undaunted courage in assault, but 
in all the battles which we have described, its object 
was to stand upon the defensive in well-protected 
positions. We have seen how the natural features of 
Weissenberg, Worth, and Spicheren were used for 
this purpose, and the hilly region around Metz was 
not less adapted to this end. Bazaine therefore de- 
termined to engage in a decisive battle on this spot 
before he commenced his retreat to Verdun. 

One of the reasons for adopting this method of 
fighting, the adoption of which is to be attributed 
to Marshal ISTiel, was the fact that the French army 
was equipped with cliassepot guns of long range and 
with mitrailleuses. For that reason it was not con- 


sidered wise to place French troops in a position 
where they would have a wide expanse before them 
and great difficulty of approach, so that they might 
await the onslaught of the enemy in their entrench- 
ments, overwhelm them with their fire, and then dis- 
perse them with a vigorous charge. The defeats of 
Weissenburg, Worth, and Spicheren ought to have 
given the French a warning that these tactics were 
not suited to the genius of their army, but they at- 
tributed these disasters rather to superior numbers 
or to surprise. At Remy and at Vionville they had 
been able, at least, to hold their own, why should not 
Bazaine make a third attempt, which might scatter, 
if not annihilate, the enemy and open the road to 
western France ? There were manv things in his 
favour — the courage of the French troops was un- 
broken, and their spirit had rather been excited than 
crushed by their previous misfortunes. He had with 
him an army of one hundred and sixty thousand to 
one hundred and eighty thousand men, scarcely in- 
ferior in number to the Germans, and had the ad- 
vantage of their being already in hand, whereas the 
enemy would not be able to assend)le for some time. 
He also flattered himself that he could hold before 
Metz a position which was regarded not only as im- 
pregnable but as one wdiich it would be madness to 

The left bank of the ]\[oselle rises suddenly to 
the heights of St. Quentin and Plappeville, and 
from the summit of these heights falls gradually 
towards, the west, the ground being very uneven and 
partly covered Avith wood. Two narrow valleys or 
gorges penetrate this inclined slope, one on the east, 
leading from St. Privat by Amanvillers and Chatel 
St. Germain to the Moselle, and the other on the 


west, formed by the rivulet of La Mance, beginniiii; 
at Verueville, and also reaching the Moselle, The 
French army was posted on the heights lying between 
these two ravines; the high-road from Gravelotte 
to Metz passes through this position in many wind- 
ings, which form a species of defile. The ground 
was of such a nature that it was possible for the de- 
fending party to fire in tiers, one above the other, 
also to occupy a number of sheltered positions behind 
the heights, whereas the assailants were compelled to 
advance over ground which offered no cover what- 

The corps of Canrobert was placed on the right, 
occupying the village of St. Privat la Montague, 
which, as its name implies, stands upon a height, 
is surrounded by a wall, and consisted at that time 
largely of massive stone houses which had been 
strongly fortified. The corps of Lebceuf was in the 
centre, occuj)ying the farmhouses of La Folic, Leip- 
zig, Moscou,and the Bois de Geniveaux. This posi- 
tion was defended by a triple row of rifle-pits, one 
over the other. The corps of Ladmirault was on the 
left wing, and that of Frossard on the extreme left, 
especially favoured by the formation of the ground, 
and defended also by rifle-pits. The Imperial 
Guards were in reserve behind the left w^ng, and the 
artillery was drawn up on the heights of St. Quentin 
and Plappeville. On these heights Marshal Bazaino 
took up his position and retained it throughout the 
battle. The extent of the French line altogether was 
about seven miles. 

In the battle of Gravelotte, which ensued, the King 
of Prussia took command of his own army. He drew 
up his line of battle by placing his corps d'armee in 
the following order, beginning with the right; the 


seventh, eighth and ninth corps, the corps of the 
Guard, the twelfth corps, holding the third and tenth 
corps, whicli had suffered severely on August 16 in 
reserve. The most difficult part of the struggle had 
been committed to the Guard and the twelfth corps, 
because they were in the freshest condition ; but as 
they had been compelled to make a considerable 
march from Mars-la-Tour it was ordered that until 
they could take part in tlie battle the fight on the 
centre and the right should be confined to an artillery 

The French opened the battle at midday with a 
murderous fire. The eighth German corps then occu- 
pied Gravelotte and deployed its artillery on the 
heights on the east and the south, and at 12.45 fifty 
guns opened their fire. They kept up the artillery 
combat!lnostresolutely,not^\■ithstandingtho losses they 
suffered from the French guns and mitrailleuses for 
many hours. At 4 p.m. fifteen of these guns had been 
disabled, and it became necessary to obtain fresh 
supplies of ammunition from the rear. The French, 
however, had been entirely unable to drive them 
back. At this time the Germans gained an advantage 
on the left wing. Prince Ilohenlohe advanced to- 
wards St. Privat, till his batteries got within chasse- 
pot range and succeeded in silencing the enemy's 
artillerv, not onlv at St. Privat, but at Amanvillers 
and Montigny. The ninth corps maintained its posi- 
tion, although it was deluged with the enemy's pro- 
jectiles, and the brave Hessians never yielded a foot 
of ground. St. Marie aux Chenes was also taken 
about 4 p.M.^ and the Saxon artillery was able to take 
a position north of the village, directing its fire on 
St. Privat and Roncourt. 

As Marshal Bazaine surveyed the field of battle 


from the heights of Plappeville at about 5 p.m.^ he 
had sound reason for believing that the battle was al- 
ready decided in his favour, and that victory was 
certain. At that time the French army held unflinch- 
ingly all its main positions along the whole line and 
had only lost a few small advanced posts. Can- 
roberts still remained perfectly intact in the position 
of St. Privat and Roncourt, although his corps had 
been driven back at St. Marie, and was engaged in a 
serious artillery combat; Ladmirault also held his 
ground at Amanville and at Montigny. Leboeuf 
had been compelled to evacuate the Bois de Geni- 
veaux, but had warded off the enemy's attack against 
its main position on the heights of Moscou ; Frossard 
was still liolding his fortified positions at Point du 
Jour and Rozerieullcs, although St. Hubert had been 
lost. The Imperial Guard, in reserve, had not as yet 
taken any part in the engagement. It must, how- 
ever, be remembered that on the side of the Germans 
only about half the disposable forces had been 
actively employed, and that powerful efforts were 
possible with fresh troops, both on the right and left 


The battle had now been raging for five hours 
without intermission ; there were signs that evening 
was comina; on, and if anvthine; decisive was to be 
done that day, it Avas necessary that the Guards should 
take part in the engagement. Therefore soon after 5 
P.M. orders were given to three brigades of the Guards 
to advance to the attack of St. Privat. As they ad- 
vanced they were received with a heavy fire, but they 
continued to press steadily forward. Indeed nearly 
all the generals, field-officers and adjutants who re- 
mained on horseback were either dismounted or 
killed. The loss was so great that orders were given 


to suspend the attack and to await the arrival of the 
Saxons. Those troops, forming the twelfth corps, 
reached Roncourt at 6.30 p.m. and proposed to at- 
tack St. Privat on the north, and at this moment the 
three brigades of the Guards received orders to con- 
tinue their advance. At 6.45 they forced their way into 
the village from the south and west, and at the same 
moment some of the Saxon troops entered from the 
north. A street fight ensued in which the houses of 
the village had to be stormed one after the other, and 
just as darkness set in the united German troops 
became masters of the village. 

The attack of the Guards upon St. Privat made it 
possible for the Hessian division and the third 
brigade of Guards to advance upon Amanvillers, but 
the French forces at this spot were so much superior 
in numbers that the attack did not succeed. How- 
ever, the defeat of the French at St. Privat carried 
with it the abandonment of Amanvillers. Ladmi- 
rault, fearing to be taken on flank, evacuated his posi- 
tions and retreated through the wood of Lorry to 
Plappeville, the retreat being so precipitous that a 
large encampment of huts fell into the hands of the 
Prussians, together with much other booty. When 
the news of the defeat of the French right wing 
reached headquarters General Bourbaki, commander 
of the Imperial Guard, issued orders to march 
through the forest to its support, but they arrived too 
late to be of any advantage. 

At the other extremity of the field General 
Fransecky, commanding the second corps, received 
orders from the King at 5.30 p.m. to carry the 
plateau of the Moscou farm. For this purpose it 
was necessary to pass through the terrible defile of 
Gravelotte, which can never be forgotten by any one 


who has seen it, as it appears almost impregnable. 
The pass, formed by the steep banks of the River 
Mance, is only twelve yards wide. After passing the 
bridge the road to Metz is bordered for about five 
hundred yards by a wall of precipitous rocks, thirty 
or forty feet high, and on the right by a ravine in 
some places twenty feet deep. After passing St. 
Hubert the road reaches the level of the plateau. 
Along this road the infantry had to advance un- 
supported, until they reached St. Hubert. The pro- 
gress was watched by Moltke and by the King him- 
self until Von Roon forced him away from his 
dangerous position. 

Fransecky's orders were that the troops were to 
climb the eastern bank of the Mance, and move along 
the road until they came in front of Point du Jour, 
they were then to storm that important position, 
which is the higliest point of the road. These orders 
were carried out, the troops pressing forward in one 
continuous close column, every file closing up to the 
next one, and each rank calling to the other, '* Close 
up well forwards, shoulder to shoulder." The drum- 
mers beat the charge, the bugles sounded the advance, 
and the soldiers responded with an hurrah ! They 
were received on the plateau by a storm of mitrail- 
leuses and chassepots, while the solid mass of soldiers 
moving forward on the high-road were ploughed into 
with projectiles, which found their victims on the 
other side of the defile. In the meantime the artil- 
lery of the corps kept up a continuous fire against 
the plateau over the heads of the storming columns. 

The attack was not without its special feature of 
disaster. Some Prussian troops were driven back to 
the rear along the same road and hindered these ad- 
vancing invaders; guns also moving out of fire 


caused still more confusion. Something like a panic 
occurred, and it required all the efforts of the leaders 
to restore order; a considerable number of soldiers 
were thrown forcibly down the deep ravine which 
borders the other side of the road. The sun had now 
gone down, and it was found that in the confusion 
Prussian troops who had reached the heights were 
firing upon their advancing comrades. Fransecky 
therefore ordered the bugle to sound " cease firing," 
and a general cessation of fire occurred for a mo- 
ment on both sides. The storming column, which 
had been temporarily stopped, now got under weigh 
again and reached St. Hubert, but beyond that vil- 
lage it was again exposed to a murderous hail. At 
last Point du Jour was carried. About 10.30 p.m. 
the enemy delivered a terrible fire of mitrailleuses 
and chassepots upon the Germans, the last great vol- 
ley which formed a closing scene to the whole battle. 
On the next morning it was found that the enemy had 
evacuated all his positions, the road being thickly 
strewed with arms and knapsacks thrown away in 
flight. The King passed the night on a field-bed in 
a small room at Rezonville, not having changed his 
clothes for thirty hours, and having no covering 
during the night except his military cloak. On the 
following day, finding that no attempts were being 
made to renew the conflict, he moved his headquarters 
to Pont-a-Mousson. 

In this battle the French lost 609 officers and 
11,705 men, the Germans 90-i officers and 19,058 
men. Besides this six thousand French were made 

Let us now consider the operations we have de- 
scribed in their general aspect. After the battles of 
Weissenburg, Worth, and Saarbriicken, the German 


army formed a line obliquely directed towards the 
Moselle, so that the right wing was fifty miles and the 
left wing a hundred and ten miles distant from the 
stream. The line of the Moselle now became the 
objective, and the whole army eventually came into 
a position parallel to its course, the right wing hold- 
ing back and the left wing pressing towards the river. 
The centre, under Prince Frederick Charles, now 
moved round the right wing under Steinmetz and 
crossed the river at Pont-a-Mousson, so that when it 
took up its position at Mars-la-Tour and Doncourt, 
it had described a half-circle. At Mars-la-Tour 
the former Prussian centre was posted with its face 
to the Rhine and its back towards Paris, and the 
French army against which it had fought had 
its face towards Paris^ and its back to the Rhine — a 
position similar to that of the French and the allies 
in the battle of the Valmy. These movements had 
been carried out with perfect precision and without 
any confusion, as was the movement which after 
Mars-la-Tour united the two armies placed on differ- 
ent sides of the Moselle. These remarkable man- 
oeuvres would have been disastrous failures if they 
had not been executed in the most perfect manner; 
and the conception and development of them were 
both due to the astounding genius of Moltke. 




Bazaixe was now definitely slint np in Metz. The 
battle of Augnst 16 had cut him off from the southern 
road by Mars-la-Tour, the march on August 18 had 
closed the road by Conflans, the storming of St. 
Privat had shut up tlie third and last avenue of 
safety by way of Briey and Etain. The German 
army was now to undertake the difficult task of keep- 
ing tlie general and his army strictly confined in the 
fortress while the remainder of their strength was 
employed in action on the field. Eor the purpose of 
carrying out these two objects, the King separated 
three corps from the united army, the twelfth corps 
composed of Saxons, the corps of the Guards, and the 
fourth corps, as well as the greater part of the 
cacalrv. This armv was placed under the command 
of the Crown Prince of Saxony and received the 
name of the Army of the Meuse, being destined to 
march upon Paris and to act on the right wing of 
the third army. The remaining parts of the first 
and second armies were formed into a Siege Army — 
preserving their original names but placed under 
the command of Prince Frederick Charles. 

The Army of the Siege, gradually strengthened 
by the arrival of reservists and other soldiers, at- 
tained at best the number of one hundred and fifty 


thousand combatants. It invested the city on both 
sides of the Moselle and was stationed in trenches, 
batteries and parallels, often double or three-fold in 
depth, together with the use of the villages lying 
within the region of the lines. The foreposts were 
jjushed as far forward as the fire of the forts per- 
mitted ; indeed they were generally within the range 
of the heavy ordnance, and only the reserves were 
entirely out of range. The whole length of the line 
of investment was about thirty miles. Observatories 
wereerected on all lofty points, connected by telegraph 
with each other or with the different headquarters, 
so that any weakness in any portion of the blockade 
could be immediately redressed. The fortress was 
well supplied with ammunition, but less well \Wtli 
provisions, as the city contained, besides the army 
of Bazaine, its own inhabitants and those of much 
of the surrounding countrv. 

Considering the difficulties wliich stood in his way, 
it is creditable to Bazaine that he was already pre- 
pared to make a sortie on August 26, when Mac- 
Mahon's army was marching from Rheims to 
Ilcthel. His object was to got possession of Thion- 
ville, and to force his way to Chalons by the for- 
tresses of the north ; but, after a few attempts made in 
the direction of Xoiseville and Colombey, he became 
convinced that the Prussian general was his master. 
Holding a council of war, he deferred anv further 
attempt until the ground should have hardened after 
the copious storms of rain. At this council of war 
General Soleille made a report on the supplies of 
munition remaining in Metz, and Bazaine sent a 
telegram to the j\Iinister of War in these words: 
" Still in Metz, artillery ammunition only sufficient 


for one battle. Impossible under these circumstances 
to break through the entrenched lines of the besiegers. 
It would be a good thing if attacks from the interior 
could comj^el the blockading army to retreat." A 
few days after this he was informed that the second 
and third corps of the besieging army had withdrawn 
in the direction of Stenay and Dun, in order to 
strengthen the army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, 
which was threatened by MacMahon. Therefore on 
August 31, 1870, he made a powerful sortie, with 
the object either of driving the Prussians back and 
regaining his freedom of action, or of replenishing 
his commissariat and thus being able to hold out 

He chose for this attempt the right bank of the 
Moselle, where the defences of the enemy were less 
strong and where his enterprise could be supported 
by some advanced forts. He hoped to be able to 
reach Saarlouis and Thionville, and from thence to 
restore his communication with the army of Chalons. 
He did indeed succeed, towards evening, in driving 
the Germans out of their position at !N"oiseville and 
Montey, and of occupying new ground even as far as 
Colom'bey ; but he was eventually repulsed in a night 
attack by the first army corps and a division of the 
Landwehr, together with forty thousand men, under 
General ]\[anteuffel. Soon afterwards the detached 
portion of the army returned and Bazaine could have 
no further hope of executing his plan. By Septem- 
ber 1 the French were at last at Metz again. It is 
clear from this that by the victories of the middle of 
the month the morale of the German army had been 
strengthened and that of the French army had been 
weakened. The surrender of the army in Metz was 
now only a matter of time, provisions were becoming 


scarce, and the dav after the great sortie the besieged 
began to shiughter their hor.^es. 

The Emperor Xapoleon, leaving Bazaine's army at 
Metz on the morning of Angust 16, arrived the same 
evening at the camp of Chalons where ]\Jarshal Mac- 
Ma hon was posted with the first and twelfth corps 
of his armv, the fifth and seventh corps having 
not yet arrived. The camp was sitnated in a large 
plain, supposed to be identical with the Catalaunian 
Fields, which once witnessed the defeat of the Huns. 
Between the camp of Chalons and the fortress of 
Metz stretches a table-land diversified with hills, 
a part of the Ardennes ; the road from Chalons to 
Metz passes by Valmy and St. Menehould, famous 
for the defeat of the French monarchy in the flight 
to Varennes and the triumph of the Republic in the 
cannonade of Kellermann. This line of hills, called 
the Argonne, is pierced by the Meuse and the Marne, 
which rises in the heights of Langres, and by the 
Aisne, a tributary of the Gise. A row of fortresses 
of the second and third rank protect the valley of 
the l[euse and its eastern tributary the Chiers, 
towards the east and the north, the principal of 
them being Verdun, Montmedy, Sedan, Mezieres, 
Langwy, and Givet. This territory is the scene of 
the military operations of September, which began 
with the battles of Beaumont and Sedan, and ended 
with the siege of Paris. 

Mac]\rahon's army, concentrated at Chalons, con- 
sisted of about one hundred and twenty-five thousand 
infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. He had under 
him Generals Ducrot, De Fa illy, Douay, and other 
leaders of the former Army of the Rhine, which 
now bore the name of the Army of Paris. Shortly 


afterwards General Wimpffen arrived with reinforce- 
ments from Algiers. General Trocliii was originally 
in the camp, but being appointed by !N"apoleon to be 
Governor of Paris, and to the command of the forces 
destined for the defence of the capital, he soon left 
to take up his new duties. At the council of war held 
at Chalons on August 17 it had been determined that 
the Emperor should proceed to Paris and resume 
the reins of government ; also that MacMahon's army 
should march on Paris and accept a battle there if 
necessary. However the Empress and the Ministry 
were afraid that if the Emperor returned to the Tuil- 
leries, both his life and his dynasty would be in 
danger ; they were also opposed to the retreat of Mac- 
^^lahon's arm}'. This brought about a most unsatis- 
factory state of things. The Emperor virtually ab- 
dicated just at the time when his authority was most 
required, and MacMahon Avas not left to his own 
devices in the command of his army, but was con- 
stantly interfered with both by the Empress Regent 
and bv the ^linisters. 

The Emperor and MacMahon both adhered to the 
original plan of leading the Army of Chalons back 
to Paris, or at least to the neighbourhood of the 
capital ; but in Paris it was insisted upon that Mac- 
AEahon should make an offensive advance in the direc- 
tion of Verdun, so as to co-operate with Bazaine and 
effect a junction with him. MacMahon had grave 
doubts as to the success of this bold enterprise, which 
could only produce its effect if Bazaine could succeed 
at the same time in breaking through the iron em- 
brace of the Prussian armies. He adopted a com- 
promise of marching to Rheims and evacuated the 
camp on the morning of August 21. The store of 
food, forage and clothing collected there was des- 


trojed and the camp burned down, measures which' 
were dictated by fear and which were quite unneces- 
sary. MacMahon remained at Eheims two days, 
and on August 23, in obedience to stringent orders 
from Paris, commenced his march to Montmedy, 
having witli him an army of one hundred and forty 
thousand men. He passed by way of Kethel, Chene 
le Populeux, and Mouzon to the Meuse, the heads of 
his columns reaching this latter place on August 28. 
The Army of Chalons gradually lost confidence in 
their leaders. Dejection and insiubordination be- 
came rife, and the rations were so defective that the 
soldiers had to resort to plunder. Great masses of 
stragglers followed the army, and wandered over the 

To meet this unexpected move on the part of the 
French, an entirely new disposition of the Prus- 
sian forces was required, all previous arrangements 
having been made on the supposition of a march to 
Paris. The fourth German army, called the Army 
of the Meuse, had reached the range of the Argonne, 
and occupied the road between Clermont and Ste. 
Menehould, but it was not of itself strong enough to 
oppose MacMahon if he should operate in the direc- 
tion of Metz. The third army had established com- 
munication with the fourth, but the two armies to- 
gether formed a line of forty-six miles, broken at a 
right angle. But it was necessary, in order to effect 
MacMahon's destruction, to require from the third 
army long marches to the east, whilst the fourth 
army had to detain the enemy and obstruct his por- 
gress. These complicated operations were carried 
out with such precision that in no single case did a 
crossing of columns occur, and this rapid wheel to 
the right of an army of more tlian two hundred thou- 


sand men and its concentration at the determined 
point has probably never been equalled in the history 
of war. Even the great difficulty of procuring sub- 
sistence in a new line of advance was met by the 
zeal and resource of the commissariat. 

Orders for the march of the army on the Meuse 
were issued by the King on the evening of August 
25. The movements of the German armies were of 
such a nature that two days later MacMahon must 
have seen that it would be impossible for him to con- 
tinue his march on Metz. He therefore wished to 
abandon the attempt and to retreat with the army 
of Chalons to Mezieres. But he was overruled by 
the most positive commands from Paris and had no 
alternative but to obey. He made preparations for 
crossing the Meuse on August 29, with his left wing 
at Mouzon and his right at Stenay, but in con- 
sequence of an engagement at j^ouart he was obliged 
to abandon the advance on Stenay and to retreat to 
Beaumont. By the evening of August 29 the net 
was spread out in all directions, by means of w^iich 
the French army was forced to operate in a narrow 
field and at last compelled to accept a battle under 
the most unfavourable circumstances. 

By this time the army of the Crown Prince had 
reached the right bank of the Aisne, after coming 
into conflict with the enemy at Buzancy and Chene 
le Populeux, while the reinforced fourth army had, 
after the engagement at J^ouart, occupied the line 
of the Meuse from Dun to Stenay. The King of 
Prussia had fixed his headquarters, first at Cler- 
mont and then at Varennes, whilst the Emperor 
and MacMahon were established in Mouzon. Here 
the news reached them that on August 30 the corps 
of De Failly had been attacked in the town of Beau- 


iiiont by the Bavarians under General von der Tann, 
and the Saxons, and had been forced to retreat 
har^tily to Carignan and Sedan. 

We have seen that De Failly had encamped with 
the fiftli corps on the heights to the north of Beau- 
mont. He liad caHed together the commandants of 
the several divisions at 9 a.^u, and their reports all 
agreed that the enemy were not pursuing. Tlie 
march on ^Sfouzon was therefore deferred til} H 
A.M., l)ut no efforts were made to reconnoitre the 
wooded country south of Beaumont. The French 
troops were enjoying their ease, the men employed 
in cooking, and the horses being taken to water, when 
all of a sudden shells fell into the camp and every 
one rushed to take up arms. But the Prussian in- 
fantry had in the meantime reached the camp, and 
overmastered its defenders. The artillery had no 
time to harness the horses and to put them to the 
guns; all the tents, the baggage and the stores fell 
into the hands of the enemy. The troops which 
had been encamped to the north of the town were 
aide to offer resistance, but De Failly was at last 
compelled to retreat. The battle of Beaumont had 
a decisive effect, the fifth corps of the French army 
l)eing decimated. It lost eighteen hundred men 
killed and wounded and had to leave nineteen 
guns, eight mitrailleuses, and three thousand pris- 
oners in the hands of the enemy. 

After the battle the Emperor of the French might 
even then have escaped to Mezicres and have secured 
the safety of his person, but he refused to leave the 
army, lie arrived at Carignan at 4 p.m. on August 
30, and sent a reassuring despatch to the Empress, 
;^^ac]\[ahon was now aware that the army of Chalons 
had been overtaken by tlie forces of the enemy in 


far greater numbers than his own. It had become 
necessary to abandon the march of the army on 
Montmedv and the attempt to relieve Bazaine at 
Metz. The choice remained between accepting a 
battle at Mouzon and retreating to the west without 
fighting in order to prevent the army if possible from 
being surrounded by the enemy. The Marshal there- 
fore determined to concentrate his forces at Sedan, 
which could only be effected by a nidit march. 
Every preparation had been made for the Emperor 
passing the night at Carignan, but at 8 p.m. he left 
unexpectedly bv the railway for Sedan, which is about 
twelve miles off. The troops marching through the 
night reached their encampments at Sedan on the 
morning of August 31, some as late as 9 a.m. 

Whatever designs ]\Iac]\[ahon may have had in re- 
treating to Sedan were rendered nugatory by the 
swift advance of the German troops. When the 
fourth army marched up the right bank of the Meuse 
and, crossing the Chiers at Douzy, occupied the east 
of Sedan, the third army, composed of Xorth Ger- 
mans, Bavarians and Wilrtemburgers, and provided 
with excellent artillery, was marching along the left, 
bank by Raucourt and Remilly. An attempt made 
by the Bavarians to pass the river at Bazeilles was 
at first repulsed, but in the night they were able to 
cross at two places above Sedan, whilst the eleventh 
Xorth German corps crossed the river at Donchery, 
and the Wiirtembergers lower down, whilst the army 
of the Crown Prince of Saxony gained the heights to 
the east and north of the town. Thus were the 
French enveloped in a snare from which there was no 
escape. It is said that when Moltke received the 
last report which completed the intelligence that his 
plans for the investment of the French army had 


been duly carried out, he made a note in his pocket- 
book and uttered the words, " Es stimmt," which 
may be somewhat feebly translated by the English 
expression, " All right " — an eloquent exclamation 
from the famous strategist whose distinction was to 
be silent in seven languages. 

SEDAN. 447 



On September 1, 1870, the French army at Sedan 
was confined within a space of fonr and a half miles 
from north to south, and two miles from east to west. 
Sedan, a small fortress, lies on the right bank of the 
Meuse, and on the left bank is a suburb called Torcy, 
defended by a tete-du-pont. The village of Bazeilles 
and Balan, a suburb of Sedan, are on the right bank 
of the river, above the town; on the east are the 
villages of Givonne, Daigny, and Moncelle, and on 
the north-west those of Illy and Floing. The space 
between Sedan and Bazeilles on the right bank is 
low, whereas on the opposite bank the high ground 
comes down to the bank of the river, between Remilly 
and Wadelincourt. The wood of Garenne, which 
played an important part in the battle, lies to the 
north of the town. Sedan is seven miles distant 
from the Belgian frontier. The right wing of the 
French held Balan and Bazeilles and was opposed 
by the Bavarians ; then came the first French corps 
at Givonne and Daigny, opposed by the Prussian 
Guards and the Saxons of the twelfth corps. The 
positions of Illy and Floing to the north of Sedan 
were defended by the seventh French corps and two 
cavalry divisions, and was attacked by the eleventh 
and fifth corps, together with some cavalry. The 


fifth French corps was posted just outside Sedan to 
act as a general reserve. In this manner the attack 
upon the three main points of the French position 
Bazeilles, the valley of Givonne, and the position of 
Floing and Illy, superior forces of the German troops 
were everywhere available. 

The battle began before daylight at 4 a.m. by the 
Bavarians under General von der Tann advancing 
to attack Bazeilles, which had been half burnt down 
on the day before. It was most obstinately de- 
fended in the streets, houses, and gardens both by sol- 
diers and citizens and was only captured after a 
hard struggle. Unfortunately for the French, 
Marshal MacMahon, who had ridden into the fore- 
most line of combat, was so severely wounded in the 
very beginning of the battle from the splinters of a 
shell, that he had to surrender the command and was 
carried back into Sedan, meeting the Emperor on 
his way, who then rode into the battle. The com- 
mand would naturally pass to General Wimpffen, 
who had just arrived from Algiers, but MacMahon 
passed him over and entrusted the army to Ducrot. 
These generals differed very much in their views of 
military matters, and neither had any knowledge of 
what the plans of MacMahon had been. 

Ducrot assumed the command at 7.30 a.m., and 
immediately gave commands for the army to retire 
to the plateau of Illy, in order that they might force 
the way out to Mezieres; Bazeilles was to be 
evacuated first and Givonne last. When General 
Wimpffen heard of this he disapproved so highly of 
Ducrot's tactics that he determined to make use of a 
power which had been given him to assume the com- 

SEDAN. 449 

niand under certain circumstances, and therefore at 

9 A.M. wrote to Ducrot saying that he had been au- 
thorised by the Minister of War to assume the chief 
command in case of any accident happening to Mac- 
Mahon, and that he disapproved of the evacuation of 
Bazeilles and Givonne. But when the Saxons had, 
after tremendous eiJorts, obtained possession of the 
north-eastern ridge of Villers and Cernay, Daigny 
and Givonne, and had given the hand to the Ba- 
varians, who after similar efforts had become masters 
of Bazeilles and were now able to seize the heights of 
La Moncelle, and when these two streams of con- 
querors united to drive the French out of Balan the 
issue of the day was no longer doubtful. 

During the battle the Crown Prince took his stand 
on a hill a little south of the village of Donchery, 
and the King of Prussia established himself at a 
point a little further to the east from which the 
whole field was visible. This stationary position of 
the two commanders throughout the dav was of ffreat 
assistance both in receiving reports and in sending 
orders, and as we have seen a similar course was almost 
always adopted by the Great T^apoleon in his battles. 
The Bavarians became masters of Bazeilles at about 

10 A.M. after six hours' fighting. Similar attacks 
were made by the Saxons on the other side, and 
shortly after this the whole valley of the Givonne 
with all the villages in it as far as Daigny was held 
by the soldiers of these two great German races. The 
French artillery had been compelled to retreat to a 
new position at Balan, and all possibility of the 
French being able to break through on their side was 
at an end. At this juncture the Emperor rode back 



to Sedan, passing through Balan, finding that he was 
neglected on the field of battle and that his physical 
powers were exhausted. He had to force his way 
through crowds of runaway troops, who were taking 
refuge in the fortress ; shells were falling in the 
streets, and as the Emperor rode into the town a 
shell exploded just in front of him, killing his horse. 

In the meantime, to the north-west, the Prussian 
troops had occupied St. Menges and Fleigneux, and 
were directing a terrible artillery fire on the French 
divisions who were defending Floing and Illy. At 
midday the French were so completely surrounded 
that only two means of escape remained to them, 
either to break out between Givonne and Fleigneux 
and reach the Belgian frontier, or to cross the Meuse 
into the suburbs of Torcy and fight their way through 
the enemy to Rheims. The boldest general might 
Avell hesitate before adopting either of these courses, 
as the result, even if successful, could only be ac- 
complished after very heavy loss. ISTot long after 
this Illy was taken by the advance of the Prussian 
Guards, the iron ring closed more and more pitilessly 
around the fortress, and at last the position of Floing 
had also to be given up. 

When Wimpffen saw that the state of the army 
was hopeless he determined to make the desperate 
attempt of cutting his way out towards the east, so as 
to reach ]\rontmedy with the Emperor and what he 
could rescue of the arm v. So at 1.15 p.m. he in- 
vited the Emperor to place himself at the head of his 
troops, who would think it an honour to provide for 
his personal safety. The Emperor received this 
letter at 2 p.m., but declined to accede to the proposi- 

SEDAN, 452 

tion. After waiting an hour for an answer 
Wimpffen rode first to Givonne and then to Balan, 
but found that in both places his troops had re- 
treated. Alone and without a staff, and having no 
troops to command, there was nothing left for him 
but to retire into the fortress of Sedan as others had 
done before him. It was now 3 p.m.^ broken bodies 
of the French were flying in all directions, some to 
the wood of Garenne, some to Sedan. The Prus- 
sians advanced against the wood and took many pris- 
oners; some even pressed up to Sedan, where they 
were exposed to the fire of the fortress, but they suc- 
ceeded in cutting off the retreat from a number of 
French detachments. 

Half an hour later General Ducrot rode into the 
toA\Ti, and everything which met his gaze induced 
him to abandon hope. The streets and squares were 
blocked with guns, and with waggons of every de- 
scription, hordes of soldiers who had thrown away 
their arms and knapsacks rushed into the houses in 
search of food and to the churches for shelter. 
There was nothing before him but a chaotic mob, 
calling out " Treachery " and threatening to kill 
their ofiicers. Ducrot found the Emperor at the 
Sous-Prefecture in a state of deep dejection and per- 
fectly hopeless. He had already hoisted a white 
flag on the citadel, but it had been taken down by 
the orders of General Faure, chief of the staff. An- 
other flag of truce was sent and Wimpffen received 
the Emperor's orders to cease firing and to open 
negotiations, but being determined to make another 
attempt to break through the lines he positively re- 
fused to obey. He managed to get together a force 


of about two tlioiisand men, and, accompanied by 
two guns, got as far as Balan, but soon afterwards, 
as he was riding at the head of the column, he looked 
round and found that all his men had disappeared, 
so that he was forced to retire to Sedan. 

At about 5.30 p.m. the King of Prussia sent 
Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf to Sedan with a 
flag of truce, to smnmon the French commandant 
to capitulate. On entering the Prefecture, to his 
great astonishment he found himself face to face 
with the Emperor, whom he did not know^ to be in 
the fortress. The Emperor had apparently just 
written a letter to the King in the following terms: 
'* IXot having been able to find death in the midst 
of my soldiers, nothing remains for me but to de- 
liver mv sword into the hands of vour maiestv." 
This letter was carried by the Emjieror's own aide- 
de-camp. General Keille, who handed it to the King 
of Prussia shortly after 7 p.m. The King was deep- 
ly moved ; he first rendered thanks to God, and then 
informed the German princes of what had occurred, 
thanking them for their assistance, without which his 
success would have been impossible. He replied to 
the Emperor that he regretted the manner of their 
meeting, that he accepted his sword, and he re- 
quested him to send some person with full power to 
conclude the capitulation. 

The King, having committed the care of military 
matters to Count Moltke and of political matters 
to Count Bismarck, left the field of battle and drove 
fourteen miles to his headquarters at Vendresse 
which he reached at 11 p.m. At Sedan a violent 
quarrel broke out between Dncrot and Wimpffen in 

SEDAN. 453 

the Emperor's presence, which Avas ended by the Em- 
peror commanding Wimpffon to proceed to Don- 
chery and discuss the details of the surrender, an <^ 

armistice having been previously concluded which 
was to last till 4 a.m. on September 2. The discussion 
with regard to the terms of the capitulation lasted 
throughout the night. Wimpffen asked that his 
army might be allowed to retreat with arms and 
baggage, promising not to serve against the German 
armies again till the end of the war; Moltke insisted 
upon the unconditional surrender of the whole army 
as prisoners of war. When Wimpffen threatened to 
renew the struggle he was reminded that his army 
was decimated, that he had food only for forty-eight 
hours, and that, if he did not consent, a fire of three 
hundred guns should be opened upon the city and the 
troops as soon as the armistice expired. 

The next morning the council of war which as- 
sembled at Sedan at 7 a.m. agreed that no other 
course was possible except to sign the capitulation on 
the terms proposed, and it was only by the personal 
intervention of the Emperor that in consideration of 
the brave defence made by the French army, the 
generals, officers and military employes holding the 
rank of officer were excepted from the capitulation 
on condition of giving their word of honour in 
writing not to serve during the present war, or to 
act in any way contrary to the interests of Ger- 
many. The Emperor met the King of Prussia at the 
Chateau of Belleville, and it was arranged that he 
should reside at the Palace of Wilhelmshohe, near 
Cassel, so long as he remained a prisoner of war. 
On the following day he drove to the Belgian town 


of Bouillon, and when he entered his quarters was 
ervino; bitterly. 

The French prisoners of war, after laying down 
their arms, were taken to a tongue of land at Iges, 
which is surrounded on three sides by the Meuse, 
there to await their removal to Germany. Unfor- 
tunately they underwent great sufferings, as the rain 
converted the ground on which they bivouacked into 
mud. There was also a deficiency of food, as the 
French had none whatever, and the Germans were 
hardly able to produce eighty thousand more rations 
tlian they required for themselves. A strange 
feature of the capitulation was formed by the French 
cavalry horses, which had been let to run loose. Ten 
thousand of them forming into one or two large 
bodies, galloped wildly over the country like a hurri- 
cane, doing much damage in their course. Many of 
them fought together with their hoofs and teeth and 
were drowned in the Meuse. The numbers which 
took part in the battle of Sedan were, on the German 
side, one hundred and twenty-one thousand infantry 
and six hundred and eighteen guns, no cavalry having 
been employed ; on the French side between sixty and 
seventy thousand, with three hundred and twenty 
ffims and seventy mitrailleuses. The battle was one 
of the longest in duration of the great battles of 
modern times, having lasted without intermission 
from 6 A.M. till 4 p.m. The reason of this was tliat 
no time had to be spent on the deploying of the at- 
tacking army. The losses on the German side 
amounted altogether to 9,860, and on the French to 
thirteen thousand ; besides this there were taken in 
the battle twenty-five thousand unwounded French 

SEDAN. 455 

prisoners, besides seven thousand men and five hun- 
dred horses which escaped into Belgium, making- the 
total French losses in September forty-one thousand 
men, considerably more than half their entire force. 
By the capitulation of September 2 eighty-three 
thousand men surrendered as prisoners of war, in- 
cluding the wounded and the non-combatants. 
Among the prisoners were 2,866 ofiicers, including 
Marshal MacMahon and forty generals. 

As one portion of the French army was shut up in 
Metz and the other had been compelled to capitulate 
at Sedan, there was no further obstacle to the ad- 
vance of the third and fourth armies on Paris. In- 
deed the orders for the advance were signed within 
an hour after the conclusion of the capitulation and 
the troops commenced their march on September 3. 
It was thought by many and hoped by more that the 
war might now be considered at an end, but this was 
not to be the case. The Empire was overthrown on 
September 4 ; the government of the Regency was 
compelled to fly and the Republic was proclaimed, 
taking as its motto, " La Guerre a entrance ! " — a 
war which lasted for six months^ until it ended 
favourably for the German armies by the defeat of 
the republican forces and the capture of Paris. 




The new Republican government proclaimed bj 
the mouth of Jules Favre its programme to be, '' Xot 
a foot of our territory, nor a stone of our fortresses." 
^Vlien the battle of Sedan took place General Vinoy 
was on his way from Chalons to Mezieres with Mac- 
Mahon ; but on hearing of the defeat he returned 
to Paris, collecting a certain number of stragglers 
on his way. His troops formed the kernel of the 
army of defence with which Trochu expected to 
protect the forts and the capital from the advancing 
enemy. Besides this were collected all arm-bearing 
people who could be of any kind of use — marines, 
custom-house officers, fire brigades, gamekeepers, 
policemen both horse and foot, discharged soldiers — 
so that the whole number amounted to four hundred 
thousand. In the meantime the two armies which 
had fought at Sedan were on the march to Paris 
under the command of the Crown Princes of Prussia 
and Saxony. On September 5 General Tiimpling 
concentrated the whole of the sixth army corps in 
Rheims, and on September 15 the King visited the 
same city before establishing his headquarters at 

The agitation in Paris became more riotous as 
the population saw that the city was being gradually 


invested, the Crown Prince of Saxonj occupying the 
right bank of the Seine and the lower Marne on the 
line from Argenteuil bv Montmagnv and Blanc 
]\Ienil, and through the wood of Bondy to Gournay ; 
and the Crown Prince of Prussia with the third 
army the left bank of the Seine from Gournay to 
Bonneuil, Choisy-le-Roi, Thiais, Chevilly, Sceaux, 
Meudon, Sevres, and Bougival. The two armies 
touched each other at the peninsula of Argenteuil. 
The forces occupied in this investment, which 
eventually by reinforcements reached the number of 
two hundred and fifty thousand, were divided in such 
a way that the Prussians occupied the north and 
west, the Bavarians the south, the Saxons the east, 
while the Wiirtembergers watched the line of for- 
tresses. After the combats of Petit-Bicetre and 
Chatillon on September 19 the investment was com- 
plete, six army corps occupying a space of fifty miles, 
and standing in some places within the fire of the 

Under the reigns of Louis Philippe and Xapoleon 
III. Paris had been converted into a fortress of the 
first rank, its river line of defences being composed 
of ninety-four armed bastions, its second line by a 
circle of advanced forts, well provided with garrisons 
and guns, one of which, Mont Valerien, was regarded 
as impregnable; and besides the double row of de- 
fences, the hills surounding Paris were furnished 
with entrenchments and redoubts, all connected with 
each other. The Germans placed their confidence 
in famine, and believed that if they carefully cut off 
all supplies of food, a population of two millions, 
many of whom were accustomed to luxury and self- 


indulgence, could not hold out for very long. Great 
pains Avere therefore taken to make the lines of in- 
vestment impenetrable. 

Paris and Metz were not the only cities which 
were being besieged by the German armies. On 
September 23 Toul, an ancient city of Lorraine, 
which formed with Metz and Verdun the " three 
bishoprics" which were the first territory trans- 
ferred from the Teutons to the French, capitulated 
after a terrible bombardment. The possession of this 
city opened for the Germans direct railway communi- 
cations with the Rhine, and a few days later, on Sep- 
tember 27, Strasburg, the great frontier city of the 
Hhine, the most important acquisition of Louis XVL, 
fell into the hands of the Germans, having held out 
since August 10. It is not our purpose to relate 
the details of these sieges, which resemble each other 
in the endurance and the suffering of the defenders 
and the tenacity of the assailants. In the bombard- 
ment which preceded the regular siege, W'hich may 
be dated from August 29, great pains were taken to 
spare the cathedral, and it was only slightly injured. 
On the other hand, the public library, consisting of 
three hundred thousand volumes, many of great 
value, was entirely destroyed, although the French 
might have preserved it by concealing it in the 
ample cellars which formed the basement of the 
building. Some novelties which distinguished the 
siege ought to be mentioned: first, the use of rifled 
short twenty-four pounders and rifled twenty-six 
centimetre mortars, weighing each seven tons; 
secondly, the construction of batteries beyond the 
second parallel; and thirdly, the use of indirect fire 


for breaching. This was done by curved fire at a 
thousand yards' distance, when the wall to be 
breached could not be seen, but only ascertained by 
careful measurement. Also the enemy's mines were 
unloaded and then used for the careful observation 
of the enemy's works. 

After Strasburg had fallen General von Werder 
was sent with the fourteenth army corps to reduce 
the southern part of Alsatia from Schlettstadt to 
Belfort, and to clear out the Mobiles and the Free 
Corps from the passes of the Vosges. On October 
5 King William transferred his headquarters from 
Ferrieres, the luxurious chateau of the Rothschilds, 
to Versailles, the ancient palace of the Bourbon 
kings, and from this centre the siege of Paris Avas 
conducted. On October 13, 1870, the Chateau of 
St. Cloud, so notable in French history, was set on 
fire by the projectiles of the French themselves, and 
the Germans had the greatest difficulty in preserving 
the valuable objects and the works of art contained 
in the rooms. A few days later the Imperial Palace 
of Malmaison, with all its treasures, was destroyed 
in a sortie. 

A new character was given to the struggle on 
October 7, 1870, by Leon Gambetta, a man of genius 
and remarkable energy, who had left Paris in a 
balloon, joining the Provisional Government at 
Tours; he used every effort to rouse the country 
against the invaders, and to compel the retirement 
of the besieging army. For this purpose France, 
with the exception of Paris, was divided into four 
governments, that of the north under Bourbaki with 
Lille for its capital, that of the south under Fiereck 


in Le Mans, that of the centre nnder Pohles in 
Bonrges, and that of the east nnder Cambriels in 
Besaneon, and that eleven camps of instruction and 
defence should be formed for resistance against the 
enemy. Also two armies named respectively from the 
Loire and the Sonime were to advance upon Paris 
and he assisted by sorties made under the direction of 
Trocliu, who was military commandant of the cap- 
ital. This policy gave rise to the sorties of October 
13 and October 21, the first in the south and the 
second in the west, and the more important attack on 
Le Bourget to the north-east which took place on 
October 28. The French succeeded in driving the 
Germans from Le Bourget and holding it for two 
days, but they were eventually driven back after an 
obstinate engagement. There were great difficulties 
in keeping up communications between the capital 
and the provinces, because the invaders had destroyed 
all the telegraph wires ; but this want was supplied 
to some extent by carrier-pigeons and balloons. 

In forming his plans for the relief of Paris Gam- 
betta had counted upon the co-operation of Bazaine 
and his army, who were shut up in Metz ; but before 
the organisation of the Seine army was complete this 
fortress capitulated. On October 11 Bazaine sent 
one of his adjutants. General Boyer, to the head- 
quarters at Versailles to propose terms. He de- 
manded for his army a free departure with arms and 
baggage with the obligation not to take part in the 
war for three months, whilst Metz preserved the 
riffht of defending herself. At the same time 
private negotiations were conducted between Bazaine 
and the Empress Eugenie in England with the object 


of eraploving the army of Metz for the restoration of 
the Empire; but the history of these is imperfectly 
known. These negotiations led to no resnlt, and 
Bazaine was at last compelled to capitulate on 
similar terms to the French army in Sedan, when 
his troops had been brought to the verge of starva- 
tion, and his available troops had been reduced in 
numbers by sickness to seventy thousand. General 
Changarnier arranged the terms by which Metz and 
its fortifications, with arms, munitions of war, and 
provisions, were delivered to the enemy, and the 
whole army, including three marshals, Bazaine, 
Canrobert, and Leba?uf, six thousand officers, and 
more than one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, 
became prisoners of war. The disarmament took 
place on October 26 and 27 in a meadow on the road 
between Jarny and Metz. In recognition of this 
crowning mercy the Crown Prince and Prince Fred- 
erick Charles of Prussia were made Field-marshals, 
and Moltke was created a Count. 

In the last month of 1870 the northern half of 
France from the Jura to the English Channel, from 
the frontier of Belgium to the Loire, was one broad 
battlefield. Of the forces set free by the fall of 
Metz, part remained behind as a garrison under 
General von Zastrow, with the additional object of 
attacking Thionville, and part marched to the north 
under the command of Manteuffel to occupy Picardy 
and Xormandy and to prevent the army of General 
Bourbaki from approaching Paris. A third division 
joined the second army, whose commander Prince 
Frederick Charles had his headquarters in Troyes, 
and, supported on the right by the troops of Von 


der Tann, and the Duke of Mecklenbiirg-Schwerin, 
and on the left by the forces of General Werder, 
made head on the one side against the French army 
of the Loii-e, and on the other against the free corps 
of Garibaldi in the east. A fourth contingent went 
to strengthen tlie besieging forces around Paris ; and 
other detachments were sent against the fortresses of 
the north. 

In consequence of these movements, Soissons sur- 
rendered on October 1(3, Verdun on November 8, 
Thionville on November 24, Ham on December 10, 
Phalzbourg on December 12, and Montmedy on 
December 14. Mezieres fell on January 2, 1871. 
Tlie garrisons of all these fortresses were sent as 
prisoners to Germany, and the spoil which they con- 
tained went to swell the jiossessions of the con- 
querors. The little mountainous fortress of Bitsch 
was never taken, and did not come into the possession 
of the Germans till the peace. 

We have seen that General von Werder, after the 
fall of Strasburg, proceeded to the conquest of 
Schlett»tadt, Neu-Breisach, and Belfort, and to the 
occupation of the mountain districts of the Vosges 
and the Jura. He had here to deal with a guerilla 
warfare, which dej^ended for its support on the for- 
tress of Langres, and his forces were hardly suffi- 
cient for the task which he was expected to ac- 
complish. By the end of October Schlettstadt and 
Neu-Breisach were reduced, but the last army, which 
had been first formed at Lyons under Cambriels, 
was now joined by Garibaldi and his two sons, Ric- 
ciotti and l\renotti, bringing with them a motley 
crew of republicans of all nationalities, Italians, 


Spaniards, and Poles. With considerable difficulty 
Dijon, the ancient capital of Burgundy, was cap- 
tured on October 31. 1870, and was occupied by 
Prince William of Baden with the view of prevent- 
ing the Germans from being interfered with in their 
prosecution of the important fortress of Belfort. 
But he was several times compelled to evacuate it 
by the pressure of the army of the East, and the 
attack on Chatillon-sur-Seine, made by Ricciotti 
Garibaldi on the night of J^ovember 20, showed to 
what dangers the invading army were exposed. 

Gambetta had now to succeed in involving the 
whole French nation in the struggle against the Ger- 
mans and in making the annihilation of the enemv a 
national duty. This added very largely to the cruel 
nature of the war, and the outrages against German 
troops had to be put down by severe reprisals. The 
cavalry regiments, which were sent in the month of 
October in a southerly direction to examine the 
country between the Seine and the Loire, and to 
make requisitions, fell in with the rear-guard of the 
array of the Loire, under General de la Motterouge, 
who was marching to the relief of Paris. The 
Crown Prince, hearing that they were in Toury, be- 
tween Orleans and Etampes, sent against them Gen- 
eral von der Tann with the first Bavarian army 
corps and some jS^orth German troops. They came 
up with the rear of the retreating French at Artenay 
on October 10, and compelled them to fight in the 
forest of Orleans, and on the following day took pos- 
session of the town. Motterouge was deprived of his 
command by Gambetta, who transferred it to Au- 
relles de Paladines, who had served in Africa, the 
Crimea, and Italy. 


The new commander got together the various con- 
tingents, which liad been formed and practised in the 
several camps of instruction, and set himself not only 
to recover the line of the Loire, but to cross the 
stream at various points, and to carrv out the original 
plan of a march on Paris. Although great pains 
were taken to conceal these movements, they came to 
the ears of Von der Tann. In order that his flank 
might not be turned he evacuat-ed Orleans on 
I^ovember 8, leaving his sick behind him in the 
charge of the municipality, as he hoped to return. 
General Wittich also, who liad captured Chateau- 
dun with great sacrifice on October 18, was ordered 
to retreat to Chartres. A severe battle took place at 
(\:)ulmiers on Xovember 10, in which the French 
^vere much superior in numbers, and Von der Tann 
had some diificulty in effecting his retreat to Toury, 
where he was joined by General Wittich. The battle 
lasted from 7 a.m. till 5 p.m.^ from daybreak till 
dusk, and caused the French a loss of two thousand 
dead and wounded, whereas the German loss did not 
much exceed the half, marking the difference between 
seasoned troops and brave but inexperienced levies. 

This success was the occasion of great rejoicing 
to the French and of great discouragement to the 
Germans. Gambetta, to whose energy and genius 
it was greatly due, did everything in his power to 
increase tlie forces at his disposal and to unite the 
whole power of the south and west in a common 
action. He summoned up, as it were from the soil, 
new forces from the s^uth ; lie hastened in persou 
to the camp of Conlie in Brittany to reunite the two 
generals, Charette and Keratry, who had quarrelled. 


But his principal hope for the salvation of France 
and the deliverance of Paris from the iron ring which 
enclosed her was in the Armv of the Loire, and the 
energetic leadership of Aurelles de Paladines. But 
as before enthusiasm and zeal were no match for 
discipline and experience. The German troops 
in the neighbourhood of the Loire were united in a 
sinffle armv under the command of the Grand Duke 
Frederick Francis of Schwerin. A week after the 
disastrous retreat of Toury he inflicted such defeats 
at Dreux, at Chateauneuf , at Bigny, and in the forest 
of St. Jean, upon the bodies of the Gardes ]\robiles, 
who under General Fiereck were attempting to join 
the army of the Loire, that he not only prevented the 
threatened junction, but created such dismay amongst 
the lines that Keratrv laid down his command and 


Fiereck had to be superseded. 

The Grand Duke now received orders to move 
further to the east and to join the Second Army under 
Prince Frederick Charles. The result of this was 
the indecisive battle of Beaune la Rolande, fought 
on November 28, 1870, north-east of the forest of 
Orleans, in which the French were as numerous 
as the Germans. Both sides were fully aware of 
the great importance of the battle, and of the in- 
fluence it would have in the progress of the war. 
It was therefore contested with the utmost energy, 
and the losses on either side were proportionately 
great. The Germans, however, gained the victory 
and the French were foiled in this design of penetrat- 
ing to Paris bv wav of Fontainebleau. Further at- 
tempts to push through to the west were repelled by 
a number of engagements fought by the Grand Duke 


of Meeklenbiirg-Scliwerin between Artenaj and 
Chateaudun, the most important of which was the 
battle of Loigny fought on December 2, the great 
day of the fallen Empire. The French were com- 
pelled to retreat with great loss, but the losses on the 
German side had also been considerable, and their 
difficulties were increased bj the endless exertions 
caused bv the nature of the marshv soil, now 
tliorouglilj soaked with rain, and bv the cold of 
winter which now began to make itself felt. 





Tkochu^ who commanded at Paris, was not 
ignorant of the efforts which were being made to re- 
lieve him. He did his best to second them by re- 
peated sorties, to the south and the west. But the 
possibility of relief from the side of the Loire 
was gradually coming to an end. The day after the 
battle of Loigny the French were driven back from 
Poupry, and the result of four days' fighting on 
the banks of the Loire and the edge of the thick 
forest which protects the city was that the French 
were driven from the centre which they had held 
so long, were compelled to retire to the south, and 
that the Germans entered Orleans on December 4. 
The attempts made by Trochu at the same time to 
break through the lines of investment and to join 
the army of the Loire in the forest of Fontainebleau 
were also repulsed. It is impossible to contemplate 
without a deep feeling of pathos the result of these 
passionate efforts of the French, every\vhere crushed 
by the iron hand of their relentless foe, which re- 
semble the struggles of a victim in the arms of the 
murderer who is strangling him. 

By the capture of Orleans a large number of 
prisoners and much booty fell into the hands of the 
Germans, and the remains of the army of the Loire 


retired down the river to Blois. Bishop Dupan- 
loup, who had made himself conspicuous by the 
energy of his patriotism, was made a prisoner in his 
l)alace, and his catliedral was turned into a receptacle 
for French prisoners. Gambetta was nearly taken 
])risoner on his way from Tours to the field of battle. 
He was dissatisfied with the manner in which Aurelle 
de Paladines had conducted the campaign and re- 
lieved him from his command. Gambetta now con- 
ceived the plan of forming his lines in two divisions, 
one of which should operate towards the east, under 
the command of Bourbaki, who had surrendered the 
charge of the Armv of the North to General Faid- 
herbe, while the other under Chanzy should under- 
take the duty of expelling the enemy from the lower 
and middle Loire. For the purpose of conducting 
these operations with greater freedom the seat of 
government was removed on December 10 from 
Tours to Bordeaux. 

The immediate result of this change was to give for- 
tune to the French, and Chanzy was enabled to gain 
considerable successes in the second week of December 
over the troops of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg 
at Meung, Beaugency, Marchenoir, and other places. 
But the arrival on the scene of Prince Frederick 
Charles inclined the scale in the other direction. 
Having first driven back the x\rmv of Bourbaki to 
Vierzon and Bourges, he hastened to Orleans and 
was soon able to gain possession both of Blois and 
of Tours. The second army of the French under 
Chanzy was not able to maintain its first success, but 
was gradually driven back, until all hope of reliev- 
ing Paris had disappeared. In the early days of 



January the united armies of Prince Frederick 
Charles and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin, numbering more than seventy thousand 
men, advanced against Chanzv's army of the west. 
In the midst of the paralysing cold of an unusually 
severe winter the Germans pursued the French over 
swelling fields, whose surface was covered with sno\v 
and slippery ice, shot down by the francs-tireurs who 
lav in ambush behind every hedge and every wall, 
wiiming slowly, by patient efforts, hill after hill and 
field after field. It would be useless to repeat the 
names of the places lying between the Loire and the 
south, made memorable by their engagements. The 
decisive battle took place at the gates of La Mans on 
January 11 and 12, and the Camp of Conlie was 
captured on January 15. Chanzy was compelled ^o 
retire to Laval, where he attempted to reorganise 
the relics of his army, and the Germans pressed for- 
ward to Alengon. 

It was an essential part of the French plan that 
the attempts to break through the line of investment 
from without should be seconded by energetic sorties 
from within. In order to effect this object they had 
erected on the heights of Mont Avron, to the east of 
Paris, in front of the forts of Xogent and Rosny, 
some batteries armed with heavy pieces of siege 
ordnance in order to bombard the villages occupied by 
the Saxons and Wiirtembergers. General Ducrot had 
selected this region as best adapted for a successful 
outbreak, and he declared in a proclamation that he 
would return from the attack either as conqueror 
or a corpse. He directed feigned assaults on the 
German positions to the south and to the north in 


order to divert the attention of the enemv, while he 
pressed beyond Vincennes with his main force in 
ironchid railway trains, armed with cannon, in order 
to reach nnobseryed the objective on which his de- 
signs were directed. Under the protection of a 
terrible cannonade from Mont Avron and the forts of 
Charenton and Xogent he threw eight bridges across 
the Marne, and with largely superior numbers fell 
upon the villages of Brie, Champigny, Villiers and 
Xoisy. On November 30 the Germans defended 
their position for a wliole day, but at approach of 
evening were compelled to evacuate Brie and Cham- 
pigny, which, however, were recovered on the fol- 
lowing day with the assistance of the Pomeranians 
under Franseckv. In these engagements and in other 
combats which ensued on December 2 and 3 the Ger- 
mans lost six thousand two hundred men, and the 
French enjoyed the triumph of marching a number 
of German prisoners through the streets of Paris, 
but they had lost on their side twelve thousand men 
and more than four hundred officers. 

Disappointed of relief from tlie south, the be- 
leaguered city looked for lielp from the north and 
north-west, from Xormandy, Artois and Picardy, as 
well as from the Free Corps of French Flanders. 
The army of the north, first, as we have seen, under 
the command of Bourbaki and then of Faidherbe, 
was supported by the fortresses of Lille and Amiens, 
while those of La Fere, St. Quentin and Peronne 
\vere also in the possession of the French. Amiens 
was captured after a great battle on Xovember 27, 
and from it the Germans proceeded to the conquest 
of Xormandy. Rouen fell on December 6, and three 


days later, by the capture of Dieppe, the Germans 
reached the shores of the English Channel, the 
French army taking refuge in Le Havre. Ten days 
later the repulse of a great sortie organised by Trochu 
at Le Bourget, already the scene of murderous con- 
flicts, gave the Germans an opportunity of celebrat- 
ing their Christmas in comparative peace ; but 
Christmas Eve witnessed the long contested and 
sanguinary battle of Hallue. At Bapaume after 
two days' fighting, on January 2 and 3, 1871, the 
victory remained uncertain, the French retreating to 
the north and the Germans to the south. The de- 
parture of Manteuffel for the army of the east in- 
spired Faidherbe with new courage. Reinforced by 
fresh arrivals of marines and gardes mobiles, he 
determined to make an attack on the lines of invest- 
ment. He suffered, however, a serious defeat at St. 
Quentin on January 19, and that important fortress 
was lost to the French. 

The bombardment of Paris, which had been so 
long deferred, was now begun on the day after 
Christmas Day, and increased ten-fold the distress 
of the besieged citizens. The Parisians had believed 
that an effectual bombardment at so great a distance 
was impossible to carry out, but when shells were 
seen to fall in the heart of Paris, in the Luxembourg, 
the church of Saint Sulpice and the Pantheon, and 
when persons were killed by them in the Rue du 
Bois and the Faubourg St. Germain, there was a 
general outcry against the barbarians who had the 
audacity to destroy the metropolis of civilisation, 
Trochu was now driven against his better judgment 


to make one last effort. On January 19, the day 
after the King of Prussia had been proclaimed Em- 
peror in the palace of Versailles, the whole of the 
available French forces, one hundred thousand strong;, 
maj'ched in the direction of Meudon, Sevres, and St. 
Cloud for the final struc'ffle. Vinov commanded on 
the left, Ducrot on the right, whilst Trochu directed 
the whole advance from the commanding posi- 
tion of the observatory. Vinoy's column succeeded 
in gaining possession of the German entrenchments 
at Montretout; but Ducrot was hindered in his ad- 
vance bv the barricades which had been erected in 
the streets of Paris and was unable to give support 
at the proper time. After an obstinate fight of seven 
hours' duration the French were driven back into 
their capital with a loss of seven thousand men, and 
on the following day Trochu demanded an armis- 
tice for the purpose of burying his dead. After long 
discussions a convention was signed which provided 
for a suspension of arms to last from January 28 to 
February 10. It was confidently stated at Berlin 
in the following winter, on the authority of Moltke, 
that until this last sortie had been made and failed, 
the investment of Paris was still regarded as un- 
certain, and that the King's baggage stood ready 
packed at Versailles in order that a dej)arture might 
take place at any moment. 

The line of demarcation established by the con- 
vention cut through the departments of (Calvados 
and Orne, and left in the power of the Germans the 
depai-tments of Sarthe, Indre-et-Loire, Jjoir-et-Cher, 
Loiret, Yonne, and thence to the north-east with the 


exception of Pas-de-Calais and ]^ord. The cessa- 
tion of arms in the departments of the Cote-d'Or, 
Doubs, Jnra, and at Belfort was deferred for tlie 
present, for reasons which will soon be apparent. 
Arrangements were made for the election of a 
Xational Assembly which was to decide on the qnes- 
tion of war and peace, and which was to meet at 
Bordeaux. The whole of the Paris forts were to be 
immediately surrendered, and the fortifications were 
to be deprived of their means of defence. All the 
French troops in Paris were to be considered prison- 
ers, with the exception of twelve thousand which 
were left for the security of the capital. They were 
to remain for the present within the walls of the 
town, their arms being surrendered. The ISTational 
Guard and the gendarmes were allowed to retain 
their arms for purposes of police; but all the 
Free Corps were disbanded. Measures were taken 
for the provisioning of Paris. Ko one might leave 
the capital without the joint permission of the French 
and Germans ; and the municipality of Paris was to 
pay a contribution of two hundred million francs 
within fourteen days. All German prisoners were 
to be immediately exchanged for a corresponding 
number of French prisoners. 

This lengthy but momentous story is now nearly 
at an end. Gambetta formed a plan by which Bour- 
baki, perhaps the most competent of the French 
generals, should with that portion of the Army of 
the Loire, which after the second conquest of Orleans 
had retired to Bourges, move eastwards towards 
Severs, and gathering to itself what reinforcements 
it could command, throw himself on the German 


communications, set free Belfort and the district of 
the Upper Rhine, and carry fire and sword into the 
mountains of Baden, and the valleys of the Black 
Forest. Telegraph wires were to be cut, railways 
broken up and bridges destroyed, so that the retreat 
of the Germans towards the Khine might be cut off. 
In pursuance of these plans the bridge over the 
Moselle at Fontenoy was broken down on January 
22, 1871, so that railway communications were in- 
terrupted for ten days. 

To frustrate these plans General Werder was 
posted at Dijon with twenty-eight thousand men, 
whilst Bourbaki was hastening with one hundred 
and fifty thousand by way of Besangon and Mont- 
belaird, to raise the siege of Belfort, and to invade 
Alsace. Werder was compelled to abandon Dijon, 
which was immediately occupied by Garibaldi. After 
a forced march of three days he engaged the troops 
of Bourbaki on January 9, at Villersexel on the 
Oignon, and then arrested his advance at Hericourt. 
Three days' struggle, on January 15, 16, and 17, gave 
Manteuffel time to come up, and the victory of Wer- 
der at Hericourt and Goeben at St. Quentin were 
the first gifts of honour which the newly-proclaimed 
Emperor received at Versailles. Kettler compelled 
Garibaldi to evacuate Dijon, and Bourbaki was sur- 
rounded by the German armies in such a manner that 
he had no alternative but to surrender or to retreat 
into the neutral territory of Switzerland. This final 
step was taken on February 1, General Clinchant 
having succeeded Bourbaki in the command, who had 
been wounded and taken to I^yons. Thus an army 
of eighty-five thousand in the most miserable cou- 


dition, half-starved and scarcely like limnaii beings, 
crossed the frontier and laid down their arms, the 
Swiss doing their utmost to supply their wants. This 
was the fourth French army, the other three being 
those of Sedan, Metz, and Paris, which had been 
rendered useless for further combat since the Ger- 
man invasion in the previous August. 

Belfort, wliich had been so nobly defended by its 
commandant Treskow, capitulated by the orders of 
the French Government on February 16, under the 
condition that the garrison should march out with 
the honours of w^ar. Ten days later the preliminaries 
of peace were signed at Versailles between Bismarck 
and Jules Favre. Thus ended one of the most re- 
markable wars in history, marked by twenty-three 
battles and an endless number of lesser engagements. 
N^ever before had such large masses of men been seen 
in conflict. At Gravelotte the numbers were 270,000 
against 210,000, at Sedan 210,000 against 150,000. 
The losses of the Germans were calculated at 5,254 
officers and 112,000 men; those of the French in 
killed, M^ounded,and prisoners almost defy enumera- 
tion. The number of German prisoners captured by 
the French did not exceed 10,000; whereas at least 
400,000 unarmed Frenchmen crossed the Rhine as 




The Emperor Alexander IL, having determined, 
for reasons which seemed snfficient to himself, to 
make war on Turkey, left St. Petersburg for the 
army and arrived at Kisheneff, the capital of Rus- 
sian Bessarabia, on April 23, 1877. On the follow- 
ing day he issued a proclamation in which he stated 
that he was taking up arms for the purpose of secur- 
ing to his suffering fellow-Christians on Turkish soil 
the safeguards wdiicli w^^ere necessary for their future 
welfare. In the same night large Russian forces 
crossed the Prutli at three different places w^th the 
object of marching to the Danube, the passage 
through Roumania, which was then tributary to 
Turkey, having been secured by a convention. The 
Emperor was present with the army in person, not 
with the view of assuming command of it, which was 
left in the hands of the Grand Duke Nicholas, but 
to inspire the troops with confidence and courage. 
He fixed his headquarters at Plojesti. 


On Mav 22 Prince Charles of Roumania now as- 
serted himself to be independent of the Porte, and 
marched at the head of an army into the field in 
order to assist the Russians in fighting against the 
Sultan, his former suzerain. At the same time other 
Russian armies crossed the Turkish frontier in Asia, 
taking Bojazid without striking a blow, and storm- 
ing Ardahan on the upper Kur. The flotilla which 
the Turks were keeping on the Danube was ham- 
pered by batteries along the shore, and still more 
by torpedoes, which were employed with great effect 
in this war ; and two ironclad vessels were blown up. 

Owing to the negligence of the Turkish general, 
Abdul Kerim, the Russians had little difficulty in 
crossing the Danube at Galatz, and in occupying 
the strong places of Matshin, Isaktcha, Tulcha, 
Babadagh, and Hirsova, whilst the Turks withdre^y 
to the line between Chernavoda and Kustendji, while 
the main army crossed the same river at various 
points between Simnitza and Sistova, and compelled 
the Turks to retreat partly to jSTicopolis and partly 
to Tirnova. The Emperor placed his headquarters 
at Sistova, and from this place issued on June 27 a 
manifesto to the Bulgarian Christians announcing 
that he had come to set them free from Mussulman 

Thus in ten weeks from the opening of hostilities 
the Russians had established themselves on the 
southern bank of the Danube, with a loss which was 
entirely insignificant in proportion to the magni- 
tude of their success. In the first days of July they 
were in possession of all the country from Sistova 


to Gabrova, which lies at the foot of the Shipka 
Pass over the Balkans, and Prince Cherhesky was 
entrusted with the government of the province of 
Bulgaria. On July 16, four days after the entry 
of the Russian army into Tirnova, the importaiit 
fortress of jSTicopolis fell into Russian hands, six 
thousand men and two pashas being made prisoners, 
and forty guns being captured. Soon after this the 
towns of Selvi and Levatz were occupied, while Gen- 
eral Gourko and Prince Mirski made themselves 
masters of the Shipka and the Hankoi Passes. On 
reaching the southern slope of the Balkans the Rus- 
sian cavalry pressed on by way of Eshi-Sagra, Kara- 
bunar and Jamboli as far as Ilarmanli, which lies be- 
tween Adrianople and Philippopolis and encamped in 
the valley of the Maritza. These rapid successes 
seemed to point to the probability that in a few weeks 
the Russians would be in Constantinople and the 
war would be at an end. 

The party which was now in power in England 
was most discouraged by these remarkable successes. 
They strengthened the British squadron in Besika 
Bav, and made an offer to the Porte to send men-of- 
war into the Bosphorus, or to occupy Gallipoli. The 
Porte refused to accept these offers except under the 
condition of an offensive and defensive alliance, and 
the English Government were disinclined to take 
so important a step without the co-operation of 
Austria, who was unwilling to do violence to the 
union which had existed for some time between the 
three Emperors. 

The Porte at last woke up to the gravity of the 


crisis, and began to understand how much her in- 
terests had been sacrificed by the generals she had 
employed. Abdul Kerim, the Commander-in-Chief, 
and Redif Paslia, the Minister of War, were deprived 
of their positions and were banished to Lemnos; 
Mehemet Ali Pasha, of European origin, was in- 
vested with the command of the army of the Danube, 
and Osman Pasha, the Commandant of Widdin, oc- 
cupied the town of Plevna with thirty thousand men, 
and fortified it in such a manner as to make it a 
centre of serious resistance. Osman Pasha's army 
was soon increased by reinforcements to the number 
of fifty thousand; and besides this the Turks were 
superior to the Russians in armaments. Two at- 
tempts of the Russians to capture Plevna failed, one 
on July 20 and the other ten days later. The first 
defeat was due to the fault of the Russian general, 
who, having no accurate knowledge of the strengtli 
or position of the enemy, and without any reserves 
in store, led his troops to the assault along two lines 
which had no communication with each other, against 
an enemy which he afterwards discovered to be moi-e 
than four times his strength. The second attack 
imder Kriidener also ended in complete failure. The 
Russian loss in the second battle of July 30 was little 
less than eight thousand, of whom two thousand four 
hundred were left dead upon the field; the loss in 
the first battle had been scarcely three tliousand. 

On hearing of these defeats the Grand Duke 
INicholas removed his headquarters from Tirnova to 
Biela, and from thence to Gourji-Studen, whither 
he was soon followed by the Emperor. 


The decisive defeat at Plevna on July 30 brought 
the Russian advance to a standstill. The Russians 
at this time occuj^ied a position nearly elliptical in 
shape, from ^N^icopolis on the Danube to a point on 
the same river near Rustchuk, the major axis of 
the ellipse being about eighty miles, the minor axi.s 
about sixty. The six corps occupying this space had 
lost about fifteen thousand men, killed and wounded, 
since the opening of the campaign, their total 
strength Avas therefore about one hundred and 
twenty thousand infantrv, twelve thousand cavalrv 
and six hundred and forty-eight guns. Besides this 
there was a detachment under Zimmermann, on the 
Dobrudja, numbering about twenty-five thousand 
men. The Turks were posted outside of this ellipse 
and occupied three points in force, Plev^ia, Yeni- 
Zagra and Rasgrad, situated nearly at the angles of 
an equilateral triangle whose sides were from seventy 
to ninety miles long. Osman Pasha commanded at 
Plevna with fifty thousand men, Suleiman at Yeni- 
Zagra with forty thousand, Mehemet AH at Ras- 
grad with sixty-five thousand. The total force of the 
Turks in the field numbered one hundred and ninety- 
five thousand. Tliere is no doubt that the Russians 
had under-estimated their enemy and began the war 
with an inadequate force. 

The Russians determined to leave their troops on 
the defensive in their present position and to await 
tlie arrival of reinforcements. At the beginning 
of August the guard, the grenadiers, and two di- 
visions of the line were mobilised, giving a rein- 
forcement of one hundred and twenty thousand men 
and twenty-four guns: besides this, the first line of 


the militia was called out, amounting to one hundred 
and eighty thousand men ; thev were to replace the 
losses already suffered in battle and to be readv to re- 
place others which might afterwards occur. The 
Prince of Roumania was called upon to put his army 
in the field, which consisted of thirtv-two thousand 
infantry, five thousand cavalry, and eighty-four guns. 
It was now the moment for the Turks to strike a 
vigorous blow, but the three commanders, Mehemet 
Ali, Suleiman, and Osman, were all independent of 
each other, and were directed by means of telegraphic 
despatches by a War Council sitting at Constanti- 
nople. The best plan would have been for Suleiman 
to have united himself with Mehemet Ali, gathering 
up the garrisons of Shumla and Varna on his way. 
They would then have been able to attack the Rus- 
sian left wing with one hundred and twentv-five 
thousand men and compelled them to release their 
hold of the Sliipka Pass. Suleiman, however, deter- 
mined instead to attack the Shipka Pass directly in 
front, and in this he was supported by the War 
Council in the capital. He began this attack on 
August 20, and continued it for about four months, 
with the sole result that he sacrificed the best parts 
of his army. 

It seemed at the besiinning as if his attack were 
likely to succeed. On August 23 the Russian posi- 
tions in the pass were nearly surrounded by the 
Turks. The struggle continued during the whole 
day, with seven thousand five hundred Russians 
against twentv-eic^ht thousand Turks. In the after- 
noon the position of the Russians became most criti- 
cal, their artillery' ammunition was exhausted, and 
their losses were enormous. If the Turks could 
have established themselves in the rear of the Rus- 


sians and cut off their one line of communication, a 
disastrous retreat or possibly a surrender was in- 
evitable. But reinforcements came up just at the 
critical moment and the Turks were driven back. On 
the following davs further assistance arrived and the 
Turks were compelled to retreat still further; 
so after five davs of nearly uninterrupted fight- 
ing both sides were much in the same position as 
they were at the beginning. For three days 
less than eight thousand Russians and Bulga- 
rians had held the armv of Suleiman in check, 
their only food being the biscuits which they had in 
their pockets when they began. The heat was in- 
tense and the nearest spring was three or four miles 
in the rear. When the firing slackened they lay 
down on the ground and obtained a little sleep, but, 
as the moon was full, the night brought no cessation 
of the firing. Reinforcements arrived just as the 
men had reached the extreme limit of human en- 

Mehemet Ali, after some preliminary skirmishing, 
attacked the army of the Tsarevitch on the left wing 
and drove it back from the Lorn to the Yantra. He 
then suddenly stopped, and a few days later, to- 
wards the end of September, returned to his former 
position. The Tsarevitch had under his command 
about forty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, 
and two hundred guns ; Mehemet Ali, about fifty 
thousand infantry, sixty guns and a certain number 
of cavalrv. In fifteen davs Mehemet Ali drove the 
Russians back with a loss of between three and four 
thousand men. He then should have concentrated 
his forces, which now amounted in all to sixty thou- 
sand, andhave delivered a decisive battle in the neigh- 
bourhood of Biela. But apparently he had no such 


design in view ; possibly from the incompetence of his 
officers. On September 28, however, he attacked 
the Russian position near Cerkovico, but was entirely 
defeated, and was compelled to retreat along his 
whole line, so that at the end of his offensive move- 
ment lie had lost more men than the enemy and had 
not diverted a single Russian soldier either from 
Plevna or from Shipka. On October 2 he was super- . 
seded and Suleiman Pasha put in his place. 




The chief attention of the Russians was naturally 
directed towards Plevna, in which neighbourhood, 
at the end of August, they had assembled about one 
hundred and five thousand men. As no more Rus- 
sian troops could be expected before the end of Sep- 
tember and as the season was advancing the Grand 
Duke determined to attack at once. He was, how- 
ever, anticipated by Osman, who on August 31 at- 
tacked him with about twenty-five thousand men. 
This sortie had no result except the sacrifice of one 
thousand Russians and three hundred Turks, so 
that the Grand Duke went on with his original de- 
sign, hisobjectbeingfirst to capture Lootcha, and then 
to close round Plevna with one hundred thousand 
men. Lootcha is about twenty miles from Plevna, 
and might be regarded as the extended right flank of 
the Turkish position. The attack took place on Sep- 
tember 3, under the command of Skobeleff on the 
left and Dubovolsky on the right. The battle lasted 
the whole day, and tlie main redoubt, the most im- 
])ortant feature in the position, was not captured till 
7 p.M.^ at which time the bodies of dead and Avound- 
ed, Russians and Turks, lay piled up in a mass six 
feet deep around its approach. 

Tlie Russians could now give their undivided at- 
tention to Plevna, having in the field 74,000 in- 
fantry, 10,000 cavalry, 24 siege guns, 364 field guns, 

PLEVNA. 485 

and 54 horse artillery, to which Osman could oppose a 
force of 56,000 men, together with 2,500 cavalry and 
80 gnns. Plevna is a little town of about 7,000 in- 
habitants, lying in a hollow surrounded by hills of 
moderate height. It is the meeting-place of the 
roads leading to Widdin, Sophia, Shipka, Biela, 
Zimnitza, and Xicopolis, and therefore could not be 
neglected with safety by an invading army. Osman 
had occupied his time by carefully fortifying the 
town, and at the beginning of September it was pro- 
tected by eighteen redoubts and several lines of 
trenches, the Grivitza redoubt being the key of the po- 
sition in the north, and the Kischni redoubt in the 
south. The Russian attack was made on September 6, 
the redoubts were bombarded till September 11, when 
a general assault was ordered. The result of this third 
battle of Plevna, as it may be called, was a terrible 
and murderous repulse, the Russian losses amounting 
to eighteen thousand men. It was a great disaster 
for the Russian army, but, as the sequel will show, 
was not irreparable ; the cause of it w^as, probably, a 
lack of unity in the command of the army. 

It was now determined to make no more assaults 
upon the works of Plevna, but to proceed to a regular 
investment. For this purpose the famous General 
Todleben, the defender of Sebastopol, w\as sum- 
moned from St. Petersburg, arriving at Plevna on 
September 28. The investment was completed by 
the end of October, being effected chiefly by the 
enerffv and skill of General Gourko, who after the 
hardly fought battle of Gorni Dubnik drove back the 
Turks into the entrenchments, Osman Pasha being 
prevented by simultaneous attacks from coming to the 
assistance of his countrvmen. 

During these autumn months the war was raging 


ill other parts of the Turkish Empire. In Armenia 
the Turks succeeded in defending the fortresses of 
Kars and Batoum, and even forced the Russians to 
evacuate Bajazid, while General Tergakasoff was 
compelled to retreat to the Russian frontier. This 
defeat was, however, redressed in the middle of 
November when the Army of the Caucasus, in a 
second advance, after having fought a series of 
murderous battles, before the gates of Erzeroum, 
stormed the fortress of Kars, capturing seventeen 
thousand prisoners, including two pashas and eight 
hundred officers, as well as three hundred guns and 
twenty standards. In Montenegro Mehemet Ali 
and Suleiman Pasha had attacked Prince ISTikita 
from three sides, and endeavoured to put down the 
insurrection which had broken out there with a strong 
hand. But the Prince captured the fortress of 
!Nikish on September 8, and then made himself 
master of the port of Spizza and the suburbs of An- 
tivari. In Bulgaria events were more favourable 
for the Turkish arms. Suleiman Pasha, having 
left ]\Iontenegro, pressed into the valleys of the 
Tundja and the Maritza, and drove General Gourko 
back, first to Kasanlik, and then to the Shipka Pass. 
These successes were accomplished by great cruelty. 
Eski-Sagra and Kasanlik were burned dowoi and their 
inhabitants massacred. Suleiman took up a position 
at the foot of the Shipka Pass and barred the pro- 
gress of the enemy, but he could not expel the Rus- 
sians from the entrenchments or win the summit of 
the pass. The struggle continued for weeks with 
great losses on either side ; but the Russians re- 
mained masters of the summit of the pass till the 
end of the year. 

At Plevna there was no fighting along the lineS; 


with the exception of desultory artillery and picket 
firing, till December 10, but on both sides the work 
of fortifications continued without intermission till 
the last moment. On November 17 the Grand 
Duke sent a flag of truce to Osman Pasha, summon- 
ing liim to surrender, but he replied that his military 
honour would not allow him to do so. However, 
his provisions had now reached their last limit, a 
third of his army lay sick and wounded, rain and 
snow alternating for six weeks had made his trenches 
untenable, and desertions were increasing every day. 
He therefore determined to make an effort to break 
through the Russian lines with the object of reach- 
ing either Widdin or Sophia. During the nights of 
December 9-10 he abandoned the Kischni and 
Grivitza redoubts, left a force of ten thousand men in 
two other redoubts, built two pontoon bridges by the 
side of the regular bridge over the Vid, distributed 
about six davs' rations of bread and rice to his armv, 
and with about forty thousand made a furious at- 
tack upon the position held by the grenadiers on the 
Widdin road. He succ-eeded in carrying the first 
line of the Russian works, but by noon his army 
was defeated and he was himself wounded, so that 
there was nothing left for him but to surrender at 

The struggle between the Russian and the Turkish 
troops began at daybreak under the eyes of the Em- 
peror ; the advanced Russian lines were taken by the 
Turks at about 8.30 a.m. At about 11 a.m. the 
Turks were driven out again, and about noon they 
began to retreat towards the Vid, keeping up a 
strong fire against the enemy. The Turkish cap- 
tured guns were now turned aarainst their former 
owners. The Russian troops advanced and turned 


the Turkish retreat into a rout ; thej were driven 
down to the Vid, huddled up with the carts of the 
baggage train which had left Plevna in the morning 
to the number of a thousand. About an hour later 
the Turks could no longer continue the struggle and 
sent a flag of truce. General Ganetzky demanded 
the unconditional surrender of the whole Turkish 
army, to which Osman Pasha agreed. The Turks 
had lost in the battle about 6,000 men; the numbers 
now surrendered were 10 pashas, 130 field officers, 
2,000 ordinary officers, 40,000 foot soldiers and 1,200 
cavalry, 77 guns, and large quantities of ammunition 
also fell into the possession of the conquerors. 

Lieutenant Greene, whose authority has been 
largely followed in the preceding narrative, says that 
Osman Pasha must be credited with a brilliant de- 
fence, because he succeeded in arresting the Rus- 
sian advance, and completely paralysed their whole 
plan of campaign and all their movements for five 
months, causing them to summon large reinforce- 
ments from Russia and to invoke the aid of Rou- 
mania, disabling forty thousand of his enemies and 
detaining the Emperor from the capital during half 
a year. Up to the middle of October he made no 
mistakes, but when he knew that the Russian guard 
had arrived in Bulgaria, that he was gradually being 
enclosed, he ought to have abandoned Plevna and 
retreated to Radonitza instead of allowing the guard 
to cross the Vid and attack Gorni Dubnik. Rado- 
nitza is about forty-five miles from Plevna and could 
have been reached in two long days. It was a posi- 
tion of much greater natural strength than Plevna, 
and its fortifications were considerably advanced. 
Even if he had failed to hold it he could have retreat- 
ed behind the Balkans with his army intact, and he 


PLEVNA. 489 

then could have saved his country from an irrepar- 
able disaster. Whatever reasons Osman may have 
given for not taking this course, the probability is 
that he had received the most positive orders from 
the War C'onncil at Constantinople not to abandon 
Plevna, and that he did not dare to disobey them. 




After the fall of Plevna the Turkish cause was 
far from being hopeless. Thev possessed one hun- 
dred thousand men in the neighbourhood of their 
principal fortresses, thirty thousand at Shipka, twenty 
thousand around Sophia, and fifteen thousand at 
Constantinople, besides a number of reserves in Asia. 
Their enemv had double their numbers, but the Rus- 
sian lines of communication were five hundred miles 
long, cut into two portions by the Danube; much 
snow had already fallen, and the only good roads 
available for the Russian advance were those from 
Sistova to Shipka, and from Plevna to Sophia. Un- 
fortunately their only general was Suleiman, who 
had already proved his incompetence. He was sum- 
moned to Constantinople in the middle of December, 
and was given the chief command in Roumelia, with 
special orders to defend the line of the Balkans. 
Greene is of opinion that the proper course for him 
to have pursued would have been to have placed small 
bodies of men at the various points of passage, keep- 
ing a large body at Adrianople, to which all the 
roads converge, in order to act whenever it might be 
necessary. Instead of this he left only ten thou- 
sand men in that important city, and dispersed the 
rest of his forces over the different points of possible 

Turning to the side of the Russians, the fall of 


Plevna had set free one hundred and ten thousand 
men. Servia had declared war against the Turks 
immediately after the fall of Plevna, and had brought 
about twenty-five thousand soldiers into the field. 
General Todleben advised that the troops should be 
put into winter quarters to the north of the Balkans 
and the siege of Rustchuk proceeded with ; when that 
important place had fallen the armies could cross 
the Balkans in the spring and advance upon Con- 
stantinoijle. The Grand Duke Nicholas, however, 
supported by Skobeleff and Gourko, determined to 
cross the Balkans at once before the Turks had had 
time to recover themselves. His plan was that 
Gourko should force the Araba-Konab Pass, capture 
Sophia, and march by way of Philippopolis to 
Adrianople, whilst Radetsky was to cross the Shipka 
Pass, defeating the Turks who were defending it, and 
join Gourko. In the meantime the Tsarevitch was 
to remain north of the Balkans, protect the Russian 
communications, and prosecute the siege of Rust- 
chuk with the help of Todleben. 

Gourko began his task with a force of sixty-five 
thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and two 
hundred and eighty guns, having opposed to him a 
Turkish army consisting of thirty-five thousand in- 
fantry, two thousand cavalry, and about forty guns. 
His plan was to use his main force to turn the left 
flank of the Turkish position across the high-road, 
leaving smaller bodies of troops in front of each of 
the Turkish positions. The lines of column were to 
march thirty-two miles in thirty-six hours over a 
pass eighteen hundred feet above the valley. When 
he made these arrangements he believed that the road 
was practicable for artillery, but it was found that 
the guns could not be dragged by horses, they were 


therefore taken to pieces and transported by hand, 
the operation being something similar to the passage 
of tlie Great St. Bernard by Xapoleon. By Decem- 
ber ;>0 all the guns had arrived in the Cnrish valley, 
put together for action and harnessed; the left column, 
however, had in its descent met with so t^^rrible a 
storm that it was obliged to return to Etropol, 
having lost eighty-three men killed and eight hun- 
dred and ten permanently disabled by the frost. 

The attack on Sophia was begun on the last day 
of the year, and Sophia was evacuated during the 
night of January 3, 1878, the Turks abandoning all 
their tents, an immense quantity of ammunition, and 
about sixteen hundred sick and wounded. They 
also left behind them a sufficient amount of pro- 
visions to feed General Gourko's force for a month. 
This was a very brilliant enterprise, and its success 
was largely due to the Turks being ignorant of the 
existence of the road through which Gourko ad- 
vanced. The main road from Sophia to Philip- 
popolis and Adrianople is by the watershed and the 
pass of Ichtiman, passing through a deep gorge called 
Trojan's Gate. This road, which is easy to defend, 
can be turned bv other roads leadina: through the 
valleys on either side of it. These passes were de- 
fended by Suleiman and attacked by Gourko, who 
reached the neighbourhood of Philippopolis on 
January 15. 

The Turks now saw that they could no longer re- 
treat in the direction of Adrianople, but that they 
must accept a battle in their present position in 
order to be able to retire with safety across the moun- 
tains of Rhodope in the south. Suleiman had with 
him about sixtv thousand men, but he thought it 
better to provide for his personal safety by run- 


ning away before the battle with a considerable num- 
ber of troops, leaving the brunt of the engagement to 
be sustained by Fuad Pasha. After a series of en- 
gagements in which the Russians were successful, 
the main battle was fought on January 17, Fuad 
Pasha having his back to the mountains. The 
battle was over at about 3 p.m.^ and the Turks 
abandoned everything, climbing up the mountains 
through the snow. Gourko had thus succeeded in 
his march from Sophia to Philippopolis in entirely 
destroying Suleiman's army, capturing one hundred 
and fourteen guns and about two thousand pris- 

The miserable remnants of the Turkish army 
made their ways to the shores of the ^Egean near 
Enos, whence they were conveyed in transports to 
the number of about forty thousand to Gallipoli and 
Constantinople. Suleiman was arrested and tried 
by court-martial about a year afterwards. 

Another portion of the Grand Duke's plan was 
the passage of the Shipka Pass. For this purpose 
Radetsky divided his troops into three columns, the 
centre of which, under his own command, was to re- 
main at the summit of the pass, while the other two 
were to cross the mountains on either flank and at- 
tack the main pass from the south, while Radetsky 
forced it from the north. The right column was 
placed under the command of Skobeleff, and the left 
under Prince ]\Iirsky; the movement was to begin 
on January 5, and it was calculated that the columns 
would arrive in the valley on the evening of January 
7 and attack on the morning of January 8. The 
snow was in many places ten feet deep ; it was found 
therefore that the guns could not be drawn in sledges, 
and had to be left behind, excepting the mountain 


guns which accompanied the columns. From his 
position on Mount St. Nicholas Radetskj could see 
the villages by which the columns were to debouch. 

Mirsky reached his objective on January 7, but 
Skobeleff was detained in the mountains by the 
Turks, and Mirsky was compelled to attack the pass 
alone. Skobeleff was not in a position to attack 
the pass until 10 a.m. on January 9, and was able t) 
co-operate with Mirsky. The Turkish redoubts were 
carried in a brilliant manner, and the Turks began to 
run away. Just as Skobeleff was preparing to fol- 
low them a Turkish officer arrived with orders to sur- 
render the whole force. Twelve thousand men laid 
down their arms immediately, and by midnight the 
disarmament of the rest of the Turkish force was 
complete, the whole number who surrendered being 
thirty-six thousand men, of whom six thousand were 
sick and wounded. The Russian losses, however, 
were considerable. Greene considers that Skobeleff's 
energetic attack, after he had got all his men to- 
gether in the valley, was one of the most splendid 
assaults ever made, and seems to show that the carry- 
ing of earthworks defended by modern breechloaders 
is not impossible. The Turks seem to have relied on 
the opinion that the intense cold, the deep snow, 
and the impassable nature of the mountains would 
render such flank attacks as actually took place abso- 
lutely impossible. 

In this manner the Turkish defence of the 
Balkans had entirely collapsed, an army of thirty- 
six thousand men having been captured at Shipka, 
and another army of fifty thousand men having 
been routed and dispersed. The Grand Duke now 
made preparations for the advance to Adrianople, 
but the. armistice of January 31 was signed before 


the troops had made much progress in, their move- 
ments. The Russian cavalry, however, entered that 
city on January 20, and Skobeleff himself two days 
afterwards. Then the ancient capital of Turkey and 
the second city of the Empire fell without a blow. 

We need not pursue this narrative further, or 
show how the Russians, having won every right to 
the occupation of Constantinople and the exaction 
of such terms as they pleased from the Turks, were 
deprived of their advantages by the action of the 
British Government, who only waited for the con- 
clusion of the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3 to 
tear it up and substitute for it the less wise and 
statesmanlike Treaty of Berlin. Whatever we may 
think of their political defeat the Russian armies had 
certainly covered themselves with glory. Between 
December 10, 1877, and January 31, 1878, fifty-one 
days, they had marched over four hundred miles, had 
crossed a lofty range of mountains deep in snow, and 
had fought three series of battles resulting in the cap- 
ture or destruction of two Turkish armies. This had 
been accomplished with the loss of less than twenty 
thousand men, of whom half fell in battle and the 
rest succcumbed to the rigour of the climate. Greene 
attributes these results to the " almost boundless 
patience and endurance of the Russian soldiers. 
Without knapsacks, which were left on the other side 
of the Balkans, they marched, fought and slept in 
snow and ice, and forded rivers with the ther- 
m^ometer at zero. They had very little food and a 
heavy pack to carry, yet there was not a single case 
of insubordination, the men were in excellent spirits, 
and the stragglers were few." 




War may be said to have broken out between the 
Spanish and American Governments on April 21, 
1898. The news was received with great jov in 
Xew York ; the Stars and Stripes were hung every- 
where across the streets and from the windows. 
Everywhere was seen the motto " Remember the 
Maine." Steps were taken to meet the crisis. The 
American army, which, on a peace footing, consists 
of twentv-tive thousand men, was now raised to 
seventy-one thousand, while the President called for 
a volunteer force of one hundred and twentv-five 
thousand men. The first shot of the war was fired on 
April 23 at Key West, when the Spanish merchant 
ship Buena Ventura was captured by the Nashville. 
This was followed by the capture of the Vedro and 
other vessels who were not aware that war had been 
declared. President McKinley now announced a 
blockade of the northern coast of Cuba between Car- 
denas and Bahiafonda as well as of the harbour of 
Cienfuegos upon the south coast. This was carried 
out by a squadron of twenty-three men-of-war, under 


the command of Admiral Sampson, in the New 
York, who started from the Key West Islands, 
which are only eighty miles distant from Havana, 
the capital of Cuba. 

The Spaniards, considering that they had suffi- 
cient troops in Cuba, paid chief attention to the 
operations of their fleet and attempted to break the 
blockade by the use of their smaller men-of-war in 
the West Indian waters. On April 25 a sea engage- 
ment off Cadenas resulted in the injury of an Ameri- 
can torpedo destroyer, three Spanish gunboats suc- 
ceeded on April 26 in breaking through the blockade 
of Havana, and on the following day an American 
merchant ship was taken, Spain having reserved the 
right of issuing letters of marque to merchant 
vessels as privateers. On the same day a Spanish 
squadron under Admiral Cervera left Cadiz, and 
after touching at the Cape Verde Islands pursued 
its way to the West Indies. No important opera- 
tions were possible before its arrival, because the 
sending of an American army to Cuba could not take 
place for some time. The United States militia was 
gradually concentrating itself in the National Park 
of Chickamauga, Tennessee, and the force destined 
for the conquest of Cuba, of which General Shafter 
was given command, was being prepared at Tampa, 
a harbour on the west coast of Florida. 

The American fleet now began the bombardment 
of Castel Morro at Havana on April 25, and of 
Matanzas on the two following days. An eye- 
witness tells us that the shots fell fairly in the 
ramparts, throwing the earthworks fifty feet in the 
air and cutting them level with the ground. Only 
three shots from the enemy^s batteries struck the 
New York, and none of them came closer than a 


hundred yards, although the engagement lasted fifteen 
minutes. Admiral Sampson's fleet could not sail 
out to intercept the fleet of Admiral Cervera, because 
it would be difiicult to discover their whereabouts 
in the broad expanse of the Atlantic, and because 
two American warships, which were expected from 
Brazil, could not be left off the coast of Cuba 
without protection. On the other hand, if Cervera's 
fleet were left unmolested it might attack the east 
coast of North America without being materially 
prevented by the flying squadron commanded by Ad- 
miral Schley. Consequently some apprehension 
was felt in the towns of the sea-coast, and mines were 
laid, as a precautionary measure, in the harbour of 
New York. 

Whilst in the West Indies every one was on the 
tiptoe of expectation with regard to the coming of 
Cervera's fleet, news of momentous import arrived 
from the far East. Admiral Dewev, who was com- 
manding an American squadron of eight ships-of- 
war in the harbour of Hong-Kong, sailed on April 
25 for the Philippine Islands, with orders to capture 
or destroy the Spanish fleet that was lying there. 
This squadron consisting of thirteen ships under the 
command of Admiral Montojo y Pasaron, went out 
to meet him, but soon came back again with the inten- 
tion of awaiting the attack in the Bav of Canacao. 
near Cavite, in the Bay of Manilla. By doing this 
he would be supported by the land batteries, and a 
bombardment of Manilla during the sea-fight would 
be impossible. Dewey, who had anchored in the 
Bay of Mirs, left on April 27, and on May 1 sailed 
into the Bay of Manilla, without being stopped by 
the armies and batteries of the Corregidor Islands 
which lie at the entrance, and laid his ships alongside 


of the Spanish fleet, at the extremity of the Pen- 
insula of Cavite. His fleet was armed with 122 
guns of modern construction, some of which were of 
enormous size, and in seven hours, after a terrible 
struggle, he succeeded in completely destroying the 
whole of the Spanish ships. 

The Spaniards defended themselves with heroic 
courage, but the strength of the two combatants was 
unequally matched. Of the Spanish cruisers, armed 
with ninety-six guns, only five were fit for battle, 
while the American ordnance, which consisted main- 
ly of long eight-inch guns of the newest construction, 
had a longer range and never missed their mark. 
Consequently the Spanish vessels, which had no 
similar resources, were at once set on fire, and others 
were sunk. The Spaniards lost several hundred 
men ; the Americans had none killed and only a few 
wounded. It had never occurred to the Spanish 
Government that a number of antiquated vessels 
which might be quite sufiicient for the local needs of 
the far distant but extensive group of islands and for 
the maintenance of Spanish sovereignty would be of 
no use whatever to meet an external enemy armed 
with serviceable vessels. 

The news of this disaster caused great conster- 
nation in Madrid, and the Ministry of Sagasta was 
attacked for the insufficiency of its preparations. 
On May 2 a state of siege was proclaimed in the 
capital, and eventually the Ministry was recon- 
structed. In America the victory of Admiral Dewey 
was received with corresponding enthusiasm, and on 
receiving a report from him that he had not suffi- 
cient troops to take possession of Manilla, it was 
determined that an army should be sent to his sup- 


The offensive operations of the Americans in the 
West Indies were continued at the beginning of May. 
Several attempts at landing were made in the Cuban 
province of Pinar del Rio and Santa Clara, at Cara- 
con, Hermandura, Icotora, and Cienfuegos. At- 
tacks were also made on Spanish gunboats in the 
Bay of Cardenas, on the northern coast of the prov- 
ince of Metangos. Matanzas was subjected to an- 
other bombardment, as was also Cabana in the north, 
and Cienfuegos in the south of Cuba, as well as San 
Juan in the island of Puerto Rico; but all these 
operations remained without result. 

At length on May 2 the fleet of Admiral Cervera, 
consisting of four armour-plated cruisers, three tor- 
pedo-boats, and three torpedo-boat destroyers, was 
sighted at Fort de France, in the Island of Martin- 
ique. It appears to have been his intention to dis- 
cover as soon as possible one of the two American 
squadrons which had not as yet been able to unite, 
to engage with them, and to do them so much 
damage that they would be powerless to protect the 
transports which had left Tampa on May 11 with the 
troops destined for action in Cuba. 

Cervera was forbidden to land at Martinique, 
which belonged to the French, and proceeded to the 
harbour of Santiago de Cuba, situated on the south 
coast of the island. The town of Santiago is situ- 
ated in a larce bav, surrounded bv the mountains of 
tlie Sierra Maestra, which has space for the evolu- 
tions of any number of large ships-of-war. The 
entrance to the bay is narrow and difficult, and is 
defended by the castles of Morro and Estrella. Cer- 
vera thought that from this basis he would be able to 
defend the neighbouring coast, and he was the more 
confident of success because the squadron of Admiral 



Sampson, who bad been misinformed with regard to 
Cervera's movements, was crossing to tbe north of 
Havti, and was proceeding in the direction of Key 
West, where there happened to be a great scarcity of 
fresh water for drinking. 

Sampson's fleet reached Santiago on May 19 and 
was joined here on the hist day of the month by the 
flying squadron of Schley. The two admirals then 
undertook to bombard the forts, whose defective 
armaments had to be strengthened by cannons from 
Cervera's ships. The attack was renewed on June 
3, and on this occasion the American schooner 
Merrimac was sunk in the entrance of the harbour, 
but not in such a manner as to render the exit im- 
possible, although it increased the difficulties of en- 
trance. A third attempt was made on the following 
day, June 4, but an assault on the forts of La Sorapa 
and Puertegrande was repelled, and it now seemed 
as if Cervera intended to break out and to sacrifice 
his fleet in preventing the arrival of an invading 
army. He still, however, remained in the vicinity, 
and on June 6 five thousand American infantry were 
landed at Punto Cabrera under the protection of a 
heavy bombardment, and on the following day six 
hundred at Carminanera. 

The Bay of Santiago is so deep that even Samp- 
son's heavy guns could barely reach the towTi, which 
lies at its furthest extremity, or even Cervera's fleet. 
At the same time the Admiral did not feel justified 
in forcing an entrance. He therefore sent a message 
to the American Government on June 17, with a 
pressing request for further reinforcements on a con- 
siderable scale. Some detachments which had landed 
at Guantanamo on June S had a few days later 
serious engagements with the Spanish troops. The 


Spaniards began to congratulate themselves on their 
Buccesses, as the American fleet had not been able to 
effect anything, and the only loss which they had 
suffered had been the sinking of the torpedo-boat 
destroyer Terror by the American line-of-battle ship 

At length the army which had been so anxiously 
expected sailed from Tampa on June 8, under the 
command of General Shafter, who had served in 
the War of Secession, and landed on June 23 at 
Baiguire, a harbour half-way between Santiago and 
Guantanamo, an operation in which only two men 
were drowned. After landing they were assisted 
by three thousand insurgents under the command 
of Calixto Garcia, who speedily united himself with 
Shafter. But on the following day, June 24, was 
fought the battle of Guasimos, which, after a vigor- 
ous resistance on the part of the Spaniards, ended 
with the victory of the Americans. The main burden 
of the fight fell upon the regiment of " Rough 
Riders " commanded by Colonel Roosevelt. It had 
been intended at first to recruit it mainly from cow- 
boys, picked up from the ranches, but there enlisted 
in it fashionable young men from ISTew York clubs, 
undergraduates and graduates from the Universities, 
and athletes from schools and colleges, and it cer- 
tainly covered itself with glory. In the battle of 
Guasimos the enemy numbered at least four thou- 
sand, whereas the Rough Riders were only 354, 
and General Young's force 464. Of the first there 
were eight killed and thirty-four wounded, and of 
the second eight killed and eighteen wounded. The 
Americans had thus attacked and vanquished a force 
over four times their number, entrenched behind 
rifle-pits and bushes in a mountain pass. 




After the battle of Guasimos on June 2-i, the 
army was advanced along the single track whicli 
leads from Siboney to Santiago. Two streams of 
excellent water run parallel with this track for short 
distances, and some eight miles from the coast crossed 
it in two places. The American outposts were sta- 
tioned at the first of these fords, and the Cuban out- 
posts a mile and a half further on at the second ford 
nearer Santiago. The stream made a sharp turn 
at a place called El Poso, and the track extended an- 
other mile and a half from El Poso to the trenches 
of San Juan. For six days the army was encamped 
on either side of the track for three miles back from 
the outposts. The track was an ordinary waggon,- 
road, with banks three or four feet high, which when 
it rained became a huge drain with sides of mud 
and a bottom of liquid mud a foot deep. All day 
long the pack trains passed up and do^m this track, 
carrying the day's rations; it was possible in some 
places for two waggons to pass at one time, but fre- 
quently there was only room for a single waggon. 

On June 25 fighting began for the possession of 
Sevilla, south of Santiago, which was taken on June 
28. Then took place the battle of San Juan, for the 
possession of the entrenchments in that place, which 


were the outer defences of Santiago. The advance 
began on the afternoon of June 30, " twelve thou- 
sand men with their eves fixed on a balloon, treading 
on each other's heels in three inches of mud." At 
El Poso the trail forked, the right-hand road leading 
to El ( *anev, and the left to Santiago. The troops 
slept in the mist, seeing the street lamps of Santiago 
shining over the San Juan hills. Before the moon rose 
again every sixth man who had slept in the mist that 
night was either killed or wounded. Caney is about 
four miles to the east of Santiago and M'as held bv 
five hundred Spanish soldiers ; it was thought that 
the Americans would take it without difficulty. The 
idea was that the right division should attack towards 
the north, and after the capture of Caney turn south- 
west and join the left division for the attack on 
Santiago. But the village was strongly defended 
and Caney was not taken till late in the afternoon, 
the Americans having lost 377 killed and wounded. 

The battle on the left was far more serious. The 
greatest loss took place at the San Juan River, where 
the Americans were fired into, with orders not to re- 
turn the fire, but to lie still and wait for further 
orders. For a whole hour they lay on their rifles 
while the bullets drove past incessantly, sharp- 
shooters and guerillas being hid in the trees above 
the stream and above the track. They spared no one, 
neither the wounded, nor the surgeons and attend- 
ants carrying the litters. The balloon, intended as 
a point of observation, was a great failure, as it was 
of no use, and directed the fire of the enemy. At 
last the division came within sight of the hill on the 
top of which was tlie Spanish blockhouse and fort of 
San Juan. Tliey were intended to take it, although 
it was almost impregnable. It was madness to as- 


sault this hill without artillery, but it was done. 
Luckily the Spanish trenches on the top were built 
so far back on the brow, that unless the Spaniards 
lay actually on the breastworks or outside them, they 
could not depress their rifles enough to fire down the 
hill. Thus the fire was hotter in the rear than it was 
in the actual assault. At last the Americans flooded 
the ridges and swarmed in the blockhouse, and the 
army halted, gazing at the city beneath them. It is 
reckoned that the loss on both American wings did 
not fall short of two thousand men. On the side of 
the Spaniards General Linare>^ was severely wounded, 
467 men were killed, and half their force was disabled. 
An unex]>ected incident now supervened. The 
moment had arrived Avhen Cervera's fleet could be 
of great service, although up to the present it had 
done but little good. But to the surprise of all, at 
9.80 A.M. on Sunday, July 3, it came out of the har- 
bour under full steam, and in three-quarters of an 
hour was entirely destroyed by the American fleet, 
which was three times superior in number and was 
armed with excellent artillery. The Spanish ships 
Avere set on fire and driven on to the coast, where 
they blew up. Field-Marshal Blanco had sent him 
repeated orders to come out, and he had at last 
obeyed because his supply of coal was nearly ex- 
hausted, and because, seeing that Santiago was noAV 
closely invested, he did not wish to be caught like 
Montojo at Cavite, but preferred to perish in the 
open sea. Unfortunately he was misinformed as to 
the position or number of the American fleet, and 
sailed in the wrong direction. As the engagement 
took place at fifteen hundred yards' distance not a 
single Spanish shot could touch the American ships. 


although the flagship, the Vizcaya, continued to 
fire after she was in flames. This Spanish fleet was 
not ten years old, but the armour-plates were thin; 
it carried six heavy, forty-six medium, and ninety- 
six light guns, whereas the American fleet had sixty- 
seven heavy, thirty-six medium, and one hundred and 
ninety-six light guns. Cervera was taken prisoner 
and with his companions honourably treated. 

Before Santiago an armistice was concluded from 
July 2 to July 9, during which period many dis- 
cussions were held about surrender, although Mar- 
shal Blanco talked about making the place a second 
Saragossa. Both parties were really desirous of peace, 
because the position of the Americans was anything 
but secure, while the garrison of Santiago, which 
had been reinforced with eighteen thousand men 
under General Pondo from Seilobo, was gradually 
running short of provisions and ammunition. At 
length on July 15 the town and province of San- 
tiago de Cuba was surrendered to the United States, 
under the condition that the garrison, amounting to 
22,780 men, should be sent back to Spain unarmed. 
Sampson's fleet now entered the harbour, and on July 
17 President McKinley issued orders for the gov- 
ernment of the Province. 

The struggle for the possession of the island still 
continued. Manzanilla was bombarded on July 29. 
Marshal Blanco refused to recognise the capitulation 
of Santiago, which he declared to be strategically 
unimportant, and was burning to meet the Ameri- 
cans in conflict; but soon afterwards the Spanisli 
troops in Kipa on the north coast as well as in 
Caimanera and Guantanamo on the south coast laid 
down their arms. These events caused great dejec- 
tion in Spain. On July 13 a member of the Spanish 


Parliament said that Spain might have conquered in 
the war if they had sent four thousand men to 
Florida, but that now the responsibility of its con- 
tinuance would rest with the Government. But the 
cup of disaster was not yet full. A third or reserve 
squadron, which had been formed at Cadiz under the 
command of Admiral Camara, sailed on June 15 for 
the Philippine Islands, where it was doomed to cer- 
tain destruction, whereas it might have been of some 
use in the West Indies. On reaching Port Said it 
was prevented by the Egyptian Government on June 
30 from coaling from its o\vn transport vessels, and 
was recalled on July 9 to protect the Spanish coast 
towns from a possible bombardment. 

In the Philippine Islands Admiral Dewey was still 
waiting for a force to commence operations on land, 
but meanwhile the Spanish troops were hardly 
pressed by the insurgents. At the end of June the 
Governor-General Augusti proposed to the German 
Vice-Admiral Von Diedrichs, who was at Manilla for 
the purpose of protecting German commerce, that the 
Admirals of the neutral powers should take Manilla 
under their protection. This offer was refused in 
consequence of the American blockade. On the other 
side Aguinaldo, who commanded the insurgents, and 
who on June 12 had proclaimed the independence of 
the islands, made a declaration to the same Admiral, 
that any claim made to the islands by America was 
excluded by the convention which had been signed 
by him and Admiral Dewey on April 24, and agreed 
to by President McKinley, England, and Japan, by 
which the insurgents should join the Americans in 
making war upon Spain with the object of establish- 
ing in the Philippines an independent Federal Re- 
public under American protection. 


The American land forces were still detained at 
sea. On their way they had hoisted the American flag 
in the Ladrone Islands, which belonged to Spain, 
and carried off the garrison, which had heard nothing 
of the outbreak of the war. On July 17 they eyent- 
ually arrived at the island of Luzon, and engaged 
the Spanish troops on July 31. This enabled Ad- 
miral Dewey to demand the surrender of Manilla 
on August 1. The summons, howeyer, was rejected 
and he did not become master of the city till August 
13, after it had suffered a bombardment. 

The capture of the island of Puerto Rico forms a 
striking contrast to the operations in Cuba, the dif- 
ference beina; attributed by the Americans to the 
incompetence of the commanders in the one case, and 
their competence in the other. General Miles had as- 
sumed the command of the American army in Cuba 
on July 23, and immediately turned his attention to 
Puerto Rico, where the feeling of the inhabitants was 
strongly Spanish. The island had been declared inde- 
pendent on February 9, and a Parliament assembled 
on July 21:, which protested against the attack of 
America on the freedom of the country. We are told 
by an eye-witness that the army in Puerto Rico ad- 
vanced with the precision of a set of chessmen; its 
moves were carefully considered and followed by suc- 
cess ; its generals acting independently and yet along 
routes reconnoitred by Generals Ray Stone and Major 
Flagler, and selected by General Miles, never missed 
a ]ioint, nor needlessly lost a man, nor retreated from 
a foot of ground over which they had advanced. The 
consequence of this was that eight cities or towns, 
with seven hundred thousand inhabitants, were won 
over to the United States at the cost of very few men 
killed. General Miles landed at Geronimo on July 


25, and the reduction of the island was completed 
by the surrender of Ponce on July 28. 

Although only a small portion of Cuba had sur- 
rendered to the Americans, and the Spaniards still 
had eighty thousand men on the island, the Span- 
iards could not continue the war any longer, which 
had cost Spain about five thousand million pesetas in 
six months, and was likely to cost twelve or fifteen 
million a month in the future. Also the destruction 
of the Spanish fleet made it impossible to raise the 
blockade. Therefore on July 27, by the friendly 
offices of the French Ambassador, Cambon, in Wash- 
ington, the Spanish Government declared itself to be 
beaten, and asked for conditions of peace. 

On August 12 preliminaries were signed by which 
Spain surrendered all the Antilles, except Cuba, the 
town, bay, and harbour of Manilla, and a coaling 
station on the Ladrones to America ; it further re- 
nounced its sovereignty over Cuba. America on her 
side declined to take over the debt of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico and gave up any claim to a war in- 
demnity, A commission to settle the details of the 
treaty was to be appointed on the understanding 
that Spanish troops should be immediately with- 
drawn from Puerto Pico and the remaining provinces 
of Cuba. The definite treaty was signed on Decem- 
ber 12, by which Spain renounced her sovereignty 
and every claim to possession with regard to Cuba, 
and made over to the United States Puerto Rico 
and the rest of her West Indian possessions, the 
island of Guam, the most southerly of the Ladrone 
group, and the Philippine Archipelago, on the con- 
dition that for ten years Spanish ships should be al- 
lowed to have access to them on the same conditions 
as the ships of the United States. America was to 



pay twenty million dollars to Spain within three 
months, who thus bv the loss of some three hundred 
square miles of territory and some twelve million of 
inhabitants gave up all claim to be a colonial country 
and had to content herself with the recollections of 
the past. 



Abach, The, 80. 

Abbiategrasso, 305. 

Abens river, 77, 79. 

Abensberg, 77 ; Battle, 20 April, 1809, 

Aberdeen, Lord, 285. 

Acqua Fredda, 311. 

Adams, at Waterloo, 254. 

Adda river, 309. 

Aderklaa, 94, 95. 

Adige river, 37, 43, 208, 390, 391. 

Adrianople, 478, 490, 491, 492, 494. 

.^gean shores, 493. 

African troops, 410. 

Aguelda river, 191. 

Aguinaldo, proclaims indepen- 

dence of Philippine Islands, 507. 

Aisne river, 209, 210, 211, 216, 440, 443. 

Alabama State, 320, 358. 

Albaredo, 6, 7, 391. 

Albert, Crown Prince of Saxony, 410 ; 
Army under his command, 437 ; 
threatened by MacMahon, 439 ; at 
Sedan, 445 ; march to Paris, 456 ; 
on banks of Seine, 457. 

Albrecht, Archduke, commands 
Army of South in Venetia and 
Istria, 379; in Italy, 390-392; 
orders to F. M. Benedek, 400. 

Albuera battle, 11 May, 1811, 186. 

Alen5on, 469. 

Alessandria, 13, 16, 17 ; armistice, 
15th June, 1800, 22 ; French army 
and Emperor Napoleon at, 295, 

Alexander I., Emperor of Russia, 
Collects army in Moravia, 47 ; at 
Olmiitz, 50 ; at Battle of Auster- 
litz, 52, 56 ; renascence of Polish 
nation intolerable, 105 ; at Vilna, 
107, 108 ; kindly feelings towards 
Napoleon, 109 ; not giving in to 
Napoleon, 130 ; head-quarters at 
Neu-Burschwiz, 140 ; Peace of 
Tilsit, 161 ; at Troyes, 216 ; ad- 
vance to Paris, 220, 221. 

Alexander II., Emperor of Russia, 
succeeds Emperor Nicholas, 2d 
March, 1855 ; Address to diplo- 
matic body, 286 ; makes war on 
Turkey, and leaves St. Petersburg 
to assume command, 476 ; at 
Gourji-Studen, 479 ; at Plevna,487. 

Alexander, Prince of Hesse : com- 
mands new corps to enter Switzer- 
land, 209 ; beats French at Poli- 
gny, 213 ; Prussian declaration of 
war against Hesse, in command 
of corps, 380, 382 ; surrenders 
Frankfort and retires to Oden- 
wald, 399. 

Alexandria, Sardinian army around, 
294, 337. 

Alexandria, U.S.A., 322; rail- 

way, 323. 

Algiers, 239 ; troops from, 441, 448. 

Alle river, 73. 

Alleghany mountains, 333. 

Allenstein, 70. 

AUix, Gen., Defends the Yonne, 206 ; 
attacks farm of La Haye Sainte, 

Alma, Battle of the, 19 Sept. 1854, 266- 

Almaraz, 187. 

Almeida fortress, 183, 185 ; surren- 
dered, 186. 

Alps, Austrians in possession of 
western, 10 ; France and her 
frontier of, 200 ; Army of N. Italy 
and Naples to cross, 231 ; Aus- 
trians to drive allies towards, 
295 ; Cialdini to watch the passes, 

Alps, Army of the, 231. 

Alsace, Cavalry in, 38 ; French army 
in, 410 ; abandoned by MacMahon, 
415 ; a conquered country, 421 ; 
Gen. Werder intends invading, 

Alsatia, 459. 

Alvensleben, Gen. von. Corps under, 
410 ; at Saarbriicken,417 ; attacks 
the French at Trouville and 
Vionville, 424, 425. 

Aman villers, 429, 431, 432 ; abandoned, 

Ambleteuse camp, 38. 

America, War of secession, 1861-65, 
320-376 ; Presidential Election of 
18G0, 320; war with Spain, 1898, 

Amiens fort, 470. 

Ampflng, 25. 

Anapa, 289. 

Andalusia, Dupont reduces prov- 
inces, 66 ; K. Joseph and Soult's 
invasion, 181, 182 ; Soult covering 




frontiers, 185, 187 ; troops with- 
drawn, 188 ; French armies in, 

190 ; Soult leaves, 193. 
Anderson's force at Spottsylvania, 

Andujar, 166. 
Angelv. Gren. Regnaud de St. Jean d", 

Angouleme, Duchesse d", 226. 
Annapolis, 362. 
Ansbach, Jlargravate of, given to 

Bavaria. 61. 
Antietam, Battle of, 17 Sept. 1862, 340, 

Antilles, The, Admiral Musiessy at31 ; 

Surrendered to America by Spain, 

12 Aug 1898, 509. 
Antivari, 486. 

Antwerp besieged, 208; English re- 
tire to, 238. 
Aosta. 4. 6. 
Apeunines, The. 3. 
Apolda. 67. 

Appomatox Court House, 376. 
Aprica pass, 28. 
Aquia, 346. 

Araba-Konah pass, 491. 
Aragon, 174. 
Aranjuez revolution, 19 March, 1808, 

Arapiles battle, 23 July 1812, 192, 

Arcis-sur-Aube, 217, 218, 219. 
Ardahan stormed. 477. 
Areizaga, Gen., fails to reconquer 

Madrid, 181. 
Argenteuil, 457. 
Argonne hills, 440, 442. 
Arkansas. 321, 328, 355. 
Arlberg, The, 47. 
Arlington Heights, 322. 
Armistead, Gen., falls at " Bloody 

Ingle," 354. 
Arnau, 384. 
Arras, 38. 
Artenav, 463, 466. 
Artois,"Comte d", 226. 
Artois, 470. 
Aschaffenburg, 399. 
Aspern, 94, 95, 402. Battle of, 21 May, 

1809, 85-91, 391. 
Astorga. 171, 179. 
Asturias, Prince of the (Ferdinand 

VII. of Spain). 
Asturias, 165, 170, 187. 
Athies, 212. 
Athis, 224. 
Atlanta. Sherman to capture, 361, 368, 

battle, .369, Fall, 2 Sept. 1864, 370 ; 

Sherman leaves, 371. 
Atlantic, Lines of Torres Vedras from 

the Targus to the, 184. 
Aube river, 202, 203, 206, 209, 217, 218, 

Auerstadt battle, 16 Oct. 1886, 66, 69 ; 

Troops of Duke Frederick William 

dressed in black in memory of the 
Duke, mortally wounded in, 245. 

Augereau, Marshal, 24, 27, 47, 62, 65, 
69. 70, 144, 157, 206, 207, 209, 213, 215. 

Augsburg. 41, 46, 77, 78. 

Augusti, Gov. -Gen., 507. 

Austerlitz, battle of, 2 Dec. 1806, 55-60, 
65,75, 114, 177,2.33. 

Austria, Peace negotiations with 
France, 9 Nov. 1800 ; rejected. 22- 
23 ; Napoleon's plan of 1805 cam- 
paign, 35 ; Treaty of Pressburg, 
59 ; war of 1809 to wipe out 
treaty of Pressburg, 75: arming 
for war, 171 ; army in war of 1814, 
199, 203-209; advance to Paris, 
221 ; officers educated in. 227 ; 
joined a new coalition against 
Napoleon, 230 ; strength of army. 
231, 232 ; joined allies at Sebasto- 
pol, 285 ; war with France and 
Sardinia, 1859, 294-319 : war with 
Prussia, 1866, 377-402; French 
plan to induce A. and Italy to 
abandon their neutrality. 412 ; 
English disinclined to an alliance 
with the Port without co-opera- 
tion of. 478. 

Avallon, 3. 

Avesnes, 233. 

Azofl, Sea of, 289. 

Azores, Villeneuve at the, 32. 


Babadagh, 477. 

Badajoz, Junta fled to, 170 ; Welling- 
ton at, 180 ; retires, 181 ; taken by 
Soult, 185 ; Beresford advancing 
to its relief. 186 ; defeated by Mar- 
mont, 1S7 ; taken by Wellington, 

Baden, promised contribution to the 
Grand Army, 39 : made a Grand 
Duchy, 40; Troops from,381-2, 396 ; 
French troops to occupy, 412. 474. 

Bagration, Prince, despatched to 
Hollabrunn. 50 ; on Plan of Aus- 
terlitz battle, 54 ; opposed by 
Lannes and Murat, 56, 57 ; in com- 
mand against French invasion of 
Russia, 106 ; in province of Minsk, 
109 ; retreat to Smolensk inter- 
cepted by Davoust, 110 ; reaches 
Smolensk, 111. 

Bahiafonda, 496. 

Baiguire, 502. 

Baird, stand at Elvas, 172. 

Bakshisherai, 272. 

Balaclava Charge, The, 25 Oct. 1854, 
271-276 : parallel to the charge of 
the Light Brigade, 246. 

Balaclava, Stores in, 283 ; harbour, 
270, 382. 

Balan, 447, 449. 450, 451. 452. 

Balashov, aide-de-camp to Alexander 
I., 107, 108. 



Balcombe, Betsy, and Napoleon, 118. 

Bale, 3, 199, 200, 207, 219, 231. 

Bulganak, The, 267. 

Balkans, The, 478, 488, 490, 491, 494, 495. 

Baltic, The, 410. 

Baltimore, 322, 339. 

Bamberg, 63. 

Banks, Gen. N. P. at Culpeper, 836 ; 
engagement at Cedar Mountains 
and retreats, 337 ; to take Mobile, 

Banks, Ford, 346, 348, 349. 

Barbadoes, Nelson at, 31 . 

Barcelona, 169. 

Bard fort. 6 ; attacked and capit- 
ulated, 7. 

" Bare-foot " battalions, 4. 

Baring at Waterloo, 260. 

Barral's reserve cavalry, 422. 

Bar-sur-Aube, 202, 206, 208, 217. 222. 

Baschutz, 142. 

Basque provinces, 190. 

Bassano, 393. 

Baste, Capt., 91, 93. 

Bath, 44. 

Baton Rouge, 355. 

Batoum. 486. 

Battle above the clouds. 360. 

Bautzen, 145, 152 : Battle of, 20, 21 
May, 1813, 139-143. 

Bavaria, Elector of, raised to rank of 
King, 60. 

Bavaria, French in, 22 ; Bernadotte 
to command Bavarians, 38 ; Aus- 
tria driven from, 15 ; Margravate 
of Ansbach receives, 61 ; Napo- 
leon's Marshals in, 62 ; men from, 
76 ; Augereau's corps in, 144 ; 
troops intercept retreating 
French army and are crushed, 
169 ; supports Benedek against 
Prussia, 382, 394; under Prince 
Charles, 396, 397 ; troops defend 
Kissingen, .398 ; surprised on the 
Saale, 398 ; Falckenstein assumes 
g"'vernment of portions of, 399 ; 
troops with Prussia, 414 ; march 
with Germans after Sedan, 445 ; 
at Argenteuil. 457. 

Baylen, Capitulation of, 16.5, 166, 180, 

Bayonne, 162, 165. 168, 171, 196, 197. 

Bazaine, Marshall. In command at 
Metz, 409 ; near Spicheren, 418 ; 
commands Rhine army ; recalls 
Frossard to Metz, 420 ; retires 
from Metz to Verdun, 423 ; crosses 
the Moselle, 423 ; at Gravelotte, 
424 ; battle of Vionville, 425-29 ; 
shut up in Metz, 437-40 ; attempts 
to relieve him, 445 ; Gambetta 
counting upon his co-operation, 
460 ; capitulation of Metz, 460-61. 

Bazeilles, 445, 447, 448, 449. 

Beauharnais, Eugene, Prince of 
Leuchtenberg, Napoleon's saying 


to, 12 ; reverses in Italy, 81 ; im- 
peding Archduke John, 84 ; at 
Wagram, 94 ; saying concerning 
the Cossacks, 101 ; in the advance 
to Smolensk. 106 ; opposed to the 
advance to Moscow, 111 ; at Battle 
of Borodino, 115 ; captures Ma- 
loyaroslavetz, 119, 120 ; retreat 
from Smolensk, 121. 122; at- 
tacked, 123, 124 ; at Battle of 
Lutzen, 1.33-137 ; sent to Italy to 
levy an army, 140, 144 ; defence 
against Austrians in Italy, 199, 
208 ; Viceroy, 76. 

Beaumont, 231, 233, 234, 235, 440, 443, 

Beaune la Rolande battle, 28 Nov. 
1870, 465. 

Beauregard, Gen., commands Con- 
federate Army, 323, 324, 330, 331. 

Beaver Down Creek, 334. 

Bee, Gen., at Bell's Ford, 325, 326 ; 
death, 333. 

Bethune roads. 33. 

Belbek river, 269. 

Belfort. 409, 459, 462, 463. 473, 474. 475. 

Belgium held by French troops, 199 ; 
Maison retires before Duke of 
Saxe-Weimar, 208 ; Napoleon's 
plan to conquer English and 
Prussians in, ^2 ; probably join- 
ing France. 233 ; French advance 
to frontier, 2.34 ; Belgians of 
Chasse at Waterloo. 254 ; French 
after Sedan escape into. 455 ; 
frontier to the Loire one broad 
battlefield, 461. 

Bell's ford, 324. 

Belle Alliance. 253. 

Belleville. 223, 453. 

Belliard, Gen., 224. 

Bellizona Castle, 11. 

Belvedere, 168. 

Benavente, 171. 

Benedek, Field-Marshal, commands 
Austrian forces in Italy. 295 ; at 
Peschiera, 312 ; retires after Battle 
of Solferino, 318 ; assumes com- 
mand of Austrian army, 379 ; oc- 
cupation of Saxony, 382 ; Battle 
of Koniggriitz, 3831389 ; ordered 
to send his troops to Vienna, 400. 

Benedetti. 402. 

Benatek. 387, 388. 

Benningsen, Gen., commands com- 
bined forces of Russia and Prus- 
sia : Battle of Eylau, 70-74 ; Re- 
inforced the allies against Napo- 
leon in Saxony, 154 ; at Battle of 
Leipzig, 158. 

Bentonville, 375. 

Bereguardo. 295. 

Beresford. Gen. Lord, sent to relief 
of Badajos, 185 : battle at Al- 
buera : Wellington's remarks, 
186 ; Badajos preserved from, 187. 



Berezina river, 124, 125, 128. 

Berlin, Napoleon's plan to march to, 
63, 64 : entry of Napoleon, 27 Oct. 
1806, 68 ; ministers left behind in, 
69 ; Napoleon's idea to eventually 
inarch to, 139 ; Wittgenstein and 
Blucher's armies not covering, 
140 ; Oudinot to march to, 142, 
144, 151 ; beaten and driven back, 
151, 153 ; Reserve forces in, 379 ; 
Benedek dictating peace in, 282 ; 
282 ; King William in, 407 ; We 
shall soon reach Berlin, 413 ; 
August 15 destined for French 
entry into, 423 ; Treaty of Berlin, 

Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden. 
In Hanover, his plan, 38 ; at In- 
goldstadt, 41 ; crosses the Inn, 47, 
48 ; summoned to Napoleon at 
Brilnn. 53; in Pratzen, 57 ; in Ba- 
• varia, 62 ; occupies Saalburg, 64 ; 
refuses to assist Davoust, 66 ; 
moves to the Vistula, 69 ; Battle 
of Eylau, 70, 71 ; at WUrzburg, 
77 ; at Enzersdof , 94 ; occupies 
Aderklaa and retreats, 95 ; elected 
■ Crown Prince of Sweden, deserts 
Napoleon, and joins Russia, 133 ; 
commands Army of North, 145 ; 
Oudinot despatched to Berlin to 
deal with, 151 ; crosses the Elbe 
at Dessau, 154 ; Napoleon to meet, 
155 ; attacks Marmont, 158 ; suc- 
cessful engagement with French, 
159 ; supports Duke of Saxe- 
Weimar, 208. 

Bernard, Prince, of Saxe-Weimer, 
237, 244. 

Bernato bridge, 303. 

Bernkopf, commandant at Bard, 7. 

Berry-au-Bac, 210, 211, 212, 213. 

Berthier, Marshal, opinion of Desaix, 
18 ; in Bavaria, 62 ; sent to Ratis- 
bon, 77 ; paralysed by responsi- 
bility, 78 ; at Esslingen, 86 ; con- 
ference at Island of Loban, 89 ; 
with Napoleon at Wagram, 96 ; at 
Moscow, 120 ; at the Berezina, 126 ; 
orders transmitted by, 176 ; to 
lead army to Fontainebleau, 222. 

Bertrand, Gen. at Battle of Lilt- 

zen, 135, 137 ; Battle of Bautzen, 
140-142 ; visits outposts with Na- 
poleon before Battle of Water- 
loo, 252 ; retreat with Napoleon 
after Waterloo, 265. 

Besangon, 202, 460, 474. 

Besika Bay, 478. 

Bessarabia, Russian, 476. 

Bessieres, Marshal, with Napoleon 
after Battle of Moscow, 120 ; death 
at Rippach, 136, 

Bessieres, advance on Madrid, 


Best, Hanoverians of, 253. 

Beyer, Gen. invades Hesse-Cas- 

sel, 381 ; united with the Army of 
the Main, 3% ; invests Strasburg, 

Biberach, 21. 

Bidassoa river, 163, 183, 198. 

Biela, 479, 482, 485. 

Big Black river, 356. 

Big Round Top, 357. 

Bigny, 465. 

Bilbao, 196. 

Bismarck, Prince, in German Army, 
410 ; cuirassier regiment annihi- 
lated at Vionville, 425 ; two sons 
in cavalry charge, 426 ; political 
matters after Sedan committed 
to him, 452 ; signed preliminaries 
of Peace at Versailles, 475. 

Bistritz river, 386, 387. 

Bitsch, 409, 415, 462. 

Bitterfeld, Gen. Herwarth von, com- 
mands army of Elbe, 383 ; at 
Battle of Koniggratz, 384-8. 

Black Brunswickers, 245, 246, 251. 

Black Forest, Army of, 3, 40. 

Black Forest valley, 474. 

Black Sea, 267. 

Blackburn's Fort, 334. 

Blake, Gen., opposes King Joseph in 
Spain, 165 ; Napoleon sends troops 
against, 168. 

Blanc Menil, 457. 

Blanco, Field-Marshal, 505, 506. 

Blasiowitz, 57. 

Blenheim battle-fleld, 21. 

Bloser-Wasser stream, 141, 142. 

Blois, 224, 468. 

Blondel's song discovers King Rich- 
ard, 48. 

" Bloodv Angle " 351. 

Blue Mountains, 333, 337, 342. 

Bliicher, Field-Marshal, at Jena, in 
command of rear-guard ; urges 
renewal of conflict, 67 ; brought 
up as a cavalry officer, 102 ; from 
Silesia crosses the Elbe, 134 ; 
captures Gross-Gorschen, 136 ; 
fails to reach Kaja ; allies retreat 
to his disgust, 137 ; wounded, 138 ; 
Battle of Bautzen, 140-143 ; Dres- 
den, 145, 146 ; advance to Katz- 
bach, 151, 153; "Marshal For- 
wards," 152, 203 ; crossed the Elbe 
at Wittenberg, 154, 155 ; attacks 
Marmont at Mockern, and cap- 
tures, 158 ; crossed the Rhine, 
Jan. 1 1814, 200 ; advance to Vassy 
and St. Dizier ; design to march 
to Paris, 203; attacked by Napo- 
leon and retreat to Barsur-Aube, 
203, 303 ; at La Rothiere : advance 
to Paris, 203 ; attacked at Vau- 
champs, 203, 204 ; resumes march, 
208; Battle of Craonne, 211; at 
Laon, 211-213, 215, 216 ; communi- 
cations re-established 220 ; on 



frontiers of Lorraine 222 ; inva- 
sion of France, 233; at Namur, 
234; disgusted at a soldier desert- 
ing his colors, 235 ; Battle of 
Ligny, 238-243 ; at Quatre-Bras, 
245, 249, 253 ; arrived at Waterloo, 
258, 259 ; pursuit of the French 
after Waterloo, 265. 

Blunienau, 402. 

Blumenthal, 410. 

Bober, The, 144, 146, 152. 

Bobr, 124. 

Bodenbach, 381. 

Bohemia, troops from, 24 ; Archduke 
Ferdinand's plan to reach, 42, 43 ; 
collecting army in, 46 ; hindered 
by Napoleon, 47, 49 ; Austrians to 
drive French into, 54 ; Archduke 
Charles to crush French between 
his army and that of, '7 ; Arch- 
duke Charles on the frontiers, 82 ; 
retreats towards, 97 ; Napoleon 
secure from attack from. 144 ; ap- 
proachs guarded, 144 ; expected 
attack of French, 146 ; army en- 
ters Saxony, 147 ; in defiles of 
Peterswalde : retire, 152 ; army at 
Fri6berg to oppose, 154 ; to march 
to Paris, 200 ; rear threatened by 
Napoleon, 205 ; at Aube, 218 ; 
communications opened, 384 ; 
mountains, 141, 382. 

Bols de Geniveaux, farmhouse, 430, 

Bojazid, 477, 486. 

Bologna, 380. 

Bonaparte. See Napoleon. 

Bonaparte, Jerome, King of West- 
phalia, at the Niemen, 106 ; to 
dispose of Bragation, 109 ; march- 
ing under Davoust, 110 ; attacks 
Chateau of Hougoumont. 256. 

Bonaparte, Joseph, meets Cobentzl at 
LunSville ; conditions of peace, 
rejected, 23 ; President of the 
Senate, Paris, 39 ; Crown of Spain 
given to, 165 ; French army re- 
ducing his provinces, 166 ; joined 
by Napoleon at the Miranda, 168 ; 
incapable of commanding in Pen- 
insula, 175 ; threatened invasion 
of Madrid, 179 ; South displaces 
Jourdain on his staff, 180 ; enters 
Seville, 181 ; his command re- 
duced : a phantom king, 182 ; 
commanding French army in 
Peninsula, 190; takes refuge in 
Valencia, 193; enters Madrid, 
Nov. 2, 1812; formed army of 
Portugal : defeated by W^ellington 
at Arapiles : retires to Cuidad 
Rodrigo, 195 : in command, 195 ; 
too weak to oppose Wellington 
at Valladolid, defeated at Vil- 
toria, June 21, 1S13, 196 ; recalled 
to France in disgrace, 197 ; Presi- 

dent of Court of Regency at 
Paris, 223. 

Bonaparte, Louis, to raise troops and 
form a National Guard, 39. 

Bondy wood, 457. 

Bonnet, succeeds Marmont, 


Bonneuil, 457. 

Bordeaux, troops from, 47 ; entered 
by English, 198 ; Government re- 
moved to, 468 ; National Assem- 
bly to meet at, 473. 

Borgo Vercelli, 301. 

Borisor, 124, 125, 126. 

Bormida, The, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19. 

Bormio. 392. 

Bornheim, 399. 

Bowdino, 120, 192 ; Battle of the, 113- 

Borstedt, 134. 

Bosphorus, The, 478. 

Bosquet, Marshal, at Inkerman, 278, 
281 ; Sebastopol, 290, 292. 

Bossu wood, 246. 

Boudet occupies Esslingen, 86. 

Bougival, 457. 

Bouillon, 454. 

Boulages, 217. 

Boulogne, French ships for, 30 ; plan, 
31 ; camp of army, 38 ; Napoleon 
at, 39 ; English landed at, 42. 

Bourljaki, Gen., command in Army of 
the Rhine at Metz, 409, 420 ; at 
Remy, 422 ; news of defeat at St. 
Privat, 433 ; government of North 
of France under, 459 ; prevented 
from approaching Paris, 461 ; 
operating in East of France, 468 ; 
moves to Nevers to attack Ger- 
mans, 473 ; to destroy Germans' 
retreat to the Rhine, 474 ; sur- 
rounded and retreats to Switzer- 
land, 474. 

Bourbons, Napoleon, to drive them 
from Naples, 35 ; from the throne 
of Spain, 163; return to Paris, 
April, 1814, 224, 225, 226 ; changes, 
226-227; Napoleon's saying at St. 
Helena, 235; cause lost forever, 

Bourges, 460, 468, 473. 

Bourmont, Gen., desertion from 
French army, 234. 

Bourrienne, 3. 

Bover, Gen., 460. 

Brabant, 43. 

Braga, 177. 

Braganza, House of, ceased to reign, 
163, 164 ; arms supplanted, 164. 

Bragg, Gen., 358, 359, 360. 

Braine-l'Alleud, 253, 254. 

Brannan Fort, 27, 47. 

Bray, 205. 

Brazil, Spanish monarchy transferred 
to, 163, 164 ; Spanish fleet ex- 
pected from, 498. 



Bredone's corps, 425. 

Breslau, 142. 

Brest, 30, 31, 32, 33, 92. 

Brie, 470. 

Brienne, 302, 203, 217. 

Briey, 437. 

Bristol Station, 337, 338. 

Brittany, 408. 

Briiun, 50, 51, 53. 

Brune, Gen., with troops in the 
Mincio, 24, 27, 28 ; at Boulogne 
defending sea-coast, 39. 

Brunswick, Duke of, 03 : attacked by 
Napoleon, escapes by K6.sen, 64 ; 
watch-flres, 05 ; retreat from 
Weimar to Naumburg, 66; blinded, 
67 ; death, 245. 

Brussels, "Wellington at, 234, 2.35, 236, 
2:39, 240, 245, 247, 250 ; Duchess of 
Richmond's Ball, 240. 

Brve, 23S. 240, 241. 245. 246, 348, 349. 

Bubna, Gen., 83, 207, 209. 

Buckner, 327. 

Buell, Gen., 330. 

Biilow, Gen. von, with Army of North, 
209 ; at Ligny, 340 ; Waterloo, 
257, 259 : at Vionville, 435. 

Bueno Ventura. The, 496. 

BuflFalora, 395, 303-308. 

Bulgaria, Prince Chechesky. governor 
of, 478 ; Bulgarians with Russian 
army, 482 ; Russian guard in, 488. 

Bull Run, battle (July 21, 1&6H, 323, 
325, 332, 333, 337, 338, 348, 349. 

Burford. 350. 

Burgos, 168. 169, 192, 196. 

Burgoyne, Sir John, 373. 

Burgundy, 463. 

Burkensdorf, 48. 

Burlink, 268. 

Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E., to cross 
Turner's Gap, 340 ; driven from 
his post by Lee, 341 : replaces 
McClellan in command and re- 
organises army, 342 ; crosses the 
Rappahannock, 343 ; driven back 
from Fredericksburg, .344 : super- 
seded, 345 ; at Annapolis, .361, 362 ; 
Battle of The Wilderness, 364, 

Busaco heights, 183. 

Busca, 302. 

Bussv, 248. 

Butler, Gen., .361. 

Buzancv, 443. 

Bylandt, 253. 

Byng, Guards of, 2.53. 


Cabano, 500. 

Cadiz, Ships from, 30, 31 ; British 
fleet reaching, 33 ; Villeneuve at, 
33, 34, .35 ; Population in arms, 
165 ; might have been surprised 
by Joseph and Soult, 181 ; Central 

Junta in refuge in, 182 ; Cervera 

leaves, 497 ; reserve force under 

Camara starts from, 507. 
Caesar, 81. 
Caffarelli, commandant in Basque 

provinces, 190. 
Carmanera, 506. 
Calais, Pas de, 408. 
Calder, Sir Robert, against French 

fleet, 32, 33, 34. 
Calvados. 472. 
Camarino, 312. 
Camaro, Admiral, 507. 
Cambaceres, Consul, 1, 29, 39. 
Cambon, French ambassador in 

Washington, 509. 
Cambriels. 460, 462. 
Camou, 306, 307, 308. 
Campbell, Thos., on the Battle of 

Hohenlinden, 26. 
Campo-Formio, Peace of, 2. 
Canacao Bay, 498. 
Canrobert, Marshal, at Sebastopol, 

284 ; resigned his command, 290 ; 

with troops, 296 ; at Magenta. 

304-306 ; marches on Medole, 314- 

316 ; at Metz, 409 ; to assemble at 

Chalons for Metz, 412, 413 ; at 

Metz, 430, 432 ; at village of St. 

Privat la Montague, 430 ; prisoner 

of war, 462. 
Canrobert's hill, 269, 274. 
Cape Finisterre, 32. 
Cape Verde Islands, 497. 
Caracon, 500. 
Cardenas. 496. 497. 500. 
Cardigan, Lord, leads charge of Light 

Brigade at Balaclava, 275, 276. 
Careenage bay, 271, 272. 
Careenage creek, 271. 
Careenage harbour, 277. 
Careenage ravine, 277. 278, 380. 
Carignan, 444, 445. 
Carinthia, "6. 
Carlisle, U.S.A., 350. 
Carminanera, 501. 
Carnot, 208. 

Carolina, North. 321, 333. 373, 374, 376. 
Carolina. South, 320, 321, 333, 373, 374. 
Carpathian mountains, 408. 
Carpenedolo, 311. 
Carroll's brigade, 352. 
Casa Marino, 314. 
Casa Nuova, 315. 
Casate, .306. 

Cassel, 110. 379, 380, 381, 453. 
Casselino Nuovo, 316. 
Cassino Nuovo, .307. 
Castanos, 166, 168, 169. 
Cast eggio, 11,297, 298. 
Castel Ceriolo, 15. 
Castel Goffredo, 311, 312, 315, 316. 
Castel Grimaldo, .313. 
Castel Venzago, 310. 
Castelnuovo, 391. 
Castiglione, 310, 313, 314, 316. 



Castile, Old, 169, 190, 191. 

Catalonia, 169, 180, 188, 197. 

Catalaunian fields, 440. 

Cathcart, Col. Geo., on European 
Tactics, 98. 

Cathcart, Gen. Sir Geo., killed at 
Inkerman, 280. 

Caucasus, Army of the, 266, 486. 

Caulaincourt, Gen. August, killed in 
Battle of the Borodino, 115. 

Caulaincourt, Armand August, 
Duke of Vicenza, accomparies 
Napoleon to Paris, 129, 223 ; de- 
spatched to Paris with full power 
to treat for peace, 224. 

Cavite, 498, 499, 505. 

Cavo del Lago, 301. 

Cavo Scotti, 302. 

Cavriana, 310, 311, 312, 314, 316, 317. 

Cedar mountains, 336. 

Cemetery Ridge, 351, 352, 353. 

Cenesara, 310, 311, 315. 

Centreville, 323, 324, 325, 338. 

Ceriolo, 14, 17. 

Cerkovlco, 483. 

Cernay, 449. 

Cervera, Admiral, leaves Cadiz, 497 
Dewey in search of his tleet, 498 
fleet sighted at Fort de France 
forbidden to land at Martinique 
proceeds to Santiago, 500 ; comes 
out of harbour and is destroyed, 
505 ; prisoner, 506. 

Ceschi, Col.. 300. 

Chalons, 202, 203, 204, 205, 216, 219, 408, 
410, 412, 413, 420, 422, 423, 427-429, 
440, 441-443, 456. 

Cham, 82. 

ChamberslJurg, 350, 351. 

ChambiSre, Island of, 422. 

Champagne, 208. 

Champaubert, 203, 204. 

Champigny. 470. 

Champion Hill battle. May 15, 1863, 

Chancellorsville, 346, 3-17, 348. 

Changarnier, General, at Metz, 420 ; 
terms for capitulation of Metz, 

Chanzy, 468, 469. 

Charenton, 470. 

Charette, Gen., 464. 

Charleroi. 19, 233-236, 239, 253, 265. 

Charles XII. chose the road by Pol- 
tava, 109. 

Charles IV. of Spain, compelled to 
abdicate, 164. 

Charles, Archduke. Armistice with 
Moreau, 27 ; with Austrian army 
to conquer Mantua and Peschiera, 
and enter Switzerland, 36 ; Mas- 
sena to keep head against him, 
37 ; hurries from Italy to Vienna, 
46, 51, 52 ; re-organises Austrian 
army, 75 ; campaign in Bavaria, 
76-81 ; Aspern and Esslingen, 81- 

87 ; Battle of "Wagram ; retreat, 
91-97 ; Archduke Albert a worthy 
son of, 391. 

Charles, Prince, of Bavaria, com- 
manding Bavarian army, 394 ; in 
supreme command of the Army 
of the Main, 396 ; army divided by 
Falchenstein, 397. 

Charles, Prince, of Roumania, inde- 
pendent of the Porte, assists the 
Russians, 477. 

Charles City Cross Road, 335. 

Charleston, 329. 374, 321. 

Charonne, 223. 

Chartres, 464. 

Chass6, Belgians of, 854. 

Chasseurs d'Afrique, 276. 

Chateau Thierry, 203, 204. 

Chateaudun, 4&1, 466. 

Chateau neuf, 365. 

Chatel St. Germain, 429. 

Chatillon, 457, 463. 

Chattachoochee, 369. 

Chattanooga, 358, 359, 368, 371. 

Chaumont, 202, 206. 

Chaves, 177. 

Chemnitz, 147, 154. 

Chene le Populeux, 442. 

Cheraw, 374. 

Cherbourg, 410. 

Cherhesky, Prince, 478. 

Chernavoda, 477. 

Cherson, Cape, 272. 

Chersonesus, 271. 

Chevilly, 457. 

Chiavenna. 28. 

Chicago, 322. 

Chichagov, 124, 126. 

Chickahominy, 334, 335, 364, 366. 

Chickamauga, 358, 497. 

Chiers river, 440, 445. 

Chlum hills, 386, 388, 389. 

Choisy-le-Roi. 457. 

Cialdini, Gen., capture of Palestro, 
301 ; watching passes of the Alps, 
316 ; at Bologna, 380 ; La Mamora 
with, 391 ; near Mirandola and 
Modena, 392 ; succeeds La Ma- 
mora : crosses Lower Po and 
reaches Padua: occupies Udiue, 

Cienfu'egos, 496, 500. 

Cintra Convention, Aug. 30, 1808, 167. 

CiudaJ Real, 177. 

Ciudad Rodrigo, 181, 183, 186, 187, 188, 
191, 192, 195. 

Ciudad Rodrigo. Duke of Wellington 
at, 193. 

Cisalpine Republic re-established, 
June 5, 1800, 9, 17, 23. 

Clarke, French Minister of War, 211. 

Clausel, Marshal, succeeds Marmont 
and Bonnet at Salamanca, 192 ; 
pursued by Wellington to Burgos, 
194 ; against guerilla bands in N. 



Spain, 195 ; wanted by K. Joseph, 
296 ; arrives at Vittoria and re- 
treats into Catalonia, 197. 

Clermont, 442, 443. 

Cleve, Duchy of, 61. 

Clichy barrier, 223. 

Clinchant. Gen., 474. 

Cobentzl, 22, 33. 

Coburg, 63,394,397. 

Codrington's division, 268, 269. 

Coehorn, Gen.. 82. 

Coimbra, 178, 183, 184, 185. 

Col de Ranzola. 4. 

Cold Harbour, 335, 366. 

Collingwood, Admiral Lord, 38. 

Cologne, 199. 200. 

Colombey, 423, 438, 439. 

Columbia, 374. 

Como, 303. 

Compans, 221. 

Cond6, 227. 

Confederation of the Rhine, 60. 

Conflenza, 302. 

Conflans. 437. 

Conlie, 4(>1, 469. 

Conneurtz, 159. 

Consort, Prince, 326. 

Constance, Lake of, 20. 

Con.stantine, Grand Duke, 50, 57. 

Constantinople, Hospital system at, 
284 ; Russia to be in, 478 ; Turks 
directed from, 481. 489 ; Turkish 
army at, 490 ; Suleiman sum- 
moned to, 490 ; Servia to advance 
to, 491 ; remnants of Turkish 
army convej'ed to, 493 ; Russia's 
right to occupation, 495. 

Copenhagen, Wellington's horse, 254. 
' Cordova, 166, 181. 

Corfu, 36. 

Corinth, U.S.A., 329, 331. 

Cornwallis, Admiral, at Cadiz, 33. 

Cornwallis, Lord, surrenders at York- 
town, 332. 

Corregidor Islands. 498. 

Corsican chasseurs with Napoleon, 

Corunna, 33. 170, 171. 

Cote-d'Or, 473. 

Couch's corps, 346, 347. 

Coulmiers, 464. 

Courland, 106. 

Cowroux, Gen., 93. 

Cracow, 379. 

Crampton's Gap, 340. 

Craonne, 211, 215. 

Cremona, 380. 

Crimean War, 1854, 266-293. 

Crimean Armj' Fund, 284. 

Crump's landing, 329. 

Cuba. 496, 497, 500, 508, 509. 

Curish Valley, 492. 

Cuchiari, 380. 

Cuggiono, 303, .306, 307. 

Gulp's Hill, 351, 352. 

Culpeper, 336, 842, 349. 

Cumberland, 327. 
Custozza, 312, 391, 392. 
Czartoryski, 52. 


Daigny, 447, 449. 

Dalton, 368. 

Dannenberg, Gen., at Inkerman, 278, 

Danube river, 10, 20. 21, 27, 37, 40, 41, 
46, 47, 49, 51, 76, 79, 82, 83, 84,88, 91, 
94, 95, 402, 476, 477, 479, 480, 490. 

Danzig, 70, 134. 

Dardanelles, 266. 

Darmstadt, 396. 

Daru, Count, Napoleon dictates plan 
of campaign of 1805 to, 35, 37. 

Daun, Marshal, 140. 

Davis, Jefferson, President of Con- 
federate Republic, 321 ; taken 
prisoner, 376. 

Davout, Marshal, commands camp 
of Ambleteuse, 38, crossed the 
Danube at Neuburg, 41 ; with Na- 
poleon to cross the Inn, 47 ; sum- 
moned to Briinn, 53 ; at Raigern 
Monastery, 55 : Battles of Jena 
and Auerstadt, 62-68 ; Eylau and 
Fried land, 69-72 ; to march to 
Ratisbon, 77 ; to Neustadt, 78 ; at 
Abensberg, 80 ; battle of Eek- 
miihl, 80 ;' " Prince of Eckmuhl," 
80 ; at Battle of Aspern, 87 ; to de- 
fend Vienna, 89 ; at Esslingen, 94 ; 
successfully attacks heights of 
Neusiedel, 95, 96 ; corps with Na- 
poleon, 106 ; detains Emperor of 
Russia's aide-de-camp, 107 ; to dis- 
pose of Bagration, 109 ; marching 
with Jerome, King of AVestphalia, 
110 ; object failed : joined by Na- 
poleon at Orsha, 111 ; at the Boro- 
dino, 115 ; to leave Smolensk, 122 ; 
attacked, but escapes with ditli- 
culty, 123 ; despatched to regain 
Hamburg, 140 ; enters Hamburg, 
142 ; crushed Bavarians intercept- 
ing French retreat, 160 ; at battle 
of Craonne, 211 ; defender of 
Paris, 232. 

Decaen, Gen., attacks Austriansat 
MattenbliJtt, 25, 26 ; in Metz, 420, 

Decoster, guide, 255, 264. 

Decres, Minister of Marine, 34. 

Denneuritz, 153. 

Desaix, General, arrives at Stradclla 
from Egypt : presentiment of 
death, 12, 13, 1.5, 16, 17; killed, 17; 
buried in convent of Sant Angelo, 
remains transferred to monas- 
tery of the Great St. Bernard, 
18, 19. 

Dessau, 1.54. 

Dewey, Admiral, commanding Amerl- 



can Squadron in Hong Kong, sails 
for Philippine Islands, 498 ; de- 
stroys Spanish Fleet in Bay of 
Manila, 499 ; blockades Manila, 
507 ; demandsits surrender : bom- 
barded, 508. 

Diebitsch, Gen., 220. 

Diedrichs, Vice-Admiral von, 507. 

Dieppe, 471. 

Dijon, 3, 4, 43, 474. 

Dinwiddle Court House, 375. 

Dippoldswalde, 147. 

Dnieper river, 110, 111, 123. 

Dobrudja, 480. 

Dobrudsha, 267. 

Dolitz, 159. 

Dohalitz, 387. 

Doholicka, 387. 

Dolgoruki, Prince. 51, 52. 

Dombach battle, 397. 

Domburg, 64. 

Donau worth, 21, 40, 41, 78. 

Donchery, 445, 449, 453. 

Doncourt, 423, 436. 

Donelson, Fort, 327. 

Donzelot, Gen., 258. 

Dorogobuzh, 114. 

Douay, General Abel, with Army of 
South, on the Rhine, 410 ; killed in 
Battle of Weissenburg, 413, 414. 

Douay, Felix, with the Army of 
Paris, 420 ; at Chalons, 440. 

Douay, 38. 

Doubs department, 473. 

Doulevant, 222. 

Douro river, 190, 191, 194, 195. 

Douzy, 445. 

Dresden, Napoleon reaches, 129 ; his 
plan to re-capture, 135 ; allied 
armies at, 139, 140 ; Battle of 
Dresden Aug. 26, 1813, 144-1.00 ; 
Napoleon's troops round, 153, 154 ; 
Army of Saxony's main strength 
in, 380. 

Drissa, 109. 

Dr'^hnberg, 141. 

Drouot, Gen., at Llitzen, 137; at 
Quatre-Bras, 248; at Waterloo, 
261 ; retreats with Napoleon, 265. 

Dub, Hill of, 386. 

Dubovolsky, 484. 

Dubreton, Gen., 194. 

Ducrot, Gen., at Battle of Worth, 414, 
415 ; with Army of Paris, 420 ; at 
Chalons, 440; succeeds MacMahon, 
498 ; retires to the Illy ; letter 
from Gen. WimpfCen, 448, 449 ; at 
Sedan, 451, 452 ; on heights of 
Avron, 469 ; hindered in Paris, 

Diiben, 155. 

Diinaburg, 105. 

Diirrenstein, 48, 51. 

Duhesme, 4. 

Dumas, Mathieu, 28. 

Dun, 439, 443. 

Dupanloup. Bishop, prisoner in Or- 
leans, 468. 

Duplat's troops, 254. 

Dupont, Minister of War, 227. 

Dupont, Gen., obtains possession of 
Cordova, retires to Andujar and 
capitulates, 166. 

Durando, 380. 

Durham Station, 376. 

Duroc, Gen., leaves Paris, 3 ; returns 
with Napoleon to Paris after the 
Russian Campaign, 129 ; signed 
treaties between France and 
Spain, 163. 

Dwina river, 109, 110, 112. 

Dyle river, 251. 


Early, Gen., 875. 

Ebelsberg, 82. 

Ebersberg forest, 25. 

Ebersdorf, 85, 89. 

Ebro river, 166, 168, 182, 194, 197. 

Eckmiihl, Prince of (Davoust.) 

Eckmuhl, 79. Battle, April 22, 1809, 

Edolo, 392. 

Egypt, Bonaparte leaves, Aug. 24, 
1799, 1 ; Desaix returns from, 12 ; 
forces in, 24 ; Picton at Quatre- 
Bras : " Twenty-eighth remember 
Egypt," 245 ; Government pre- 
vent Spanish Fleet from coaling 
in. 507. 

Elba, Sovereignty accepted by Napo- 
leon, 1814, 224 ; Return of Napo- 
leon from, 1815, 225 ; Napoleon at, 
227, 229. 

Elb6, Gen., building of bridge at 
Studianka, 125. 

Elbe river, 04, 65, 133, 134. 135, 139, 140, 
143 to 145, 147, 151, 154, 155, 379, 
885, 389. 

Elbe, Army of the, 379. 381, 883, 884, 

Elbing, 70. 

El Caney, 504. 

Elchingen, Duke of (Ney), 42. 

Elchingen, Battle of, Oct. 14, 1805, 42. 

Ellsworth, teaches the Zouave drill 
to a Chicago Company, 322. 

El Poso, 503, 504. 

Elssasshausen, 416. 

Elster, 136, 159. 

Elvas, 172, 189. 

Ely's ford, 346, 348. 

Engadine, 28. 

Engen, 20. 

England, Fleet at Genoa, 4 ; subsidies 
to Austria, 22 ; Napoleon's in- 
tended invasion, 29-34; Napoleon 
to subdue, 101 ; English in Spain, 
1813, 142 ; Treaty with Portugal, 
Oct. 22, 180?, 163 ; officers educated 
in, 227 ; in the American AVar, 



326 ; offer to the Porte, 478 ; 
Treaty of Berlin, 495. 

Enns, 27. 

Enos, 493. 

Euzersdorf, 91. 94. 

Epernay, 204, 216. 

Eppes, Chateau of, 812. 

Erfurt, C3, 64. 

Erfurt, Congress of, 168. 

Erlon, Gen. d\ with Reille at Charle- 
roi, 235, 239; at Ligny, 241, ;J42 ; 
at Quatre-Bras, 246, 247. 

Ernest, Archduke, 379. 

Erzbirge mountains, 150. 

Erzeroum, 486. 

Eski-Sagra, 486. 

Esla river, 171. 

Eslii-Sagra, 478. 

Espagne, 86. 

Espinasse, Gen., at Marcello, 306, 307 ; 
killed at Magenta, 308. 

Espinosa, 168. 

Esslingen, 85-88, 91, 92, 94, 95, 402, 417. 

Essonnes, 224. 

Estremadura, 177. 

Estretta Castle, 500. 

Etain, 423, 437. 

Etampes, 463, 

Etoges, 203, 204. 

Etropol, 492. 

Etroubles, 4. 

Etruria, King of, 163. 

Eugen, Prince, of Wiirtemberg, 148. 

Eugene, Empress of the French, 
Franco-German AVar of 1870 : " It 
is my war,"' 412 : entrusts Mac- 
Mahon with formation of New 
Cabinet, 419 : afraid of Emperor's 
return to Tuilleries, 441 ; Em- 
peror's despatch to, after Beau- 
mont defeat, 444 ; negotiations 
with Bazaine, 460. 

Eupatoria, 267, 286. 

Europe. Jlap of, Pitt and the, 44. 

Ewell, Gen. R. S., 350-353, 363, 375. 

Exelmans, 247, 248. 

Eylau, Battle of, Feb. 7 and 8, 1807, 

Fabler, Col., 212. 

Faidberbe, Gen., with Army of tlie 
North, 468, 470, 471. 

Failly, G«n. de, Neil waiting at Casa 
Nuova for, 315 ; at Bitsch, with 
no money, 409 ; in Metz, 420 ; at 
Chalons, 440 ; attacked at Beau- 
mont, and retreats, 443, 444. 

Fair Oaks, 332. 

Fairfax Court House, 338. 

Falckenstein, Gen. Vogel von, 304 ; 
capitulation of the Hanoverians, 
396 ; Battle of Dombach, 397 ; 
reports all lands north of the 
Main in possession of Prussia : 

assumes government of duchy of 
Nassau, 399 ; at Hanover defends 
German coasts, 410. 

Falmouth, U.S.A., 342, 347. 

Farragut, Capt., bombards and cap- 
tures New Orleans, 328, 329 ; tries 
to capture Vicksburg, 355. 

Faure, Gen., 451. 

Favre, Jules, proclaims Republican 
government, 1870, 456 ; signed 
preliminaries of peace at Ver- 
sailles, Feb. 26, 1871, 475. 

Fayetteville, 374. 

Feniletto, 310. 

Ferdinand VII. (Prince of Asturias) 
of Spain, succeeds Charles IV., 
1808, 164 ; summoned to Bayonne 
by Napoleon ; population in arms 
for, 165 ; restored to his throne 
by Napoleon, March 22, 1814, 198. 

Ferdinand, Archduke, 41, 46, 76. 

Ferdinand, Prince Louis, 64. 

Fere-Champenoise, 216, 217, 321. 

Ferkat Pasha, 266. 

Ferrara. 391. 

Ferrieres, 459. 

Ferrol, 30-34. 

Fiancoura, 396. 

Fi^reck, Gen., 459, 465. 

Finland, Army of, 124. 

Fisher Fort, 374. 

Fismes, 210. 

Five Forks, 375. 

Flagler, Major, 508. 

Flanders, Free Corps of French, 470. 

Flavigny, 425. 

Fleigneux, 450. 

Fleurus, 2.35, 236, 238-241, 246- JM8. 

Floing, 447, 448. 450. 

Florida, 320, 376, 497, 507. 

Floudsdorf, 402. 

Fontainebleau. Treaties signed at, 
Oct. 27, 1807, 163 ; Napoleon's ad- 
vance on the capital by, 222 ; 
Napoleon at, 224 ; Treaty of. 227 ; 
French failed in advance to Paris, 
465, 467. 

Fontanone book, 14, 17. 

Fontenoy, 474. 

Forbach, 417, 418. 

Foresto, 312. 

Forey, Gen., 297, 298. 

Fort de France (Martinique), 500. 

Forton, 422. 

Foy, 245. 

France, Bonaparte returns from 
Egypt, Oct. 8, 1799 ; Government 
of the Directory overthrown, 1 ; 
Rhine to be the frontier, 23 ; 
revolution in, 43 ; Napoleon's 
policy, the regeneration of, 104 ; 
Treaties with Spain, 1807, 163 ; 
condition, 1814, 200-202 ; advance 
to the frontier, 1815, 230 ; to be 
invaded by six armies, 231 ; in- 
vasion to begin in June, 234 ; 



French troops in Paris, 267, 281, 

293 ; Franco-Italian War of 1859, 

294 ; army at Solferino, 31 1 ; war 
with Prussia, 1870, 403 ; liability 
to military service acknowledged, 
404 ; German invasion : army 
organisation, 420. 

Franche-Comte, 36. 

Francis I., Napoleon's answer to, 131. 

Francis II., Emperor of Germany, 
Bonaparte's letter to, 2 ; at Battle 
of Austerlitz, 50-56 ; laid down his 
title of Emperor of Austria, 1806, 

Francis Joseph, Emperor, commands 
Austrian army : at Villafranca, 
311, 318. 

Franconia, 62, 63. 

Frankfort, 380. 397, 399. 

Franklin, Gen., 338, 340, 342. 

Franzesky, Gen., 387, 388, 410, 433, 434, 
435, 470. 

Frasnes, 236, 237, 240, 244, 247, 265. 

Franenberg, 43. 

Frazier's farm, 355. 

Frederick the Great, 61, 63, 98, 101, 

Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, 
with Napoleon at Berlin, 139. 

Frederick William III., King of Prus- 
sia, at battle round Hassenhausen, 
67 ; flies to Konigsberg, 69 ; Na- 
poleon offers peace to : refused, 
73 ; at Battle of Bautzen, 140 ; fol- 
lowing Napoleon, 220. 

Frederick, Crown Prince of Prussia, 
with Prussian army in Silesia, 
379 ; at Battle of Koniggratz, 384- 
389 ; holding Benedek in Olmiitz, 
400 ; Worth and Saarbrucken, 
414-417 ; Vionville, 421 ; his army 
on the Aisne, 443 ; at Sedan, 449 ; 
march to Paris, 456, 459, 461, 463. 

Frederick Charles, Prince of Prussia, 
with Prussian army at Hoyers- 
werda, 379 ; at Battle of KiJnig- 
griitz, 383-388 ; advance to Prague, 
400 ; commands section of Ger- 
man forces, 410 ; Battle of Vion- 
ville, 422-425 ; at the Moselle, 436 ; 
siege army under his command, 
4.37 ; made Field-Marshal, 461 ; 
Battle of Beaumela Rolande, 465 ; 
drives back the Army of Bourba- 
ki, goes to Orleans and gains pos- 
session of Blois and Tours, 468 ; 
Battle of Le Mans, 469. 
Francis, I'rederick, of Schwerin, 
Grand Duke, commands Ger- 
man troops at the Loire, 465. 
Frederick, 339, 

Fredericksburg, 342, 343, 345-350, 363. 
Freemantle, Col., 262. 
Freiberg, 40, 153, 154. 
Fremont, 3S6. 
Frentenstadt, 140. 

Friedland, Battle of, June 14, 1807, 73, 
74, 233. 


Froschweiler, 416. 

Frossard, Gen., strengthens fortress 
at Alexandria, 296 ; in command 
at Chalons, 408 ; attacks Saarbrii- 
cken,413 ; evacuates SaarbriJcken, 
417 ; at Battle of Vionville, 420, 422, 
424, 425, 430, 432. 

Fuad Pasha, 493. 

Fuentes d'Onoro, 185. 

Fulda, 397, 399. 


Gabrova, 478. 
Gaines Mills, 334. 
Gaisberg, 414. 
Galatz, 477. 
Galicia, 175, 179, 187. 
Gallipoli, 200, 478, 493. 
Gambetta, Leon, leaves Paris in a 
balloon for Tours ; to rouse 
country against the invaders for 
the relief of Paris, 4.59, 460 ; suc- 
ceeds in rousing the nation, 463, 
464 ; nearly taken prisoner ; plans, 
468, 473, 474. 
Ganetzky, Gen., 488. 
Gantheaume, Admiral, orders for sail- 
ing, to hold the channel, 30 ; 
Villeneuve to co-operate with, 32 ; 
to be freed from blockade at 
Brest ; Letter from Napoleon ; 
leaves Brest, 33 ; returns to Brest, 
Garcia, CatixtO, 302. 
Garda, Lake of, 310, 311, 312, 316, 390. 
Gardanne, Gen., French advance 

guard under, 14. 
Garenne woods, 447, 450. 
Garfield, President, 327. 
Garibaldi, Guiseppe, Free corps 
under, 296 ; General in Sardinian 
army, 303 ; his chasseurs, 316 ; to 
attack passes from Lombardy, 
391 ; his force, 392 ; attempting 
conquest of the Italian Tyrol, 393 ; 
at New Breisach, 462 ; occupies 
Dijon, 474. 
Garibaldi, Menotti, 462. 
Garibaldi, Riciotti, 462, 403. 
Gembloux, 238, 248, 249. 
Gemiinden, 399. 
Genappe, 235, 236. 249, 251, 265. 
Genestrello, 297, 298. 
Geneva, Napoleon enters. May 7, 

1800, 3. 
Geneva, Lake of. 4. 
Geneva, Massena to protect sea-coast, 
3; Massena blockaded, 4, 37 ; capit- 
ulated June 4, 1800, 9, 11 ; be- 
seiged by Austrians, 10 ; Melas' 
supposed retreat to, 13 ; to be in- 
dependent, 23 ; French troops 
enter and occupy, 1859. 294, 295. 



George III., Bonaparte's letter to, 
Dec. 25, 1799, 1. 

George, Mr., quoted, 113, 116, 120. 

Georgia, 320, 321, 333, 358, 361, 370, 374, 

Gera, 64. 

Gerard, Gen., his corps In confusion, 
S34 ; Napoleon's saying to, 241 ; 
advance on Ligny, repulsed, ^12 ; 
at Quatre-Bras, 248. 

Germania plank road, 362. 

Germanna Ford, 346. 

Germanstown, 338. 

Germany, Bloreau's army in, 10 ; 
South, in hands of French, 22 ; to 
be invaded, 35 ; Napoleon's object 
to destroy the Empire, CO ; people 
no longer religious, 109 ; France 
to give up all claims in, 200 ; 
South Germans with Schwarzen- 
berg, 231 ; military service in, 
404 ; German families expelled 
from Paris, 420. See also, Prussia. 

Germershein, 412. 

Gerona, Siege of, 175. 

Geronimo, 508. 

Gettysburg, 350, 354. 

Ghent, Louis XVIII., flies to, 229. 

Gibraltar, Straits, 31 ; Nelson at, 33 ; 
to be exchanged for Portugal, 

Giessen, 381, 397. 

Gilly, 236. 

Gitschin, 384, 385. 

Giulay, Field-Marshal, commands 
Austrian forces in Italy, 295, 300, 
304, 305, 309. 

Givet, 231, 440. 

Givonne, 447-451. 

Glatz, 385. 

Glinzendorf, 95. 

Glogau fort. 134, 143. 

Glubokoie, 109. 

Gneisenau, Gen. A., 240 ; succeeds 
Bliicher and determines line of 
retreat, 249 ; concentrates Rus- 
sian army at "SVavre, 250. 

Goblenz, Gen., 385. 

Godoy, Prince of the Algarves, 163 ; 
Prince of the Peace : unpopular- 
ity : nearly lost his life, 1G4. 

Goben, Gen., 396-399, 410, 417, 418, 474. 

Goding, 400. 

Gorlitz, 142, 153, 379, 385. 

Gorsdorf, 415. 

Goethe in Wiemar, 60. 

Goettingen, 38, 380, 894. 

Goits, 310, 391. 

Goldbach defile, 55. 

Goldsboro', 374. 

Golfe-Juan, 228. 

Golz, Gen. von, 418, 422. 

Gordonville, 336, 342. 

Gorni Dubaik, 485, 488. 

GortschakofC, Prince, at Battle of 
Inkerman, 278, 280, 281 ; defends 

Sebastopol, 291 ; Fall of Sebasto- 
pol, 292 ; destroys fortifications, 

Gosselies, 235, 236, 237, 240. 

Gotha, 394. 

Gourgaud, Gen., 235. 

Gourji-Studen, 479. 

Gourko, Gen., Shipka and Hankoi 
Passes, 478 ; at Plevna, 485, 486 ; 
at the Shipka Pass, 491-493. 

Gournay, 459. 

Graham, Gen., at Vittoria, 196. 

Gramont, 419. 

Granada entered by the French, 181. 

Grant, Gen., capture of Fort Henry 
and Fort Donelson, 327 ; Battle of 
Shiloh. 329, 330 ; besieging Vicks- 
burg, 349, 355, 356 ; head of mili- 
tary division of Mississippi, 359 ; 
Battle of the "Wilderness, 359-367, 
368 ; made Lieutenant-General, 
360 ; on Sherman's march through 
Georgia, 370, 371 , 373-376. 

Gravelotte, 423, 424, 430, 431, 433, 475. 

Gravina, Admiral, in Cadiz, 81 ; sailed 
to Ferrol, 33. 

Graz in Styria, 84. 

Grazau's division almost destroyed, 

Great St. Bernard, Bonaparte's 
passage of the, 3-8 : Desaix's re- 
mains in the monastery, 18. 

Greene, Lieut., 488, 490, 494. 

Grenoble, 228. 

Grenville, Lord, Secretary of State. 
Reply to Bonaparte, 2. 

Gressonav. 4. 

Grisons, the, 24, 27. 

Grivitza, 485, 487. 

Grodno, 106. 

Gross-Beerdan, 151, 153. 

Gross-Gorschen, 136. 

Groundry, Gen. E., remarks on, 19 ; 
at Vauchamps, 204 ; quarrel with 
Vandamme, attack delayed, 236 ; 
to march on Sombreffe, letter to 
Napoleon, 238, 239 ; to pursue 
enemy, 247 : accompanied Napo- 
leon to Mill of Brye : to con- 
centrate at Gembloux, 248, 249 ; 
at Waterloo, 255, 256, 257, 261, 

Groveton, Battle at, 338. 

Guadarama mountains, 169. 

Guadiana river, 177. 

Guam Island, 509. 

Guantanamo, 501, 502, 506. 

Guasimos, battle, June 24, 1898, 503, 

Guersburg, 41. 

Guerilleros, 173, 177, 182, 195. 

Guidizzolo, 310, 312-815, 317. 

Guignes, 205. 

Gunstett, 415. 416. 

Gustavus Adolphus, Tactics of, 98. 

Gzhatsk, 114. 





Haddick, Gen., at Marengo, 14, 16, 17. 

Hagenau, 416. 

Hagerstown. 339, 350, 354. 

Haines' Bluff, 356. 

Hal, 254, 

Halkett, Colin, 253, 251. 

Halle, 379. 

Halleck, Gen., 331, 336, 339, 350. 

Hallue, 471. 

Ham. 462. 

Hamburg, a French Prefecture, 131 ; 
Davoust despatched to regain 
possession, 140 ; regained May 29, 
1813, 142, 144 ; D .voust at, 151. 

Hameln, 38. 

Hamley, Gen., 268, 276, 279, 282, 288, 

Hammelburg, 398. 

Hanan, 160, 380, 397. 

Hancock, W. S., on Cemetery Ridge, 
351 ; wounded at Bloody Angl6, 
354 ; with Army of Potomac at 
Battle of the Wilderness, 361-365. 

Hankoi pass, 478. 

Hannibal's passage over the Alps 
studied by Bonaparte, 6. 

Hanover, King of, 380, 394 ; accepts 
Prussian terms, 395. 

Hanover, Crown Prince of, 395. 

Hanover, reconquest of, 1805, 36 ; 
Bernadotte at, 38 ; exchanged to 
Prussia, 61 ; an apple of discord 
between Austi-ia and England, 
62 ; troops at Waterloo, 253, 254 ; 
Prussia prepares troops for in- 
vasion of, 1866, 379 ; army un- 
prepared, 380 : war declared, 
June 15, 380 ; army returns to 
Gottingen : not uniting with 
Bavarians, 394 ; Battle of Lan- 
gensalza, 394, 395. 

Hanover Junction, 365. 

Hanse towns, Neapolitan Bourbons 
recompensed by gift of, 61. 

Hanseatic Departments unseparable 
from France, 131. 

Hardinge, Col., prevents defeat of 
English at Albuera, 186. 

Harmanli, 478. 

Harper's Ferry, 339, 340, 342, 849, 350. 

Harrisburg, 350. 

Harrison's Landing, 336. 

Hassenhausen, 66, 67. 

Hangurtz, Count, sent by Prussians 
to Napoleon, 53, 61. 

Havana, 497. 

Haxall, 335. 

Hayti, 501. 

Hegel writing Phcenomenology dur- 
ing Battle of Jena : flies to 
Nuremberg, 66. 

Heilsberg, 70. 

Heine, description of Napoleon's 
hand, 56. 

Henry, Fort, 327. 

Herbert, Sidney, Secretary of War, 

Hfiricourt, 474. 

Hermandura, 500. 

Hersfeld, 397. 

Hesse-Cassel, Prussia declares war 
against, June 15, 1866, 880 ; in- 
vaded, 381. 

Hesse-Darmstadt, troops from, 381 ; 
Falckenstein assumes govern- 
ment of portion of, 399. 

Hessian troops with Prussia, 414 ; in 
Battle of Gravelotte, 431-433. 

Hill, Gen., at Coimbra, 178 ; stormed 
heights of Puebla, 196. 

Hill's division, rearguard of Gen. 
Lee, 339 ; at Battle of the Wilder- 
ness, 362. 

Hiller, Gen., at Abensberg, 77 ; driven 
before Napoleon, 82 ; attack upon 
Aspern, 86, 87. 

Hilliers, Marshal Paraguay d', lost a 
brigade, 121 ; with Napoleon, 296 ; 
despatched to the Adda, 309 ; 
march on Solferino, 314 ; Battle 
of Solferino, 317. 

Hirsora, 477. 

Hochkirch, 140 ; entered by Bliieher. 

Hochstiidt battlefield, 21. 

HoUenthal, The, 40. 

Hof, 63, 64. 

Hohenlinden, Convention of, Sept. 
20, 1800, 22 ; Battle of Dec. 3, 1800, 
20; immortalised by Campbell,26. 

Hohenlohe, Prince, on banks of the 
Saale, 63, 64 ; on road to Weimar, 
65; defeated at Jena, 66, 67, 68, 
at Gravelotte, 431. 

Hohentwiel fortress surrendered, 20. 

HoUabrunn, 50 ; Russians victorious 
at, 57. 

Holland, King of, Wellington's letter 
to, 249. 

Holland, armies of Prussia to be 
directed against, 36 ; sailors in 
the Danube, 92 ; inseparable from 
the French Empire, 131 ; France 
to give up all claims to, 200. 

Holly Springs, 355. 

Hong-Kong, 498. 

Hood, Gen., supersedes Johnston at 
Chattachoochee, 369 ; threatens 
Sherman on South of Atlanta, 371 ; 
no danger of attack from, 374. 

Hooker, Gen. Jos., at Battle of An- 
tietam, 340, 341 ; Fredericksburg, 
344 ; supersedes Burnside to com- 
mand of Army of the Potomac, 
President Lincoln's letter to, 346 ; 
in command, 346-349 ; with Gen. 
Grant, 359, 360. 

Horsitz, 385. 

Hortense, Queen, Bands playing air of 
" Partant pour la Syrie," 93. 



Hougoumont, Chateau of, 253, 254, 

256, 258, 260. 262-264. 
Houssaye quoted, 216. 
Howard, Gen., 346, 347, 371. 
Hoverswerda, 379. 
Hozier quoted, 400, 402. 
Hudson, Port, 355. 
Hungary, Troops from, 24 ; probable 

battle in, 49, 402. 
Huns, 440. 

his own in, 208 ; Army of North, 
231 ; Franco-Italian war of 1859, 
294-319 ; strength of Italian army, 
1866, 379 ; war declared against 
Austria, June 20, 1866, 380 ; French 
plan to induce Italy to abandon 
neutrality, 412. 
Ivrea, Lannes enters, 7. 


Iberian peninsula, 162. 

Icljtiman pass, 492. 

Icotora, 500. 

Idro, Lake of, 392. 

Iges, 454. 

lller, River, 21, 40, 41. 

Illy. 447, 448, 450. 

Illyrian provinces, 84. 

Imperial, Prince (France), 412, 413, 
423, 468. 

Indies, Emperor of both the. King of 
Spain to assume tlie title, 163. 

Indre-et-Loire, 472. 

Ingoldstadt, 22, 40, 41, 79. 

lukerman, 277 ; Battle of Nov. 5, 1854, 
277-281, 282. 

Inkerman, Mount, 287. 

Inn river, 22, 24, 26, 28, 43, 47, 76. 

Iran, 197. 

Ireland, Bonaparte thouglit to be 
aiming at, 31. 

Isaktcha, 477. 

Isar, River, 21, 22, 24, 25, 40, 77, 383, 

Isouzo, 393. 

Isquierdo represents Spain at sign- 
ing of Treaty with France, 163. 

Istria, 379. 

Italy, Bonaparte promises Army 
abundance of everything in, 3 ; 
reports Italy will be reconquered, 
4 ; to attack Austrians in, 10 ; 
Convention by which France ob- 
tained North, June 15, 1800, 18 ; 
Bonaparte strengthens forces in, 
2i ; the Mincio to be the frontier, 
23 ; French soldiers in North 24 ; 
reinforcements to be sent, 27 ; 
Napoleon's plan to drive Austrians 
from, 35 ; Austria's best Generals 
in, 37 ; Mack united with Austrian 
army, 41 ; Archduke Charles 
hastening from. 46 ; Napoleon's 
policy, the calling back into life 
of, 104 ; Re-establishment of in- 
dependence of Poland, compared 
with creation of, 105 ; people no 
longer religious, 109 ; Prince Eu- 
gene sent to, 140 ; allies hopes 
for France giving up claims in, 
200 ; forces of nature on Napo- 
leon's side in, 202 ; Eugene holds 

Jackson, Stonewall, with Confederate 
Reserve at Mitchell's ford, .324 ; 
Battle of Richmond, 333-343 ; 
passed into the Wilderness ; in- 
jured, 347 ; death, 348. 

Jackson, 355. 

Jiigers, 302. 

Jagerthal, 416. 

Jamaica, Bonaparte's objective, 31. 

Jamboli, 478. 

James river, 335, 336, 361, 366, 373, 

Japan, 507. 

Jaromierz, 385. 

Jarny, 423, 461. 

Jena, 68 ; Battle of, Oct. 18, 1806, &1-66, 
69, 101. 

Jerusalem and the Crusaders, 117. 

John, Archduke. In command at 
Vienna, "22 ; with Austrian Army 
in the Tyrol and the Voralberg, 
36 ; collecting troops in Bohemia, 
47 ; to Carinthia to attack Eu- 
gene, 76 ; Napoleon's precautions 
against, 84 : crossed the Isono 
followed by Eugene and Macdon- 
ald, 84 ; not at Battle of Wa- 
gram, 95 ; reached battlefield and 
retired, 97. 

Johnson, Gen., 324. 

Johnston, Gen. Alb. Sidney, at Battle 
of Shiloh, 329-331 ; Battle of the 
AVilderness, 361, 364 ; defends road 
for Sherman's march, 368, 369, 374; 
surrenders at Durham station, 

Johnston, Rossiter, quoted, 341. 

Jomini, H., 145,205. 

Josephine, Empress, 39, 74. 

Josephstadt, 410. 

Jourdan, Major-Gen., attached to 
King Joseph, 175 ; at Talavera, 

179 ; held responsible for ill-suc- 
cess of Talavera and recalled, 

180 ; again attached to King 
Joseph. 190, 195. 

Junot, Gen. Andoche, at the Boro- 
dino, 115 ; with army of observa- 
tion at Bayonne, 162 ; in Spain 
and Portugal. 163, 164 ; defeated 
at Vimiero, returns to France, 
167 : with armv in Portugal, 183. 

Jura, 199, 213, 461, 462, 473. 

Jura, Corps of the, 231. 




Kaja. 136, 137. 

Kalisch, 134. 

Kalkreuth, Gen., 67. 

Kaltennordheiin, 397. 

Kaluga, 119, 130. 

Kameke, Gen., 417, 418, 423. 

Kamiesch inlet, 272. 

Kammeritz, 386. 

Kaninchenberg, 418. 

Karabunar, 478. 

Karawankas Alps, 76. 

Kars, 486. 

Kasanlik, 486. 

Katzbaeh, 143, 146, 147, 151, 152. 

Katzatch inlet, 272. 

Keim, at Marengo, 14, 16, 17. 

Keith, Admiral, 12. 

Kellermann, Gen., the hero of Valmy, 
at Marengo, 14, 17 ; at Strasburg, 
39 ; at Battle of Leipzig, 158 ; 
Cuirassiers of, 2:3.5 ; at Quatre- 
Bras, 246 ; Comte de Valmy, 239, 

Kempt, Sir Jas., 245, 253. 

Kenesaw, 369. 

Kentucky, 321, 326, 327. 

Keratry, Gen., 464, 465. 

Kerim, Abdul, 477, 479. 

Kertsch, 289. 

Kettler, compels Garibaldi to evacu- 
ate Dijon, 474. 

Key West, 496, 497, 501. 

Kielmansegge, 253. 

Kienmayer, Gen., 46. 

Kingston, 3o9. 

Kirkpatrick, Gen., -371. 

Kischni redoubt, 485, 487. 

Kisheneff, 476. 

Kissingen, 398. 

Klein Forstgen, 140. 

Klein-Gorschen, 136. 

Kleist, Gen,, 150, 212. 

Konigsberg, King of Prussia at, 169 ; 
Benningsen retires to, 73 ; French 
reaching, 129. 

Koniggratz, 386, 388, 389, 390, 399, 400. 

Koniginhof, 385. 

Konigstein, belonging to the French, 
144 ; not occupied by the Prus- 
sians, 381. 

Kiisen, 64, 66. 

Kolotza river, 114, 115. 

Kowno, 106, 129. 

Kozniloff, Admiral, killed, 273. 

Krasnoe, 123. 

Kray, Gen., army of Black Forest un- 
der, 3 ; defeated at Stokach, 4 ; 
defeated and driven to the 
Danube, 20, 21, 22 ; re-called, 22. 

Krems, Bridge of, 48, 82. 

Kronach, 63. 

Kriidener, 472. 

Kufstein fort, 27. 

Kulm valley, 149. 

Kur river, 477. 

Kutusov, Prince, commanding army, 
46 ; retreat to Moravia, 49 ; sends 
men to Hallabrunn : proposals to 
Napoleon for armistice : reaches 
Olmiitz : failure of Napoleon's 
plans for annihilating his army : 
at Olmiitz : induced to attack 
Napoleon at Briinu,50 ; General- 
in-Chief under Emperor Alex- 
ander, 52 ; in supreme command 
of Russian army, 1812 : selects the 
Borodino, 114 ; plan for the battle, 
115 ; defeated Sept. 5, 116 ; at 
Tarutino, attacked by Napoleon, 
119 ; attacks French Army at 
Viasina, 121 ; follows Grand Army 
of France, 133-126. 


L'Artigue, De, 415. 

La B6doyere, 263. 

La Belle Alliance, 255, 261, 265. 

Laber river, 79, 80. 

La Chapelle, 223. 

La Chene Populeux, 443. 

La Cuesta, don Gregoire de, 165, 179. 

L'Admirault, at Metz, 420, 422 ; at 
Vionville, 426 ; Gravelotte, 430, 
432, 433. 

Ladrone Islands, 508, 509. 

La Fere, 470. 

La Ferte-sous-Touarre, 209. 

La Foiie Farmhouse, 430. 

La Havre, 471. 

La Haye Sainte, Farm, 253, 257, 258, 
360, 261, 262, 264. 

Laibach, 84. 

La Mancha, 166. 177, 181, 430. 

La Marmora, Gen., 285, 390, 391, 393. 

Lambro river, 309. 

La Moncelle, 449. 

La Motterouge, Gen., 306, 463. 

Landshut, 77, 79, 80. 

Landwehr, 439. 

Langensalza battle, 394, 395. 

Langeron, 54, 213. 

Langres, 202, 206, 207, 231, 440, 462. 

Langwy, 440. 

Lannes, Gen. Jean, in the passage of 
the Great St. Bernard, 4-7 ; 
crossed the Po, and battle, 11, 12, 
retreat, 15 ; at Marengo, 17 ; 
Montreuil camp, 38 ; Ulm cam- 
paign, 40-43 ; march to Auster- 
litz, 47, 49 ; Battle of Austerlitz, 
56, 57 ; in Bavaria, 62 ; at Jena, 
64, 65 ; on the Vistula, 69 ; Battle 
of Friedland, 73 ; marches on 
Ausburg, 77 ; Ratisbon captured, 
81 ; advances from Esslingen, 86, 
87 ; defeats Spanish at Tudela, 
169 ; besieges Tudela, 174 ; death. 
May 30, 1809. 88. 

Laon, 190, 210, 211, 213, 215, 233. 



La Rocca, de, 380. 

La Romana, Marquis de, in Denmark: 

enters Spain, 175, 179, 180. 

La Rothiere, 203, 208. 

Lasalle, 85. 86. 

La Sorada, 501. 

Latour d'Auvergne, killed at Neu- 
berg, 21 ; Monument erected, 21. 

Lattermann, at Battle of Marengo, 
14, 17. 

Lauffacho, 399. 

Lauriston, Gen. A. J., sailing with 
Villeneuve, 33 ; at fortress of 
Braunan, 47 : drives Prussians 
beyond the Katzbach, 147 ; at 
Battle of Leipzig, 157, 159, 160. 

Lausanne, 4. 

Lauter river, 414. 

Lauterburg, 414. 

].,aval, 469. 

Laverno, 303. 

LaVillete, 823. 

Le Boeuf, Marshal, vrar minister, 
state of French army, 48 : with 
Army of Rhine at Metz, 409 ; re- 
moved from post of minister of 
war, 420 ; at Vern^ville, 424 ; at 
Battle of Vionville, 43(5 ; Battle of 
Gravelotte, 430, 432 ; prisoner of 
war, 461. 

Le Bourget, 460, 471. 

Le Brun, consul ; chief of staff, at 
Cuggiono, 306 ; with Army of the 
Rhine at Metz. 420. 

Le Caillon, farm, 251, 265. 

Lech river, 24,86, 40, 41, 46. 

Lecourbe, Gen., 3, 20, 25. 

Lee, Gen. R. E., commands Confe- 
derate Army in Virginia. 333 ; 
Battle of Richmond, 333-343 ; op- 
posed by Hooker, 346-348 ; to in- 
vade the North, 349 ; collects 
army at Culpeper and crosses 
the Potomac, 349 ; to Hagers- 
town ; concentrates at Gettys- 
burg, 350 ; at Seminary Ridge, 
852, 353 ; defeat at Bloody Angl6, 
854 ; retreat : then loss, 354, .355 : 
Battle of the AVilderness, 361 to 
865 ; attacking Sherman, 374 ; de- 
feated at Petersburg,and retreats, 
375 ; surrenders, 376. 

Le Ferte-sous-Jouanne, 209. 

Lefebvre, Marshal, in Mainz, 39 ; at 
Burgos, 168, 109. 

Lefebvre-Desnouelles, Gen., taken 
prisoner at the Elsa, 171 ; at Wa- 
terloo, 259. 

Le Fontane hamlet, 310. 

Legations, 18, 23. 

Leghorn, 12. 

Legnago, 309. 

Legnano, 379, 390. 

Le Grote, 310, 312. 

Lehnbach, 23. 

Leipzig, Napoleon to seize, 135 ; 

reached. May 21, 1813, 136 ; allies 
design to capture, 147 ; concen- 
trating, 154, 155 ; Battle of Leip- 
zig, Oct. 14-19, 1813, 156-160, 199, 
200, 201. 

Leipzig farmhouse, 430. 

Leiria, 185. 

Le Mans, 460, 469. 

Lemnos, 479. 

Le Mur, 228. 

L'Estocq, Gen., 70, 72. 

I.,evatz, 478. 

Lichtenstein, Prince, 56, 57, 87, 207, 
295, 312. 

Lick creek, 329. 

Liebertwolkwitz, 157. 

Liege. 238, 248, 249. 

Liegnitz, 142. 

Lignv, 239 ; Battle, June 16, 1815, 
240-242, 246, 247. 

Liguria fortress, 18. 

Lille, 38, 229, 233, 459, 470. 

Linares, Gen., 505. 

Lincoln, Abraham, President of U. 
S., elected, 320 : calls out militia, 
322 ; letter to Gen. Hooker, 345 ; 
re-elected president, 370 ; murder- 
ed, 376. 

Lindenau, 159, 160. 

Lindenburg, 401. 

Linz, 47, 83. 

Lipa hills, 386, 38S, .389. 

Lisbon, 33, 162, 104, 176-178, 183-185,187. 

Lissa, 393. 

Lithuania, 105. 

Little River, 365. 

Little Round Top, 351, 352. 

Liverpool, Lord, 180. 

Livy studied bv Napoleon, 6. 

Lobau, Island of, 85, 89, 90, 91, 94, 137, 
239, 248, 259, 261, 265. 

Lobkowitz's dragoons, 15. 

Lodi, 309, 380. 

Logrono, 196. 

Loigny, Battle, 466, 467. 

Loire, 460-465, 467-169, 473. 

Loire-et-Cher, 472, 

Loiret, 472. 

Loison, 128. 

Lom, 482. 

Lombardy, 9, 18, 85, 46, 294, 309, 391, 392. 

Lonato, 311. 

Longstreet's division, 337, 338, 342, 
349, 352, 358, 359, 362, 363. 

Look-out Mountains, 359, 360. 

Lootcha, 484. 

Looz, Counts of, 241. 

Lorraine, Bliicher advances through, 
202 ; Napoleon advances upon, 
215, 217, 219 ; Bliicher on frontiers, 
232 ; Prussian army marches into, 
421 ; Prussians in, 458. 

Lorry wood, 4.33. 

Louis XVIII., 229 ; flies to Lille and 
Ghent, 239 ; 'Wellington anxious 
for restoration of, 231, 



Louis Philippe, 457. 

Louisiana, 320, 321, 361. 

Louisiana Tigers, 352. 

Louisiana, Polk, Protestant bishop of, 

Louisville, 355. 

Low Countries, Army of, 231. 
Lubino or Valutino, Battle of. 111. 
Lucan, Lord, 275, 276. 
Ludwig, Archduke, 77, 82. 
Liitzelstein, 419. 
Lutzen, 135 ; Battle of. May 2, 1813, 

135. 136, 137, 139, 142, 143. 
Lugo, 171. 
Luufiville, Negotiations at, 2:3 ; Peace 

of, Feb. 9, 1801, 28. 
Lusatia, 140, 379. 
Lusitania, North, Kingdom of, 163 ; to 

be given to King of F.truria, 

Luxemburg, 38. 
Luzon, 508. 
Lyons, 213, 215, 231, 233, 462, 474. 


McAlister, fort, 373. 

McClellan, Gen., fortifies Washington 
and organising the army : Gen- 
eral-in-chief of all armies : attacks 
Yorktown : Battle of Williams- 
burg : Fair Oaks, 3.32 ; Richmond, 
332-342 ; opposes Lincoln for pres- 
idency, 370. 

McColl, Gen., 334, 335. 

Macdonald, Gen., E. J. J. A., Army 
of reserve under, 23, 24, 27 ; pas- 
sage of the SplUgen, 27 ; follows 
Archduke John over the Isonzo, 
84 ; at Wagram, 95, 96 ; to cross 
the Niemen, 106 ; advancing on 
Milan, 109 ; at Milan, 112 ; return 
from Russia, 130 ; at Battle of 
Liitzen. 137 ; Bautzen, 140 ; Dres- 
den, 147 ; advance against army 
of Silesia, 157 ; driven back, 152 ; 
Battle of Leipzig, 157, 160 ; on the 
Rhine, 199, 202 ; at Guignes, 205 ; 
at the Aube, 209 ; beaten at Ver- 
nonfays and retreats, 213, 215, 216, 

McDowell, Gen., 324, 336, 337, 338. 

Mack, Gen., with Austrian army on 
the Lech to march into Switzer- 
land, 36 ; Battle of Ulm : Army 
destroyed, 40-43, 46, 64 

Mackenzie's farm, 270, 272. 

McKinley,President, announces block- 
ade of North coast of Cuba, 496 ; 
orders for Government of Santia- 
go, 506, 507. 

McLaws, at Harper's Ferry, 339. 

McLean's fort, 325. 

MacMahon, Gen., at fall of Sebastopol, 
292 ; with Napoleon, 296 ; opposed 

by Austrians, 304-7 ; Magenta 
gained, receives title of Duke of 
Magenta, 308 ; fails to stop Aus- 
trians at the Adda, 309 ; Battle of 
Solferino, 309-317 ; with Army of 
the South at Metz, 409 ; Battle of 
Weissenburg, 413-415 ; forms a 
new Cabinet at Paris, 419, 420 ; 
the march to Sedan, 438-445 ; at 
Sedan, 448, 449 ; prisoner, 455. 
McPherson, 368. 
Madonna della, Scoperta height, 310, 

312, 316, 318. 
Madrid. Murat enters, March 23, 1808, 
164 ; puts down insurrection, 165 ; 
Joseph King of Spain enters, 
July 20 : compelled to withdraw, 
166 ; Napoleon marches to, and 
town capit\ilated, 169, 170 ; King 
Joseph restored, 173 ; Wellington 
threatens, 179 ; Gen. Areizaga 
tries to re-conquer, 181 ; Welling- 
ton enters, August 12, 193 ; Wel- 
lington leaves, and King Joseph 
returns, but retreats, 194, 195 ; 
Dewey's destruction of Spanish 
Fleet received at, 1898, 499. 
Maestricht, 2.38, 249. 
Magdeburg, 134, 144. 
Magenta, Duke of. See MacMahon. 
Magenta, Battle, June 4, 1859, 303, 304, 

Maggiore, Lago, 203. 
3Iagruder, Gen., 335. 
Mailly, 216. 
Main river, 24. 399. 
Main, Army of the, 396, 397. 
Maine, Remember the, 496. 
JIainz, 38, 39, 63, 129, 134, 160, 200. 
Maison, Gen., 208. 
Maitland's guards, 253, 363. 
Malakoff, 271, 272, 273, 287, 288, 390, 292, 

Malmaison, 39, 459. 
Maloyaroslavetz, 119, 130. 
Malta, 36. 
3Ialvern hill, 335. 
Mamelon, 287, 288, 290. 
Manassas, Junction, 323, 337, 338 ; gap 

railway, 324. 
Mance river, 434. 
ManiUa, 498,499, 507-509. 
Mannheim. 38. 
Manstein, 410. 
ManteufCel, Gen., 396, 410, 439, 461, 471, 

Mantua, 12, 18, 23. 36, 309, 311, 312, 314, 

379, 390. 
Manzanilla, 506. 
Marbars, 250. 
Marcello, 307, 308. 
Marchenoir. 468. 
Marchfeld, 84, 89, 90, 91, 93. 
Marchienne-au-Pont, 235. 
Marengo, 11 ; Napoleon sees plains of, 
12 ; Battle, June 14, 1800, 13-19 ; 



Marengo and Waterloo, 19 ; an- 
niversary of, 233. 
Maret. 39. 

" Marie-Louises," The, 201. 
Marienburg, 70. 
Marietta, 369. 
Mariopol, 389. 
Maritza Valley, 478, 486. 
Markkleeberg, 157. 
Marlborough, 103, 180. 
Marmont, Marshal, at the passage of 
the Great St. Bernard, 4 ; at 
Marengo, 17 ; to set out for 
Mainz, 38 ; moved to the Inn, 47 ; 
leaves the Illyrian provinces, 84 ; 
at Wagram, 94, 97 ; Llitzen, 135, 
136 ; Bautzen, 140, 141 ; with Ney, 
154 ; Battle of Leipzig, 156-160 ; 
supersedes Mass6na, 186 ; takes 
command of the Army of Por- 
tugal, 187; Battle of Salamanca, 
187-192 ; on the Rhine, 197 ; driven 
before the Prussians ; at Chalons, 
202 ; to Suzanne, 203 ; at Cham- 
paubert ; retiring before Bliicher, 
but turn. 204; holds Bliicher in 
check, 206 ; forced to retire, 209 ; 
attacks army of Silesia : routed, 
212 ; to keep BlUcher behind the 
Aisne, 216 ; in contact with armies 
marching to Paris, 231 ; defeated 
at Romainville, capitulates, 223 ; 
letter to Napoleon, 224. 
Marne river, 202, 203, 209, 217, 440. 

4.57, 470. 
Mars-Ia-Tour, 423, 424, 428, 431, 436, 

Marshall, Humphry, 327. 
Martignv, 4, 5. 
Martinique, 30, 31, 500. 
Martinsburg, 339, 340. 
Maryland, 323, 326, 339, 350. 
Mason captures Federals, 326. 
Massena, Gen. A., protects sea-coasts 
of Nice and Genoa, 3 ; blockaded 
at Genoa, 4 ; capitulated, 9 ; de- 
fence of Italy, 37 ; detains Arch- 
duke Charles on the Adige, 43 ; 
to march on Ulm, Battles of 
Abensberg, Eckmtihl, 77-80 ; 
Battle of Ebelsburg, 82 ; Aspern 
and Esslingen, 85-87 ; at Island of 
Loban, 89-92 ; Wagram, 94. 95 ; 
at head of Army of Portugal, 182 ; 
attacks Wellington at Fuentes 
d'Onoro, 185 ; superseded and re- 
turns to France, 186. 
Matshin, 477. 
Mattenbott, 25. 
Maubeuge, 231. 
Maxan, 412. 

Maximilian, Archduke, 83. 
Maynes Hill, 344. 
Meade. Gen., 346, 347. 349, 351, 362, 383, 

Meaux, 205, 208, 221, 457, 473. 

Mechanicsville, 334. 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Duke of, 462, 
465, 466, 468, 469. 

Medellin, 177, 179. 

Medici, Gen., 393. 

Medina del Rio Seco, 165. 

Medole, 311-315, 317. 

Meerveld, Gen., 158. 

Meerveldt, 46. 

Mehemet Ali Pasha, commands Army 
of the Danube, 479 ; at Rasgrad, 
430 ; directed from Constan- 
tinople, 481 ; drove Russians 
back, 482 ; superseded, 483 ; at 
Montenegro, 486. 

Meiningen, 397. 

Melas, Gen., prevented from crossing 
the Apennines, 3 ; blockades 
Mass6na in Genoa, 4 ; Genoa 
capitulates, 9 ; at Marengo, 12, 
13, 14. 16-18 ; wounded, 16 ; per- 
mitted to retire to Mantua, 18 ; 
recalled, 22. 

Melegnano, 309. 

Mellinet, 305. 

Memel, 73. 

Memmingen, 40, 46. 

Memphis, 329, 355. 

Menchikoff, Prince, 268, 270, 278. 

M^nilmontant, 223. 

Merida, 177. 

Merlin, Van, 245. 

Merrimac, sunk, 501. 

M6ry, 217. 

Mestre, 393. 

Metangos, 500. 

Mettenberg, 21. 

Metternich's policy, 143 ; interview 
with Napoleon, 145. 

Metz, 38, 408 ; French army round, 
409, 412, 413, 415 ; in Metz, 420-423, 
426, 428, 430, 434 ; Bazaine shut up 
in, 438-440, 442, 443, 445, 456, 458, 
460, 461, 475. 

Meuden, 457, 472. 

Meung, 468. 

Meuse River, 231, 424, 440, 442, 445, 
447, 450, 454. 

Meuse, Army of the. 437, 442, 443. 

M^zieres, 409, 440, 443, 444, 448, 466. 

Michael, Grand Duke, 278. 

Michel, Gen., 409. 

Michelsberg, 43, 46. 

Milan, entered by Bonaparte, June 2, 
1800, 8, 9 ; Asalpine Republic re- 
established, 9, 10 ; Bonaparte 
leaves, 11, 18, 23 ; Napoleon to ad- 
vance upon, 300, .302, 3aS, 309. 
Milanese, Victor Emmanuel, obtains 

possession of the, 319. 
Miles, Gen., 340, 508. 
Milhaud'8 cavalry, 248, 259. 
Mill Springs, 327. 
Minoio river. 18, 23, 24, 27, 28, 37, 309, 

310, 312, 314, 318, 390, 391, 392. 
Minho, 177. 



Minsk. 106, 109. 

Miranda, 168, 196. 

Mirandola, 392. 

Mirs Bay, 498. 

Mirsky, Prince, 478, 493. 

Missionary Ridge, 360. 

Mississippi, 320, 329, 855, 357, 359, 373. 

Missouri, 321, 326. 

Mitau, 109, 112. 

Mitchell's troops, 254. 

Mitchell's ford, 324, 349. 

Mobile, 361 ; railway, 329. 

Modena, 23, 392. 

Mockern, 156, 158. 

Molk monastery, 83. 

Mosskirch, 20, 21. 

Mohilev, 110. 

Mokrovous, 387. 

Molitor, Gen., 86. 

Mollendorf, Field - Marshal. 63 ; 
wounded, 67. 

Molodetschno, 128. 

Moltke, Gen., orders to Prussian 
army, 407 ; head of staff, 410 
plan to detain French army, 424 
at Battle of Gravelotte, 434. 436 
plan for enveloping the French 
succeeds, 445 ; at Sedan, 452, 453 ; 
created a Count, 461, 472. 

Moncelle, 447. 

Moncey, Gen., 4, 11, 21. 169, 223. 

Mondego river, 166, 183. 

Monnier's division, 15. 

Monroe. 332. 

Mont Avron, 469. 470. 

Mont Genevre, 294. 

Mont-Saint-Jean, 250, 253, 268, 259. 

Mont Valerien. 4.57. 

Monte Cenls, 10. 294. 

Monte Fenile. 310. 

Monte Moro, 4. 

Monte Rotondo. 305. 

Monte Vento. 392. 

Montbelaird, 474. 

Montebello, Battle of, May 20, 1859, 11, 
297, 298, 300. 

Montenegro, 486. 

Montereau. 205. 

Montey. 439. 

Montigny, 422. 431, 432. 

Montmagny. 4.57. 

Montmedy. 440. 442, 445, 450, 462. 

Montmartre, 223. 

Montmlrail. 203, 204. 

Montojo, 505. 

Montretout. 472. 

Montreuil, 38. 

Monza, 303. 

Moore, Sir John, with Napoleon in 
Spain, 168-172 ; killed. 172. 

Moravia, 47, 49. 78. 

Moreau, Gen., 3 ; beats Krav at 
Stokach. 4, 10, 11. 20-23 ; Battle of 
Hohenlinden, 24-37 ; at Dresden, 
147 ; killed, 149. 

Morfontaine, 197. 


Mornant, 205. 

Morris, Gen., 276. 

Morro castle, 500. 

Morsbrunn, 415. 

Mortier, Gen., 48, 157, 169, 179, 202, 206, 
209,216. 321,223,224. 

Moscou farmhouse. 430, 432, 4.33. 

Moscow, Napoleon's march to, 101. 
108-116 ; enters,, Sept. 14. 1813, 
117-122 ; retreat. 123, 134, 132, 160, 

Moselle, The, 408. 419. 433, 423, 424, 
429, 430. 436. 438, 439, 474. 

Moskva, 114, 192. 

Motte rouge. 307. 463. 

Mount St. Nicholas, 494. 

Mouton. 129. 

Mouzon. 442-445. 

Mozhaisk, m). 

Muffling. Gen., 262. 

Milhldorf, 25. 

Miinchengratz, 38.3, 384. 

Mulda, 154. 

Munich. 24. 41. 47, 77. 

Murat. Gen., cavalry committed to, 
4 ; at campaign of Ulm, 40, 41 ; 
march to Austerlitz , 48-50 ; at 
Austerlitz, 56, 59 ; in Bavaria. 63 ; 
in Saxony, 64 ; Jena, 65; 66 ; on 
the Vistula, 69 ; at Eylau, 72 ; 
march to Smolensk. 110, 111 ; at 
the Borodino. 115. 116 ; Moscow, 
117, 120 ; Berezina. 139 ; returned 
to his kingdom of Naples. Jan.. 
1813. 129 ; Battle of Bautzen, 140 ; 
Dresden. 148 ; keeping Austrians 
in checlc. and retreats to Leipzig, 
1.55 ; Battle of Leipzig. 157, 158 ; 
enters Madrid, 164 : insurrection 
put down, 165 ; Soults auibition 
to be his equal. 176. 

Musiessy, Admiral, 31. 


Nachod. 385. 

Namar, 38. 

Namur. 234, 235, 236, 238, 239, 246, 248, 

Nancy, 38. 231. 431. 

Nangis, 205, 215. 

Naples, Bourbons to be driven from, 
35 ; English and Russian troops 
to land in, 36 ; Murat returns to. 
129 ; ordered to leave, 140, 163. 

Naples. Army of. 331. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, leaves Egypt, 
Aug. 24. 1799 : lands in France, 
Oct. 8: First Consul, Nov. 9: 
Letter to George III.. Dec. 25, 1 ; 
Letter to Emperor Francis IL, 2 ; 
Leaves Paris for Geneva, May 6, 
1800 : to invade Italy by the Great 
St. Bernard, 3 : the passage of 
the Great St. Bernard, 3-7 : en- 
tered Milan, June 2 : re-estab- 

530 INDEX. 

lished the Cisalpine Republic, 9 ; 237 ; Liprny, June 16, 238-243 ; 

preparation for Marengo, 9-12 ; Quatre-Bras, June 16, 244-252 ; 

Battle of Marengo, June 14, 1800, Waterloo, June 18, 253-265 ; re- 

13-19 ; victory celebrated in Mi- treat to Cliarleroi, 265. 

Ian : returns to Paris, June 28. 18 ; Napoleon III., despatched Gen. Niel 

strengthens his forces in Italy to Crimea, 287 ; contemplates 

and South Germany, 22 ; Battle journey to the Crimea, 289 ; in 

of Hohenlinden, Dec. 2, 1800,24- command in war against Sardinia, 

28 : proclaimed Emperor, Dec. 2, 296 ; Palestro and Magenta, 300- 

1804, 29 ; intended invasion of 308 ; Solferino, 309-319 ; Venetia 

England, 1805, 29-34 ; the cam- ceded to, 393 ; offers mediation, 

paign of Ulm. 1805, .3.5-45 ; the 402 ; joins Army of the Rhine at 

march to Austerlitz, 46-.52 ; Battle Metz, 409, 412, 413 ; at Vionville, 

of Austerlitz, Dec. 2. 1805, 5.3-59 ; 419-427 ; the March to Sedan. 440- 

Battles of Jena and Auerstadt, 445 ; at Sedan, 449-453 ; prisoner 

Oct. 14. 1806, 60-68 ; entered Ber- of war. 4.53, 457. 

lin, Oct. 27, 1806, 68 ; Battles of Napoleon, Prince, 285, 286. 

Eylau and Friedland, Oct. 7, 8, Nashville, 329, 330, 496. 

1807, 69-74 ; campaign in Bavaria,. Nassau, 236. 254, 381, 396, 399, 414. 
1809, 74-81 ; Aspern and Esslingen, Naumburg. 64, 66. 

May 21, 22, 1809, 82-88 ; the Island Naviglio Grande, c